August 2024

Todd v. Capella Logistics, Inc.

United States District Court, N.D. Georgia, Atlanta Division.

Timothy TODD and Molly Todd, Plaintiffs,

CAPELLA LOGISTICS, INC., et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:22-CV-108-TWT

Signed July 17, 2024

Attorneys and Law Firms

Caroline Harwell Monsewicz, Darren Michael Tobin, Tobin Injury Law, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiffs.

Frederick Mills Valz III, Jessica F. Hubbart, Michael James Yates II, Copeland, Stair, Valz & Lovell, LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendants Capella Logistics, Inc., Jacek Marian Bula.

Margaret L. Manns, Lueder, Larkin & Hunter, LLC, Atlanta, Jennifer Pridgeon, Lueder Larkin & Hunter LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant Progressive Commercial Advantage Agency, Inc.

OPINION AND ORDER

THOMAS W. THRASH, JR., United States District Judge

*1 This is a personal injury action. It is before the Court on the Defendants Capella Logistics, Inc. (“Capella”) and Jacek Marian Bula’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. 140]. For the reasons set forth below, the Defendants’ Motion [Doc. 140] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. Background¹

This case arises from an automobile accident between the parties that occurred on February 13, 2021. (Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 1). The Defendant Jacek Bula was driving a tractor-trailer on behalf of the Defendant Capella when he rear-ended a tractor driven by former Defendant Rodney Chappelle that then spun across the interstate, collided with the Plaintiffs’ vehicle, and ultimately caused injuries to the Plaintiffs Timothy and Molly Todd. (Id. ¶ 2). The Plaintiffs filed the present action on January 10, 2022, and the Defendants Capella and Bula now move for summary judgment as to the Plaintiffs’ claims for negligent hiring, entrustment, training, and supervision against Capella, and claims for punitive damages and attorneys’ fees against both Defendants.

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits submitted by the parties show that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c). The court should view the evidence and draw any inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970). The party seeking summary judgment must first identify grounds that show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant, who must go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).

III. Discussion

The Defendants move for summary judgment as to the Plaintiffs’ claims for negligent hiring, entrustment, training, and supervision against Capella and for punitive damages and attorneys’ fees against both Defendants. (Br. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Part. Summ. J., at 2). The Plaintiffs dispute summary judgment as to all claims except the one for negligent entrustment. (Pls.’ Resp. Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Part. Summ. J., at 2–3). The Court addresses the disputed claims and the parties’ arguments in support thereof in turn.

A. Negligent Hiring, Training, and Supervision

The Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiffs’ negligent hiring, training, and supervision claims because there is no evidence that Bula had ever been in any prior collisions similar to the one at issue and no evidence that Bula drove in a manner that would have put Capella on notice of any dangerous driving habits. (Br. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Part. Summ. J., at 7–8). In response, the Plaintiffs contend that Capella failed to exercise ordinary care in hiring Bula because he had numerous violations on his record (four violations over three years) and because Capella’s owner and president, Mrs. Renata Fiedor, failed to drive with Bula for his driving test. (Pls.’ Resp. Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Part. Summ. J., at 6, 12). Regarding negligent training, they claim that Fiedor lacked knowledge of the regulations governing motor carrier safety and that Capella failed to exercise ordinary care in training Bula because Fiedor merely checked his driving record and reviewed his medical card before hiring him. (Id. at 10–11). And regarding negligent supervision, the Plaintiffs rely on the same evidence in support of their claim. (Id. at 13).

*2 In reply, Capella notes that Fiedor’s late husband trained Bula when he was hired and that Bula had twenty-six years of driving experience, graduated from a driving school, maintained a Commercial Driver License, and had never been in an accident. (Reply Br. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Part. Summ. J., at 4). Capella also notes that Bula’s driving record was clean and that the four violations he received were “unrelated to the subject accident (driving beyond 8 hours, brake hose issues, and record of duty status issues).” (Id. at 4–5). Finally, Capella argues that there is no evidence it should have known that Bula tended to engage in any behavior relevant to the alleged injuries sustained by the Plaintiffs. (Id. at 5).

Under Georgia law, liability for negligent hiring “requires evidence that the employer knew or should have known of the employee’s propensity to engage in the type of conduct that caused the plaintiff’s injury.” Middlebrooks v. Hillcrest Foods, Inc., 256 F.3d 1241, 1247 (11th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). And “[t]o establish a negligent training claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that inadequate training caused a reasonably foreseeable injury.” Advanced Disposal Servs. Atlanta, LLC v. Marczak, 359 Ga. App. 316, 319 (2021) (citation omitted). Finally, “to defeat summary judgment on an issue of negligent supervision, a plaintiff must produce some evidence of incidents similar to the behavior that was the cause of the injury at issue.” ABM Aviation v. Prince, 366 Ga. App. 592, 598 (2023). (citation omitted).

The Court concludes that the Plaintiffs have failed to present affirmative evidence showing a genuine issue of material fact on any of their negligent hiring, training, or supervision claims. Rather, the evidence suggests that Bula had no driving history indicating a propensity to drive negligently. (See Driving Record, Doc. 141-2). Instead, Bula’s record shows that prior to his employment with Capella, he had a 2016 citation for driving beyond an eight-hour time limit, a 2016 citation for lacking a current record of duty status, and a 2017 citation for faulty brake hose and tubing. None of these citations suggest that Capella knew or should have known that Bula had a propensity to engage in negligent driving. Nor does Fiedor’s alleged lack of knowledge of the motor carrier safety regulations indicate that Bula was improperly trained, much less that such training or lack thereof could have caused the Plaintiffs’ injuries. Moreover, when a driver has a CDL like Bula did, “[t]he Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations generally do not require trucking companies to train their drivers.” Ortiz v. Wiwi, 2012 WL 4468771, at *4 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 26, 2012). Finally, the Plaintiffs offer no evidence that would support their negligent supervision claim, nor does Bula’s driving record substantiate any instances of negligent driving similar to that alleged in the Third Amended Complaint. Therefore, summary judgment in favor of Capella is proper on the negligent hiring, training, supervision, and entrustment claims.

B. Punitive Damages

The Defendants next contend that they have not engaged in any willful misconduct that would support the Plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim and thus seek summary judgment on the claim. (Br. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Part. Summ. J., at 10). The Plaintiffs sole argument in support of their punitive damages claim is that Capella’s alleged breach of independent duties goes beyond gross negligence. (Pls.’ Resp. Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Part. Summ. J., at 14). Having found that Capella was entitled to summary judgment on the Plaintiffs’ negligent hiring, training, supervision, and entrustment claims, the Court concludes that the Plaintiffs have not carried their burden to present affirmative evidence showing any willful or wanton misconduct on the Defendants’ part that would support a claim for punitive damages. See Battle v. Thomas, 623 F. Supp. 3d 1312, 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2022). Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the Defendants is proper as to punitive damages.

C. Attorneys’ Fees

*3 Finally, the Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs’ claim for attorneys’ fees is meritless because the Plaintiffs point to no specific facts other than those alleged generally in the Complaint in support of their claim and because a bona fide controversy exists as to whether a now-terminated codefendant was wholly or partially at fault for the accident. (Br. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Part. Summ. J., at 11–12). The Plaintiffs argue, in response, that an award of attorneys’ fees is proper because the Defendants have improperly refused to accept liability for the collision. (Pls.’ Resp. Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Part. Summ. J., at 16–17). “Questions concerning bad faith, stubborn litigiousness, and unnecessary trouble and expense under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 are generally questions for the jury to decide.” Forsyth Cnty. v. Martin, 279 Ga. 215, 219 (2005). Because the parties dispute whether a bona fide controversy exists as to liability for the underlying cause of action, the Court finds that summary judgment on the attorneys’ fees claim is improper.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. 140] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. It is GRANTED as to the Plaintiffs’ claims for negligent hiring, training, supervision, and entrustment and punitive damages, and it is DENIED as to the Plaintiffs’ claim for attorneys’ fees.

SO ORDERED, this 17th day of July, 2024.

All Citations

Slip Copy, 2024 WL 3445006

Footnotes

The operative facts on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment are taken from the Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts. The Court will deem the parties’ factual assertions, where supported by evidentiary citations, admitted unless the respondent makes a proper objection under Local Rule 56.1(B).

End of Document

Gauthier v. Hard to Stop, LLC

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

Katia GAUTHIER, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Peter Gauthier, and as Parent and Natural Guardian of minors, D.G. and N.G., Plaintiff-Appellant,

HARD TO STOP LLC, et al., Defendants,

Total Quality Logistics, LLC, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 22-10774

Filed: 07/09/2024

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia, D.C. Docket No. 6:20-cv-00093-RSB-CLR

Attorneys and Law Firms

Jeffrey Robert Harris, Harris Lowry Manton, LLP, Savannah, GA, Yvonne Godfrey, Jed D. Manton, Attorney, Harris Lowry Manton, LLP, Brookhaven, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Lea Dearing, Jeremy Leonard Kahn, Berman Fink Van Horn, PC, Atlanta, GA, Colby E. Longley, McCorkle & Johnson, LLP, Savannah, GA, for Defendant-Appellee.

Adina H. Rosenbaum, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae Public Citizen.

Before William Pryor, Chief Judge, and Jill Pryor and Brasher, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

PER CURIAM:

*1 Peter Gauthier died when his car collided with a tractor trailer that was blocking traffic while its driver attempted a U-turn on a state highway at night. The driver of that tractor trailer was defendant Ronald Bernard Shingles; the owner of that tractor trailer was defendant Hard to Stop LLC. Katia Gauthier, Peter’s widow and administrator of his estate, also named as a defendant Total Quality Logistics, LLC, the shipping broker that arranged for Shingles and Hard to Stop to haul a load that evening. Gauthier alleged that Total Quality Logistics, LLC was liable for Peter’s death because under Georgia negligence law, Total Quality Logistics, LLC had a duty to “ensure that the motor carriers with whom it arranged transportation of goods were reasonably safe.”

The district court concluded that Gauthier’s negligent selection claim against Total Quality Logistics, LLC is preempted by a federal statute, the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (“the Act”). The Act generally prohibits states from enacting or enforcing any law “related to a price, route, or service of any … broker … with respect to the transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). The Act does preserve states’ ability to exercise “safety regulatory authority … with respect to motor vehicles,” however. Id. § 14501(c)(2)(A). The district court concluded that state common law negligence claims predicated upon a broker’s selection of a shipping company or driver necessarily relate to a service of a broker and thus fall within the general preemption provision. The district court also concluded that although such claims arise from a state’s safety regulatory authority, they do not relate to “motor vehicles,” specifically, and therefore are not excepted from preemption.

After the district court’s decision, we adopted the same reading of the Act in Aspen American Insurance Company v. Landstar Ranger, Inc. and held that the Act preempts state law claims against “a transportation broker” who was allegedly “negligent … in its selection of [a] carrier.” 65 F.4th 1261, 1264 (11th Cir. 2023). There, the broker unwittingly selected “a thief posing as a [broker]-registered carrier” to haul an expensive load of cargo. Id. The shipperclient’s insurance company sued the broker under a state common law theory of negligent selection. We first decided that such allegations fall within the scope of the Act’s preemption provision because they are “related to a … service of [a] … broker … with respect to the transportation of property.” Id. at 1266–68 (citation omitted). We then held that such claims are not preserved by the Act’s exception allowing claims arising from “the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” Id. at 1268–72 (citation omitted). We acknowledged that common law negligence claims are generally within a state’s “safety regulatory authority.” Id. at 1268–70 (citation omitted). But, we continued, “the phrase ‘with respect to motor vehicles’ limits the safety exception’s application to state laws that have a direct relationship to motor vehicles.” Id. at 1271. And, we concluded, “a claim against a broker is necessarily one step removed from a ‘motor vehicle’ because … ‘a broker … and the services it provides have no direct connection to motor vehicles.’ ” Id. at 1272 (quoting Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 976 F.3d 1016, 1031 (9th Cir. 2020) (Fernandez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). “Because [a] negligent [selection] claim seeks to impose a duty on the service of the broker rather than regulate motor vehicles … the exception does not apply.” Id. (quoting Creagan v. Wal-Mart Transp., LLC, 354 F. Supp. 3d 808, 814 (N.D. Ohio 2018)).

*2 Gauthier’s negligent selection claim is foreclosed by our holding in Aspen, which the district court’s reasoning in this case presaged. Her allegations—that Total Quality Logistics, LLC failed to exercise due care under state law when it assigned the shipment to Shingles and Hard to Stop—are materially indistinguishable from the claim in Aspen. See 65 F.4th at 1264, 1266–68. Gauthier’s claim thus falls within the Act’s preemptive scope. See id. at 1266–68; 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). Likewise, her claim “against a broker” is “necessarily one step removed from a ‘motor vehicle,’ ” Aspen, 65 F.4th at 1272, and thus not preserved from preemption by Section 14501(c)(2)(A).

Gauthier resists this outcome. She first argues that her claim here does not implicate the “service of any … broker … with respect to the transportation of property,” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1), because the Georgia common law is “applicable to the general public.” Appellant’s Supp. Br. 4–5. We acknowledged in Aspen that the Act “does not preempt ‘general’ state laws (like a ‘prohibition on smoking in certain public places’) that regulate brokers ‘only in their capacity as members of the public.’ ” 65 F.4th at 1268 (quoting Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 375 (2008)). Although Georgia common law, broadly speaking, is generally applicable, her specific claim here is certainly not. Members of the public do not arrange for the motor transportation of property; brokers do. By regulating that specific activity, Gauthier’s common law claim is aimed solely at “the performance of [brokers’] core transportation-related services.” Id.

Gauthier also contends that cases arising from traffic accidents (like this one) should be treated differently than cases arising from property loss (like Aspen). But the nature of the injury is not what matters for purposes of the Act’s preemption provision. Any claim that a broker negligently selected a driver to haul a load of property clearly falls within Section 14501(c)(1) because, as just noted, that claim seeks to regulate the broker’s “performance of [its] core transportation-related services.” Id. And such claims do not arise from an exercise of “the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles,” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A), which requires that the relevant state law “have a direct relationship to motor vehicles,” Aspen, 65 F.4th at 1271. We made that clear in Aspen by holding that negligent-selection-of-broker claims necessarily lack a direct relationship because “the services [a broker] provides have no direct connection to motor vehicles.” Id. at 1272 (quoting Miller, 976 F.3d at 1031 (Fernandez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Our holding in Aspen that a challenge to a broker’s front-end selection of a motor carrier is preempted in no way turned on the back-end injury suffered as a result of the allegedly negligent selection.

Finally, Gauthier argues that Aspen was wrongly decided. She says that we erred in concluding that the Act requires a “direct” connection between the relevant state law and motor vehicles. But, as Gauthier correctly notes, Aspen is binding. See United States v. Dubois, 94 F.4th 1284, 1293 (11th Cir. 2024) (“[A] prior panel’s holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this court sitting en banc.” (citation omitted)). We, therefore, must follow it here.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

All Citations

Not Reported in Fed. Rptr., 2024 WL 3338944

End of Document