-->
Menu

Bits & Pieces

GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. GOLD COAST EXPRESS INC., et al., Defendant.

United States District Court,

E.D. New York.

GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff,

v.

GOLD COAST EXPRESS INC., et al., Defendant.

No. 12 CV 4847(DRH)(ARL). | Signed March 10, 2015.

 

 

ORDER

HURLEY, Senior District Judge.

*1 Great American Insurance Company (“plaintiff”) commenced this interpleader action to resolve competing claims to the proceeds of a $10,000 bond issued by plaintiff on behalf of defendant Gold Coast Express, Inc. (“Gold Coast”). Many of the named defendants (“defaulting defendants”) failed to appear in the action, and plaintiff currently seeks a default judgment against them1 and a judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 54(b) that the defaulting defendants are not entitled to any relief under the bond at issue.

 

After the defendants’ default was noted by the Clerk of the Court pursuant to Rule 55(a), plaintiff moved for entry of a default judgment under Rule 55(b). On May 12, 2014, this motion was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Arlene R. Lindsay to issue a Report and Recommendation as to whether plaintiff demonstrated that default judgment and judgment under Rule 54(b) is appropriate against the defaulting defendants.

 

On February 17, 2015, Judge Lindsay issued a Report and Recommendation which recommended that a default judgment be entered against the defaulting defendants and that plaintiff “is entitled to a judgment that the defaulting defendants are not entitled to any relief under the bond.” (Report and Recommendation at 6.) More than fourteen days have elapsed since service of the Report and Recommendation and no party has filed an objection.

 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, this Court has reviewed the February 17, 2015 Report and Recommendation for clear error, and finding none, now concurs in both its reasoning and its result. Therefore, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation of Judge Lindsay as is set forth therein. Accordingly, the Court hereby directs that the clerk of the Court enter default judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defaulting defendants and enter judgment that defaulting defendants are not entitled to any relief under the bond.

 

SO ORDERED.

 

 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

LINDSAY, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Great American Insurance Company (“Plaintiff”) brings this interpleader action to resolve competing claims to the proceeds of a $10,000.00 bond issued by Plaintiff on behalf of defendant Gold Coast Express, Inc. (“Gold Coast”). This matter was referred to the undersigned by District Judge Denis R. Hurley for the purpose of issuing a report and recommendation on whether Plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment should be granted and, if so, the appropriate relief to be awarded. Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit or Eric M. Eusanio, dated May 8, 2014, along with exhibits, in support of its motion. Despite having been served with the motion, the defaulting defendants1 have not submitted papers in opposition to the motion. Based upon the papers submitted, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment be granted.

 

 

BACKGROUND

*2 The following facts are taken from the complaint and the motion for default judgment.

 

Plaintiff, as surety, issued a bond—expressly limited to $10,000 .00—on behalf of its principal, Gold Coast, with respect to Gold Coast’s contracts or agreements for the supply of transportation. Prior to the filing of this action, defendants asserted claims under the bond, claiming that Gold Star failed to pay them for the alleged transportation of freight and goods. Because these claims vastly exceeded the bond’s express limit of $10,000.00, defendants’ claims were adverse and conflicting and could not be satisfied by the bond. Accordingly, in order to avoid multiple liabilities and inconsistent rulings, Plaintiff filed the instant interpleader action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335, seeking Court direction as to distribution of the bond.

 

Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit on September 27, 2012 and filed an amended complaint on October 10, 2012. On August 20, 2013, Plaintiff filed a “third amended complaint” adding several new defendants but otherwise adding no new claims for relief.

 

With regard to the appearing defendants, Plaintiff has agreed, in principle, to a Stipulation and Order for Entry of Final Judgment. With regard to the defaulting defendants, Plaintiff has filed the instant motion. All of the defaulting defendants named in the amended complaint were served with that pleading, and all of the newly added defaulting defendants were served with the third amended complaint.2 The defaulting defendants have not interposed an answer or otherwise responded to the complaint.

 

On April 15, 2014, Plaintiff requested a Certificate of Default with the Clerk of the Court. Although the request was initially denied on April 23, 2014, it was thereafter granted. Thus, on April 29, 2014, the Clerk of the Court issued the Certificate of Default and certified the defendants’ default.3 On May 9, 2014, Plaintiff served and filed the instant motion.

 

 

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard Governing Defaults

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 establishes a two-step process regarding default judgments. First, the Clerk of the Court enters the party’s default. Then, as here, a motion for a default judgment is made to the district court judge. A default constitutes an admission of all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, except those relating to damages. See Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir.1992); see also Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. El Norteno Rest. Corp., No. 06–CV–1878, 2007 WL 2891016, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2007) (“[A]ll well-pleaded factual allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to liability are deemed true”). However, even if a plaintiff’s claims are deemed admitted, a plaintiff must still demonstrate that the allegations set forth in the complaint state valid claims. See City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 137 (2d Cir.2011) (suggesting that “a district court is ‘required to determine whether the plaintiff’s allegations establish the defendant’s liability as a matter of law’ “ prior to entering default judgment) (quoting Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir.2009)) (alterations omitted). Thus, the Court examines Plaintiff’s allegations to determine if they state a valid claim.

 

 

B. The Court Recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion Be Granted

*3 In the instant default motion, Plaintiff does not seek damages or attorneys’ fees. Rather, Plaintiff asserts a claim for interpleader pursuant to the Federal Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1335. Essentially, Plaintiff’s complaint seeks to deposit the proceeds of the bond with the Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335, with a discharge of liability, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2361. By instant motion, Plaintiff requests that the Court direct that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), there being no just reason for delay, Plaintiff is entitled to a final judgment of default against the defaulting defendants directing that such defendants are entitled to no relief under the bond at issue in this action.4 For the reasons that follow, the Court reports and recommends that Plaintiff’s motion be granted.

 

Interpleader is designed to “protect stakeholders from undue harassment in the face of multiple claims against the same fund, and to relieve the stakeholder from assessing which claim among many has merit.” Fidelity Brokerage Servs., LLC v. Bank of China, 192 F.Supp.2d 173, 177 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (citing Wash. Elec. Coop. v. Paterson, Walke & Pratt, P.C., 985 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir.1993)). Interpleader actions normally proceed in two stages. First, the stakeholder must demonstrate that “the requirements for interpleader have been met and that it is entitled to a discharge.” Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Little, No. 13 cv 1059, 2013 WL 4495684, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2013). Second, the court “determines the adverse claims between the claimants.” Id.

 

“As to the first stage, the interpleader statute applies only where there is minimal diversity,’ i.e., where there are two or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship, and when money or property worth $500 or more is involved.” Perlman v. Fidelity Brokerage Servs. LLC, 932 F.Supp.2d 397, 415 (E.D.N.Y.2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, once subject matter jurisdiction is show, “a court must assess whether the stakeholder legitimately fears multiple liability directed against a single fund, regardless of the merits of the competing claims.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, plaintiff “must state that he has deposited or is depositing the fund with the court.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

 

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied all of the requirements of the first stage of an interpleader action. First, there is “minimal diversity” because there are adverse claimaints of diverse citizenship and the value of the bond exceeds $500.00. Next, Plaintiff is a neutral party that takes no position as to the proper disbursement of the proceeds of the bond, against which there are multiple and competing claims. Lastly, Plaintiff has stated that it is depositing the value of the bond with the Court.

 

As to the second stage of the inquiry, there can be no question that the defaulting defendants have forfeited any claim to the proceeds. See Metropolitan Life, 2013 WL 4495684, at *2 (“ ‘The failure of a named interpleader defendant to answer the interpleader complaint and assert a claim to the res can be viewed as forfeiting any claim of entitlement that might have been asserted .’ ”) (quoting Gen. Accident Group v. Gagliardi, 593 F.Supp. 1080, 1089 (D.Conn.1984)). Accordingly, as both stages of the interpleader inquiry have been met, the Court reports and recommends that Plaintiff’s motion for a default be granted and that there being no just reason for delay under Rule 54(b), Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment that the defaulting defendants are not entitled to any relief under the bond.

 

 

OBJECTIONS

*4 Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of the Court within 14 days. Failure to file objections within this period waives the right to appeal the District Court’s Order. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72; Wagner & Wagner, LLP v. Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile, P.C., 596 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir.2010); Beverly v. Walker, 118 F.3d 900, 902 (2d Cir.1997); Savoie v. Merchants Bank, 84 F.3d 52, 60 (2d Cir.1996).

 

Filed Feb. 17, 2015.

 

 

Footnotes

 

1

 

The defaulting defendants are as follows: Gold Coast Express Inc.; Greatwide American Trans–Freight, LLC; ABC Transport LLC, Aleksandr I. Yatchuk d/b/a AL–EX Transportation; R.B. Humphreys, Inc .; Juan Alcalde d/b/a Triplets Transport; A & R Logistics LLC; George E. Huntley; I & J Transport Services, Inc.; Challenge Trucking LLC; Paul Allan Morgan d/b/a Works 2 Wheel Transport; KYS Express, Inc.; Bill’s Trucking Service, Inc.; Speedway Express, Inc.; Kiswani Trucking, Inc.; CTL Express LLC; North Florida Hauling, LLC; Rapid Response Inc.; Hauling Inc.; Blaine Evans Trucking Inc.; Go Trucking Services, Inc.; Cook Logistics, LLC; Wehunt Contract Hauling, Inc.; Reliance Transportation, Inc.; GGS Transport, Inc.; Taylor Truck Line Inc.; Rosedale Transport Inc.; Express Roadside Assistance, Inc .; Viktar Palukoshka d/b/a VIK Transport; Hempel Transportation, LLC; Buchanan Hauling & Rigging Inc.; Master Trucking, LLC; J.C.’s Xpress Transport Solutions, LLC; Graval Corporation; AD Trucking Inc.; University Towing & Transport, Inc.; Road King Unlimited Inc.; Admiral Merchants Motor Freight, Inc.; Werner, LLC; Northern Lights Specialized, LLC; E and V Services, Inc.; Zen Transport, Inc.; Samuel J. Wallis d/b/a Wallis Flats, Inc.; B S L Express, Inc.; Maximum Speed Transportation Inc.; Sammons Transportation Inc.; J.H. Sims Trucking Company, Inc.; Pro–Trans Logistics Inc.; Apex Capital Corporation; Baxter, Bailey & Associates, Inc.; Comdata Network, Inc .; Sunbelt Finance, LLC; and First Bank & Trust d/b/a Firstline Funding Group.

 

1

 

The defaulting defendants are as follows: Gold Coast Express Inc.; Greatwide American Trans–Freight, LLC; ABC Transport LLC, Aleksandr I. Yatchuk d/b/a AL–EX Transportation; R.B. Humphreys, Inc .; Juan Alcalde d/b/a Triplets Transport; A & R Logistics LLC; George E. Huntley; I & J Transport Services, Inc.; Challenge Trucking LLC; Paul Allan Morgan d/b/a Works 2 Wheel Transport; KYS Express, Inc.; Bill’s Trucking Service, Inc.; Speedway Express, Inc.; Kiswani Trucking, Inc.; CTL Express LLC; North Florida Hauling, LLC; Rapid Response Inc.; Hauling Inc.; Blaine Evans Trucking Inc.; Go Trucking Services, Inc.; Cook Logistics, LLC; Wehunt Contract Hauling, Inc.; Reliance Transportation, Inc.; GGS Transport, Inc.; Taylor Truck Line Inc.; Rosedale Transport Inc.; Express Roadside Assistance, Inc .; Viktar Palukoshka d/b/a VIK Transport; Hempel Transportation, LLC; Buchanan Hauling & Rigging Inc.; Master Trucking, LLC; J.C.’s Xpress Transport Solutions, LLC; Graval Corporation; AD Trucking Inc.; University Towing & Transport, Inc.; Road King Unlimited Inc.; Admiral Merchants Motor Freight, Inc.; Werner, LLC; Northern Lights Specialized, LLC; E and V Services, Inc.; Zen Transport, Inc.; Samuel J. Wallis d/b/a Wallis Flats, Inc.; B S L Express, Inc.; Maximum Speed Transportation Inc.; Sammons Transportation lnc.; J.H. Sims Trucking Company, Inc.; Pro–Trans Logistics Inc.; Apex Capital Corporation; Baxter, Bailey & Associates, lnc.; Comdata Network, Inc .; Sunbelt Finance, LLC; and First Bank & Trust d/b/a Firstline Funding Group.

 

2

 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(a)(2), “[n]o service [of an amended pleading] is required on a party who is in default for failing to appear” unless the amended pleading “asserts a new claim for relief against [the defaulting party].” Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(a)(2).

 

3

 

The Court has independently reviewed all of the executed summons and has confirmed valid service.

 

4

 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides that “the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b).

 

 

 

Juan MEDINA and Ramona Medina, Plaintiffs–Appellees, v. PILE TRUCKING, INC.; et al., Defendants–Appellants.

United States Court of Appeals,

Ninth Circuit.

Juan MEDINA and Ramona Medina, Plaintiffs–Appellees,

v.

PILE TRUCKING, INC.; et al., Defendants–Appellants.

Juan Medina and Ramona Medina, Plaintiffs–Appellees,

v.

Pile Trucking, Inc.; et al., Defendants–Appellants.

Nos. 13–55441, 13–55637. | Argued and Submitted Feb. 12, 2015. | Filed Feb. 25, 2015.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Zaid Dean Hakkak, Esquire, Law Offices of Z. Dean Hakkak, Los Angeles, CA, Arash Homampour, Esquire, The Homampour Law Firm, PC, Sherman Oaks, CA, Michael J. Rand, Esquire, Law Offices of Michael J. Rand, Encino, CA, for Plaintiffs–Appellees.

Peder Kristian Batalden, Esquire, Lisa J. Perrochet, Esquire, Horvitz & Levy LLP, Encino, CA, for Defendants–Appellants.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Patrick J. Walsh, Magistrate Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 2:11–cv–06329–PJW.

Before: GRABER and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges, and MOLLOY,* Senior District Judge.

 

 

MEMORANDUM**

*1 Alvin Flynn, Pile Trucking, Inc., and Earl Pile Trucking (collectively, “Pile Trucking”) appeal a $2,625,000 judgment and a $238,047.95 award of interest entered against them and in favor of Juan and Ramona Medina1 following a jury trial in a wrongful-death suit. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the judgment but vacate the award of interest.

 

1. The district court erred in providing the jury with a verdict form that included separate blank lines for the awards of damages to Juan and Ramona, allowing a jury verdict with two sums for damages. In a wrongful death action under California law, “ ‘the court or jury must compute the damages, if any, by considering the pecuniary damage suffered by all the heirs and return a verdict for one sum.’ ” Corder v. Corder, 41 Cal.4th 644, 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 660, 161 P.3d 172, 176 (2007) (quoting Watkins v. Nutting, 17 Cal.2d 490, 110 P.2d 384, 388 (1941)). Here, the verdict form permitted the jury to return separate awards, and the jury did so—awarding $1,750,000 to Juan and $1,750,000 to Ramona. After taking into account the jury’s comparative fault finding, the district court aggregated those awards for a joint judgment of $2,625,000.00.

 

Pile Trucking, however, has not demonstrated that it was prejudiced by the verdict form. It has not cited to any case law or presented any evidence in support of its contention that a jury supplied with two blank lines is likely to award greater damages than a jury supplied with only one blank line. Because the purpose of the lump-sum rule is to protect plaintiffs, not defendants, we do not presume prejudice. See Robinson v. W. States Gas & Elec. Co., 184 Cal. 401, 194 P. 39, 43 (1920).

 

2. The district court’s jury instructions did not erroneously introduce a theory of liability that was absent from the case. In analyzing whether jury instructions fairly and adequately cover the issues presented, we review the instructions as a whole rather than in isolation. Gulliford v. Pierce Cnty., 136 F.3d 1345, 1348 (9th Cir.1998). Reading the instructions as a whole, it is clear that the only theory of liability presented to the jury was that Flynn acted negligently, and that Pile Trucking was vicariously liable for the negligence of Flynn, its employee. Instruction Number 18, when viewed in context, did not introduce a theory of direct liability against Pile Trucking.

 

3. The district court erred in awarding the Medinas $238,047.95 in interest pursuant to California’s offer-of-judgment statute. See Cal. Civ.Code § 3291. Offers of judgment are procedural in nature and, therefore, are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). See Home Indem. Co. v. Lane Powell Moss & Miller, 43 F.3d 1322, 1332 (9th Cir.1995). Because Rule 68 permits only defendants to serve offers of judgment, the district court’s award of interest to the Medinas based on their prior offer of judgment was improper. We therefore vacate the award of interest.

 

*2 AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED. Each side shall bear its own costs.

 

 

 

Footnotes

 

*

 

The Honorable Donald W. Molloy, Senior District Judge for the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana, sitting by designation.

 

**

 

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36–3.

 

1

 

For ease of reference, we refer to each of the Appellees by his or her first name.

© 2024 Central Analysis Bureau