Menu

CASES (2020)

Lazcano v. U.S

2020 WL 1157368

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.
Jacob LAZCANO, Plaintiff,
v.
The UNITED STATES of America, Defendant.
No. 17-cv-02969
|
Signed 03/10/2020
Attorneys and Law Firms
Benjamin B. Kelly, Patrick Michael Crowley, Daniel Francis Gallagher, The Vrdolyak Law Group, LLC, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.
AUSA, Kristen Elise Rau, Ernest Yi Ling, United States Attorney’s Office, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Andrea R. Wood, United States District Judge
*1 Plaintiff Jacob Lazcano was riding his bicycle down a Chicago street on July 3, 2014 when he collided with a United States Postal Service (“USPS”) truck. Lazcano subsequently sued Defendant United States of America, alleging that the accident occurred because its employee, the driver of the USPS truck, acted negligently. The parties tried Lazcano’s claim in a bench trial. For the reasons set forth below, the Court now returns its verdict in favor of the United States.

TRIAL EVIDENCE
This Court held a three-day bench trial on Lazcano’s negligence claim. The testimony and evidence presented at trial is summarized as follows.

I. Lazcano’s Testimony

A. Lazcano’s Background
Lazcano took the stand at trial and testified that he learned how to ride a bicycle as a child—when he was approximately nine or ten years old. At the time of the accident, Lazcano was seventeen years old. Because Lazcano did not have a car, he relied on his bike for transportation and rode it four to five times a week, weather permitting. Lazcano has a fixed-gear bike, which does not have brakes; instead, the speed of the pedals corresponds with the speed of the wheels, and the rider uses the strength of his legs to decrease the speed of pedals and come to a stop.1

B. The Accident
On the afternoon of July 3, 2014, Lazcano made plans to go to a friend’s house to play video games. The weather was sunny; a “typical summer day.” Lazcano’s friend’s house is located at the intersection of Pulaski Road and Lawrence Avenue in Chicago. Prior to this occasion, Lazcano had ridden his bike to this friend’s house approximately four times per week that summer and was well-acquainted with the route. Lazcano rode his fixed-gear bike and did not put on a helmet. En route to his friend’s house, Lazcano rode his bike along Kinzie Street, which has a designated bike lane. He then turned onto Lawrence and rode west. Lawrence is a two-way street, running east and west. The street includes a driving lane, a lane for parked cars, and a bike lane in between. Lazcano estimated that the bike lane is approximately four feet wide. Lazcano intended to turn off Lawrence onto Harding Avenue, one street before Pulaski.

Around 3:00 p.m., Lazcano approached the intersection of Lawrence and Kimball Avenue Traffic was heavy, and Lazcano observed that the traffic light at the intersection was about to turn red, so he slowed down. Lazcano estimates that he was riding at approximately 12 to 15 miles per hour in the bike lane, and he did not veer from the lane at any point. Meanwhile, the USPS truck, which was in the driving lane, approached the intersection and came to a stop. Lazcano intended to ride past the USPS truck and got within six inches of the back of the truck. But suddenly, the truck’s rear right tire struck his left handlebar. Lazcano’s bike was crushed under the tire, and the force of the impact threw him off the bike “to the side and forward.” Lazcano landed on the ground on his buttocks and lower back. Lazcano attempted to stand up slowly, while passersby who had witnessed the collision told him to sit back down and informed him that they would call an ambulance.

*2 Eventually, police officers and an ambulance arrived at the scene. When confronted with the ambulance report of the accident at trial, Lazcano acknowledged that it indicated that he “denie[d] pain” in his neck, upper back, and lower back. (Trial Pl.’s Ex. 1.) However, Lazcano testified that both his neck and back hurt on the way to the hospital. Lazcano went to the hospital emergency room (“ER”). Approximately an hour later, Lazcano was discharged from the ER and went home.

C. Aftermath
The following day, Lazcano recalled feeling sore, especially in the region of his back. Over the next few days, he avoided most activities, as he no longer had his bike and still felt a great deal of pain. Approximately one week later, on July 11, 2014, Lazcano sought medical treatment and underwent approximately six to eight weeks of physical therapy. Initially, Lazcano told the physical therapist that he did not have neck and back pain, but he later expressed feeling pain in those areas. The physical therapist instructed Lazcano to perform certain exercises that would ease his back pain and applied tape and electronic massage therapy to Lazcano’s back. According to Lazcano, the physical therapy was helpful but only temporarily eased the pain. Lazcano admitted to skipping three physical therapy appointments.

In early 2015, Lazcano sought treatment from Dr. Intesar Hussain. Dr. Hussain recommended an MRI exam and a series of steroid injections into Lazcano’s spine. In March 2015, after three injection appointments, Lazcano informed Dr. Hussain that the injections only provided temporary relief. Dr. Hussain replied that Lazcano should give it some time.

Then, in June 2015, Lazcano was involved in another accident while riding his bike to work. This time, Lazcano was struck by a truck that made a turn without properly signaling. Again, Lazcano was riding a fixed-gear bike with no brake and without wearing a helmet. He suffered injuries to his neck and shoulder but not his back. Lazcano was again transported to the ER in an ambulance. After this second accident, Lazcano sought and received treatment for his neck and shoulder pain. Lazcano later sued the truck driver and obtained a favorable settlement.

Meanwhile, Lazcano continued undergoing medical treatment for his back. Eventually, Lazcano sought treatment from Dr. Ronald Michael instead of Dr. Hussain. At trial, Lazcano could not recall who referred him to Dr. Michael, but he previously testified at his deposition that it was his attorneys at the Vrdolyak law firm, who represent him in this action. Dr. Michael took x-rays and conducted an additional MRI exam. He then prescribed more injections for Lazcano, which lasted another eight to nine months. Eventually, in late 2017, Lazcano stopped seeing Dr. Michael, as the pain in his back was largely resolved at that point. But Lazcano testified that before the pain abated, he had to refrain from standing for long periods of time or else he would experience back pain. For a while, he avoided riding his bike or lifting items heavier than 50 pounds, as those activities exacerbated his symptoms. On cross-examination, however, Lazcano admitted that he worked as a mover before and after the July 2014 accident, and his injuries did not prevent him from continuing to do so. Indeed, Lazcano admitted at trial that he felt “great.”

II. Rishko’s Testimony
Lazcano also called the USPS driver, Volodymyr Rishko, as a witness at trial.

Rishko testified that he drives a tractor trailer truck for USPS, which has a single axle and is 30 feet long and 10 feet wide. He has been a USPS driver since 2000, although he has been a commercial truck driver in the United States since 1993. During his employment with USPS, he has been involved in four accidents with other individuals, including one other accident with a man riding his bike. Because of this history—and his concerns about false accusations and frivolous lawsuits—Rishko purchased and mounted a camera on the dashboard of his USPS truck (the “dash camera”). (Trial Def.’s Exs. 2, 3.)

*3 According to Rishko, on July 3, 2014, he was driving his USPS truck westbound on Lawrence, along a route that he takes on a weekly basis. The route requires him to drive along Lawrence repeatedly for short distances—turning off of and then back onto Lawrence. At the time of the accident, Rishko was at a spot on the route that required him to drive straight along Lawrence for approximately 1.5 miles. Rishko knew that there was a bike lane on Lawrence to the right of the driving lane but it was a shared lane, not designated expressly and solely for bikes. As he drove along Lawrence, Rishko periodically checked his mirrors for bikes—for example, he recalls seeing a bike pass his truck shortly before the accident—but his focus was mostly directed towards the road in front of him. He was listening to the radio while driving, although he claims he was not paying attention to it. Rishko also testified that he was not driving faster than the speed limit.

As Rishko approached the intersection of Lawrence and Kimball, the traffic light turned from green to yellow to red. Rishko was looking straight ahead at the intersection and did not check his mirrors while he was braking. As he came to a stop, Rishko heard a sound that he analogized to “when [a] tractor is crossing [a] crack on the road.” He then noticed a man sitting at a nearby bus stop pointing at his truck. Concerned that something had happened, Rishko parked the truck and got out to investigate. As he began to walk towards the back of the truck, Rishko observed a police car across the street turn on its lights. Rishko stopped walking and waited for the police car to approach, then told the police officer that he had a dash camera in his truck. The police officer asked to see the dash camera video footage, and Rishko complied. The police officer then instructed Rishko to move the truck, as it was impeding traffic. Before moving his truck, Rishko took several photos of the back of the truck to show its location in the driving lane. (Trial Def. Ex. 2.) He eventually submitted the photos to his employer, the USPS, as documentation of the accident. By Rishko’s estimate, the truck was stopped approximately 40 feet away from the point of impact with Lazcano’s bike.

At trial, the United States introduced both the video footage from the dash camera and the photos taken by Rishko. (Def.’s Ex. 3.) The dash camera video depicts Rishko driving straight along Lawrence. At one point, the bike he described in his testimony passes the truck in the bike lane on the right. The video also depicts a parking lane with numerous parked cars to the right of the driving lane. As Rishko approaches the intersection of Kimball and Lawrence, the traffic light changes, and the silver car directly in front of Rishko’s truck displays its brake lights. Rishko then brakes and comes to a complete stop behind the silver car. At no point does the video show Rishko making any turns or swerves. The photos taken by Rishko similarly portray the tires of his USPS truck facing directly forward. Rishko acknowledged on cross-examination that the front and back tires of the truck did not align perfectly with the lane markings on the pavement, but he explained that, in his opinion, the lane markings are slightly crooked because the road incorporates a left-turn lane at the intersection.

III. Barrette’s Expert Testimony
The United States called Roger Barrette, an accident reconstructionist and former police officer, as an expert witness. Barrette testified that he reviewed the related police reports; transcripts from the depositions of Lazcano, Rishko, two other USPS employees, and Lazcano’s friend Omar Espinoza; the dash camera video footage; and Rishko’s photos. Armed with this information, Barrette personally visited the site of the accident on August 5, 2018, approximately four years later. After comparing the dash camera video footage and photos to the pavement, Barrette concluded that the gouges, marks, and cracks in the pavement were the same; in other words, the road had not been repaved or otherwise altered since the accident occurred. Barrette then used survey equipment and took measurements of the gouges and marks to gather additional information for his analysis.

*4 Barrette confirmed Rishko’s statement that the bike lane on Lawrence is, in fact, a shared bike lane. He specifically testified that tire tracks and other marks on the pavement illustrate that vehicles regularly drive in the bike lane as well as the driving lane. He also explained that the crooked lane marking described by Rishko reflects where the lane splits into a left-turn lane and a straight-ahead lane. All traffic—including bikes—are required to move slightly to the right to accommodate the left-turn lane. Barrette then reconstructed the accident and determined the following sequence of events that led to the collision: The USPS truck was traveling westbound on Lawrence at approximately 14 miles per hour. As it approached the area where the lane diverges, the left side of the truck was 1.9 feet away from the dashed center line between eastbound and westbound traffic, and the right side of the truck was 3.9 feet away from the solid white line on the right side of the lane. The truck then moved slightly to the right to stay out of the left turn lane and continue straight through the intersection. At that time, Lazcano approached from the rear and moved into the 3.9 feet between the right side of the truck and the solid white line on the pavement. Lazcano was moving faster than the truck and tried to navigate between the truck and a limousine that was parked on the side of the road. As he passed the leading axle of the USPS truck tractor trailer—the second axle from the rear of the trailer—his handlebars made contact with the tire, causing him to lose control of his bike. Lazcano then flipped over the handlebars of the bike onto the pavement.

IV. Dr. Deutsch’s Expert Testimony
The United States also called as an expert witness Dr. Harel Deutsch, a board-certified neurosurgeon with specialized knowledge about pathology of the spine. Dr. Deutsch personally performs approximately 400 spinal surgeries every year. Dr. Deutsch reviewed Lazcano’s multiple MRI exam results, his hospital and physical therapy records, the accident report, various other medical records, Lazcano’s deposition transcript, and Dr. Michael’s deposition transcript. After his review, Dr. Deutsch disputed the conclusion of Lazcano’s treating physicians that Lazcano may have suffered a disc herniation or other similar trauma. Dr. Deutsch testified that, in his expert opinion, Lazcano at most experienced a cervical or lumbar strain from the accident, which he characterized as minor injuries. As a result, the vast majority of Lazcano’s physical therapy treatments and all the spinal injections were medically unnecessary and even inappropriate. Dr. Deutsch criticized other aspects of Dr. Michael’s treatment of Lazcano’s injuries as well.2 For example, Dr. Deutsch pointed out that the spinal injections were performed without the use of a fluoroscopy, a technique that provides continuous x-ray images throughout a procedure. In Dr. Deutsch’s opinion, the standard of care requires use of a fluoroscopy when administering spinal injections to ensure that the steroid is injected into the proper location. In addition, Dr. Deutsch pointed out that the spinal injections were administered at the facet joint, which would not be the proper site even if Lazcano did have a disc herniation. Dr. Deutsch further opined that Lazcano does not have an increased risk of injury or physical harm as a result of the accident—for example, he is not predisposed to premature aging or future degeneration.

DISCUSSION
The Court has considered the evidence presented, including the testimony of the above witnesses and the exhibits submitted by the parties. Based upon that evidence, the Court enters the following conclusions of law and findings of fact pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52.

I. Conclusions of Law
In the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b)(1) & 2671–80, “Congress waived the United States’s sovereign immunity for suits brought by persons injured by the negligence of federal employees acting within the scope of their employment.” Furry v. United States, 712 F.3d 988, 992 (7th Cir. 2013). The United States does not dispute that Rishko is a federal employee who, at all relevant times, was acting within the scope of his employment with the USPS. The “law of the place where the act or omission occurred” governs FTCA claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), so the Court applies Illinois law here. See Del Raso v. United States, 244 F.3d 567, 570 (7th Cir. 2001). To succeed on a negligence claim in Illinois, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence “that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, that defendant breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.” Furry, 712 F.3d at 992 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If the defendant acted negligently, then the Court must also consider whether the plaintiff acted negligently, because Illinois limits a plaintiff’s recovery in the event that he is contributorily negligent. 735 ILCS 5/2-1116(c). If a plaintiff is more than 50 percent at fault for the accident, then he cannot recover anything, even if the defendant in fact acted negligently. Id.; see also Knights v. United States, 203 F. Supp. 3d 916, 927 (N.D. Ill. 2016).

*5 The United States does not dispute that its employee, Rishko, had “a duty to exercise reasonable care in the operation of his vehicle and to have his vehicle under such control as would enable him to avoid collision with other vehicles or pedestrians.” Furry, 712 F.3d at 992 (citation, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted). Accordingly, the issues presented for resolution at the trial were breach, proximate cause, contributory negligence, and damages.

II. Findings of Fact
The Court finds that Lazcano failed to present credible evidence to show that Rishko breached his duty of care by driving negligently at the time of the accident. First, the Court cannot conclude that Rishko exceeded the speed limit. Rishko testified that as he approached the intersection, the traffic light changed from green to yellow to red, and he accordingly applied the brakes and came to a stop. The Court finds Rishko’s testimony at the trial to be credible, especially considering that it was confirmed by the dash camera video footage, which shows the truck slowing down at a comparable rate to the silver car in front of it. Barrette similarly testified that his reconstruction of the accident indicated the USPS truck was moving at a mere 14 miles per hour when it collided with Lazcano.

Lazcano contends that the handlebars of his bike came into contact with the USPS truck because the truck swerved into the bike lane where he was riding. However, Lazcano’s claim is unsupported by the evidence. Lazcano does not offer any eyewitness testimony that the truck swerved, and he himself testified that he did not see the postal truck move towards him before or during the impact. See, e.g., Furry, 712 F.3d at 993 (affirming judgment against plaintiffs who failed to offer eyewitness testimony regarding the cause of the accident and instead argued that the only “commonsense” explanation for the collision was that defendant hit them). On the other hand, Rishko testified that he did not make any turns or swerves. He explained that his route required him to drive straight through the intersection, and thus he had no reason to deviate from his lane. Rishko’s testimony is again corroborated by the video footage, which shows the truck steadily traveling forward, facing the same direction before and after the accident. The footage does not depict the truck taking any sharp turns or swerves. Lazcano claims that Rishko’s photos of the USPS truck’s position after the accident show that the truck must have swerved to the right, as its tires are not precisely lined up with the lane markings on the pavement. However, as Barrette’s reconstruction revealed, this configuration is easily explained by the emergence of a left turn lane at the intersection. Naturally, to make room for that left turn lane, the driving lane veers slightly to the right. In view of the evidence, the Court finds that Rishko adjusted the course of the USPS truck to stay in the driving lane, rather than swerving into the bike lane.

Lazcano also contends that Rishko acted carelessly by failing to check his mirrors as he approached the intersection to see if any bikers were in the bike lane. Rishko admitted at trial that he took this route on a regular basis and knew that bikers often used the bike lane on Lawrence. But Rishko explained that he did not check his mirrors immediately prior to the accident because his attention was focused on the road ahead. Considering the approaching intersection and red traffic light, the Court finds Rishko’s behavior reasonable. The Court acknowledges that if Rishko intended to swerve into the bike lane or otherwise change the course of the USPS truck, his duty of care would have required him to check his mirrors to avoid colliding with other vehicles or bikers. But as explained above, the USPS truck did not move out of the driving lane or take any turns. Thus, the Court cannot conclude that his failure to look for bikers in that moment constituted a breach of his duty.

*6 Lazcano further argues that Rishko was distracted by the radio while driving. Lazcano’s argument might be stronger if Rishko were listening to an exciting radio program or blasting loud music. But the footage from the dash cam illustrates that he was listening to a simple radio talk show at an appropriate volume. The Court declines to find that such conduct breaches the duty of reasonable care imposed on all drivers. Ultimately, Lazcano has offered several possible explanations for the collision but has not met his burden of proof.

The Court’s conclusion that Rishko was not negligent effectively puts Lazcano’s negligence claim to rest. Still, the Court briefly addresses the United States’s argument that Lazcano’s recovery should be reduced or barred due to contributory fault. “A plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence when [he] fails to exercise a degree of care which a reasonably prudent person would have used for [his] own safety under like conditions, and that failure is the proximate cause of [his] injury.” Savage v. Martin, 628 N.E.2d 606, 614 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). In Illinois, a plaintiff cannot recover on a negligence claim if his own negligence was more than 50% of the proximate cause of the injury for which he seeks to recover. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1116(c). And if a plaintiff’s negligence contributed to the injury but was less than 50% of the proximate cause, his recovery is reduced in proportionate to his contributory fault. See id. The United States argues that Lazcano failed to act with reasonable care by not wearing a helmet, riding a fixed-gear bike that has no brakes, and failing to maintain sufficient distance from the USPS truck.

The United States contends that both state and municipal laws require Lazcano to wear a helmet, ride a bike with proper brakes, and maintain a safe distance from other vehicles on the road, and his violation of these laws serves as evidence of his general carelessness. It is correct that violation of “a statute designed for the protection of human life and property … is prima facie evidence of negligence.” Lindquist v. Chi. & Nw. Transp. Co., 722 N.E.2d 270, 276 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). However, any such negligence stemming from Lazcano’s lack of proper brakes was not the proximate cause of his injuries. See id. at 283 (finding “negligence on [plaintiff’s] part in causing the subject collision” (emphasis added)). While the Court agrees that a bicyclist acting with reasonable care should wear a helmet, Lazcano’s back, not his head, was injured. A helmet is unlikely to have prevented his injuries. Similarly, hand or foot brakes would have enabled Lazcano to come to a stop more quickly, but there is no indication in the record that his improved ability to stop would have prevented the accident. Lazcano testified that he was not moving at a high speed leading up to the intersection, as he had decreased the speed of his bike in response to the red traffic light up ahead. Further, Lazcano explained that he was trying to ride past the truck when his handlebar came into contact with its tire. As Lazcano was not trying to stop before he reached the truck, the Court does not see how his ability to brake more effectively would have prevented the accident.

Lazcano admitted that he came within six inches of the USPS truck. But viewed in context, this distance is not necessarily unreasonable. For example, Lazcano testified that the bike lane is only four feet wide. Barrette testified that the USPS truck was less than two feet away from the center line dividing eastbound and westbound traffic. Considering these short distances, the Court understands why Lazcano would be only six inches away from a vehicle on the road. Moreover, both Lazcano and the USPS truck had slowed down considerably in approaching the intersection, intending to come to a complete stop. Given their low speeds, the short distance between them is not clearly unreasonable. Therefore, the evidence does not establish that Lazcano was contributorily negligent.3

*7 Finally, the Court briefly summarizes the parties’ arguments as to damages. The United States argues that Lazcano cannot recover the costs of his medical treatment because the vast majority of it was medically unnecessary. The Court need not reach a conclusion as to this issue, however, because none of Lazcano’s treating physicians testified at the trial. Thus, Lazcano failed to authenticate properly his medical bills and other documentation of his treatment, which forces the Court rely solely on his testimony of pain and suffering. Lazcano requested a judgment in his favor of $50,000.4 Lazcano claims that he experienced pain and suffering and the loss of normal life. Specifically, he felt back pain for years and had to refrain from normal activity such as riding his bike or lifting weights heavier than 50 pounds. In response, the United States argues that Lazcano is not entitled to any such damages because his statements and conduct after his accident demonstrate that he was not actually in pain. For example, the ambulance report states that Lazcano denied feeling pain in his upper back, lower back, and neck. Also, Lazcano was discharged from the ER after only an hour. Moreover, in 2014, Lazcano was employed by a moving company as a mover, and his injury did not limit his ability to continue working there. But ultimately, because the Court has concluded that Rishko did not act negligently, the Court need not determine the extent of Lazcano’s pain and suffering.

CONCLUSION
Because Lazcano has not presented sufficient evidence to support a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Rishko was driving negligently at the time of the accident, the Court finds that he has failed to meet his burden of proof. Judgment will accordingly be entered in favor of the United States.

All Citations
Slip Copy, 2020 WL 1157368

Footnotes

1
During cross-examination, counsel for the United States asked Lazcano whether he was aware that riding a bike without a hand or foot brake violates both Illinois state law and Chicago municipal law. Lazcano answered that he did not.

2
As explained in the Court’s August 20, 2019 Order (Dkt. No. 52), Lazcano indicated in his pretrial submission that he intended to call Dr. Michael, one of the physicians who treated Lazcano’s injuries after the accident, to testify at trial as both a fact and expert witness. However, even though the Court granted two continuances, Dr. Michael still failed to appear. Ultimately, Dr. Michael did not testify at the trial.

3
The Court’s conclusion that neither Rishko nor Lazcano were negligent reflects the belief that a collision can occur even when both parties act with reasonable care. The mere fact of a collision is insufficient evidence of negligence. See, e.g., Furry, 712 F.3d at 993.

4
The $50,000 request was based on $3,505 in medical bills from the ambulance service and ER after the accident, $20,000 for pain and suffering, and $26,495 for loss of normal life.

Gray v. Macarthur Company

2020 WL 999007
United States District Court, D. South Dakota, Western Division.
Robert GRAY, Plaintiff,
v.
MACARTHUR COMPANY, Defendant.
CIV. 16-5095-JLV
|
Signed 03/02/2020
Attorneys and Law Firms
Terence R. Quinn, Goodsell Quinn, LLP, Rapid City, SD, Christopher B. Gambill, Pro Hac Vice, Wagner, Crawford and Gambill, Terre Haute, IN, for Plaintiff.
Ryland L. Deinert, Timothy A. Clausen, Klass Law Firm, LLP, Sioux City, IA, for Defendant.

ORDER
JEFFREY L. VIKEN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

INTRODUCTION
*1 Plaintiff Robert Gray filed a complaint against defendant MacArthur Company seeking recovery for plaintiff’s injuries suffered when a roll of rubber roofing materials broke loose and injured plaintiff. At the time plaintiff was injured, the rolls were being unloaded from plaintiff’s flatbed trailer by defendant’s employees. (Docket 1). Defendant filed an amended answer denying the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint. (Docket 26). Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment together with a legal memorandum, a statement of undisputed material facts and nine exhibits. (Dockets 32-34 & 35-1 through 35-9). Plaintiff filed a legal memorandum in resistance to defendant’s motion together with a response to defendant’s statement of undisputed facts, three exhibits and plaintiff’s affidavit. (Dockets 36, 37-1 through 37-3, 38 & 38-1). Defendant filed a reply brief and two additional exhibits. (Docket 39, 41-1 & 41-2). For the reasons stated below, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), a movant is entitled to summary judgment if the movant can “show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Once the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on the allegations or denials in the pleadings, but rather must produce affirmative evidence setting forth specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the case under the governing substantive law will properly preclude summary judgment. Id. at p. 248. “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 247-48 (emphasis in original).

If a dispute about a material fact is genuine, that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, then summary judgment is not appropriate. Id. However, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the nonmoving party failed to “make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In such a case, “there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at p. 323.

In determining whether summary judgment should issue, the facts and inferences from those facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986). The key inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at pp. 251-52.

FACTUAL SUMMARY
*2 The following recitation consists of the material facts developed from plaintiff’s complaint (Docket 1), defendant’s amended answer (Docket 26), defendant’s statement of undisputed material facts (Docket 34) and plaintiff’s response to defendant’s statement of undisputed material facts (Docket 36). Where a statement of fact is admitted by the opposing party, the court will only reference the initiating document. These facts are “viewed in the light most favorable to [Mr. Gray, who is] opposing the motion.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587. The facts material to defendant’s motion for summary judgment are as follows.

Plaintiff Robert Gray is a resident of the State of Indiana. (Docket 1 ¶ 1). Defendant MacArthur Company is a business operating in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. Id. ¶ 2. The home office of MacArthur Company is in St. Paul, Minnesota. Id.

On April 20, 2015, Mr. Gray was an employee of Boyd Operating, Inc., a trucking company located in Indiana. Id. ¶ 5. His entire career had essentially been as a truck driver dominated by mostly long-haul routes. (Docket 34 ¶ 30). Mr. Gray had driven truck for his employer for 13 years as of the date of the incident giving rise to this case. Id. ¶ 4. Mr. Gray had experience hauling rubber roofing materials, including rubber roofing rolls, for Firestone at the time of his injuries. Id. ¶ 5. Prior to April 20, 2015, Mr. Gray delivered approximately four or five loads of roofing materials from Firestone to the MacArthur Company warehouse in Sioux Falls. Id. ¶ 6; see also Docket 36 ¶ 6.

While acting in the course and scope of his employment, Mr. Gray picked up a load of roofing material from the Firestone Company located in Hendricks County, Indiana. (Docket 1 ¶ 6). The rubber roofing rolls were loaded to form pyramids and had 2×4 guards installed on the side of the trailer to keep the rolls from rolling off while being loaded. (Dockets 34 ¶ 14 & 36 ¶ 14). Mr. Gray testified that following the loading process the truck driver is responsible for placing and tightening straps across the pyramids of rolled rubber roofing to secure the load for transport. (Docket 38-1 ¶ 8).1 Straps were utilized to secure the rolls of roofing material while on the highway. (Docket 36 ¶ 14). Mr. Gray denies the 2×4 guards stabilized the load. Id. ¶ 15.

Mr. Gray drove the flatbed truck2 of roofing materials to the MacArthur Company’s place of business in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. (Docket 1 ¶ 7). Upon arrival, Mr. Gray unhooked the straps from the load as required and drove the truck and trailer into the warehouse unloading bay. (Docket 34 ¶ 7). Defendant’s employees directed the trailer to a “crooked” position. (Docket 38-1 ¶ 10). Mr. Gray saw that this did not provide sufficient room on the passenger side of the trailer to properly operate a forklift to remove the pallets of roofing material. Id. Mr. Gray indicated to defendant’s employees that the truck could be moved to where they could safely and properly remove the pallets from the passenger side. (Docket 38-1 ¶ 10). Defendant’s employees never asked or directed that the trailer be moved, so it remained in this “crooked” position. Id.

*3 Defendant’s employees Redmond Patterson and Austin Irvine began unloading the flatbed using forklifts. (Dockets 1 ¶ 8 & 34 ¶ 9). They told Mr. Gray they did not need help unloading the trailer. (Docket 34 ¶ 9). MacArthur Company had a policy that only its employees could unload the trailer. Id. ¶ 10. Mr. Grey knew this was defendant’s policy. Id.

Even though there was no set way to unload the trailer, Mr. Gray wanted his trailer unloaded using a spear, as opposed to forks on a forklift. (Docket 34 ¶ 30). Neither Firestone nor Boyd Transport cared how an end customer like MacArthur Company unloaded trailers. Id. MacArthur Company was not given any instructions on how to unload the trailer. Id.

For safety reasons, Mr. Grey knew he was to stay away from the trailer because items could fall off during the unloading process. Id. ¶ 11; see also Docket 36 ¶ 11. Mr. Gray planned to stand by the truck cab and not help unload his trailer. (Docket 36 ¶ 12). Mr. Gray knew it was generally safe to stay by the cab while defendant’s employees were in the process of unloading the trailer. Id. ¶ 8 (emphasis omitted).

Mr. Grey knew when rubber roofing rolls were being unloaded from the side of the trailer, like defendant’s employees were doing on the day of his injury, and the rolls are bumped by a worker unloading material on the other side of the trailer, the pyramid formation may shift causing rolls to fall or come off. (Docket 34 ¶ 23). Mr. Grey knew he should not be in the area of the trailer when it was being unloaded because he could not see what was occurring on both sides of his trailer. Id. ¶ 24.

It is common knowledge in the trucking industry that when hauling rubber rolls, or a similar product, a driver is not to change the structural side of the trailer or remove the guards unless that is discussed with the people unloading the trailer. Id. ¶ 25. It is also common knowledge that a driver should not approach the customer’s employees on the side of the trailer while it is being unloaded. Id. ¶ 26. If the driver needs to talk to the unloaders, the driver should first get their attention before moving into the zone of danger. Id.

Mr. Gray observed one of defendant’s forklift operators extend the forks into the pyramid to lift the rolled roofing material off the trailer. (Docket 38-1 ¶ 19). By improperly extending the forks into the pyramid the roofing material can be damaged. Id. ¶ 15. When challenged by Mr. Gray, the forklift operators stopped unloading and left the area. Id. ¶ 20. Mr. Gray intended to instruct the forklift operators on the proper way to unload when they returned. (Docket 36 ¶ 18). Because the load was Mr. Gray’s responsibility, he thought he should instruct the defendant’s employees how to properly unload the roofing rolls so they would not damage the goods. Id. ¶ 19.

Because the employees were gone Mr. Gray believed the area was safe. (Docket 36 ¶ 20). Several minutes went by without Mr. Gray seeing or hearing either of the two forklift operators. (Docket 38-1 ¶ 23). Mr. Gray did not notify defendant’s employees he was approaching the side of the trailer. (Docket 34 ¶ 27). As he was approaching the side of the trailer, Mr. Gray did not determine where Mr. Irvine and Mr. Patterson were when he removed two of the three 2×4 guards. Id. ¶¶ 17 & 21.

While standing near the rear of the trailer waiting for the return of the defendant’s employees, Mr. Gray heard a bang and was immediately struck by two or more rolls of rubber roofing. (Docket 38-1 ¶ 24). He did not see or hear the forklift operators prior to being struck by the rolls. Id. ¶ 25.

*4 Mr. Gray testified that one of defendant’s employees while using a forklift caught the end of a roll closest to the front of the trailer causing two or three rolls to fall off the trailer injuring him. (Docket 36 ¶ 22; see also Docket 35-4 at p. 11 (100:11-22).3 The second forklift operator told Mr. Grey he saw the rolls “fly in the air twisting” before they struck Mr. Gray. (Docket 38-1 ¶ 29).

Based on his knowledge and experience, it was Mr. Gray’s opinion the third 2×4 guard snapped in two when the rubber rolls came off the trailer. Id. ¶ 30. Based on the description from the second forklift operator, it was Mr. Gray’s opinion the other two 2×4 guards which he removed would not have prevented or stopped the rolls from coming off the trailer. Id.

Mr. Gray knew from firsthand experience he should not assume the risk of being on the side of a trailer while it was being unloaded because he was injured in a similar incident approximately one year earlier. (Docket 34 ¶ 27). Mr. Gray had removed some of the 2×4 guards in an incident in Neeland, Michigan, and knew if the guards had been kept in place, they would have eliminated the danger of rubber rolls falling on him. Id. ¶ 28. He did this even though it was his employer’s policy that its drivers could not remove the guards. Id. ¶ 29. Mr. Gray placed himself in danger by being at the side of the trailer in Neeland. Id.

Mr. Gray was terminated from his employment with Boyd Transport because the workers’ compensation insurance carrier would not insure his employer or would significantly raise its premiums if Mr. Gray remained employed. (Docket 36 ¶ 34; see also Docket 38-1 ¶ 4).

DISCUSSION
Defendant asserts two separate grounds on which it argues summary judgment should be granted in its favor; contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. (Docket 33 at p. 2).

A. Applicable Law
The parties agree the court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 as it is a diversity action. (Dockets 1 ¶ 3 & 28 ¶ 3). In diversity actions, the court applies the substantive law of the forum state. See Jordan v. NUCOR Corp., 295 F.3d 828, 834 (8th Cir. 2002). “[F]ederal courts sitting in diversity cases, when deciding questions of ‘substantive’ law, are bound by state court decisions as well as state statutes.” Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965) (referencing Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). See also In re Baycol Products Litigation, 616 F.3d 778, 785 (8th Cir. 2010) (“in a suit based on diversity of citizenship jurisdiction the federal courts apply federal law as to matters of procedure but the substantive law of the relevant state.”) (internal citations omitted). Only then can the court determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. United States v. One Parcel of Real Property, 27 F.3d 327, 329 n.1 (8th Cir. 1994). In this case, the forum state is South Dakota. Accordingly, the court shall apply South Dakota law.

B. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Under South Dakota law “[e]very person is responsible for injury to the person, property, or rights of another caused by his … want of ordinary care or skill, subject … to the defense of contributory negligence.” SDCL § 20-9-1. Contributory negligence is an affirmative defense which must be pled. SDCL § 15-6-8(c).

*5 A claim of contributory negligence by a party asserting a claim “does not bar a recovery when the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was slight in comparison with the negligence of the defendant, but in such case, the damages shall be reduced in proportion to the amount of plaintiff’s contributory negligence.” SDCL § 20-9-2. In the posture of the present motion, the court must determine whether the contributory negligence of Mr. Gray, as plaintiff, is “slight in comparison with the negligence” of the employees of MacArthur Company, the defendant. Id. “The term slight in SDCL § 20-9-2 has been defined to mean small in quantum in comparison with the negligence of the [other party].” Estate of He Crow v. Jensen, 494 N.W.2d 186, 188 (S.D. 1992) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “It is a question of fact which varies with the facts and circumstances of each case whether [plaintiff’s] negligence is slight compared to that of [defendant’s employees].” Id.

In other words, “even if [defendant’s] negligence is proven, recovery may be barred or reduced by [plaintiff’s] own contributory negligence.” Mitchell v. Ankney, 396 N.W.2d 312, 313 (S.D. 1986). “Issues of negligence, contributory and comparative negligence … are ordinarily questions of fact and it must be a clear case before a trial judge is justified in taking these issues from the jury. It is only when reasonable men can draw but one conclusion from facts and inferences that they become a matter of law and this rarely occurs.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See also Baddou v. Hall, 756 N.W.2d 554, 562 (S.D. 2008) (“[I]t must be a clear case before a trial judge is justified in taking these issues from the jury.” (emphasis in original; internal citation omitted). “[C]redibility is for the jury to decide.” Id. at 561 (internal citation omitted).

Defendant argues it is entitled to summary judgment based on plaintiff’s contributory negligence. It claims “[Mr.] Gray’s story … does not make sense as the rolls of rubber that fell on him came from the pyramid in the middle of the trailer and they landed right next to the trailer wheels ….” (Docket 33 at p. 7). Defendant asserts Mr. Gray’s story “is a red herring, as the actual location of the injury is not a genuine issue of fact … because even if [Mr.] Gray was where he claims [to have been], he wasn’t even supposed to be there while the trailer was being unloaded[.]” Id. Defendant argues Mr. Gray should have been “near the cab” and “away from the trailer.” Id. Defendant “contends it was gravity and the settling of the pyramid after the removal of two of the 2×4 guards that caused rolls to come off the trailer[.]” Id. “[E]ither way,” Defendant submits “[Mr.] Gray knowingly and wrongfully placed himself in a zone of danger[.]” Id. Defendant also contends Mr. Gray should have known he was obligated to shout out to let defendant’s employees know he was “moving into the zone of danger.” Id. at p. 8.

Defendant asserts plaintiff’s “conduct was negligent, more than slight, in comparison to the negligence of MacArthur, if any, and should preclude recovery in this case.” Id. at p. 12. Defendant argues “if [Mr.] Gray was not knowingly, wrongly, and negligently beside the trailer during the unloading process, the rubber rolls … would not have struck … and injured him.” Id.

Mr. Gray argues “[w]hen the forklift operators did not return to resume unloading the roofing, [he] walked to the driver’s side rear of the trailer … to locate the [operators] and to provide them proper instructions.” (Docket 38 at p. 2). Plaintiff asserts that without his knowledge one of the forklift operators approached the passenger side of the flatbed trailer. Id. Mr. Gray contends that “with limited room to operate the forklift” defendant’s employee “removed a pallet from the front end of the trailer, negligently knocking off two to three rolls … which came off the truck like a ‘helicopter blade’ striking Mr. Gray.” Id.

*6 Whether this incident occurred in the manner described by plaintiff or as presented by defendant is a jury question. Baddou, 756 N.W.2d at 561. The jury must determine whether plaintiff was negligent and, if so, whether plaintiff’s negligence was greater than slight in comparison to defendant’s employees’ negligence so as to bar plaintiff’s recovery in this case. SDCL § 20-9-2; Estate of He Crow, 494 N.W.2d at 188. The court is not convinced this is a “clear case” warranting “taking these issues from the jury.” Baddou, 756 N.W.2d at 562.

C. ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK
“Assumption of the risk requires that the person: ‘(1) had actual or constructive knowledge of the risk; (2) appreciated its character; and (3) voluntarily accepted the risk, with the time, knowledge, and experience to make an intelligent choice.’ ” Jensen v. Menard, Inc., 907 N.W.2d 816, 820 (S.D. 2018) (quoting Duda v. Phatty McGees, Inc., 758 N.W.2d 754, 758 (S.D. 2008)).
Knowledge of the risk is the watchword of assumption of risk…. Indeed, assumption of the risk imports a knowing and voluntary self exposure to a known danger. Plaintiffs cannot assume risks of activities or conditions of which they are ignorant…. They must not only know of the facts which create the danger, but they must comprehend and appreciate the danger itself…. The standard to be applied is a subjective one, of what the particular plaintiff in fact sees, knows, understands and appreciates. In this it differs from the objective standard which is applied to contributory negligence.
Duda, 758 N.W.2d at 758 (quotations and citations omitted). “Questions of …. assumption of the risk are for the jury in all but the rarest of cases so long as there is evidence to support the issues.” Stensland v. Harding County, 872 N.W.2d 92, 96-97 (S.D. 2015) (quoting Janis v. Nash Finch Co., 780 N.W.2d 497, 500 (S.D. 2010)).

MacArthur Company argues plaintiff “meets element one as he not only had constructive, but he had actual knowledge of the risk of the danger of placing himself next to the trailer while it was being unloaded.” (Docket 33 at p. 13). Defendant contends Mr. Gray “meets element two in that he appreciated the risk of placing himself on the side of the trailer and removing the guards while the trailer was being unloaded.” Id. Defendant submits plaintiff “appreciated the risk” because of his previous injury. Id. at p. 14.

Regarding the third element, defendant argues “[Mr.] Gray voluntarily accepted the risk with the time, knowledge, and experience to make his decision.” Id. With this knowledge and experience, defendant submits plaintiff “removed the guards while [the trailer] was being unloaded and knowingly placed himself in the zone of danger.” Id. Defendant asserts “[r]easonable men cannot differ on the question of whether Gray assumed the risk of injury by placing himself in the zone of danger.” Id. (referencing Myers v. Lennox Co-op Association, 307 N.W.2d 863, 864-65 (S.D. 1981)). For these reasons, defendant contends plaintiff “made an intelligent choice” and assumed “the risk presented by that course of action.” Id. (citing Myers, 307 N.W.2d at 865) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Mr. Gray asserts “there is a material issue of fact as to whether [he] exercised reasonable care in making sure that unloading had ceased, and the area had been vacated, before moving to the rear of the trailer to locate and instruct the MacArthur employees.” (Docket 38 at p. 7). Plaintiff submits “[i]t is a disputed [m]aterial [f]act as to whether [he] exercised reasonable care … [and whether] his conduct was reasonable and prudent.” Id.

*7 In response, defendant argues “[t]he risk of placing one’s self near a zone of danger, and ignoring one’s company’s own safety rule certainly is knowledge of a risk that is ‘so plainly observable [that] anyone of ‘competent faculties will be charged with knowledge of it.’ ” (Docket 39 at p. 7) (citing Westover v. East River Elec. Power Co-op, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 892, 901 (S.D. 1992)). Defendant submits “[r]easonable men cannot differ on the question of whether [Mr.] Gray knowingly placed himself in the zone of danger and assumed the risk of injuring himself especially when he was injured the exact same way … just one year prior to the injury in this case.” Id. (referencing Myers, 307 N.W. 2d at 864-65).

“Whether the plaintiff knows of the existence of the risk, or whether he understands and appreciates its magnitude and its unreasonable character, is a question of fact, usually to be determined by the jury under proper instructions from the court.” Duda, 758 N.W.2d at 759 (internal citation omitted). “A person is deemed to have appreciated the risk if it is the type of risk that no adult of average intelligence can deny.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). “Because adults of average intelligence cannot deny the obvious, a plaintiff’s testimony on what he … knew or understood is not conclusive.” Id. (internal citation omitted). “Evidence that the plaintiff undertook the injury-causing conduct despite the choice of a reasonable alternative can also establish voluntary acceptance of the risk.” Jensen, 907 N.W.2d at 821.

It is a function of the jury to determine whether Mr. Gray assumed a risk of injury by his conduct in the specific setting of this case. Duda, 758 N.W.2d at 759. The court finds the evidence is not “so one-sided that [defendant] must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at p. 252. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on its affirmative defense of assumption of the risk is denied.

ORDER
Based on the above analysis, it is

ORDERED that defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Docket 33) is denied.

All Citations
Slip Copy, 2020 WL 999007, 2020 IER Cases 76,842

Footnotes

1
Defendant objects as a general matter to Mr. Gray’s affidavit. (Docket 39 at p. 2 n.2) (internal citations omitted). Other than objecting to one statement, defendant does not specifically identify which paragraphs of Mr. Gray’s affidavit are contrary to his deposition testimony. Id. Defendant’s objection is overruled.

2
The court will use either “flatbed” or “trailer” to identify the part of the flatbed truck upon which the roofing materials were stacked. The court will use “cab” or “truck” to identify the motor vehicle pulling the flatbed.

3
The court refers to the page of the document as entered in CM/ECF and the page of the transcript because several exhibits appear as single pages and other exhibits have four pages of transcript per page in CM/ECF.

© 2024 Fusable™