United States District Court,N.D. Illinois.

SOLOVY et al

v.

FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION et al.

Feb. 5, 2008.

STATEMENT

VIRGINIA M. KENDALL, J.

Plaintiff Jerold Solovy (“Solovy”) initially filed suit against FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. (“FedEx Ground”), Federal Express Corporation (“FedEx Express”), FedEx Custom Critical, Inc., FedEx Kinko’s Office and Print Services, Inc., FedEx Corporation, and FedEx Corporate Services, Inc. (collectively “FedEx”) in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois. FedEx’s notice of removal claimed, among other things, the existence of a federal subject matter jurisdiction under federal common law and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as well as 49 U.S.C. § 14706 (the “Carmack Amendment”) and 28 U.S.C. § 1337. In response, Solovy filed a Motion to Remand the matter to the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, which the Court denied.

The current Action arises out of Solovy’s attempt to ship a necklace from Florida to Illinois via FedEx, a nationwide parcel delivery service. According to Plaintiff’s allegations, on February 9, 2007, Solovy placed the necklace in a FedEx box, filled out an “air bill” with a corresponding FedEx tracking number, and contacted FedEx for the purposes of picking up two packages destined for Chicago-one containing the necklace (the “necklace package” or “necklace”) and another containing items to be delivered to a Polo store (the “Polo store package”). According to Plaintiff’s allegations again, FedEx, through it agent, apparent agent, employee, and representative, arrived at Solovy’s residence, expressly agreed to accept the necklace package and cause it to be delivered to Chicago. Subsequently, FedEx delivered the Polo store package to its correct location, but failed to deliver the necklace package. As a result, Solovy filed the current Action, alleging the following nine claims: (1) breach of bailment agreement; (2) conversion; (3) fraudulent misrepresentation; (4) negligent misrepresentation; (5) negligent hiring; (6) negligent supervision; (7) negligent retention; (8) negligence; and (9) mischance.

In its initial Notice of Removal and subsequent response to Solovy’s Motion for Remand, FedEx Express and FedEx Ground argued that this Action was properly removed to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.Specifically, FedEx Express and FedEx Ground asserted that, to the extent that FedEx Express was involved with the shipment at issue, this Court has jurisdiction under federal common law. Similarly, to the extent that FedEx Ground was involved with the shipment, the defendants contend that this Court has jurisdiction by reason of the Carmack Amendment. Relying on Treiber & Straub, Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., 474 F.3d 379 (7th Cir.2007), the Court agreed with the former argument and concluded that removal to federal court was proper under federal common law and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), district courts have removal jurisdiction over any claim that could have been brought in federal court originally.

Now before the Court is Solovy’s Motion to Reconsider the Court’s previous denial of Solovy’s Motion for Remand. A motion for reconsideration is appropriate when filed on the basis of newly discovered material evidence or a manifest error of law or fact. Publishers Res., Inc. v. Walker-Davis Publ’ns, Inc., 762 F.2d 557, 561 (7th Cir.1985). The Seventh Circuit defines “manifest error” as “ ‘wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling precedent’ ” on the part of the court. Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir.2000) (quoting Sedrak v. Callahan, 987 F.Supp. 1063, 1069 (N.D.Ill.1997)). In this case, Solovy argues that the Court’s previous reliance on Treiber represents a manifest error of law and fact because: (1) the Court incorrectly interpreted and applied Treiber to the present case and (2) Solovy’s claims are factually distinguishable from Treiber.For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that its previous denial of Solovy’s Motion for Remand does not represent a manifest error of law or fact.

With respect to the first argument, Solovy contends that this Court incorrectly interpreted and applied Treiber to the current Action by holding that federal common law “completely preempted” Solovy’s claims and “created a removable interest.” Solovy misinterprets the Court’s previous ruling. As explained by the Court during a January 24, 2008 hearing regarding the Motion for Remand, the Court does not interpret the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Treiber as standing for the proposition that federal common law completely preempts all state law claims for lost or damaged goods transported by air, nor did the Court base its conclusion on the complete preemption doctrine. Rather, this Court concluded that, to the extent that Solovy’s claims relate to lost goods transported by a common air carrier, those claims arise under federal common law and, therefore, fall within the Court’s federal question jurisdiction. In making this determination, the Court found instructive the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Sam L. Majors Jewelers v. ABX, Inc., 117 F.3d 922 (5th Cir.1997) and the Seventh Circuit’s recent holding in Treiber & Straub, Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., 474 F.3d 379.

In Sam L. Majors, the plaintiff initially filed suit in state court alleging, among other things, negligence on the part of the defendant air in conjunction with the defendant’s loss of or damage to plaintiff’s shipments. 117 F.3d at 923-24. The defendant then removed the action to federal court, asserting that the suit was governed by federal law. Id. at 924.Before determining whether removal to federal court was proper, the Fifth Circuit explained that any one of the following three theories would support removal and federal question jurisdiction: (1) the complaint raises an express or implied cause of action that exists under a federal statute; (2) an area of law is completely preempted by the federal regulatory regime; or (3) the cause of action arises under federal common law principles. Id. at 925.After offering an extensive analysis regarding the history of federal common law liability of common carriers and the regulation and deregulation of air carriers, the Fifth Circuit concluded that claims for lost or damaged goods transported by an air carrier arise under federal common law. Id. at 925-29.Because plaintiff’s negligence claim related to a common air carrier’s loss of or damage to plaintiff’s shipments, the court concluded that the negligence claim arose under federal common law. Id. Thus, the defendant properly removed the suit to federal court. Id. at 929.

Subsequently, in Treiber, the Seventh Circuit relied on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Sam L. Majors when evaluating whether it retained federal question jurisdiction over a federal common law claim against a common air carrier for lost or damaged goods. After noting that several other circuits had already concluded that such claims arise under federal common law, and highlighting the analysis set forth in Sam L. Majors, the Seventh Circuit joined the Fifth Circuit by holding that “a claim for lost or damaged goods transported by a common air carrier arises under federal common law and thus falls within the district court’s federal question jurisdiction.”Treiber, 474 F.3d at 384.

As highlighted by Sam L. Majors and Treiber, this Court’s power to exercise federal question jurisdiction over the current suit flows from principles of federal common law, not from the complete preemption doctrine. Thus, to the extent that Solovy asserts “claim[s] for lost or damaged goods transported by a common air carrier,” this Court did not misapply Treiber by concluding that such claims arise under federal common law and fall within this Court’s federal question jurisdiction.

The parties do not contest that FedEx Express’s status as an air carrier, nor does the Court find any reason to do so.

Solovy further contends that the Court committed a manifest error by denying his Motion for Remand because Solovy’s allegations concern only the conversion of Solovy’s property rather than the shipment and loss of property. Unfortunately for Plaintiff, those are not the only allegations pleaded in his complaint. To determine the presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction, the Court generally looks no further than the allegations contained in the plaintiff’s “well-pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). As the Court previously concluded, Solovy’s general and claim-specific allegations bring this Action within the ambit of federal question jurisdiction. For instance, Solovy alleges that he filled out an air bill with a corresponding FedEx tracking number so his package could be shipped from Florida to Illinois. He further alleges that, despite the express agreement from a FedEx agent, apparent agent, employee and representative to accept the necklace package and cause it to be delivered to Chicago, FedEx failed to return or deliver the necklace package. With respect to Solovy’s negligence claim (Count VIII), Solovy also alleges that FedEx breached its duty by failing to deliver the package, properly track the package, return the package, and “notify the Plaintiff that his package was lost, misplaced, and/or misdelivered.”Noticeably absent from the negligence claim is any allegation related to conversion or theft of the necklace. Instead, Solovy frames the negligence cause of action as a claim for lost goods transported by an air carrier. In light of such allegations, the Court concludes that, at a minimum, Count VIII of Solovy’s well-pleaded complaint arises under federal common law and falls within this Court’s federal question jurisdiction.See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100, 92 S.Ct. 1385, 31 L.Ed.2d 712 (1972); see also Sam L. Majors, 117 F.3d at 925-29;W. Sec. Co. v. Derwinski, 937 F.2d 1276, 1280 (7th Cir.1991) (removal proper where suit was governed by federal common law and thus arose under federal law for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331).

Solovy also argues that Treiber does not apply to the current Action because, in the present case, FedEx initially denied that a FedEx driver accepted Solovy’s necklace package in a letter to Solovy and subsequently stated that they were without knowledge or information sufficient to answer Solovy’s allegation in Count II that FedEx converted Solovy’s property. As noted above, courts generally look no further than the allegations contained in the plaintiff’s “well-pleaded complaint” to determine the presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction.Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987). A case will not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense. Id. at 393.Because the Court must focus on Solovy’s allegations, FedEx’s denial or failure to admit that it took possession of the necklace package is irrelevant to the current analysis. As noted by the Court in its January 24, 2008 ruling and again in the current order, Solovy’s allegations state a claim for lost goods transported by a common air carrier and, therefore, falls within the Court’s federal question jurisdiction.

The Court further notes that, to the extent that this Action involves FedEx Ground, removal from state court was likely proper under the Carmack Amendment, 28 U.S.C. § 1337(a), and the complete preemption doctrine.The Carmack Amendment governs the liability of common carriers to shippers for loss of, or damage to, interstate shipments.N. Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. Pinkerton Sec. Sys., Inc., 89 F.3d 452, 455 (7th Cir.1996). Because the purpose of the Carmack Amendment is to establish uniform federal guidelines to reduce uncertainty in connection with a carrier’s liability, it has a broad preemptive scope over state and common law claims arising out of interstate shipments. Hughes v. United Van Lines, Inc., 829 F.2d 1407, 1415 (7th Cir.1987). The Supreme Court, when addressing this preemptive scope, noted that “[a]lmost every detail of the subject is covered so completely that there can be no rational doubt but that Congress intended to take possession of the subject and supersede all state regulation with reference to it.”Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 505-06, 33 S.Ct. 148, 57 L.Ed. 314 (1913). Several courts, including the Ninth and Fifth Circuits, have since concluded that the Carmack Amendment completely preempts state law claims. See, e.g., Hall v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 476 F.3d 683, 688 (9th Cir.2007); Hoskins v. Bekins Van Lines, 343 F.3d 769, 777 (5th Cir.2003); Ducham v. Reebie Allied Moving & Storage, Inc., 372 F.Supp.2d 1076, 1079 (N.D.Ill.2005); Woods v. Unigroup, 945 F.Supp. 1255 (E.D.Mo.1996). While the Seventh Circuit has yet to expressly address whether the statute completely preempts state law, it has recognized that the statute ordinarily preempts “all state or common law remedies available to a shipper against a carrier for loss or damage to interstate shipment,”N. Am. Van Lines, 89 F.3d at 456, and that the purpose of the statute is to establish uniformity, Hughes, 829 F.2d at 1415. In light of the purpose of the Carmack Amendment and the Seventh Circuit’s recognition of its purpose and preemptive effect, the Court would be inclined to adopt the reasoning employed by the Fifth and Ninth Circuits and conclude that the Carmack Amendment completely preempts state law. Nevertheless, the Court need not make such a determination at this time because, as previously noted, FedEx properly removed this Action under federal common law and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1337(a), original jurisdiction exists for any civil action brought pursuant to the Carmack Amendment “only if the matter in controversy for each receipt or bill of lading exceeds $ 10,000, exclusive of interest and costs.”28 U.S.C. § 1337(a).

Under the complete preemption doctrine, a well-pleaded state law claim presents a federal question when a federal statute has completely preempted that particular area of law. Caterpillar, Inc., 482 U.S. at 392. “Once an area of state law has been completely pre-empted, any claim purportedly based on that preempted state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim” that arises under federal law. Id.

The parties do not contest that FedEx Ground’s status as a common carrier subject to the Carmack Amendment, nor does the Court find any reason to do so.

Because Solovy asserts a claim for lost or damaged goods transported by a common air carrier, the Court concludes that it did not commit a manifest error of law or fact by denying Solovy’s Motion for Remand. Further, to the extent that federal common law establishes the Court’s original jurisdiction, the Court also has the power to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Solovy’s state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The state law claims are so related to the federal claims that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III for the purposes of supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider is denied. Defendants need not file a responsive pleading to the Motion to Reconsider.

N.D.Ill.,2008.

Solovy v. Federal Express Corp.

United States District Court,S.D. Texas,Houston Division.

SCHOENMANN PRODUCE COMPANY, INC., et al., Plaintiffs,

v.

BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, Defendant.

Feb. 5, 2008.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

NANCY F. ATLAS, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Defendant BNSF Railway Company’s (“BNSF”) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. # 13]. Plaintiffs Schoenmann Produce Co., Inc., and Farming Technology, Inc ., have responded [Doc. # 18]. BNSF has not replied and the deadline to do so has passed.Upon review of the parties’ submissions, all pertinent matters of record, and applicable law, the Court concludes that BNSF’s Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

SeeHON. NANCY F. ATLAS COURT PROC. 6(A)(4), http://www . txs.uscourts.gov/district/judges/nfa/nfa.pdf.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Between June 5, 2006, and July 26, 2006, Plaintiffs, Texas companies that grow and ship produce, contracted with BNSF for the transportation and delivery of thirty-three shipments of potatoes from Bakersfield, California, to Houston, Texas. The potatoes were to be carried on refrigerated railcars that Plaintiffs assert were inspected and found to be operating properly prior to delivery of their produce to BNSF. Plaintiffs claim that the potatoes were tendered to BNSF in good and marketable condition, but that upon arrival in Texas, they were found to be in varying stages of rot or otherwise damaged. Plaintiffs allege that the damage was due to BNSF’s failure to start the refrigeration units on the railcars and to ensure that the units were working properly while in route. Plaintiffs bring suit against BNSF for violations of the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706 et seq., and for negligent or intentional misrepresentation. They also seek declaratory judgments regarding BNSF’s rights and responsibilities under the shipping contracts at issue in this case.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a sufficient showing of the existence of an element essential to the party’s case for which that party will bear the burden at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc); see also Baton Rouge Oil & Chem. Workers Union v. ExxonMobil Corp., 289 F.3d 373, 375 (5th Cir.2002). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must determine whether “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits filed in support of the motion, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23;Hart v. Hairston, 343 F.3d 762, 764 (5th Cir.2003).

For summary judgment, the initial burden falls on the movant to identify areas essential to the non-movant’s claim in which there is an “absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 401 F.3d 347, 349 (5th Cir.2005). The moving party, however, need not negate the elements of the non-movant’s case. See Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir.2005). The moving party may meet its burden by pointing out “ ‘the absence of evidence supporting the non-moving party’s case.’”Duffy v. Leading Edge Products, Inc., 44 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir.1995) (quoting Skotak, 953 F.2d at 913). However, if the moving party fails to meet its initial burden, the motion for summary judgment must be denied, regardless of the non-movant’s response. ExxonMobil Corp., 289 F.3d at 375.

If the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-movant must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 282 (5th Cir.2001).“An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action. A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”DIRECT TV Inc. v. Robson, 420 F.3d 532, 536 (5th Cir.2006) (internal citations omitted).

In deciding whether a genuine and material fact issue has been created, the facts and inferences to be drawn from them must be reviewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Reaves Brokerage Co. v. Sunbelt Fruit & Vegetable Co., 336 F.3d 410, 412 (5th Cir.2003). However, factual controversies are resolved in favor of the non-movant “only when there is an actual controversy-that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.”Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir.1999). The non-movant’s burden is not met by mere reliance on the allegations or denials in the non-movant’s pleadings. See Diamond Offshore Co. v. A & B Builders, Inc., 302 F.3d 531, 545 n. 13 (5th Cir.2002) (noting that unsworn pleadings do not constitute proper summary judgment evidence). Likewise, “unsubstantiated or conclusory assertions that a fact issue exists” do not meet this burden. Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir.1998). Instead, the non-moving party must present specific facts which show “the existence of a ‘genuine’ issue concerning every essential component of its case.”Id. In the absence of any proof, the court will not assume that the non-movant could or would prove the necessary facts. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (citing Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990)).

III. ANALYSIS

BNSF has moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that certain claims asserted by Plaintiffs are preempted by federal law and that the attorneys’ fees and incidental and consequential damages sought by Plaintiffs are not recoverable under the Carmack Amendment or the contracts governing the shipments at issue.

A. Preemption

Plaintiffs have asserted five causes of action: “Breach of Exempt Contract under Carmack Amendment,” “Negligent Transportation under Carmack Amendment,” “Action for Damages to Freight Transported in Interstate Commerce,”“Negligent Misrepresentation[,] or in the Alternative[,] Intentional Misrepresentation,” and “Action under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act.”BNSF asserts that, to the extent any of these claims are based on state or common law, they are preempted under the Carmack Amendment. Plaintiffs do not dispute that the Carmack Amendment governs this dispute, and instead contest BNSF’s characterization of their Complaint as alleging any state- or common law-based claims. Plaintiffs further argue that the preemptive effect of the Carmack Amendment does not reach their request for a declaratory judgment.

Defendants do not dispute the validity of this claim.

The same parties in this case recently litigated the issue of federal preemption in this district before United States District Judge Lee Rosenthal. See Schoenmann Produce Co. v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 420 F.Supp.2d 757 (S.D.Tex.2006). Judge Rosenthal offered an extensive review and analysis of the preemptive effect of the Carmack Amendment, and concluded, under facts virtually identical to those at issue here, that federal law preempted all of the state and common law claims raised in that case, including a misrepresentation claim identical to the claim alleged by Plaintiffs in this case. See id., at 763-64.This Court has carefully reviewed Judge Rosenthal’s published opinion and the cited precedent, and sees no reason to repeat or depart from her analysis or conclusions. The Court adopts the same reasoning; Plaintiffs may proceed only on claims arising under the Carmack Amendment.

See Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition [Doc. # 1], Schoenmann Produce Co. v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., No. 4:05-CV-1403 (S.D.Tex. Apr. 21, 2005). The Court takes judicial notice of the pleadings in this earlier action.

The Court does not read Plaintiffs’ “breach of contract” and “negligence” claims as grounded in state or common law, but to the extent that they rely on those theories, Plaintiffs must proceed under the federal law. See Hopper Furs, Inc. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 749 F.2d 1261, 1264 (8th Cir.1985) (“All actions against a common carrier, whether designated as tort or contract actions, are governed by the federal statute ….”). The Court recognizes that breach of contract or negligence principles may be relevant in establishing a claim or defense, though ultimately, Plaintiffs’ recovery is limited to that permitted under the Carmack Amendment, which provides the “exclusive remedy” for losses incurred via the interstate transportation of goods by a common carrier. Royal Air, Inc. v. AAA Cooper Transp., Inc., 395 F.Supp.2d 436, 441 (W.D.La.2005); see Hoskins v. Bekins Van Lines, 343 F.3d 769, 778 (5th Cir.2003) (In order to establish a prima facie case under the Carmack Amendment for loss or damage to goods during interstate transportation, “the shipper must demonstrate: (1) delivery of the goods in good condition, (2) receipt by the consignee of less goods or damaged goods, and (3) the amount of damages.”); see also MAN Roland, Inc. v. Kreitz Motor Express, Inc., 438 F.3d 476, 479 (5th Cir.2006) (“If the shipper establishes a prima facie case [for a cause of action under the Carmack Amendment], there is a rebuttable presumption of negligence [that t]he carrier can overcome … by showing that it was free from negligence and that the damage was due to the inherent nature of the goods or attributable to an act of God, public enemy, the shipper, or public authority.”(internal citations omitted)); Air Products & Chem., Inc. v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R. Co., 721 F.2d 483, 484-85 (5th Cir.1983) (“[T]he Carmack Amendment … provides an exclusive remedy for a breach of contract of carriage provided by a bill of lading.”).

Similarly, Plaintiffs insist that their misrepresentation claim merely pleads a theory of relief under the Carmack Amendment. On this claim, the Court is unpersuaded. Courts have consistently held misrepresentation claims to be preempted by the Carmack Amendment, see, e.g., Moffit v. Bekins Van Lines, Co., 6 F.3d 305, 307 (5th Cir.1993); Schoenmann Produce Co., 420 F.Supp.2d at 763-64, and the Court has not identified a case in which common law misrepresentation theories have been relevant to recovery under the Carmack Amendment.

Moreover, courts have considered whether a misrepresentation claim-which arguably concerns conduct by a defendant prior to the signing of a shipping contract-may be alleged alongside a Carmack Amendment claim for losses under a shipping contract. Those courts have consistently concluded that the misrepresentation claims are too closely related to the shipping contracts to survive preemption. See Berlanga v. Terrier Transp., Inc., 269 F.Supp.2d 821, 830 (N.D.Tex.2003); Mayflower Transit, Inc. v. Weil, Gotshal & Manges, LLP, No. 3:00-CV-0549-P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20299, at (N.D.Tex. Oct. 18, 2000) (citing Gordon v. United Van Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 282, 289 (7th Cir.1997)). Given the elements of a prima facie case under the Carmack Amendment, see Hoskins, 343 F.3d at 778, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ misrepresentation claim rests entirely on state or common law and hence, is preempted. Accordingly, BNSF is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Plaintiffs’ claim under the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act is also preempted.Although shippers and carriers have sought declaratory judgments in cases implicating the Carmack Amendment, those judgments primarily concern whether the Carmack Amendment will apply to the case at hand. See, e.g., McLaughlin Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Rubinstein, 390 F.Supp.2d 50, 55 (D.Mass.2005); Mayflower Transit v. Troutt, 332 F.Supp.2d 971 (W.D.Tex.2004); Rehm v. Balt. Storage Co., 300 F.Supp.2d 408, 411 (W.D.Va.2004); see also Diamond Transp. Group, Inc. v. Emerald Logistics Solutions, Inc., No. 05-3828, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42918 (E.D. Pa. June 22, 2006). Where, as here, a party seeks a declaratory judgment concerning the parties’ rights and responsibilities under a fully performed contract admittedly governed by the Carmack Amendment, the declaratory judgment claim is so closely related to the making, performance of, and recovery under the contract that it must be preempted by the federal law. See Hoskins, 343 F.3d at 778 (“Congress intended for the Carmack Amendment to provide the exclusive cause of action for loss or damages to goods arising from the interstate transportation of those goods by a common carrier.”(emphasis in original)). A declaratory judgment is unnecessary to resolution of this case, which will focus upon the parties’ obligations to one another under the shipping contracts in light of applicable federal law. Thus, BNSF is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

Plaintiffs seek declarations concerning, inter alia,“the parties’ relationship under the contract for carriage, as well as the interpretation and enforcement of the rules of carriage and the contract between the parties.”Complaint [Doc. # 1-3], ¶ 132.

Although the Mayflower court did grant a declaratory judgment under the federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), concerning both the applicability of the Carmack Amendment to the dispute and the “rights, duties, and liabilities” of a shipper and carrier, Mayflower Transit, 332 F.Supp.2d at 979, that case is distinguishable from the one here. In Mayflower, the parties potentially had future obligations to one another concerning a shipment of goods and sought a declaration to guide their future interactions. Importantly, the court was persuaded by the plaintiff-carrier’s argument that a declaratory judgment would likely prevent future litigation by clarifying any outstanding duties the carrier owed to the shipper. Id. A declaratory judgment would also stop damages from accruing while the defendant-shipper considered filing its own suit against the carrier. See id., at 981.In the case at bar, performance under the shipping contract is complete, losses have been alleged, and this case has been brought to fully litigate the entire controversy. As such, Mayflower does not counsel in favor of litigating Plaintiffs’ state law declaratory judgment claim.

B. Fees and Damages

BNSF next argues that recovery of attorneys’ fees and incidental and consequential damages are precluded by the Carmack Amendment and the shipping contracts at issue in this case. Plaintiffs have conceded that attorneys’ fees and consequential damages are not recoverable, but contend that they may still pursue incidental damages. Thus, Plaintiffs argue that they may recover their losses as measured by the fair market value of the potatoes at their point of destination rather than by the cost of the potatoes at their point of origin. BNSF has not replied to this argument and has not identified any language in the contracts governing the shipments at issue that would refute Plaintiffs’ position.

The summary judgment evidence currently before the Court is insufficient for a determination of how Plaintiffs’ damages, if any, should be measured. Thus, while BNSF is entitled to summary judgment with regard to attorneys’ fees and consequential damages, summary judgment is denied as to whether Plaintiffs may recover incidental damages. In any event, regardless of how any damages are ultimately measured, Plaintiffs’ losses will be governed by the Carmack Amendment, which limits recovery to “the actual loss or injury to the property ….”49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1); see also Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, 144 F.3d 377, 382 (5th Cir.1998).

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby

ORDERED that BNSF Railway Company’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. # 13] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART .Plaintiffs may proceed with claims arising under the Carmack Amendment, but their misrepresentation and declaratory judgment claims are dismissed. In addition, Plaintiffs may not seek to recover attorneys’ fees or consequential damages. The Court does not rule on whether Plaintiffs’ damages, if any, should be measured by the fair market value of their products at the point of origin or at the point of destination.