United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division
December 30, 2021, Decided; December 30, 2021, Filed
Civil Action No. 3:21-CV-00655 (MRC)

Reporter
2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 248236 *
LATOYA CANADA, Plaintiff, v. JASMINE MASRI, et al., Defendants.
Core Terms

motion to dismiss, gross negligence, willful, wanton negligence, reckless, allegations
Counsel: [*1] For Latoya Canada, Plaintiff: Emmet Dwayne Alexander, Michael Robert Krol, Robert Gibson Maury, Alexander Law Group PLC, Richmond, VA.
For Jasmine Masri, New Prime, Inc., New Prime, doing business as, Prime, Inc., New Prime, Inc., doing business as, Prime, Inc., Prime, Inc., Prime Transportation Services, Inc., Prime Transportation, Inc., Defendant: Karissa Thomas Kaseorg, Terrence Lemarr Graves, Sands Anderson, PC, Richmond, VA.
Judges: Mark R. Colombell, United States Magistrate Judge.
Opinion by: Mark R. Colombell
Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Latoya Canada (“Plaintiff”) brings this civil action against New Prime, Inc., New Prime d/b/a Prime, Inc., New Prime, Inc. d/b/a Prime, Inc., Prime, Inc., Prime Transportation Services, Inc., Prime Transportation, Inc., and Jasmine Masri (“Masri”) (collectively, the “Defendants”). Plaintiff alleges that Masri was negligent, grossly negligent, and/or reckless1 when she caused a motor vehicle accident that resulted in personal injuries to Plaintiff. This matter now comes before the Court on Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 7 (the “Partial Motion to Dismiss”) (ECF No. 16). For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the Partial Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff’s [*2] claim of gross negligence and GRANTS the Partial Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff’s claim of willful and wanton negligence. To the extent Plaintiff has asserted a claim for willful and wanton negligence, it is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

I. The Allegations of the Amended Complaint.
On or about December 20, 2018, Plaintiff was traveling north on I-95 in the city of Richmond. (Am. Compl. at 1, ¶ 1, ECF No. 14). At the same time and place, Masri, acting in the course of her employment, was driving a tractor-trailer on the same interstate and in the same direction as Plaintiff. (Am. Compl. at 1, ¶¶ 2, 3). Masri struck the rear of Plaintiff’s vehicle “with great force and violence” and pushed Plaintiff’s vehicle into another vehicle. (Am. Compl. at 2, ¶¶ 4, 6). As a result, Plaintiff sustained serious and permanent injuries. (Am. Compl. at 2, ¶ 7).
Plaintiff alleges that Masri was reckless and/or grossly negligent in that she: (1) failed to keep a proper lookout; and/or (2) failed to obey a traffic signal; and/or (3) failed to maintain control of her automobile; and/or (4) operated her vehicle at an excessive rate of speed; and/or (5) operated her vehicle recklessly; (6) failed not to follow [*3] another motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer more closely than is reasonable and prudent; and/or (7) failed to yield the right of way; and/or (8) failed to maintain lane position; and/or (9) was otherwise negligent. (Am. Compl. at 2, ¶ 6).
In response to the Partial Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff asserts that Masri was “swerving between lanes.” (Pl.’s Mot. Opp’n Defs.’ Partial Mot. to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (“Pl.’s Motion in Opposition”) at 1, ECF No. 18). However, the Amended Complaint merely states that Masri “failed to maintain lane position.” (Am. Compl. at 2, ¶ 6(h)). The specific factual allegation that Masri was “swerving between lanes” does not appear in the Amended Complaint.

II. Standard of Review.
Rule 12(b)(6) permits a party to move the court to dismiss an action if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Rule 8(a) provides that “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The Supreme Court’s decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) have clarified how the sufficiency of a complaint is to be evaluated under Rule 8. Under these cases, there are two essential requirements for a pleading: [*4] that its allegations be sufficient and that its allegations be plausible.
In evaluating a complaint under Twombly and Iqbal, a district court must engage in a two-step process. First, the court must begin by “identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678.
Second, the court must decide whether the remaining allegations in the complaint—taken as true—state a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). This determination is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense” to decide whether the facts “permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. In essence, “a claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678.

III. Plaintiff’s Claims for Gross Negligence and Recklessness.
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for gross negligence and recklessness pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). In [5] contemplating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must “take the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,” but “need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the facts,” and “need not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. J.D. Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000)). Simple negligence is the failure to use the degree of care an ordinary person would exercise to avoid injury to another. See Harris v. Harman, 253 Va. 336, 340, 486 S.E.2d 99 (1997). Defendants concede that Plaintiff has sufficiently set forth a cause of action for simple negligence. (Defs.’ Mem. Supp. Partial Mot. to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) (“Defs.’ Mem. in Support”) at 3, ECF No. 17). The second level of negligence, gross negligence, is conduct which shows indifference to others, disregarding prudence to the level that the safety of others is completely neglected. See Harris, 253 Va. at 340. Gross negligence is negligence which shocks fair-minded people, but is less than willful recklessness. See Griffin v. Shively, 227 Va. 317, 321, 315 S.E.2d 210 (1984). The third level of negligence, willful and wanton negligence, is “acting consciously in disregard of another person’s rights or acting with reckless indifference to the consequences, with the defendant aware, from his knowledge of existing circumstances and conditions, that his conduct probably would [6] cause injury to another.” Id. Willful and wanton negligence generally involves some type of egregious conduct. See e.g., Huffman v. Love, 245 Va. 311, 313, 427 S.E.2d 357, 9 Va. Law Rep. 1005 (1993) (motion for judgment alleged that the defendant operated his vehicle in a careless, wanton, reckless and negligent manner and with a reckless disregard for the welfare and rights of others, including the plaintiff, by driving drunk, failed to keep a proper lookout, approached a dangerous curve at nearly twice the posted speed, drove on the wrong side of the road, and failed to keep his vehicle under proper control.); see also Friedman v. Jordan, 166 Va. 65, 68, 184 S.E. 186 (1936) (a driver intentionally chased down and ran over a bicyclist in a dispute over money and failed to help extricate plaintiff who could not get out from under the car).
To survive the Partial Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to plausibly demonstrate gross negligence and/or willful and wanton conduct. Mere conclusory legal statements, without facts to support them, will not suffice. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Defendants contend that the facts as alleged in the Amended Complaint “support nothing more than simple negligence.” (Defs.’ Mem. in Support at 3). In response, Plaintiff contends that she “has asserted a multiplicity of behaviors” that [7] “when exhibited by the driver of a tractor-trailer, transgress far beyond the boundaries of acceptable driving.” (Pl.’s Motion in Opposition at 2-3) (emphasis in original). Given the high standards required to prove gross negligence and willful and wanton negligence as discussed above, the Court has concerns regarding the sparsity of Plaintiff’s factual allegations. Plaintiff has alleged that Masri: (1) operated her vehicle at an excessive rate of speed; (2) failed to maintain lane position; (3) caused a rear end collision with great force and violence that pushed Plaintiff’s vehicle into another vehicle; and (4) caused Plaintiff to sustain serious and permanent injuries. (Am. Compl. at 2, ¶¶ 4-7). These facts, as currently alleged, fail to state a claim that Masri acted in conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights or acted with reckless indifference to the consequences, with Masri aware, from her knowledge of existing circumstances and conditions, that her conduct probably would cause injury to Plaintiff. See Griffin v. Shively, 227 Va. at 321. As a result, Plaintiff has failed to state claim upon which relief can be granted for willful and wanton negligence. In regard to Plaintiff’s claim of gross negligence, at this [8] stage, the Court is required to construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. While the facts may later demonstrate that Masri was simply negligent or not liable in any way for the accident, making such a determination on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is premature. As a result, discovery is necessary to determine whether Masri’s conduct rose to the level of gross negligence. See, e.g. Lindsay v. Kvortek, 865 F.Supp. 264, 269 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (finding premature the dismissal of punitive damages in an auto accident case where plaintiffs alleged reckless indifference because “[a]t this early stage of the case, the Court cannot assume that plaintiffs will be unable to present any evidence to support a claim of punitive damages.”). Discovery is required to determine whether Masri’s conduct would shock fair-minded people. See Griffin, 227 Va. at 321. As a result, the Court will deny the Partial Motion to Dismiss as to gross negligence.

IV. Conclusion.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES the Partial Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff’s claim of gross negligence and GRANTS the Partial Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff’s claim of willful and wanton negligence. To the extent Plaintiff has asserted a claim for willful and wanton negligence, it is DISMISSED [*9] WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to deliver a copy of this Opinion and Order to all Counsel of Record in this case.
It is so ORDERED.
Richmond, Virginia
Date: December 30, 2021
/s/ Mark R. Colombell
Mark R. Colombell
United States Magistrate Judge

ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ New Prime, Inc., New Prime d/b/a Prime, Inc., New Prime, Inc., d/b/a Prime, Inc., Prime, Inc., Prime Transportation Services, Inc., Prime Transportation, Inc. and Jasmine Masri’s Partial Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 16). For the reasons set forth in the accompanying MEMORANDUM OPINION (ECF No. 21), Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Court GRANTS Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff’s claim of willful and wanton negligence. To the extent Plaintiff has asserted a claim for willful and wanton negligence, it is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court DENIES Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff’s claim of gross negligence.
It is so ORDERED.
Richmond, Virginia
Date: December 30, 2021
/s/ Mark R. Colombell
Mark R. Colombell
United States Magistrate Judge

Court of Appeals of South Carolina
November 1, 2021, Submitted; January 19, 2022, Filed
Opinion No. 5891

Reporter
2022 S.C. App. LEXIS 16 *
Dale Brooks, Employee, Appellant, v. Benore Logistics System, Inc., Employer, and Great American Alliance Insurance Company, Carrier, Respondents.
Notice: THIS DECISION IS NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Prior History: [*1] Appeal From The Workers’ Compensation Commission. Appellate Case No. 2018-002087.
Disposition: REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Core Terms

repetitive, trauma, truck, medical evidence, ergonomics, leg, job duties, trailer, causal, pain, medical certainty, reasonable degree, benefits, switcher, two-part, climb
Case Summary

Overview
HOLDINGS: [1]-The Workers’ Compensation Commission erred in ruling a claimant was not entitled to compensation for a repetitive trauma injury under S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-172 (2007) because the Commission relied on an ergonomic report that was not competent evidence of causation and all competent evidence supported the claimant.
Outcome
Reversed and remanded.
LexisNexis® Headnotes

Administrative Law > Judicial Review > Standards of Review > Arbitrary & Capricious Standard of Review
Workers’ Compensation & SSDI > … > Judicial Review > Standards of Review > Abuse of Discretion
Workers’ Compensation & SSDI > … > Judicial Review > Standards of Review > Clearly Erroneous Standard of Review
Administrative Law > Judicial Review > Standards of Review > Clearly Erroneous Standard of Review
HN1[ ] Standards of Review, Arbitrary & Capricious Standard of Review
The appellate court must affirm the factual findings of The Workers’ Compensation Commission if they are supported by substantial evidence. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5) (2005 & Supp. 2020). Like any other finder of fact, the Commission may not rest its findings on speculation or guesswork. Workers’ compensation awards must not be based on surmise, conjecture or speculation. Instead, the Commission must anchor its ruling on evidence substantial enough to provide a reasonable basis for its findings. The appellate court may reverse the Commission’s decision if its findings are clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; the result of an error of law; or arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to a claimant’s substantial rights. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5).

Workers’ Compensation & SSDI > Compensability > Injuries > Cumulative Injuries
HN2[ ] Injuries, Cumulative Injuries
S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-172 (2007) is the exclusive method for determining the compensability of repetitive trauma injuries.

Workers’ Compensation & SSDI > Compensability > Injuries > Cumulative Injuries
HN3[ ] Injuries, Cumulative Injuries
In the context of S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-172 (2007), compensability of a repetitive trauma injury requires a specific finding of fact, made by the greater weight of the evidence, of a direct causal relationship, established by medical evidence, between the injury and a repetitive act occurring in the course of the regular duties of employment.

Evidence > Burdens of Proof > Preponderance of Evidence
Workers’ Compensation & SSDI > Compensability > Arising Out of Employment > Causation
HN4[ ] Burdens of Proof, Preponderance of Evidence
Compensability under S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-172 (2007) requires a specific finding of fact, by the preponderance of the evidence, of a direct causal relationship, established by medical evidence, between the repetitive act and the injury.

Governments > Legislation > Interpretation
Workers’ Compensation & SSDI > Compensability > Arising Out of Employment > Causation
HN5[ ] Legislation, Interpretation
The plain language of S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-172 (2007) does not support a two-part construct. The intent of the statute is to require a commissioner to make a specific factual finding that medical evidence establishes a causal connection between the repetitive duties of claimant’s employment and the injury. Setting such an extra hurdle violates fundamental rules of statutory construction. The court may not resort to subtle or forced construction to expand or limit a statute’s scope.

Workers’ Compensation & SSDI > Compensability > Arising Out of Employment > Causation
Workers’ Compensation & SSDI > … > Evidence > Admissibility of Evidence > Medical Evidence
HN6[ ] Arising Out of Employment, Causation
There is no question S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-172 (2007) requires that the causal connection between the work and the injury must be established by medical evidence, which means expert opinion or testimony stated to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, documents, records, or other material that is offered by a licensed and qualified medical physician. S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-172(C) (2007).

Workers’ Compensation & SSDI > Compensability > Injuries > Cumulative Injuries
Workers’ Compensation & SSDI > … > Evidence > Admissibility of Evidence > Medical Evidence
HN7[ ] Injuries, Cumulative Injuries
S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-172 (2007) mandates that to be admissible as medical evidence in repetitive trauma cases, the doctor’s opinion must reflect that it is stated to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.

Workers’ Compensation & SSDI > Compensability > Injuries
Workers’ Compensation & SSDI > Benefit Determinations > Permanent Partial Disabilities
HN8[ ] Compensability, Injuries
Recovery under S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-172 (2007) is not limited to work injuries that an ergonomics report deems statistically likely.

Evidence > … > Testimony > Expert Witnesses > Qualifications
HN9[ ] Expert Witnesses, Qualifications
Where the subject is one for experts or skilled witnesses alone and concerns a matter of science or specialized art or other matters of which a layman can have no knowledge, the unanimous opinion of medical experts on particular subjects may be conclusive, even if contradicted by lay witnesses.

Workers’ Compensation & SSDI > … > Evidence > Admissibility of Evidence > Medical Evidence
HN10[ ] Admissibility of Evidence, Medical Evidence
Nothing in S.C. Code Ann. § 42-1-172 (2007) prevents a medical doctor from using his expert evaluation of patient history in forming his professional opinion.

Administrative Law > Judicial Review > Standards of Review > Arbitrary & Capricious Standard of Review
Workers’ Compensation & SSDI > … > Evidence > Admissibility of Evidence > Medical Evidence
HN11[ ] Standards of Review, Arbitrary & Capricious Standard of Review
While the Workers’ Compensation Commission may refuse to accept even uncontradicted medical evidence, it must base its refusal on a valid reason supported by competent evidence in the record. Otherwise, the refusal is arbitrary and capricious and warrants reversal. While medical testimony is entitled to great respect, the fact finder may disregard it if there is other competent evidence in the record. If a Commission wishes to enter an award contradicting the medical testimony, it must take care to show in the record the valid competing evidence or considerations that impelled it to disregard the medical evidence. Failure to do so may lead to reversal both of denials and awards of compensation.
Counsel: Robert T. Usry, of Holland & Usry, PA, of Spartanburg, for Appellant.
Daniel Barry Eller and William Franklin Childers, Jr., both of Eller Tonnsen Bach, of Greenville, for Respondents.
Judges: HILL, J. KONDUROS and HEWITT, JJ., concur.
Opinion by: HILL
Opinion

HILL, J.: Dale Brooks brought this workers’ compensation claim seeking benefits for a repetitive trauma injury to his lower back and right leg. A single commissioner awarded him benefits, but the Full Commission reversed, finding Brooks failed to prove his job was repetitive. We reverse and remand.

I. Facts
Brooks began working as a “switcher” truck driver for Benore Logistics Systems, Inc. in June 2016. His job consisted of driving a “switcher truck” to move trailers to various points in a yard at the BMW manufacturing plant. He would drive the switcher truck across the yard and back it up to a trailer, hook it to his truck, and drive the trailer to another location where he would unhook it. The process required Brooks to climb up three steps to access the cab of the truck (which he testified he had to stoop to enter), bend his body to position it in the seat, [2] bend and twist his body while seated to back up the truck to the trailer, exit the cab by a rear door to access a platform where he would then have to bend to hook or unhook the trailer, climb off the platform and close the rear trailer doors, reenter the cab, and return to his seat to drive the truck. Brooks had to switch forty-five to sixty trailers each twelve-hour shift, sometimes getting in and out of the truck 225 times. Brooks testified he often had to switch sea containers, which were far more demanding physically because they were more difficult to open, higher off the ground, and had a ceramic seal that had to be opened with bolt cutters. Sometimes he also had to stoop underneath the sea container and pull pins to slide the axle. In January 2017, Brooks began experiencing pain in his back and leg. He went to the emergency room and was discharged with the recommendation to follow up with an orthopedist. He was then seen by Benore’s doctor at WorkWell, reporting that his symptoms had begun several weeks before when he felt sharp low back pain while stepping into his truck at work. At Brooks’ follow up appointment, the WorkWell doctor ordered an MRI. This MRI was never completed [3] because two minutes after Brooks left the appointment, Benore’s adjuster called WorkWell and advised that Brooks’ claim had been denied.
On May 1, 2017, Brooks went to Dr. Eric Loudermilk, whose notes state:
He presents today complaining of pain in his back and leg which has been present since around January 3, 2017. He runs a switcher truck. He apparently works as a driver and he climbs up and down some stairs approximately 150 times per day switching trucks. He apparently does at a minimum of 30 trucks per shift. This involves switching trucks in and out multiple times during the day, opening and closing doors, bending and stooping, and climbing ladders. Around January 3, 2017, he developed burning pain in his legs. Several days later, he developed severe pain in his lower back which radiated down his right leg all the way to the calf and right foot.
After obtaining an MRI, Dr. Loudermilk diagnosed Brooks with right lower extremity radiculopathy secondary to a L4-L5 lumbar disk protrusion and recommended a non-surgical course of treatment. Brooks’ lawyer sent Dr. Loudermilk a questionnaire that included the following two questions:
A. Did the repetitive activities of Dale’s job, including [*4] but not limited to going up and down stairs, getting in and out of a truck, opening and closing doors, bending and stooping, and climbing ladders, most probably cause low back pain with right leg radiculopathy?
B. Did the work injuries from repeated work activities above cause an L4-5 disc protrusion shown on Dale’s MRI of 6.27.17?
Dr. Loudermilk answered “yes” to both questions.
This questionnaire and other evidence were presented at the hearing before the single commissioner, where Brooks was the sole witness. Benore presented an ergonomics report it had procured that opined Brooks’ job duties entailed no enhanced risk of injury to his back. The single commissioner found Brooks proved he had suffered a repetitive trauma injury and awarded him benefits.
The Full Commission disagreed. Relying on the ergonomics report, it concluded Brooks had not proven his job duties were repetitive and denied him benefits. Brooks now appeals to us.

II. Standard of Review
HN1[ ] We must affirm the factual findings of the Commission if they are supported by substantial evidence. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5) (2005 & Supp. 2020); Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 132-33, 276 S.E.2d 304, 305 (1981). Like any other finder of fact, the Commission may not rest its findings on speculation or guesswork. Tiller v. Nat’l Health Care Ctr. of Sumter, 334 S.C. 333, 339, 513 S.E.2d 843, 845 (1999) (“Workers’ [*5] compensation awards must not be based on surmise, conjecture or speculation.”). Instead, the Commission must anchor its ruling on evidence substantial enough to provide a reasonable basis for its findings. Hutson v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 399 S.C. 381, 387, 732 S.E.2d 500, 503 (2012). As relevant here, we may reverse the Commission’s decision if its findings are “clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record”; the result of an error of law; or arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice to Brooks’ substantial rights. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5).

III. Analysis
A. The standard for recovery for a repetitive trauma injury
HN2[ ] Section 42-1-172 of the South Carolina Code (2007) is the exclusive method for determining the compensability of repetitive trauma injuries. Michau v. Georgetown County ex rel. S.C. Cntys. Workers Comp. Tr.,, 396 S.C. 589, 594, 723 S.E.2d 805, 807 (2012). The relevant part of § 42-1-172 provides:
(A) “Repetitive trauma injury” means an injury which is gradual in onset and caused by the cumulative effects of repetitive traumatic events. Compensability of a repetitive trauma injury must be determined only under the provisions of this statute.
(B) An injury is not considered a compensable repetitive trauma injury unless a commissioner makes a specific finding of fact by a preponderance of the evidence of a causal connection that is established by medical evidence [*6] between the repetitive activities that occurred while the employee was engaged in the regular duties of his employment and the injury.
(C) As used in this section, “medical evidence” means expert opinion or testimony stated to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, documents, records, or other material that is offered by a licensed and qualified medical physician.
(D) A “repetitive trauma injury” is considered to arise out of employment only if it is established by medical evidence that there is a direct causal relationship between the condition under which the work is performed and the injury.
HN3[ ] The leading case construing § 42-1-172 tells us compensability of a repetitive trauma injury requires a specific finding of fact, made by the greater weight of the evidence, of a direct causal relationship, established by medical evidence, between the injury and a repetitive act occurring in the course of the regular duties of employment. Murphy v. Owens Corning, 393 S.C. 77, 85, 710 S.E.2d 454, 458 (Ct. App. 2011).
B. The single commissioner’s ruling
In ruling Brooks was entitled to compensation for a repetitive trauma injury, the single commissioner’s order tracked § 42-1-172 and Murphy precisely, stating:

14. . . . Based on the preponderance of the evidence before me in this case, I must conclude [7] that [Brooks] has suffered a compensable repetitive trauma injury to his low back affecting his right leg. A. I find a direct causal relationship between the repetitive acts and the employment.1 B. This finding is based on the entire record. C. The Full Commission’s ruling The Full Commission reversed, finding § 42-1-172 requires “a two-part analysis a claimant must meet in order to meet his burden of proving a compensable repetitive trauma injury.” The Commission went on to describe the two-part test: First, there must be medical evidence establishing a causal connection between the “condition under which the work is performed and the injury.” § 42-1-172(D). Additionally, there is an independent requirement that the Commissioner find by a preponderance of evidence that the claimant’s specific job activities are repetitive. § 42-1-172(B). The two-part test announced by the Full Commission is unfaithful to Murphy and misreads § 42-1-172. HN5[ ] The plain language of § 42-1-172 does not support a two-part construct. The intent of the statute is to require a commissioner to make a specific factual finding that medical evidence establishes a causal connection between the repetitive duties of claimant’s employment and the injury. The single commissioner [8] did just that. In insisting the statute also requires the commissioner to make a separate factual finding that the employee’s job duties were repetitive, the Full Commission sees something in the statute that is not there. Setting such an extra hurdle violates fundamental rules of statutory construction. Paschal v. State Election Comm’n, 317 S.C. 434, 437, 454 S.E.2d 890, 892 (1995) (court may not resort to subtle or forced construction to expand or limit a statute’s scope).
    The effect of the Full Commission’s two-part formula would be to force claimants to offer expert testimony that their job duties were repetitive. HN6[ ] But that would not be enough, for there is no question § 42-1-172 requires that the causal connection between the work and the injury must be established by “medical evidence,” which “means expert opinion or testimony stated to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, documents, records, or other material that is offered by a licensed and qualified medical physician.” § 42-1-172(C).
    Michau illustrates why the ergonomics report here is not competent medical evidence under § 42-1-172. Michau HN7[ ] held § 42-1-172 mandates that to be admissible as “medical evidence” in repetitive trauma cases, the doctor’s opinion must reflect that it is stated to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, something an ergonomics [9] report cannot do. Michau, 396 S.C. at 595-96, 723 S.E.2d at 808 (quoting § 42-1-172). We are certain that in drafting § 42-1-172, the General Assembly understood, as we do, that medical doctors are capable of diagnosing the cause of an injury. Doctors do not require, any more than the statute does, an ergonomics report to diagnose the cause of a repetitive trauma injury. The Full Commission therefore committed an error of law in adding an improper, redundant condition to § 42-1-172. The Full Commission also committed a clear error in finding the ergonomics report concluded Brooks’ job duties were not repetitive. The report makes no such statement and does not even use the word “repetitive.” A fair reading of the report reveals it merely opined Brooks’ duties did not, in general, expose him to an enhanced risk of injury to his back or legs. HN8[ ] Recovery under § 42-1-172 is not limited to work injuries that an ergonomics report deems statistically likely. It is obvious to us the Full Commission substituted the opinion of the ergonomics report for the considered medical opinion, made to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, of Dr. Loudermilk. This was reversible error. HN9[ ] See Herndon v. Morgan Mills, Inc., 246 S.C. 201, 216, 143 S.E.2d 376, 384 (1965) (“[W]here the subject is one for experts or skilled witnesses alone and concerns a matter of science [10] or specialized art or other matters of which a layman can have no knowledge, the unanimous opinion of medical experts on particular subjects may be conclusive, even if contradicted by lay witnesses.”).
    The Full Commission tried to discredit Dr. Loudermilk by claiming his “opinions assume the job is sufficiently repetitive,” because he was “never asked whether [Brooks’] job activities are sufficiently repetitive” and “there is no evidence Dr. Loudermilk ever reviewed a job description for a ‘switcher'”. These statements from the Full Commission’s order are based on fuzzy logic (they use the classic fallacy known as appeal to ignorance) and are refuted by the record. Dr. Loudermilk did not assume the duties were repetitive; he gave his expert opinion that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Brooks’ repetitive job duties caused his injury. In reaching that opinion, he well knew Brooks’ job duties, as he recorded them in his notes and reaffirmed them in answering the questionnaire. HN10[ ] Nothing in § 42-1-172 prevents a medical doctor from using his expert evaluation of patient history in forming his professional opinion, and we expect the medical community would be surprised to learn the Full [11] Commission believes this time-honored practice always entails an unwarranted assumption. More to the point, Dr. Loudermilk avowed the ergonomics report—which cataloged Brooks’ job duties—did not alter his opinion. HN11[ ] While the Commission may refuse to accept even uncontradicted medical evidence, it must base its refusal on a valid reason supported by competent evidence in the record. Otherwise, the refusal is arbitrary and capricious and warrants reversal. Baker v. Graniteville Co., 197 S.C. 21, 28-29, 14 S.E.2d 367, 371 (1941); see also Tiller, 334 S.C. at 340, 513 S.E.2d at 846 (“[W]hile medical testimony is entitled to great respect, the fact finder may disregard it if there is other competent evidence in the record.”); 12 Lex K. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 128.03(4) at 128-13 (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2014) (“If a Commission wishes to enter an award contradicting the medical testimony, it must take care to show in the record the valid competing evidence or considerations that impelled it to disregard the medical evidence. Failure to do so may lead to reversal both of denials and awards of compensation.”); Cf. Burnette v. City of Greenville, 401 S.C. 417, 427-28, 737 S.E.2d 200, 206 (Ct. App. 2012). The ergonomic report was not competent evidence of causation in this § 42-1-172 case. Therefore, because all of the competent evidence supports Brooks’ claim, Brooks is entitled to compensation as a matter of law. [12] See Clemmons v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc.-Harbison, 420 S.C. 282, 289, 803 S.E.2d 268, 271 (2017); Herndon, 246 S.C. at 209-10, 143 S.E.2d at 381.
    To repeat, because the only rational inference that can be drawn from the record is that Brooks met his burden of proving he suffered a repetitive trauma injury arising out of his employment as defined by § 42-1-172, we reverse the ruling of the Full Commission and remand for calculation of benefits.
    REVERSED AND REMANDED.2
    KONDUROS and HEWITT, JJ., concur.