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Ezzi v. Domino’s Pizza Llc



Supreme Court of New York, Richmond County
December 17, 2021, Decided; January 7, 2022, Published
150530/2020

Reporter
2021 NYLJ LEXIS 1261 *
Ezzi v. Domino’s Pizza LLC
Notice: © [2022] ALM Media Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited. www.nylj.com
(Ezzi v. Domino’s Pizza LLC, NYLJ, Jan. 7, 2022 at p.17, col.3)
Core Terms

video, summary judgment, traveling, non-moving, parties, brakes, driver, summary judgment motion, safe, consolidated, discovery, distance, suddenly, traffic, lanes, truck
Judges: [*1] Judge: Justice Catherine DiDomenico
Opinion

Plaintiff brought a personal injury action arising out of a motor vehicle “accident” that occurred when he was a passenger in a U-HAUL pickup truck operated by one defendant. Another defendant was driving a tractor-trailer during his employment with defendant Domino’s Pizza. Plaintiff argued defendants are jointly and severally liable for his injuries. The Domino’s driver and Domino’s moved for dismissal of the complaint as against them on the ground that there were no issues of fact as to how the incident occurred. Defendants argued this incident was actually “staged” and was intentionally caused by the U-HAUL driver, with or without plaintiff’s knowledge. The court granted the motion, finding that the Domino’s driver showed that his vehicle was traveling at a safe rate of speed and at a safe distance from the vehicle ahead of him. The Domino’s driver also showed that the U-HAUL driver’s vehicle suddenly and unexpectedly swerved into his lane of travel and immediately applied its brakes. Further, video evidence showed that there was no objectively identifiable reason for the U-HAUL driver’s vehicle to have abruptly changed lanes or to have stopped [2] suddenly. Full Case Digest Text Recitation as required by CPLR 2219(a) of the papers considered in the review of Motion Sequence Numbers 001 & 002 Numbered Notice of Motion to Amend by Plaintiff (001, NYSCEF No.25), 1 Affirmation in Opposition to 001 by Defendant (NYSCEF #49), 2 Affirmation in Reply to 001 by Plaintiff (NYSCEF #83), 3 Notice of Motion for Summary Judgment (002, NYSCEF #33), 4 Supplemental Affirmation in Support of 002 (NYSCEF #45), 5 Second Supplemental Affirmation in Support of 002 (NYSCEF #55), 6 Affirmation & Affidavit in Opposition to 002 by Plaintiff (NYSCEF #76), 7 Affirmation in Opposition to 002 by Co-Defendant (NYSCEF #58), 8 Affirmation in Reply to Co-Defendant (NYSCEF #79), 9 Affirmation in Reply to Plaintiff (NYSECEF #80) 10 Supplemental Reply Affirmation (NYSECEF #82), 11 “Dash Cam” Video of Incident, 12 Stipulation of Partial Discontinuance Resolving Seq. No. 003 (NYSCEF #87), 13 Order of Consolidation (NYSCEF #86). 14 Upon the foregoing cited papers, the Decision and Order of the Court is as follows: Procedural History The present personal injury action was commenced with the filing of a Summons and Complaint on or about March 12, 2020. The action arises out of a motor vehicle “accident” [3] which occurred on November 6, 2019 in the westbound lanes of the Staten Island Expressway. At the time of the incident Plaintiff Ezzi was a passenger in a rented U-HAUL pickup truck which was operated by Defendant Suleiman. Defendant Alale was driving a tractor-trailer during the course and scope of his employment with Defendant Domino’s Pizza LLC (“Domino’s”). Defendant Dominos leased the tractor-trailer involved in the incident from Defendant Ryder Truck Rental, Inc (“Ryder’). Plaintiff alleges that he sustained serious injuries as a result of the November 6th incident, and that the Defendants are jointly and severally liable for his injuries.
By So Ordered Stipulation dated June 18, 2021 the present action was consolidated with a related action under Richmond County Index Number 152455/2020. Defendant Suleiman is the Plaintiff in that action, while the Defendants remain the same. The consolidation was limited to purposes of joint discovery and a joint trial. By a second So Ordered Stipulation dated June 18, 2021 the parties agreed to discontinue both consolidated actions as they pertained to Defendants Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. and U-Haul pursuant to the “Graves Amendment.” See 49 USC 30106.
[4] Present Motions / Relevant Facts On or about January 5, 2021, Plaintiff filed a motion (Seq. No. 001) which seeks to amend his Complaint to add “Domino’s Pizza Inc.” as a Defendant in this action. Plaintiff argues that as part of his investigation into the matter, he has determined that “Domino’s Pizza Inc.” is an additional insured party under the insurance policy held by Defendant Domino’s Pizza LLC. As such, he wishes to add them to this action. In opposition, Defendant Domino’s Pizza LLC. argues that any claim asserted against Domino’s Pizza Inc. would be frivolous, as they are a special purpose corporation with no employees. Thus, as Mr. Alale was employed by Defendant Domino’s Pizza LLC., any vicarious liability would flow to that entity, not to Domino’s Pizza Inc. On or about January 22, 2021, Defendants Alale & Domino’s (“The Moving Defendants”) filed a motion (Seq. No.002) which seeks an order granting them summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint on the ground that there are no triable issues of fact regarding how this incident occurred. The Moving Defendants argue that contrary to the position taken by Plaintiff that this was a typical “hit in the rear” accident, this [5] incident was actually “staged” and was intentionally caused by Defendant Suleiman, with or without the knowledge of Plaintiff. The Moving Defendants further request that they be granted the right to add an affirmative defense of the “emergency doctrine” to their Verified Answer if summary judgment is not granted.
The Moving Defendants allege in a sworn affidavit by Defendant Alale that the vehicle operated by Defendant Suliman, in which Plaintiff was a passenger, suddenly swerved into their established lane of traffic and then aggressively applied its brakes with the intention of causing a collision. The Moving Defendants further allege that Defendant Suleiman swerved into their lane, in the middle of a four-lane expressway, without signaling. In opposition, Plaintiff and Defendant Suliman both allege that traffic conditions necessitated the abrupt lane change, and the sudden stop. Arguably this assertion by Plaintiff contradicts his negligence causes of action against Defendant Suliman, as Plaintiff’s counsel asserts that “Defendant Suleiman has provided a non-negligent explanation for how the crash occurred” (Pl aff. in opp.
18). However, Defendant Suleiman has not filed a motion for [6] summary judgment. It is undisputed that Defendant Suleiman was arrested at the scene and charged with a violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law 511(3) for the “aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the first degree.” Notably, this charge does not directly relate to the manner in which Defendant Suleiman operated his vehicle and rather relates to the fact that he did not possess a valid driver’s license at the time and place of occurrence. In support of his motion the Moving Defendants have offered a copy of the MV104 Police Accident Report prepared by the arresting officer, however the report contains inadmissible hearsay and therefore cannot be considered. See De Diaz v. Klausner, 2021 NY Slip Op 05624 (1st Dept. 2021). In addition to sworn affidavits in support of the motion for summary judgment, the Moving Defendants have submitted a “dash-cam” video of the incident in question. This splitscreen video depicts a view of the inside of the tractor trailer’s cab, and a view in front of the vehicle. The video is clear, has sound, and displays the speed of the Moving Defendants’ vehicle. To date, no party has raised an objection to the submission of the video or challenged its accuracy. Rather, Plaintiff and Defendant Suleiman argue that the motion [7] is premature, and that the video in question is “inconclusive” and insufficient to support the granting of summary judgment.
Applicable Law
The proponent of a summary judgment motion has the initial burden of making a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by tendering sufficient evidence to eliminate any material issues of fact from the case. See Otty Cab Corp. v. Nazir, 72 N.Y.S.3d 517 (2d Dept. 2017). A movant’s burden can be satisfied by the submission of sworn affidavits in proper evidentiary form. See Charlie Fox, Inc. v. Diallo, 48 N.Y.S.3d 264 (2d Dept. 2016). That burden may also be satisfied by the submission of dashboard camera video evidence. See Alston v. Irizarry, 195 AD3d 578 (2d Dept. 2021). Once a prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment has been established, the burden shifts to the non-moving party or parties to raise a material issue of fact. See Ubillus-Tambini v. Ischakov, 36 N.Y.S.3d 410 (2d Dept. 2016). Generally, unsworn motor vehicle accident reports do not constitute evidence in admissible form for the purposes of supporting, or defeating, a summary judgment motion. See Hegy v. Coller, 262 AD2d 606 (2d Dept. 1999).
Decision
Here, the moving Defendants have met their initial burden of establishing their entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law. The affidavit of Defendant Charles Alale establishes that the vehicle he was operating was traveling at a safe rate of speed and at [8] a safe distance from the vehicle ahead of him. Defendant Alale states that contact between the vehicles at issue in this case occurred when Defendant Suleiman’s vehicle suddenly and unexpectedly swerved into his lane of travel and immediately applied its brakes. Defendant Alale indicates that while he attempted to apply the brakes of his vehicle, there was no way for him to stop a tractor trailer given the unexpected proximity of the Suleiman vehicle. Defendant Alale’s testimony is supported by dashboard camera video evidence of the incident, which clearly shows that the moving Defendants were traveling at 17-18 miles per hour, in moderate traffic conditions just before the incident. The video further shows that the moving Defendants were established in their lane of travel and were maintaining a safe distance of at least three and a half to four car lengths away from the vehicle traveling ahead of them in compliance with VTL 1129(a). At the five second marker of the video Defendant Suleiman’s U-haul truck comes into frame and abruptly changes lanes into the space directly in front of the Alale vehicle, at a distance of two or three feet. When the Suleiman vehicle enters Alale’s lane, there are [9] at least 3 and a half car lengths between it and the vehicle ahead of it, but despite this distance, the Suleiman vehicle abruptly slams on the brakes, causing the Alale vehicle to strike it in the rear. It appears from the video that this accident was likely “intentionally staged” as argued by the Moving Defendants. It is against the public policy of this state for a plaintiff to recover in a case where he engaged in unlawful conduct. See Oriental v. U-Haul Co. of Ariz., 130 AD3d 702 (2d Dept. 2015); Manning by Manning v. Brown, 91 NY2d 116 (1997).
The video evidence submitted in support of the present motion establishes that there was no objectively identifiable reason for the Suleiman vehicle to have abruptly changed lanes or to have stopped suddenly. Moreover, it is clear that the lane change was “unsafe” in violation of VTL 1128(a). See Castro v. Hatim, 174 AD3d 464 (1st Dept. 2019). Considering both the affidavit of Defendant Alale together with the dashcam video, the moving Defendants have met their burden of establishing that the unsafe lane change was the sole proximate cause of this incident. See Raza v. Gunik, 129 AD3d 700 (2d Dept. 2015); Reyes-Diaz v. Quest Diagnostic Inc., 123 AD3d 790 (2d Dept. 2014). Defendant Suleiman had a duty not to enter a lane of moving traffic until it was safe to do so, and his failure to heed this duty constitutes negligence per se. See Sanchez v. Oxcin, 157 AD3d 561 (1st Dept. 2018).
As the Moving Defendants have established their entitlement to summary judgment [10] as a matter of law, the burden shifts to the non-moving parties, in this case Plaintiff Ezzi and Defendant Suleiman, to raise a material question of fact. See Paula v. City of New York, 249 AD2d 100 (1st Dept. 1998). The non-moving parties have failed to meet their burden. Both Plaintiff and Defendant Suleiman argue that traffic conditions necessitated both the lane change, and the sudden application of brakes, but the video evidence submitted shows otherwise. There is no indication in the video that the vehicles traveling ahead of the incident were stopping, and even if they were, the vehicles were traveling at such a slow rate of speed such that Defendant Suleiman could have easily stopped in his lane of travel without incident if conditions necessitated him to do so. Moreover, once he changed lanes there was absolutely no reason for him to “slam on his brakes,” as there was a considerable amount of space ahead of his vehicle, but little to no space behind it. The affidavits offered by the non-moving parties are self-serving, contradicted by the video evidence, and insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. See Weber v. Monsey New Sq. Trails Corp., 191 AD3d 929 (2d Dept. 2021); see also Tardio v. Saleh, 193 AD3d 901 (2d Dept. 2021). There is no evidence in the record that the Moving Defendants in any way contributed to the happening of the [11] incident or could have done anything to avoid it. See Ming v. Grossman, 133 AD3d 742 (2d Dept. 2015). Thus, summary judgment is warranted under the facts presented. See Leonard v. Pomarico, 137 AD3d 1085 (2d Dept. 2016).
Generally, this Court requires motions for summary judgment to be filed after the close of discovery. However, in this case, specific authority was granted for the filing of the present motion. Thus, the non-moving parties’ argument that the motion is premature, standing alone, is without merit. To establish that a motion for summary is premature, the non-moving parties are required to “demonstrate that additional discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to oppose the motion are exclusively the knowledge and control of the movant.” Everhome Mtge. Co. v. Aber, 195 AD3d 682 (2d Dept. 2021). “The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion.” Toltchelnikova v. Cmty. Recycling, 197 AD3d 677 (2d Dept. 2021); see also Cajas-Romero v. Ward, 106 AD3d 850 (2d Dept. 2013). Here, the non-moving parties have not established that additional discovery would lead to relevant evidence.
For the detailed reasons set forth above, motion sequence number 002 is hereby granted in its entirety. All causes of action asserted by Plaintiff are hereby dismissed with prejudice. In light of this Court’s [*12] decision on the motion for summary judgment the Plaintiff’s motion to amend his Summons and Complaint to add a party is hereby denied as moot. Similarly, Defendant’s motion to amend his Answer to assert an “emergency doctrine” defense is hereby denied without prejudice as academic, although the facts presented would arguably be sufficient to satisfy the doctrine, as the Moving Defendants were faced with an unexpected emergency situation not of their own making. See Penaranda v. Tesoriero, 195 AD3d 633 (2d Dept. 2021).
This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court on all issues raised in relation to motion sequence numbers 001 and 002. As summary judgment has been granted to the Moving Defendants, the matter shall only proceed against Defendant Suleiman. Plaintiff’s attorney in the consolidated action is hereby granted 10 days from service of this motion to consider withdrawing that action. In the event that he fails to do so, the Defendants in that action are authorized to file a motion for summary judgment in accordance with this Decision.
Dated: December 17, 2021

Burns v. Shama Express, L.L.C.



United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
January 13, 2022, Decided; January 13, 2022, Filed
CIVIL ACTION No. 21-5104

Reporter
2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6589 *
EMILY M. BURNS, in her own right and as Administratrix of the Estate of Matthew T. Burns, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. SHAMA EXPRESS, L.L.C., et al., Defendants.
Core Terms

venue, witnesses, give rise, convenience, factors, weigh, public interest, tractor-trailer, westbound
Counsel: [*1] For EMILY M BURNS, IN HER OWN RIGHT AND AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF MATTHEW T. BURNS, DECEASED, Plaintiff: JAMES JOSEPH WALDENBERGER, LEAD ATTORNEY, KLINE & SPECTER, PC, PHILADELPHIA, PA; THOMAS R. KLINE, LEAD ATTORNEY, KLINE & SPECTER, PHILADELPHIA, PA.
For SHAMA EXPRESS, L.L.C., BSE TRAILER LEASING, L.L.C., MOHAMMED AKBARI, Defendants, Cross Claimants: MICHAEL F. NERONE, LEAD ATTORNEY, PION, NERONE, GIRMAN, WINSLOW & SMITH, P.C., PITTSBURGH, PA.
For FROST BROOK TRUCKING, INC., ROBERT LEE, JR, MARK W EDDY, Defendants: DAMIAN M. TARANTO, FOWLER HIRTZEL MCNULTY & SPAULDING LLP, PHILADELPHIA, PA; JOSEPH R. FOWLER, FOWLER HIRTZEL MCNULTY & SPAULDING, LLP, PHILADELPHIA, PA; Matthew T Bonner, Fowler Hirtzel McNulty & Spaulding LLP, Philadelphia, PA.
For MARK W EDDY, FROST BROOK TRUCKING, INC., ROBERT LEE, JR, Cross Defendants: DAMIAN M. TARANTO, FOWLER HIRTZEL MCNULTY & SPAULDING LLP, PHILADELPHIA, PA; JOSEPH R. FOWLER, FOWLER HIRTZEL MCNULTY & SPAULDING, LLP, PHILADELPHIA, PA.
Judges: ANITA B. BRODY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Opinion by: ANITA B. BRODY
Opinion

MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff Emily M. Burns brings negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and Pennsylvania Wrongful Death Act and Survivor Act [*2] claims against Defendants Shama Express, LLC, Mohammed Akbari, and Dilawar Ali Shah (collectively, “Shama Defendants”), Frost Brook Trucking, Inc., Robert Lee, Jr., and Mark W. Eddy (collectively, “Frost Brook Defendants”), and BSE Trailer Leasing, LLC.1 On November 19, 2021, the Shama Defendants removed the instant action to this Court from the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas.2 ECF No. 1. I exercise diversity jurisdiction over Burns’ claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.3
The Frost Brook Defendants and Shama Defendants move to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania based on the convenience of the parties and witnesses.4 ECF Nos. 5-6. I will grant the Defendants’ Motions to Transfer to the Western District of Pennsylvania.

I. BACKGROUND5
In the early hours of December 20, 2020, the Burns family was traveling westbound on Interstate 80 (“I-80”) in Pine Township, Clearfield County, Pennsylvania. Decedent Matthew Burns was driving the family’s Honda Odyssey minivan, Plaintiff Emily Burns was in the passenger seat, and the couple’s three children were in child car seats secured in the back rows. The road surface [*3] was wet and covered with snow. Defendant Akbari or Defendant Shah was also driving westbound on I-80, operating a tractor-trailer.6 At or near mile marker 110.4, Akbari or Shah lost control of the tractor-trailer, which jack-knifed and came to a stop across the left-hand westbound lane. Decedent Burns, also travelling in the left-hand westbound lane, was unable to avoid colliding with the jack-knifed tractor-trailer because a second tractor-trailer, driven by Defendant Eddy, was travelling in the right-hand westbound lane, thus preventing Decedent Burns from swerving to the right.7 In the ensuing collision, Decedent Burns was ejected from the vehicle and sustained fatal injuries.

II. DISCUSSION
Notwithstanding proper venue following removal to federal court, a court may transfer a civil action to another district under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Section 1404(a) provides: “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The movant bears the burden of establishing the propriety of transfer. Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 25 (3d Cir. 1970). A movant is “not required to show ‘truly compelling [*4] circumstances for . . . change . . . [of venue, but rather that] all relevant things considered, the case would be better off transferred to another district.'” Connors v. R & S Parts & Servs., Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 394, 396 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (Shapiro, J.) (quoting In re United States, 273 F.3d 380, 388 (3d Cir. 2001)) (alterations in original).

a. Venue is Proper in the Western District of Pennsylvania
The Frost Brook Defendants and Shama Defendants move to transfer this action to the Western District of Pennsylvania for the convenience of the parties and witnesses. The Court’s first task must be to determine whether the instant suit “might have been brought” in the Western District.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2), “[a] civil action may be brought in a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.” When a plaintiff’s claims arise solely from an accident, a “substantial part of the events . . . giving rise” to those claims occurs in the district where the accident takes place. See, e.g., Miller v. SAWA Transportation Inc., No. CV 21-2308, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183984, 2021 WL 4399665, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2021) (Brody, J.) (finding venue proper in the judicial district where the auto accident giving rise to plaintiff’s claims occurred, and not in the judicial district where plaintiff sought medical treatment); Medina v. Haas, No. CV 20-5019, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52820, 2021 WL 1088343, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2021) (Pappert, J.) (finding venue proper in judicial district where tractor-trailer accident giving [*5] rise to plaintiff’s claims occurred).
The accident on I-80 that gives rise to Burns’ claims against Defendants occurred in Clearfield County, Pennsylvania, which is encompassed by the Western District. ECF No. 5-1 at 6; 28 U.S.C. § 118(c). Venue is thus proper in the Western District. The Western District would also have personal jurisdiction over Defendants. See O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 316-17 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding that the conduct of business in a state creates “certain minimum contacts with . . . [Pennsylvania] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice”). Burns could have properly brought her suit in the Western District.

b. Public and Private Factors Weigh in Favor of Transfer
When venue is proper in the proposed transferee court, the transferor court must conduct a balancing test, considering “the private and public interests protected by the language of § 1404(a).” Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995). Although there is no definitive list of factors to consider, private interests often weighed include (i) the plaintiff’s forum preference; (ii) the defendant’s preference; (iii) where the claim arose; (iv) the convenience of the parties; (v) the convenience of the nonparty witnesses to the extent that the witnesses may [*6] be unavailable for trial in one of the fora; and (vi) the location of records to the extent that they could not be produced in the alternative forum. Id.

i. Private Interest Factors
In considering private interest factors, “[the plaintiff’s] choice of forum is [generally] entitled to great weight and is not to be disturbed unless the balance of convenience strongly favors the defendant[‘s] forum.” Blanning v. Tisch, 378 F. Supp. 1058, 1060 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (Luongo, J.) (citing Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 25 (3d Cir. 1970)). But “plaintiff’s choice of forum merits less deference when none of the conduct complained of occurred in plaintiff’s selected forum” or “when the plaintiff’s choice of forum is not the plaintiff’s residence.” Rowles v. Hammermill Paper Co., 689 F. Supp. 494, 496 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (Cahn, J.). The defendant’s forum preference, meanwhile, is usually “entitled to considerably less weight than Plaintiff’s, as the purpose of a venue transfer is not to shift inconvenience from one party to another.” Family Fin. Ctrs. LLC v. Cox, No. 14-5330, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22406, 2015 WL 790038, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2015) (Buckwalter, J.) (quoting EVCO Tech. Dev. Co. v. Precision Shooting Equip., Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 728, 730 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (Rufe, J.)).
Although Burns did not choose to be in federal court in the Eastern District, she to some degree chose this forum by filing in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. See Battle v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 19-cv-0945, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180224, 2019 WL 5290540, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 17, 2019) (Jones, J.) (considering the Eastern District of Pennsylvania the plaintiff’s chosen forum in action removed from Philadelphia County [7] Court of Common Pleas). But Burns’ selection of forum should be given little weight, as the events giving rise to her claims against Defendants occurred in the Western District. Furthermore, Burns lives in Huntingdon County, which is located in the Middle District and much closer to the seat of the Western District than to Philadelphia. ECF No. 6 at 18; 28 U.S.C. § 118(b). Most importantly, Burns did not oppose the Motions for Transfer currently before the Court.8 As such, the Frost Brook Defendants’ and Shama Defendants’ Motions to transfer this case do not shift the inconvenience of litigation from Defendants to Burns, because no named party resides in the Eastern District, let alone in Pennsylvania. Because Burns’ choice is given less weight than is typical of transfer analyses and because she did not oppose the Defendants’ Motions for Transfer, the private interests reflecting the named parties’ wishes favor transfer to the Western District. The private interests considering where the claim arose, the convenience and accessibility of witnesses, and the accessibility of records also favor transfer. “When the vast majority of the acts giving rise to plaintiff’s claims take place in another forum, that [8] weighs heavily in favor of transfer.” Leatherman v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., No. 12-cv-3783, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45297, 2013 WL 1285491, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2013) (DuBois, J.) (quoting Hamilton v. Nochimson, No. 09-CV-2196, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62644, 2009 WL 2195138, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 2009) (O’Neill, J.)). The events and witnesses in this case have no connection to the Eastern District. The accident occurred in the Western District. Responding state troopers, EMS personnel, and other witnesses are in western Pennsylvania, as are all relevant police and medical records. ECF No. 5-1 at 9-10; ECF No. 6 at 14-16.
Given the above analysis, private interests in this matter weigh in favor of transfer to the Western District of Pennsylvania.

ii. Public Interest Factors
Jumara also requires that the Court consider relevant public interests, including (i) the enforceability of the judgment; (ii) practical considerations that could make the trial easy, expeditious, or inexpensive; (iii) the relative administrative difficulty in the two fora resulting from court congestion; (iv) the local interest in deciding controversies at home, (v) the public policies of the fora; and (vi) the familiarity of the trial judge with applicable state law in diversity cases. Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879-80.
The first and sixth public factors are inapplicable here because a judgment in the Western District is equally enforceable as compared to one in the Eastern District, and because [*9] judges in both districts are familiar with the applicable Pennsylvania law. The third factor weighs somewhat against transfer, as the Western District has a slightly higher case load per judge than does the Eastern District. ECF No. 6 at 20. As the Shama Defendants note, however, the case loads of both districts are below the national average, suggesting the public interest in lessening court congestion should be afforded little weight in this analysis. Id. Furthermore, the remaining public interest factors weigh more clearly in favor of transfer; given the need for witness travel, access to records, and potential access to the accident scene, it is eminently more practical and cost-effective to adjudicate the case locally. The Western District surely has the greater interest in providing a forum for the resolution of a lawsuit resulting from a tragic local accident. Public interests thus also weigh in favor of transfer.

III. CONCLUSION
Because venue is proper in the Western District of Pennsylvania and both private and public interests counsel in favor of transfer, Defendants have met their burden of proving that this case is best adjudicated in the Western District. I will therefore [*10] grant the Frost Brook Defendants’ and Shama Defendants’ Motions to Transfer to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
/s/ ANITA B. BRODY, J.
ANITA B. BRODY, J.

ORDER
AND NOW, this 13th day of January, 2022, Defendants Frost Brook Trucking, Inc., Robert Lee, Jr., and Mark W. Eddy’s Motion to Transfer for Inconvenient Forum (ECF No. 5) and Defendants Shama Express, L.L.C., Mohammed Akbari, and Dilawar Ali Shah’s Motion to Transfer Venue Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1404 (ECF No. 6) are GRANTED.
It is FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is directed to transfer the above-captioned matter to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.
/s/ ANITA B. BRODY, J.
ANITA B. BRODY, J.

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