Reporter
2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28519 *
AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. KYLE GOFF; L’GOFF MOVING SERVICES, LLC; CARRIE SLAY, INDIVIDUALLY; and CARRIE A. SLAY as EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF MICHAEL E. SLAY, Defendants.
Core Terms

Insured, Lawsuit, notice, summary judgment, occurrence, notify, matter of law, coverage, summary judgment motion, condition precedent, nonmoving party, material fact, genuine
Counsel: [*1] For AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff: MICHAEL C KENDALL, LEAD ATTORNEY, MATTHEW BRANDON HOWARD, DOUGLASVILLE, GA.
For KYLE GOFF, L’GOFF MOVING SERVICES LLC, Defendants: JOHN JAY MCARTHUR, ATHENS, GA.
For CARRIE SLAY, Individually, CARRIE A SLAY, as Executor of the Estate of, deceased, MICHAEL E SLAY, Defendants: TOM CAIN, LEAD ATTORNEY, BUFORD, GA.
Judges: C. ASHLEY ROYAL, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Opinion by: C. ASHLEY ROYAL
Opinion

ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Currently before the Court is Plaintiff Auto-Owners Insurance Company’s (“Auto-Owners”) Motion for Summary Judgment. Having carefully considered the parties’ arguments, the record, and applicable law, the Court GRANTS Auto-Owners’s Motion [Doc. 24].

BACKGROUND
Auto Owners filed this declaratory judgment action to determine whether liability coverage exists for Kyle Goff (“Goff”) or L’Goff Moving Services (“Moving Company”) for the claims Carrie Slay brought in the lawsuit she filed in Athens-Clarke County Superior Court (the “Underlying Lawsuit”).1
In September of 2018, Carrie and Michael Slay (“the Slays”) hired Moving Company to move [2] their belongings from Monroe, Georgia to Cuthbert, Georgia.2 Three months later, the Slays decided to move back to Monroe and again hired Moving Company to move their belongings.3 During the second move, Moving Company allegedly lost, stole, and/or destroyed some of the Slays’ personal belongings.4 On December 29, 2018, Goff and Moving Company were notified of the alleged damage.5 Two months later, on March 1, 2019, the Slays filed the Underlying Lawsuit.6 During Goff’s deposition in the Underlying Lawsuit, the Slays discovered Goff and Moving Company (“the Insured”) maintained a liability insurance policy through Auto-Owners.7 Auto-Owners issued a commercial general liability plus and inland marine insurance policy to “Kyle Goff DBA Goff Moving Services, LLC,” policy number 154618-80576078 (the “Policy”).8 The Policy states that, “[Auto-Owners] will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ to which this insurance applies.” Under the Policy, in the event of an occurrence, offense, claim, or suit, the insured “must [3] see to it that [Auto-Owners is] notified as soon as practicable of an ‘occurrence’ or an offense which may result in a claim”; “if any claim is made or ‘suit’ brought against any insured […] you must see to it that we receive written notice of any claim or ‘suit’ as soon as practicable”; and “you and any other involved must immediately send us copies of any correspondence, demands, notices, summonses or papers in connection with any claim or ‘suit’.”9
Six months after Goff’s deposition, on June 30, 2020, Auto-Owners first learned of the incident when the Slays served Auto-Owners with a notice of filing in the Underlying Lawsuit.10 After receiving notice, Auto-Owners issued letters to the Insured providing “notice of its reservation of rights to disclaim any obligation under the Policy and to assert the defense of non-coverage.”11 Auto-Owners then retained counsel to defend the Insured, subject to the reservation of rights.12
Auto-Owners now files a Motion for Summary Judgment contending the Insured failed to timely notify Auto-Owners of the “occurrence” and the Underlying Lawsuit. Thus, the Insured violated a condition precedent of coverage, and Auto-Owners has no duty to defend [*4] or indemnify any Defendant in the Underlying Lawsuit.

LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is proper if the movant “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”13 Not all factual disputes render summary judgment inappropriate; only a genuine issue of material fact will defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.14 This means that summary judgment may be granted if there is insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party or, in other words, if reasonable minds could not differ as to the verdict.15
On summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence and all justifiable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party; the Court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.16 The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact” and [5] that entitle it to a judgment as a matter of law.17 If the moving party discharges this burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to respond by setting forth specific evidence in the record and articulating the precise manner in which that evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact or that the moving party is not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.18 This evidence must consist of more than mere conclusory allegations or legal conclusions.19 “A fact is material for the purposes of summary judgment only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”20 Furthermore, “[a]n issue [of material fact] is not ‘genuine’ if it is unsupported by the evidence or is created by evidence that is ‘merely colorable’ or ‘not significantly probative.'”21 “A mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party’s position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment; there must be evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party.”22 Accordingly, if the moving party shows “that, on all the essential elements of its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving [6] party” then “it is entitled to summary judgment unless the nonmoving party, in response, comes forward with significant, probative evidence demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of fact.”23

DISCUSSION
The record establishes that the Insured failed to timely notify Auto-Owners of the “occurrence” and the Underlying Lawsuit. Under the Policy, the Insured had two obligations—to notify Auto-Owners “as soon as practicable of an ‘occurrence’ or an offense which may result in a claim,”24 and to “immediately send [Auto-Owners] copies of any correspondence, demands, notices, summonses or papers in connection with any claim or ‘suit’.”25 The Insured failed to do both.26
At the earliest, the Insured were aware of the “occurrence” on December 29, 2018—the date the damage occurred.27 At the latest, the Insured were aware of the Underlying Lawsuit on April 8, 2019—the date they filed their answer in the Underlying Lawsuit.28 Auto-Owners did not learn of the “occurrence” or the Underlying Lawsuit until the Slays served Auto-Owners with the notice of filing on June 30, 2020—eighteen months after the damage occurred and fourteen months after the Slays filed the Underlying Lawsuit. Such delay in notice [7] clearly violates the conditions precedent requiring timely notice “as soon as practicable” and requiring the Insured to “immediately” serve Auto-Owners with any correspondence, demands, notices, summonses, or papers in connection with the Underlying Lawsuit. “An insured’s duty to provide notice to the insurer is triggered when the insured actually knew or should have known of the possibility that [he] might be held liable for the offense in question. This is an objective standard, viewed from the perspective of the ordinary policyholder.”29 “Under Georgia law, ‘when an insurance policy includes a notice requirement as a condition precedent to coverage, and when the insured unreasonably fails to timely comply with the notice requirement, the insurer is not obligated to provide a defense or coverage.'”30 “Georgia courts have held that a delay of as little as three months between the filing of a lawsuit and notice to the insurer is unreasonable as a matter of law.”31 Analogously, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed delays of four, five, and eight months to be unreasonable as a matter of law.32 Goff admits that “[d]espite having known of the Claim on or around December 29, 2018, I did not, [8] at any time thereafter, notify Auto-Owners Insurance Company of the Claim by written notice in a timely manner or as soon as practicable.”33 Furthermore, the Insured concede the delay was without excuse and “as a result of [the Insured’s] failure to comply with the timely notice provisions of the Policy, which are condition precedents to coverage, that there is no insurance coverage available under the Policy respecting either the Claim or Underlying Lawsuit.”34
The Insured’s failure to notify Auto-Owners for a period of at least fourteen months was unreasonable as a matter of law. Because the Insured failed to comply with both conditions precedent under the Policy, and provide no justification for failing to do so, Auto-Owners has no duty to defend or indemnify any of the Defendants in the Underlying Lawsuit.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Auto-Owners’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 24] is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED, this 17th day of February, 2022.
/s/ C. Ashley Royal
C. ASHLEY ROYAL, SENIOR JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Reporter
2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28747 *
INTER METALS GROUP, Plaintiff, v. CENTRANS MARINE SHIPPING, APM TERMINALS ELIZABETH LLC, C.J. INTERNATIONAL, INC., MAVERICK TRANSPORT INC., P&A TRANSPORTATION, LLC, D2 LOGISTICS, INC., CHINA PACIFIC PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANY, LTD., and TRANSATLANTIC MARINE CLAIMS AGENCY, INC., Defendants.
Notice: NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Core Terms

motion to dismiss, crossclaims, carrier, allegations, preempted, cargo, plaintiff’s claim, statute of limitations, shipping, reasons, renewed, broker, shipping container, bill of lading, pleadings, delivery, freight, state law claim, interstate, Terminals, Transport, lading’s, damaged, further order, motor carrier, federal law, post-discharge, exoneration, forwarder, contends
Counsel: [*1] For INTER METALS GROUP, Plaintiff, Cross Defendant: PATRICK FRANCIS FLANIGAN, LAW OFFICE OF PATRICK FLANIGAN, SWARTHMORE, PA.
For CENTRANS MARINE SHIPPING, Defendant, Cross Claimant: JUSTIN M. HEILIG, LEAD ATTORNEY, HILL RIVKINS LLP, MANALAPAN, NJ; TERESA HANSAEM DOOLEY, LEAD ATTORNEY, CASEY & BARNETT LLC, NEW YORK, NY.
For C.J. INTERNATIONAL, INC, Defendant, Cross Defendant, Cross Claimant: RICK A. STEINBERG, LEAD ATTORNEY, Price Meese Shulman & D’Arminio, P.C., Woodcliff Lake, NJ.
For MAVERICK TRANSPORT INC, Defendant, Cross Defendant, Cross Claimant: KEVIN M. CAPUZZI, BENESCH FRIEDLANDER COPLAN & ARONOFF LLP, HACKENSACK, NJ.
For APM TERMINALS, APM Cross Claimant, Cross Defendant: WILLIAM JOSEPH PALLAS, III, FREEHILL, HOGAN & MAHAR LLP, JERSEY CITY, NJ.
For CENTRANS MARINE SHIPPING, Cross Defendant: TERESA HANSAEM DOOLEY, LEAD ATTORNEY, CASEY & BARNETT LLC, NEW YORK, NY.
Judges: John Michael Vazquez, United States District Judge.
Opinion by: John Michael Vazquez
Opinion

John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J.
This matter concerns a shipping container that had no cargo when it was delivered to Plaintiff Inter Metals Group (“IMG”). IMG brings claims against various parties involved in the shipping process: Centrans Marine Shipping *2; C.J. International, Inc. (“C.J.”); Maverick Transport Inc. (“Maverick”); and Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. (“TMCA”) (collectively, “Defendants”). D.E. 49. Presently before the Court are (1) motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint filed by C.J., D.E. 60, and Centrans, D.E. 61, and joined in part by Maverick, D.E. 63; (2) Centrans’ motion to dismiss the crossclaims filed by APM Terminals Elizabeth, LLC (“APM”), Maverick, and C.J., D.E. 18, renewed at D.E. 73; and (3) Maverick’s motion for joinder to Centrans’ motion to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadings, D.E. 30, renewed at D.E. 56. The Court reviewed all submissions in support and in opposition1 and considered the motions without oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Local Civil Rule 78.1(b). For the reasons discussed below, the motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and Centrans’ motion to dismiss Co-Defendants’ crossclaims is GRANTED. Because the Court’s ruling on the motions to dismiss grants the relief sought in Maverick’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, the motion is DENIED as moot.

I. BACKGROUND2
Plaintiff IMG is a business headquartered in York, Pennsylvania. AC ¶¶ 1, [3] 25. On November 8, 2018, a shipping container with 20,010 kilograms of copper wire was loaded aboard a ship bound from China to the consignee, Centrans, in Newark, New Jersey. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. On December 11, 2018, Centrans circulated an “Arrival Notice/Freight Invoice” indicating that the cargo weight of the container was 20,010 kilograms. Id. ¶ 16. After U.S. Customs cleared the shipping container, an agent of C.J. signed an U.S. Customs “Entry Summary” form noting that the shipment weight was 20,010 kilograms. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. IMG claims upon information and belief that the shipping container was warehoused and under C.J.’s control as of at least December 19, 2018. Id. ¶ 21. On December 27, 2018, Maverick was issued a “Delivery Order” from C.J. to pick up the container and deliver it to IMG in Pennsylvania. Id. ¶ 22. On January 3, 2019, the shipping container was removed from the terminal under a ticket noting that the cargo weight was “17.81 MT.” Id. ¶ 23. Later that day, during transfer of the container, an automatic “Equipment Interchange Receipt” indicated that the cargo weight was zero. Id. ¶ 24. On January 4, 2019, the shipping container was delivered to IMG and found to be empty. [4] Id. ¶ 25. IMG submitted an insurance claim to TMCA, which was denied. Id. ¶ 26.
IMG commenced this action on June 18, 2020, D.E. 1, and filed an Amended Complaint on July 11, 2021, D.E. 49. The Amended Complaint brings claims under the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 101, et seq., against Centrans, C.J., Maverick, and TMCA. AC ¶¶ 27-73. Plaintiff also brings various state law claims against the Defendants. Id. ¶¶ 75-263. The current motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint followed. Additionally, Centrans renewed its motion to dismiss the crossclaims of APM, Maverick, and C.J, D.E. 73, and Maverick renewed its joinder with Centrans’ motion to dismiss and motion for judgment on the pleadings, D.E. 56.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For a complaint to survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), it must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Further, a plaintiff must “allege sufficient facts to raise a reasonable [*5] expectation that discovery will uncover proof of her claims.” Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016). In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, district courts must separate the factual and legal elements. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-211 (3d Cir. 2009). A court “must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true.” Id. at 210. However, “‘[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice'” to state a plausible claim. Feingold v. Graff, 516 F. App’x 223, 226 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint, a district court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008). A court, however, is “not compelled to accept unwarranted inferences, unsupported conclusions or legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations.” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 211 (3d Cir. 2007). If, after viewing the allegations in the complaint most favorable to the plaintiff, it appears that no relief could be granted under any set of facts consistent with the allegations, a court may dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. DeFazio v. Leading Edge Recovery Sols., No. 10-2945, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131357, 2010 WL 5146765, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 13, 2010).
A motion to dismiss a crossclaim is governed by the same Rule 12(b)(6) standard. See Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. 215 14th St., LLC, Civ. No. 19-9206, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23664, 2020 WL 634149, at 1 (D.N.J. Feb. 10, 2020) (“When deciding a motion to dismiss a crossclaim or counterclaim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court undertakes the same analysis as it would [6] for claims in a complaint.”); see also In re Winer Fam. Tr., Civ. No. 05-3394, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 31610, 2006 WL 3779717, at *2 (3d Cir. Dec. 22, 2006) (reviewing the district court’s motion to dismiss a crossclaim under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Interstate Commerce Act Claims
The Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 14706 (the “Carmack Amendment”), governs the field of interstate shipping. See Certain Underwriters at Int. at Lloyds of London v. UPS of Am., Inc., 762 F.3d 332, 335 (3d Cir. 2014). Under the Carmack Amendment, a shipper can sue any carrier of the cargo, not just the original carrier. AMG Res. Corp. v. Wooster Motor Ways, Inc., 796 F. App’x 96, 99 (3d Cir. 2020). “To establish a prima facie case against a carrier under the Carmack Amendment, a shipper must prove (1) delivery of goods to the initial carrier in good condition, (2) damage of the goods before delivery to their final destination, and (3) the amount of the damages.” Mrs. Ressler’s Food Prods. v. KZY Logistics LLC, 675 Fed. Appx. 136, 140 (3d Cir. 2017) (internal quotation omitted).
Plaintiff brings Carmack Amendment claims against Centrans, C.J., Maverick, and TMCA. Plaintiff alleges that each of these Defendants is a carrier. See AC ¶¶ 29-30 (Centrans), ¶¶ 43-44 (C.J.), ¶ 54 (Maverick), ¶¶ 65-66 (TMCA). Centrans argues that it is not subject to IMG’s Carmack Amendment claim because IMG has not plausibly alleged that Centrans acted as an interstate carrier. Centrans Br. at 16-20. Specifically, Centrans contends that the Arrival Notice and bills of lading show that Centrans’ role was limited to the ocean carriage, the consignee, and the notify party. Id. at [*7] 18. However, at the motion to dismiss stage, “[i]t is inappropriate…to make any factual determinations regarding the precise nature of [Centrans’] business status and/or activities as to the transactions at issue.” Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Dynamic Worldwide Logistics, Inc., Civ. No. 17-553, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142926, 2017 WL 3868702, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2017) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the Carmack Amendment did not apply because the defendant was a freight broker and not a “carrier” and denying motion to dismiss). Thus, at this juncture, the Court “is bound by the allegations in the [Amended] Complaint,” identifying Centrans as a carrier. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142926, [WL] at 2. Maverick joins in this portion of Centrans’ motion, contending that it is a broker rather than a carrier. D.E. 63 at 1. Maverick’s argument fails for the same reasons. C.J. similarly asserts in its reply brief that it acted as a property broker, not a carrier. C.J. Reply at 8-9. C.J.’s argument fails for the same reasons and for the additional reason that a court “will not consider new arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief.” Islam v. City of Bridgeton, 804 F. Supp. 2d 190, 197 (D.N.J. 2011). Plaintiff’s claims are sufficient to bring a prima facie case under the Carmack Amendment. As to the first prong, Plaintiff has alleged delivery of the goods to the initial carrier in good condition because IMG alleges that there was no change in the shipping container’s [8] cargo weight between departure and delivery to the initial carrier, Centrans. AC ¶¶ 14-16. Plaintiff further alleges that the shipping container was empty when it arrived at its final destination, id. ¶ 25, and seeks damages of $110,000 for the value of the cargo, id. ¶ 263, thereby satisfying the second and third prongs.
C.J. contends that Plaintiff’s Carmack Amendment claim is factually insufficient because Plaintiff fails to allege how C.J. had a duty to IMG, and in what manner C.J. breached that duty. C.J. Br. at 12. However, such allegations are not necessary for Plaintiff to state a claim under the Carmack Amendment. Accordingly, Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a claim under the Carmack Amendment. See Tokio Marine Am. Ins. Co. v. Jan Packaging, No. CV 17-7491 (JLL), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 199366, 2017 WL 6021858, at *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 4, 2017) (finding that the plaintiff’s Carmack Amendment claims survived a motion to dismiss where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was hired to transport cargo in interstate commerce; the cargo was given to the defendant in good condition; the cargo was damaged when it arrived; and the amount of damages); Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142926, 2017 WL 3868702, at *2 (finding that dismissal of the plaintiff’s Carmack Amendment claim was inappropriate where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was a motor carrier who received the cargo in good condition but failed to deliver those goods to their destination [*9] in the same condition).
For the foregoing reasons, the motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s Carmack Amendment claims are denied on these grounds.

B. State Law Claims
Plaintiff also brings various state law claims against Defendants, including negligence, unlawful interference with prospective economic advantage, conversion, common law fraud, and New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act claims. AC ¶¶ 75-263. Plaintiff’s state law claims are preempted by both the Carmack Amendment and the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) (the “FAAAA”).
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides that federal law “shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. States are free to legislate as they see fit, “subject only to limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause.” Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458, 110 S. Ct. 792, 107 L. Ed. 2d 887 (1990). Federal law “preempts” state law in three situations: “(1) when a federal statute includes ‘an express provision for preemption’; (2) ‘[w]hen Congress intends federal law to “occupy the field” in an area of law; and (3) when a state and federal statue are in conflict.” In re Foxomax (Alendronate Sodium) Products Liability Litigation (No. II), 751 F.3d 150, 158-159 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted).
“[T]he Carmack Amendment provides the exclusive cause of action for loss or damage to goods transported by a motor carrier.” AMG Res. Corp., 796 F. App’x at 100 (emphasis added); see also Certain Underwriters, 762 F.3d at 335 (“For over one hundred years, the Supreme Court has consistently [*10] held that the Carmack Amendment has completely occupied the field of interstate shipping.”). Circuit courts “have consistently held that the Carmack Amendment is the exclusive cause of action for interstate-shipping contract [and tort] claims alleging loss or damage to property.” Id. at 336.
Further, the FAAAA expressly preempts state and common law claims against motor carriers, brokers, and freight forwarders. Specifically, the statute provides that “a State…may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier…broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). Other courts in this district have found that the “other provision having the force and effect of law” includes state common law. See Alpine Fresh, Inc. v. Jala Trucking Corp., 181 F. Supp. 3d 250, 257 (D.N.J. 2016) (dismissing common law claims for breach of bailment and negligence because they were expressly preempted by the FAAAA and Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act). Similarly, courts in this district have also recognized that the FAAAA preempts state tort claims. See AMG Res. Corp. v. Wooster Motor Ways, Inc., Civ. No. 15-3716, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6747, 2019 WL 192900, at *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 14, 2019) (holding that claims for conversion, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, violation of the New Jersey [*11] Consumer Fraud Act, and unjust enrichment arising from the non-delivery of a shipment of copper were preempted by the FAAAA and Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act), aff’d, 796 F. App’x 96 (3d Cir. 2020).
Here, the Amended Complaint alleges that Centrans is a broker, carrier, and freight forwarder, AC ¶¶ 29-30; C.J. is a broker, carrier, and freight forwarder, id. ¶¶ 43-44; Maverick is a motor carrier, id. ¶ 54; and TMCA is a broker, carrier, and freight forwarder, id. ¶¶ 65-66. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff’s state claims are preempted by both the Carmack Act and the FAAAA.3 Accordingly, Counts Five through Twenty-Nine are dismissed.4 See Surplus Afr. Foods, LLC v. Air France, Civ. No. 17-7105, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4898, 2018 WL 372169, at *2-3 (D.N.J. Jan. 11, 2018) (dismissing the plaintiff’s common law claims because they were preempted by the Carmack Amendment and the FAAAA).
For the foregoing reasons, the state claims are dismissed with prejudice.

C. Statute of Limitations
Centrans contends that Plaintiff’s claims against it are governed by federal maritime law, and that any claims based on federal maritime law are time-barred. Centrans Br. at 9-12; 14-16. Centrans relies on the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (“COGSA”), which “applies to a carrier engaged in the carriage of goods to or from any port in the United States,” 46 U.S.C.A. § 30702(a). Centrans Br. at 9. COGSA applies from “tackle [12] to tackle,” meaning “the period of time when the goods are loaded on to the time when they are discharged from the ship.” 46 U.S.C.A. § 1301(e). Centrans additionally points to the Harter Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30701, et seq., which governs the preloading and post-discharge periods until proper delivery is made to the consignee or its agent. Centrans Br. at 9. Alternatively, carriers may extend COGSA to apply to the pre-loading and post-discharge periods through a “Clause Paramount” in the bill of lading. Royal & Sun All. Ins., PLC v. Ocean World Lines, Inc., 612 F.3d 138, 142 n.6 (2d Cir. 2010). Centrans argues that as the “Forwarding Agent,” it is afforded the protections of COGSA and the Harter Act through the bill of lading’s “Himalaya Clause,” which extends those protections to a carrier’s agents and subcontractors. Centrans Br. at 12. As to the timeliness of Plaintiff’s claims, Centrans argues that IMG’s claims based on federal maritime law are barred by Section 6(4)(G) of the bill of lading, which provides: “The Carrier shall be discharged of all liability unless suit is brought in the proper forum and written notice thereof received by the Carrier within nine months after delivery of the Goods or the date when the Goods should have been delivered.” Id. at 14. Centrans continues that, alternatively, Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred by COGSA’s [13] one-year statute of limitations, which applies to the post-discharge period through the bill of lading’s Clause Paramount. Id. at 15. According to Centrans, “no matter which limitation period applies…any claim asserted by IMG against Centrans would be time-barred by operation of the Himalaya Clause.” Id.
“The statute of limitations is technically an affirmative defense which must be pled in an answer.” Luongo v. Vill. Supermarket, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 3d 520, 526 (D.N.J. 2017) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1)). A complaint may be dismissed on statute of limitations grounds on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “only if the time alleged in the statement of a claim shows that the cause of action has not been brought within the statute of limitations.” Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation omitted). In other words, dismissal on this ground is appropriate “only when the statute of limitations defense is apparent on the face of the complaint.” Wisniewski v. Fisher, 857 F.3d 152, 158 (3d Cir. 2017).
Here, it is not apparent on the face of the Amended Complaint that Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Whether the limitations period set forth in Section 6(4)(G) of the bill of lading applies to Centrans cannot be ascertained by reference to the Amended Complaint. By Centrans’ own contention, the bill of lading’s nine-month limitation period only extends to Centrans if, as [14] the Forwarding Agent, it is covered by the Himalaya Clause. The Himalaya Clause is not contained within the Amended Complaint or the documents attached thereto, and the Court is not convinced that it may properly consider the bill of lading’s terms containing the Himalaya Clause submitted with Centrans’ motion to dismiss.5 Even assuming the Court may consider the bill of lading’s terms, determining whether the Himalaya Clause applies to Centrans would additionally require examination of Centrans’ role in the shipment in relation to IMG and the carrier, which is a factual inquiry that cannot be resolved by considering “only the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Further, whether COGSA’s one-year limitation period applies is not apparent on the face of the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff does not assert any claims under COGSA, and whether COGSA’s statute of limitations applies to the post-discharge period through the Clause Paramount—as Centrans contends—cannot be determined by reference to the Amended Complaint. Indeed, Centrans’ own briefing represents that whether COGSA or the Harter Act applies to the post-discharge [15] period depends upon whether the two statutes are in conflict, again an inquiry that cannot be answered at this stage. See Centrans Br. at 9-10.
In sum, the statute of limitations defense raised by Centrans is not apparent on the face of the Amended Complaint. Therefore, without deciding whether federal maritime law applies to Plaintiff’s claims against Centrans, the Court finds that dismissal of these claims on statute of limitations grounds is not warranted at this stage.

D. Exoneration Clause
Centrans further argues that IMG’s claims are barred by an exoneration clause in the bill of lading.6 Centrans Br. at 13-14. Centrans contends that it is insulated from IMG’s claims under Section 5(2) of the bill of lading, which constitutes a “covenant not to sue a carrier’s servants, agents, or subcontractors.” Id. at 14. For the same reasons discussed above, the Court will not consider the bill of lading terms containing the exoneration clause at this stage in the proceedings. Moreover, “[c]ovenants not to sue, like a waiver or a claims release, provide an affirmative defense.” Rupert v. PPG Indus., Inc., Civ. No. 07-0705, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16639, 2009 WL 596014, at 41 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 26, 2009). Because “an affirmative defense may not be used to dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6),” the Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s [16] claims on the basis of the bill of lading’s exoneration clause. In re Adams Golf, Inc. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 267, 277 (3d Cir. 2004); see also In re Tower Air, Inc., 416 F.3d 229, 242 (3d Cir. 2005) (declining to address the issue of an exculpatory charter provision because it “appear[ed] to be in the nature of an affirmative defense,” which “generally will not form the basis for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)”). Even assuming the Court could properly consider Centrans’ exoneration clause argument on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, it appears that whether the clause applies turns on whether Centrans qualifies as a servant, agent, or subcontractor of the carrier, see Centrans Br. at 14, which is a factual inquiry inappropriate for the motion to dismiss stage. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142926, 2017 WL 3868702, at *2.

E. Centrans’ Motion to Dismiss Crossclaims
Centrans also moved to dismiss the crossclaims by APM, Maverick, and C.J. D.E. 18. Centrans then renewed its motion. D.E. 73.7 Centrans argues that the crossclaims do not meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8 because they are factually unsupported and constitute improper group pleading. Centrans Crossclaims Br. at 29-30.
Maverick’s crossclaim against APM, Centrans, C.J., P&A Transportation, LLC (“P&A”), and D2 Logistics, Inc. (“D2”) asserts the following:
“If the shipment in suit was damaged as set forth in the Complaint…then the [17] loss or damage was proximately caused by the negligence, breach of contract (express or implied), breach of warranty (express or implied), or fault or omission of Co-Defendants [APM], [Centrans], [C.J.], [P&A], and [D2], or any of them, in whole or in part, and not due to any fault, omission, negligence or breach of contract or breach of warranty on the part of Maverick.” D.E. 10 at 17. Maverick also alleges that it “is entitled to recover indemnity and/or contribution from [its Co-Defendants], or any of them,” for any sums recovered against Maverick and attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. C.J.’s crossclaim against APM, Centrans, Maverick, P&A, and D2 alleges the following: “If the shipment in suit was damaged as set forth in the Complaint…then the loss or damage was proximately caused by the negligence, breach of contract (express or implied), breach of warranty (express or implied), or fault or omission of Co-Defendants [Centrans], [APM], [Maverick], [P&A], and [D2], or any of them, in whole or in part, and not due to any fault, omission, negligence or breach of contract or breach of warranty on the part of C.J.” D.E. 12 at 6. C.J. further claims that it “is entitled to recover indemnity [18] and/or contribution from [its Co-Defendants], or any of them,” for any sums recovered against C.J. and attorneys’ fees and costs. Id.
The crossclaims are clearly not plausibly pled, consisting solely of conclusory statements. Moreover, “[e]ven under the most liberal notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a), a plaintiff must differentiate between defendants.” Shaw v. Hous. Auth. of Camden, Civ. No. 11-4291, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112694, 2012 WL 3283402, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2012). Mere “conclusory allegations against defendants as a group” that “fail[] to allege the personal involvement of any defendant” are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Galicki v. New Jersey, No. 14-169, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84365, 2015 WL 3970297, at *2 (D.N.J. June 29, 2015). A plaintiff must allege facts that “establish each individual [d]efendant’s liability for the misconduct alleged.” Id. A claim that contains “impermissibly vague group pleading” will be dismissed. Falat v. County of Hunterdon, No. 12-6804, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37398, 2013 WL 1163751, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2013).
Here, both Maverick and C.J. fail to satisfy the basic pleading requirement of providing adequate notice to each Co-Defendant of the specific claims against it. Their crossclaims are brought collectively against Centrans and the other Co-Defendants and fail to specify the personal involvement of any Co-Defendant. Accordingly, Maverick’s and C.J.’s crossclaims against Centrans are dismissed. See D’Addario v. Johnson & Johnson, Civ. No. 19-15627, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116760, 2020 WL 3546750, at *6 (D.N.J. June 30, 2020) (dismissing claims for impermissible group pleading because “Plaintiffs’ [*19] Complaint broadly alleges Defendants’ misconduct but fails to allege the conduct for which each defendant is culpable”).

F. Maverick’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
Prior to Plaintiff’s submission of the Amended Complaint, Maverick moved for joinder to Centrans’ motion to dismiss the Complaint and for judgment on the pleadings. D.E. 30. Following the submission of the Amended Complaint and pursuant to the Court’s June 16, 2021 Order, D.E. 46, Maverick renewed its motion by letter, D.E. 56.8 In renewing its motion, Maverick represented that it was no longer asserting the arguments related to improper group pleading or the lack of particularity in Plaintiff’s fraud claims. D.E. 56 at 1 n.2. Accordingly, the Court does not address those arguments. Additionally, as set forth in the Court’s August 24, 2021 Order, D.E. 74, the Court does not address any new arguments raised in Maverick’s letter not set forth in Maverick’s original motion.
What remains is Maverick’s argument that Plaintiff’s state law claims are preempted by federal law. Maverick Br. at 3-8. As discussed above, the Court finds that IMG’s state law claims are preempted by the Carmack Amendment and the FAAAA and consequently must be dismissed. [*20] Accordingly, the Court does not address the preemption argument set forth in Maverick’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, as the Court granted the motion to dismiss on the same grounds.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The dismissal of Counts Five through Twenty-Nine of the Amended Complaint is with prejudice as those claims are preempted. Centrans’ motion to dismiss the crossclaims brought by Maverick and C.J. is GRANTED. The dismissal of the crossclaims is without prejudice, and Maverick and C.J. shall have thirty (30) days to file amended crossclaims curing the deficiencies noted herein. If they do not file amended crossclaims within that time, the crossclaims dismissed without prejudice will be dismissed with prejudice. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
Dated: February 17, 2022
/s/ John Michael Vazquez
John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J.

ORDER
John Michael Vazquez, U.S.D.J.
For the reasons set forth in the accompanying Opinion, and for good cause shown,
IT IS on this 17th day of February 2022,
ORDERED that the motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint submitted by Centrans [21] Marine Shipping (“Centrans”), D.E. 61, joined in part by Maverick Transport Inc. (“Maverick”), D.E. 63, and C.J. International, Inc. (“C.J.”), D.E. 60, are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; and it is further ORDERED that the motions to dismiss as to Counts Five through Twenty-Nine are GRANTED and those counts are DISMISSED with prejudice as the claims are preempted by federal law; and it is further ORDERED that the motions to dismiss are otherwise DENIED; and it is further ORDERED that Centrans’ motion to dismiss the crossclaims filed by APM Terminals Elizabeth, LLC, Maverick, and C.J., D.E. 18, renewed at D.E. 73, is DENIED as moot as to APM Terminals and is otherwise GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED that Maverick’s crossclaim against Centrans, D.E. 10, and C.J.’s crossclaim against Centrans, D.E. 12, are DISMISSED without prejudice; and it is further ORDERED that Maverick and C.J. shall have thirty (30) days to file amended crossclaims that cure the deficiencies noted in the accompanying Opinion. If Maverick and C.J. do not file amended crossclaims within that time, the crossclaims dismissed herein without prejudice will be dismissed with prejudice. /s/ John Michael Vazquez John Michael [22] Vazquez, U.S.D.J.