Superior Court of Connecticut,

J.D. OF NEW LONDON.

AT NEW LONDON.

DANIELS, JACK

v.

A. E. N. ASPHALT, INC.

NO. KNL-CV23-6060505-S

|

JANUARY 30, 2024

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION MOTION TO STRIKE

Angelica N. Papastavros, Judge

*1 The issue presented is whether the court should grant the defendant’s motion to strike count six of the plaintiff’s complaint, which alleges violations of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR), on the ground that the FMCSR does not create a private right of action for personal injury suits and, therefore, count six is legally insufficient.

FACTS

The plaintiff, Jack Daniels, in a revised complaint filed on June 6, 2023, alleges that on or about April 6, 2021, the defendant-employee, Michael Collins, was operating a truck owned by the defendant-owner A.E.N. Asphalt, Inc. (A.E.N.) in Gales Ferry, Connecticut. A.E.N. used the vehicle in question as a commercial truck to deliver its products and as a family vehicle. At all relevant times, Collins was an agent, servant, and/or employee of A.E.N. and was acting within the scope of his employment when operating the truck. Collins was also a family member of A.E.N. and was operating the truck within his general authority to do so. At that time and place, the plaintiff was operating his motor vehicle on Route 12 and had stopped while waiting for traffic to pass. Collins was also operating his truck on Route 12, directly behind the plaintiff, and collided with the rear of the vehicle driven by the plaintiff. Due to Collins’ alleged negligence and carelessness, the plaintiff suffered physical injuries and incurred medical care expenses.

The plaintiff alleges negligence and recklessness as to Collins and negligence, direct liability regarding training and supervision, negligent entrustment, and violations of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations as to A.E.N. On July 5, 2023, the defendant filed a motion to strike count six of the complaint on the ground that the FMCSR does not create a private right of action for personal injury suits and, therefore, this count is legally insufficient. The motion is accompanied by a memorandum of law. The plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion to strike on December 13, 2023.

DISCUSSION

“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest … the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint … to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). “A motion to strike is properly granted if the complaint alleges mere conclusions of law that are unsupported by the facts alleged.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. Bristol Hospital, 308 Conn. 338, 349, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). “Practice Book … § 10-39, allows for a claim for relief to be stricken only if the relief sought could not be legally awarded.” Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 325, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998). “In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). “If any facts provable under the express and implied allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint support a cause of action… the complaint is not vulnerable to a motion to strike.” Bouchard v. People’s Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991).

*2 In the present case, in count six of the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that A.E.N. violated the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations. The defendant filed a motion to strike count six, arguing that the FMCSR does not create a private right of action for personal injury suits and, therefore, the count is legally insufficient. In opposition to the motion, the plaintiff argues that, regardless of whether there is a private right of action under the FMCSR, the regulations may still be used as evidence of negligence in a personal injury case.

“[P]rivate rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress. The judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy. Statutory intent on this latter point is determinative. Without it, a cause of action does not exist, and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.” (Citations omitted.) Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87, 121 S. Ct. 1511, 149 L. Ed. 2d 517 (2001).

“[I]n the context of plaintiffs who have been injured due to violations of that statute, courts have held that there is no private right to bring an FMCSA claim.” Dighello v. Thurston Foods, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 3d 5, n.26 (2d Cir. 2018). “[T]here is no private right of action to enforce alleged violations of the [FMCSA] ….” Gilbert v. Zablauskas, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-18-6041805-S (April 29, 2022, Roraback, J.). Across other jurisdictions, most courts that have considered the issue have come to the same conclusion. See, e.g., Kavulak v. Laimis Joudzevicius, A. V, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 2d 337, 343-44 (W.D.N.Y. 2014) (statute does not create private right of action to recover for personal injuries sustained by motorist struck by tractor-trailer driver); Courtney v. Ivanov, 41 F. Supp. 3d 453, 457-58 (W.D. P.a. 2014) (adopting majority position that motor carrier regulations do not create private cause of action for personal injuries); Dumas v. Albaier, United States District Court, Docket No. 1:20- CV-00387 (6th Cir. October 7, 2020) (FMCSR does not create private right of action); Albuquerque v. Achane, United States District Court, Docket No. 19-13901 (SDW) (3d Cir. August 12, 2019) (plaintiff’s claim for violation of FMCSA must be dismissed because FMCSA does not provide for private right of action for personal injury suits); Bales v. Green, United States District Court, Docket No. 16-CV-106-GKF-JFJ (10th Cir. March 2, 2018) (clear majority of courts to consider issue concluded Motor Carrier Act and other Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations do not create private right of action for damages in personal injury claims).

In the present case, the plaintiff alleges violations of the FMCSR after his vehicle was struck by a vehicle owned and operated by the defendant. Connecticut courts that have addressed the issue have concluded that the FMCSR does not create a private right of action for personal injury claims such as the one in the present case. Dighello v. Thurston Foods, Inc., supra, 307 F. Supp. 3d 5, n.26; Gilbert v. Zablauskas, supra, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV18-6041805-S. Further, other jurisdictions that have considered the issue have also concluded that the FMCSR does not create a private right of action and provide guidance on the issue. See, e.g., Kavulak v. Laimis Joudzevicius, A. V., Inc., supra, 994 F. Supp. 2d 343-44; Courtney v. Ivanov, supra 41 F. Supp. 3d 457-58; Dumas v. Albaier, supra, United States District Court, Docket No. 1:20-CV-00387; Albuquerque v. Achane, supra, United States District Court, Docket No. 19-13901 (SDW); Bales v. Green, supra, United States District Court, Docket No. 16-CV-106-GKF-JFJ. The facts of the present case are similar to Gilbert, in which the plaintiff suffered injuries from a motor vehicle incident, where the court concluded that there was no private right of action to enforce alleged violations of the FMCSR. Gilbert v. Zablauskas, supra, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV18-6041805-S. Therefore, the facts of the present case, in which the plaintiff alleges that he suffered injuries as a result of a motor vehicle accident caused by the defendant, do not support a finding that the plaintiff can bring a private right of action under the FMCSR.

*3 In support of his opposition to the motion to strike, the plaintiff cites to jury instructions given in Amparo v. Ayala, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-16-6029461-S (December, 27, 2019,¹ Hernandez, J.), in which Judge Hernandez stated, in relevant part: “If you find that the defendants violated an FMCSR safety standard, you may consider this as a guide in determining the appropriate standard of care. Therefore, a violation of such a standard may be considered by you as evidence of negligence.” Though Judge Hernandez determined that a violation of the FMCSR could be considered as evidence of negligence in that case, the discretionary use of these instructions has no binding authority on the present case.

The plaintiff also cites to Byrne v. Avery Center for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P. C., 327 Conn. 540, 175 A.3d 1 (2018), which can be distinguished from the present case. In Byrne, the court addressed alleged violations of HIPAA in the context of a health care provider’s breach of its duty of confidentiality in the course of complying with a subpoena. In that context, the court concluded: “to the extent it has become the common practice for Connecticut health care providers to follow the procedures required under HIPAA in rendering services to their patients, HIPAA and its implementing regulations may be utilized to inform the standard of care applicable to such claims arising from allegations of negligence in the disclosure of patients’ medical records pursuant to a subpoena.” (Emphasis added.) Id., 557. The court’s decision to allow HIPAA and its regulations to be used as evidence in a negligence claim was made after consideration of the specific facts of that case and in the context of the alleged disclosure of patients’ medical records pursuant to a subpoena. Byrne differs from the present case not only in the type of regulations at issue but also the facts from which the negligence claim arises. The plaintiff does not provide any other authority to support his argument that the FMSCR may be used as evidence of negligence in a personal injury claim.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court grant the defendant’s motion to strike count six of the plaintiff’s complaint.

All Citations

Footnotes  

1. Decision due date. Action was withdrawn on October 31, 2019.  

End of Document

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