Creagan v. Wal-Mart Transp., LLC
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division
December 12, 2018, Filed
Case No. 3:16-cv-2788

Reporter
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209604 *; 2018 WL 6523123
Barry M. Creagan, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs v. Wal-Mart Transportation, LLC, et al., Defendants

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. INTRODUCTION
Before me is the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Wal-Mart Transportation, Inc. (Doc. No. 156). Filing separately, Plaintiffs Allen and Rita Meadows (collectively, the “Meadows Plaintiffs”) (Doc. No. 201) and Plaintiffs Barry and Lauren Creagan [*3] (collectively, the “Creagan Plaintiffs”) (Doc. No. 204) opposed. Wal-Mart filed a collective reply to the oppositions. (Doc. No. 211).
Related to this matter and also before me is the Creagan Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss Defendant Kirsch Transportation Services, Inc.’s federal preemption affirmative defense. (Doc. No. 172). Kirsch opposed the motion and moved for judgment on the pleading as to the negligence claim filed against it.1 (Doc. No. 183). In response, the Creagan Plaintiffs opposed Kirsch’s motion and replied in support of their own. (Doc. No. 187). Kirsch then replied, in turn. (Doc. No. 193).

II. BACKGROUND
On August 14, 2016, a traffic accident occurred on the Ohio Turnpike in Groton Township, Erie County, Ohio. Due to construction at the time, eastbound traffic was reduced to a single lane, causing traffic to slow below the posted speed limit. Failing to timely recognize the reduced speed of traffic, Defendant Chavan Carter, driving a tractor-trailer, initiated a chain collision involving nine vehicles. Among the nine vehicles were that of the Creagan and Meadows Plaintiffs.
The tractor-trailer Carter was driving was owned by his employer, Defendant Natex Group, Inc. At the [*4] time of the collision, Carter was hauling a shipment of birdseed for Wal-Mart pursuant to an arrangement brokered by Kirsch.
Because of this accident, the Creagan Plaintiffs and the Meadows Plaintiffs assert claims of negligence against Wal-Mart and Kirsch. (Doc. No. 58; Case No. 18-344, Doc. No. 1). The essence of these negligence claims is that Kirsch and Wal-Mart, in turn, acted negligently when hiring Natex to transport the shipment.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. MOTION TO DISMISS AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE AND MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
The same pleading requirements apply to a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and a motion for judgment under the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c). Sensations, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 526 F.3d 291, 295 (6th Cir. 2008). The pleadings must demonstrate sufficient factual matter, if taken as true, which state a claim “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). “A plaintiff falls short if [they] plead[] facts ‘merely consistent with a defendant’s liability’ or if the alleged facts do not ‘permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct. . . .'” Albrecht v. Treon, 617 F.3d 890, 893 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868) cert denied, 562 U.S. 1201, 131 S. Ct. 1047, 178 L. Ed. 2d 866 (2011).
On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded allegations of the non-moving party must be taken as true. Tucker v. Middleburg-Legacy Place, LLC, 539 F.3d 545, 549 (6th Cir. 2008). Judgment is granted only where there is no material [*5] issue of fact involved and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Paskvan v. City of Cleveland Civil Service Comm’n, 946 F.2d 1233, 1235 (6th Cir. 1991).

B. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant demonstrates there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). All evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 390 (6th Cir. 2008), and all reasonable inferences are drawn in the nonmovant’s favor. Rose v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 766 F.3d 532, 535 (6th Cir. 2014). A factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could resolve the dispute and return a verdict in the nonmovant’s favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). A disputed fact is material only if its resolution might affect the outcome of the case under the governing substantive law. Rogers v. O’Donnell, 737 F.3d 1026, 1030 (6th Cir. 2013).

IV. DISCUSSION
After deregulating trucking through the Motor Trucking Act of 1980, Congress enacted the Federal Aviation Authorization Administration Act (“FAAAA”) in 1994 in an effort to avoid “a State’s direct substitution of its own governmental commands for ‘competitive market forces’ in determining (to a significant degree) the services that motor carriers will provide.” Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 368, 372, 128 S. Ct. 989, 169 L. Ed. 2d 933 (2008). Mirroring the language of the Airline Deregulation Act (“ADA”)2 enacted years earlier, the FAAAA prohibits States from “enact[ing] or enforce[ing] [*6] a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier …, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).3
Interpreting the identical portions of the ADA and the FAAAA in the same manner, the Court held that the FAAAA’s preemption must too be read broadly. Rowe, 552 U.S. at 370. As such, the Court adopted the holding of Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 112 S. Ct. 2031, 119 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1992), which
determined: (1) that “[s]tate enforcement actions having a connection with, or reference to,” carrier “‘rates, routes, or services’ are pre-empted,”; (2) that such pre-emption may occur even if a state law’s effect on rates, routes, or services “is only indirect,”; (3) that, in respect to pre-emption, it makes no difference whether a state law is “consistent” or “inconsistent” with federal regulation; and (4) that pre-emption occurs at least where state laws have a “significant impact” related to Congress’ deregulatory and pre-emption-related objectives.
Rowe, 552 U.S. at 370-71 (quoting with minor alterations Morales, 504 U.S. at 384, 386-87, 391) (internal citation omitted). But this broad preemption is not unlimited; “federal law does not preempt state laws that affect rates, routes, or services in ‘too tenuous, remote, or peripheral [*7] a manner.'” Rowe, 552 U.S. at 375 (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 390).
Not discussed in Rowe are the dissimilarities between the language of the ADA and the FAAAA. Of relevance here is the scope of actors covered by each statute. While the ADA applies to “air carrier[s]” alone, the FAAAA applies to “any motor carrier, broker, or freight forwarder.” Compare 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) with 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).
Due in part to this difference between the ADA and the FAAAA, courts are divided on the issue currently before me: whether negligent hiring claims against brokers are preempted by the FAAAA when the alleged negligence results in personal injury.4 Plaintiffs argue that FAAAA preemption does not apply in personal injury cases such as this, relying on precedent of the FAAAA and ADA. But Defendants rely on the reasoning of Volkova to argue a claim of negligent hiring “relates to” the “service” of a broker and must be preempted accordingly. I am persuaded by Defendants’ argument and the supporting case law.
While the FAAAA provides no definition of “services,” it defines transportation [*8] to include “services related to th[e] movement [of passengers or property], including arranging for” the transportation of passengers or property. 49 U.S.C. § 13102(23)(B). A broker does just that – “arrange for” the transportation of a shipment by a motor carrier. See 49 U.S.C. § 13102(2). Regardless of whether the broker’s alleged negligence in its choice of motor carrier results in property damage or personal injury, the service remains the same.5 As such, Plaintiffs’ allegation that all personal injury suits are exempt from FAAAA preemption is without merit. Further, because the negligent hiring claim seeks to enforce a duty of care related to how Kirsch (the broker) arranged for a motor carrier to transport the shipment (the service), the claim falls squarely within the preemption of the FAAAA.6
Concluding the claim of negligent hiring does “relate to” the broker “service” provided by Kirsch, the remaining question is whether the safety regulatory exception applies to “save” the claims. The exception provides that FAAAA preemption
shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles, the authority of a State to impose highway route controls or limitations [*9] based on the size or weight of the motor vehicle or the hazardous nature of the cargo, or the authority of a State to regulate motor carriers with regard to minimum amounts of financial responsibility relating to insurance requirements and self-insurance authorization.
49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A). In support of the argument that the exception applies, the Creagan Plaintiffs argue that to “concern ‘transportation of property’ for application of the preemption provision,” the claim must “concern ‘motor vehicles’ for application of the safety exception.” (Doc. No. 187 at 11). But if this were so, all preempted claims would then be “saved” by the exception. As such, I reject this argument. Because the negligent hiring claim seeks to impose a duty on the service of the broker rather than regulate motor vehicles, I conclude this claim is not within the safety regulatory authority of the state and the exception does not apply. See also Volkova, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19877, 2018 WL 741441, at*4; cf. Finley, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182482, 2018 WL 5284616, at *6.
Even though the claim is preempted by the FAAAA as it relates to Kirsch as the broker and, through it, Wal-Mart, Plaintiffs are not without judicial recourse. Reading the FAAAA as a whole, it is clear that Natex as the motor carrier may still be liable for negligence here. The [*10] FAAAA mandates that to register as a motor carrier, the entity must carry liability insurance in an amount “sufficient to pay… for each final judgment against the registrant for bodily injury to, or death of, an individual resulting from the negligent operation, maintenance, or use of motor vehicles, or for loss or damage to property …, or both.” 49 U.S.C. § 13906(a)(1). The FAAAA does not impose the same requirement on brokers. Not only does this affirmatively establish that a motor carrier may be liable for these types negligence actions, but also the omission of the same language with respect to broker evinces Congressional intent that brokers not be liable for this conduct.
Finally, because the negligent hiring claim is preempted by the FAAAA, I do not find it necessary to address Wal-Mart’s arguments regarding duty of care and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations.

V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude the negligent hiring claims7 against broker Kirsch and through it, Wal-Mart, are preempted by the FAAAA. Therefore, Wal-Mart’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 156) and Kirsch’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. No. 183) are granted, as a matter of law. The Creagan Plaintiffs’ [*11] motion to dismiss affirmative defense (Doc. No. 172) is denied, in turn.
So Ordered.
/s/ Jeffrey J. Helmick
United States District Judge
JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the Memorandum Opinion filed concurrently, Defendant Wal-Mart Transportation, LLC’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. No. 156) and Defendant Kirsch Transportation Services, Inc.’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Doc. No. 183) are granted, as a matter of law. The motion to dismiss affirmative defense filed by Plaintiffs Barry Creagan, Jr. and Lauren Creagan (Doc. No. 172) is denied, in turn.
/s/ Jeffrey J. Helmick
United States District Judge

Argonaut-Midwest Ins. Co. v. Colt Logistics, Inc.
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
December 20, 2018, Decided; December 20, 2018, Filed
Civil Action No. 18-11783 (KM) (MAH)

Reporter
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 214547 *
ARGONAUT-MIDWEST INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. COLT LOGISTICS INC., et al., Defendants.
Notice: NOT FOR PUBLICATION

I. INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion for service of process on two Defendants by publication, and for an enlargement of time to serve. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1, no oral argument was heard. For the reasons set forth below, the motion for service of process on two Defendants by publication is granted in modified form.

II. BACKGROUND
On July 18, 2018, Plaintiff, Argonaut-Midwest Insurance Company, filed a Complaint seeking a declaratory judgment against Defendants Colt Logistics Inc., Daniel E. Murray, John Collier and nominal Defendant Felix Achaempong. See Complaint, July 18, 2018, D.E. 1. The instant action concerns insurance coverage in an underlying state court action, Achaempong v. Collier, et al., No. ESX-L-5952-12 (N.J. Super., Essex Cty.), in which Achaempong sued Colt, Murray and Collier, as well as other Defendants, as a result of an accident that occurred on November 8, 2013. Id. at 4-8. In that accident, a tractor [*2] trailer struck Achaempong, pinning him between the truck and a loading dock. Id. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment against Defendants Colt, Murray and Collier determining that: 1) Plaintiff’s policy provides no coverage to Defendants regarding the underlying action; 2) Plaintiff has no obligation to defend Defendants in the underlying action and may therefore, withdraw from its defense of Defendants in the underlying action; and 3) Plaintiff has no duty to indemnify Defendants with respect to the underlying action.1 Id. at 16. Plaintiff successfully served Defendant Colt on September 13, 2018, when it received a letter from the New Jersey State Treasurer formally accepting service of the Complaint on behalf of Colt.2 Exhibit J to Affidavit of William F. Stewart in Support of Motion for Leave to Effect Service by Publication, Oct. 12, 2018, D.E. 11-11. Plaintiff was also able to successfully serve Achaempong at his current address by serving his sister there on October 2, 2018. Exhibit K to Affidavit of William F. Stewart in Support of Motion for Leave to Effect Service by Publication, Oct. 12, 2018, D.E. 11-12. However, Plaintiff argues that it has made repeated attempts to serve Defendants [*3] Collier and Murray over the last four years but that they appear to be evading contact and personal service. Brief in Support of Motion to Effect Service by Publication, Oct. 12, 2018, D.E. 11, at 1. Plaintiff certifies that, in an attempt to locate and serve Defendants, Plaintiff has hired “three separate investigators over the last four years.” Affidavit of William F. Stewart in Support of Motion for Leave to Effect Service by Publication, Oct. 12, 2018, D.E. 11-1, at ¶ 8. Plaintiff argues that personal service has been unsuccessful, and now seeks leave to serve Defendants by publication pursuant to N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-5. Brief in Support of Motion to Effect Service by Publication, Oct. 12, 2018, D.E. 11, at 3. Plaintiff proposes substituted service by publication once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Star-Ledger and by sending a copy of the Complaint by regular mail and by certified mail to Murray and Collier at each man’s last three known addresses.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Service by Publication
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) states:
Unless federal law provides otherwise, an individual—other than a minor, an incompetent person, or a person whose waiver has been filed—may be served in a judicial district of the United States by: [*4]
(1) following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where service is made; or
(2) doing any of the following:
(A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally;
(B) leaving a copy of each at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or
(C) delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
Under New Jersey law, personal service is the primary method of effecting service. See N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(a), 4:4-5(a). New Jersey Court Rules 4:4-3 and 4:4-4(a) prescribe the methods of effecting personal service within the state. Substitute or constructive service, however, is permitted when personal service within the state cannot be effected. See N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(b), 4:4-5. For in personam jurisdiction, New Jersey Court Rule 4:4-4(b) provides the methods of substitute or constructive service, such as personal service outside the state, simultaneous mailings by ordinary and certified (or registered) mail, and “as provided by court order, consistent with due process of law.” N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(b)(1), (b)(3). For in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction, New Jersey Court Rule 4:4-5 provides the methods for personal, substitute, [*5] and constructive service, such as service by publication. Regardless of the type of action, substitute or constructive service requires a demonstration of due diligence that satisfies the requirements specified in New Jersey Court Rule 4:4-5(b). See N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-5(a); 4:4-4 (b)(1) (cross-referencing Rule 4:4-5(b)); N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(b)(3) (noting that service by a court order consistent with due process is precluded “[i]f service can be made by any of the modes provided by this rule”); see also Garrett v. Matisa, 394 N.J. Super. 468, 475-76, 927 A.2d 177 (Ch. Ct. 2007) (using affidavit requirement in Rule 4:4-5 as model for unique notice issue).
Diligence has no fixed standard. See Modan v. Modan, 327 N.J. Super. 44, 48, 742 A.2d 611 (App. Div. 2000). The diligence exercised and the alternative service requested must meet the constitutional requirements of due process. Cf. O’Connor v. Abraham Altus, 67 N.J. 106, 126-127, 335 A.2d 545 (1975). Namely, the “elementary and fundamental requirement of due process” is that there be “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” O’Connor, 67 N.J. at 126 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314); see also Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168, 122 S. Ct. 694, 151 L. Ed. 2d 597 (2002) (“Since Mullane was decided, we have regularly turned to it when confronted with questions regarding the adequacy of the method used to give notice.”). Accordingly, when considering diligence, the Court conducts a fact-sensitive inquiry “measured by the qualitative [*6] efforts of a specific plaintiff seeking to locate and serve a specific defendant.” Modan, 327 N.J. Super. at 48 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Diligence requires that a plaintiff follow up on information it possesses or can reasonably obtain, but it does not necessarily mean a plaintiff take every conceivable action. Id. at 48-49 (collecting cases).
Service by publication, as requested here, “is hardly favored and is the method of service that is least likely to give notice.” M & D Assocs. v. Mandara, 366 N.J. Super. 341, 353, 841 A.2d 441 (App. Div. 2004) (citing Modan, 327 N.J. Super. at 48). “Chance alone brings to the attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his home outside the area of the newspaper’s normal circulation the odds that the information will never reach him are large indeed.” Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315. Nevertheless, “in the case of persons missing or unknown, employment of an indirect and even a probably futile means of notification is all that the situation permits and creates no constitutional bar to a final decree foreclosing their rights.” Id. at 317.
Here, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has demonstrated due diligence in attempting to serve Defendants Collier and Murray. A review of the Affidavit of William F. Stewart, Esq., establishes [*7] that, in accordance with N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(a), Plaintiff hired three separate investigators over the last four years to attempt to locate and serve Colt, who had not yet been served, Murray and Collier. In April 2014, after having received the notice of the claim from Achaempong’s attorney, Plaintiff sent three letters to Colt, all of which were returned to Plaintiff as undelivered. Affidavit of William F. Stewart in Support of Motion for Leave to Effect Service by Publication, Oct. 12, 2018, D.E. 11-1, at ¶ 9. Plaintiff engaged Custard Insurance Adjusters in June 2014 in an attempt to locate Colt and the alleged driver of the tractor trailer at issue. Id. at ¶ 10. Custard was unable to make contact with any of the Defendants. Exhibit C to Affidavit of William F. Stewart in Support of Motion for Leave to Effect Service by Publication, Oct. 12, 2018, D.E. 11-4. Plaintiff then hired a second investigator, Bauer Trip Preparation (hereinafter “Bauer”), in an attempt to locate Colt, Murray and Collier. Affidavit of William F. Stewart in Support of Motion for Leave to Effect Service by Publication, Oct. 12, 2018, D.E. 11-1, at ¶ 12. Mr. Stewart sent letters on Plaintiff’s behalf on October 11, 2016 to approximately [*8] 10 addresses that the investigators had presented as potentially viable addresses for Defendants. Id., ¶ 13. Each letter was sent via regular United States mail and certified mail, return receipt requested and each letter was returned to Plaintiff’s counsel. Id., ¶¶ 13-14. The certified envelopes sent to Murray and Collier were both returned as “unclaimed,” while both the regular and certified mail envelopes sent to Colt were returned as “unknown,” “undeliverable” and/or “unable to forward.” Id., ¶ 14. The regular mail envelopes sent to Collier and Murray were not returned by the Postal Service. Id., ¶¶ 15, 21, 25.
After Bauer conducted on-site visits to numerous of the potential addresses discovered for Defendants, Murray, using a blocked telephone number, contacted the Bauer investigator and indicated that he had heard that Bauer was looking for him. Id., ¶ 16. Murray refused to provide either his current address or cell phone number. Id. He also declined to confirm whether he was affiliated with any of the addresses Bauer had found him to be associated with. Id. Murray did indicate that he was staying with a friend in North Carolina but refused to provide the friend’s name or address. [*9] Id. He stated that he would be in New Jersey for the holidays and the investigator asked him to meet with him. Id. Murray said to “give him a week to get in touch” but the investigator never heard from him again. Id.
Plaintiff hired a third investigator, Pacific Claims Service, Inc. (hereinafter “Pacific”), while the Complaint in this matter was being prepared. Id., ¶ 17. On July 15, 2018, the Pacific investigator physically located Murray at a backyard barbecue at a Toms River address but once the investigator identified himself, Murray told him to leave and that he did not want anything to do with him. Id., ¶ 20. Certified mail sent to that same Toms River address was returned “unclaimed” but regular mail sent to the address was not returned. Id., ¶ 21. After Plaintiff filed this action, its process server attempted to serve Murray three times at that Toms River address in early August 2018. Id., ¶ 22. Three weeks after the conversation at the barbecue, on August 6, 2018, Murray’s wife answered the door to the process server, and stated that Murray no longer lives there and they are separated. Id., ¶ 23. Murray’s wife refused to accept service or provide Murray’s current address. [*10] Id.
Once Plaintiff filed the Complaint in this matter, in August 2018, its process server attempted to serve Collier at the same Jersey City address that the correspondence had been mailed to, of which the ones sent regular mail were not returned by the U.S. Postal Service. Id., ¶ 26. The process server confirmed with a neighbor that Collier does live at that address but that “he is on the road most of the time and is rarely home.” Id., ¶ 27. The process server made five attempts to serve Collier at that address and four of those times there was no vehicle in the driveway. Id., ¶¶ 28-29. However, on one attempt there was a vehicle parked in the driveway but after repeated knocking on the door by the process server there was no response, so the process server concluded that Collier was possibly avoiding service. Id., ¶ 29.
In light of these circumstances, the Court will allow Plaintiff to effectuate service upon Defendants Collier and Murray by publication. It is clear that Plaintiff has exhausted the options for personal service and service via certified mail and that service by publication, while not likely to be successful, is the sole remaining option. Although Plaintiff might not [*11] have taken every conceivable action, its conduct demonstrates that it followed up on information it possessed or could have reasonably obtained, and that its efforts meet the constitutional requirements of due process. See Modan, 327 N.J. Super. at 48-49; accord Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15. Accordingly, the Court will allow Plaintiff to effectuate service upon Defendants by publication.

B. Enlargement of Time to Serve Defendants
Plaintiff has also requested an extension of time to serve Defendants Collier and Murray. The deadline to serve expired on October 16, 2018, six days after Plaintiff filed the current motion. Pursuant to the December 1, 2015 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), a party must serve the defendant within 90 days after the complaint is filed or “the court, upon motion or on its own initiative after notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant or direct that service be effected within a specified time; provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court shall extend the time for service for an appropriate period.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated that “determination of whether to extend time involves a two-step inquiry. The district court first [*12] determines whether good cause exists for a plaintiff’s failure to effect timely service. If good cause exists, the extension must be granted. If good cause does not exist, the district court must consider whether to grant a discretionary extension of time. . . .In determining whether good cause exists, a court’s primary focus is on the plaintiff’s reasons for not complying with the time limit in the first place[.]” Boley v. Kaymark, 123 F.3d 756, 758 (3d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). The good cause prong requires that “a plaintiff demonstrate good faith and some reasonable basis for noncompliance with the time specified in the rules.” House v. H.U.D., Civ. Action No. 05-3811, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91901, 2006 WL 3779762 *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 20, 2006) (citing MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Teleconcepts, Inc., 71 F.3d 1086, 1097 (3d Cir. 1995)). Thus, when determining whether or not good cause exists, the Court should assess, among other things, “the reasonableness of plaintiff’s efforts to serve,” and “whether the plaintiff moved for an enlargement of time to serve.” Pilone v. Basik Funding, Inc., Civ. Action No. 05-3798, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4998, 2007 WL 203958 * 2 (D.N.J. Jan. 23, 2007).
In this case, good cause exists to grant Plaintiff’s requested relief. The Court has already found that Plaintiff demonstrated due diligence in its attempts to serve Defendants, and has been unable to serve Defendants, not through any fault or lack of effort on Plaintiff’s part. The Court has also found that Plaintiff has acted reasonably in light of the circumstances. [*13] Accordingly, Plaintiff shall have until February 20, 2019 to serve Defendants.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to effectuate substitute service is granted and Plaintiff’s request to extend the deadline to serve Defendants is granted. Plaintiff will be permitted until February 20, 2019 to serve Defendants.
However, the Court respectfully disagrees with the details of the service that Plaintiff proposes. Plaintiff proposes to publish notice once a week, for three consecutive weeks in The Star Ledger. In an effort to ensure a greater possibility that Defendants will read the publication, the Court will require Plaintiff to publish the notice in The Star Ledger once per week, for five consecutive weeks. Five weeks in the periodical appears to exceed the minimum requirements of Rule 4:4-5(a)(3). However, the Court is satisfied that it represents a fair and reasonable effort to provide Defendants notice of the litigation. See 28 U.S.C. § 1655. In addition, the Court will require Plaintiff to publish the notice in the Charlotte Observer once per week, for five consecutive weeks because during some portion of the time during which Plaintiff has been attempting to locate Murray he was [*14] residing in North Carolina.
Additionally, consistent with Rule 4:4-5(a)(3), the Court will require Plaintiff to mail, via regular and certified mail, a copy of the Summons and Complaint to Defendants at their three last known addresses. Although Plaintiff’s motion papers suggest this undertaking may be futile, the Court finds good cause for it in ensuring the greatest possibility that Defendants will receive notice of the suit and afforded an opportunity to be heard.
The Court shall issue an order consistent with this Opinion.
/s/ Michael A. Hammer
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Date: December 20, 2018

ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion for service of process on Defendants Collier and Murray by publication, and for an enlargement of time to serve, D.E. 11;
and the Court having considered the motion on the papers and without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78 and Local Civil Rule 78.1;
and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Opinion of this date;
and for good cause shown,
IT IS on this 20th day of December 2018,
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for service of process on Defendants Collier and Murray by publication, and for an enlargement of time to serve, D.E. 11, is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that [*15] Plaintiff will be permitted until February 20, 2019 to serve Defendants; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff shall publish the notice in The Star Ledger once per week, for five consecutive weeks; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff shall also publish the notice in the Charlotte Observer once per week, for five consecutive weeks; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff shall mail, via regular and certified mail, a copy of the Summons and Complaint to Defendants at their three last known addresses.
/s/ Michael A. Hammer
United States Magistrate Judge