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BDM v. Federal Express

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United States District Court,

W.D. Washington.

BDM, LLC, Plaintiff,

v.

FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.

No. C05-1347-MJB.

 

March 31, 2006.

 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

 

This matter proceeds before the undersigned Magistrate Judge by consent of the parties.

 

BENTON, Magistrate J.

 

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY CONCLUSION

This breach of contract action involving an international shipment of goods was initially filed in King County Superior Court by Plaintiff and removed to this Court by Defendant. Now before the Court is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff has filed a response in opposition to the motion and Defendant has filed a reply. Having reviewed the motion, all pleadings and documents in support and in opposition, and the remaining record, the Court GRANTS the summary judgment motion and dismisses all of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant.

 

II. BACKGROUND FACTS

On August 16, 2004, plaintiff Beads Du Monde, LLC (“BDM”) and defendant FedEx    entered into a FedEx Pricing Agreement (the “Agreement”). Decl. of Bonnie Bridwell, Dkt. # 14 at Ex. F. The Agreement sets out terms and conditions of their contract of carriage, which includes the terms of the applicable FedEx Service Guide incorporated by reference. Id. On or around September 30, 2004, BDM contacted FedEx to arrange for pickup and shipment of twenty-one (21) export-grade cartons of gems from Washington to China. When the FedEx courier arrived, he explained to BDM that freight shipments must be palletized and arranged to come back the next day. BDM used a wood pallet that accompanied an earlier FedEx shipment to BDM.

 

Plaintiff’s complaint names as defendants Federal Express Corporation, FedEx Ground Package System, Inc, and FedEx Corporate Services, Inc., and collectively refers to these entities as “FedEx .” This Court uses the collective reference in this memorandum opinion.

 

FedEx concedes the facts in the latter two sentences of this paragraph for purposes of this motion only. Dkt. # 19 at 2.

 

On October 1, 2004, a FedEx courier picked up the palletized shipment for delivery from Redmond, Washington to Changzhou, China, traveling under FedEx international air waybill number 6888630031481. Dkt. # 14, Ex. B. All documentation and the air waybill for the shipment was prepared by BDM. The Commercial Invoice that accompanied the shipment described its contents as “synthetic cat’s eye, cut but not set for use in manufacture or jewelry” that was being “return[ed] for repair”. Dkt # 14, Ex. G. This invoice listed the total weight of the shipment as 757 pounds, the total commodity value as $210.00, and the total invoice value as $1648.35. Id.

 

The shipment arrived in China on or about October 5, 2004, but was unable to clear Customs. Dkt. # 1 at 19. From October 6 through December 31, 2004, FedEx placed more than 90 telephone calls, mostly to the consignee but also to the shipper, in efforts to have the shipment clear Chinese Customs. Dkt. # 14, Ex D. On January 10, 2005, the shipment was destroyed by Chinese Customs.

 

On July 12, 2005, BDM filed this breach of contract action against FedEx, seeking damages in the amount of $51,000 in lost profits it had expected to make in selling the gemstone beads, or in the alternative the value of the gemstone beads, $24,469.19, plus prejudgment interest. Dkt. # 1 at 10. BDM also seeks damages of $1,437.35, representing charges paid to FedEx to deliver the shipment. Id. FedEx filed the current summary judgment motion on January 9, 2006. Dkt. # 13.

 

III. THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS

FedEx moves for summary judgment dismissing BDM’s complaint on grounds that: 1) FedEx did not breach the contract, and 2) BDM failed to give proper, timely written notice of claim. In the alternative, FedEx moves for partial summary judgment limiting Plaintiff’s recovery to 17 SDR’s per kilogram pursuant to Article 22(2)(a) of the Warsaw Convention, 1929, as amended at the Hague, 1995. BDM responds that the summary judgment motion should be denied because: 1) FedEx breached the contract by insisting that BDM use a wood pallet for the shipment and providing a wood pallet that would not clear Chinese customs; 2) the notice provisions do not apply when the shipment is destroyed; 3) if the notice provisions apply, BDM complied with them; and 4) the Warsaw Convention’s limitation of liability cannot be decided on summary judgment since there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether FedEx engaged in willful misconduct.

 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate if the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed R. Civ. P. 56(c). In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and draws all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630-31 (9th Cir.1987). The moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of genuine issues of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If the movant meets this burden, then summary judgment will be granted unless there is significant probative evidence tending to support the opponent’s legal theory. See First Nat’l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968).

 

In response to a summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue of fact for trial and produce evidence sufficient to establish the existence of the elements essential to his case. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to create a factual dispute. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.

 

V. DISCUSSION

A. Applicability of the Warsaw Convention

 

The Warsaw Convention is an international treaty governing liability that arises from the “international transportation of persons, baggage or goods performed by an aircraft for hire.” Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, October 12, 1929, art. 1, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934), reprinted in note following 49 U.S.C. §  40105. When the Warsaw Convention applies, it is the exclusive remedy for actions against air carriers. Onyeanusi v. Pan AM, 952 F.2d 788, 793 (3rd Cir.1992) (citations omitted). The Warsaw Convention only applies to shipments between territories of signatories, otherwise known as “High Contracting Parties.” Mingtai Fire & Marine Ins. Co., v. United Parcel Service, 177 F.3d 1142, 1144 (9th Cir.1999) (citing Warsaw Convention, art. 1(2)).

 

Here, the January 5, 2004 FedEx Service Guide, which was in effect at the time of the shipment, clearly states that “[w]hen the carriage involves an ultimate destination or stop in a country other than the country of departure, the Warsaw Convention  [] may be applicable.” Dkt. # 14, Ex. E at 27. Moreover, neither party disputes that China and the United States are High Contracting Parties to the Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol of 1955. Thus, the present action falls within the parameters of the Warsaw Convention as amended by the Hague Protocol of 1955 (the “Convention”).

 

The FedEx Service Guide provides that “Warsaw Convention” or “Convention” as used in the FedEx Express terms and conditions, means the original Warsaw Convention or that convention as amended, including the Montreal Protocol No. 4 and the Montreal Convention.” Dkt. # 14, Ex. E at 27).

 

This treaty is formally known as the Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air signed at Warsaw on 12 October 1929, Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371. The Hague Protocol to the Warsaw Convention entered into force in China on November 18, 1975. The United States Senate approved the Hague Protocol on July 31, 2003, and it was ratified by President George W. Bush effective December 14, 2003. See Avero Belg. Ins. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 423 F.3d 73, 83 (2nd Cir.2005) (holding that the United States did not consent to be bound to the Hague Protocol by virtue of its ratification of Montreal Protocol No. 4 in 1998).

 

B. Breach of Contract Claim

 

FedEx argues that BDM’s breach of contract action is barred because although the shipment was not delivered to the consignee, the basis was not due to a FedEx breach. Rather, FedEx asserts that nondelivery of the shipment was solely due to the requirements of Chinese customs, and the burden of compliance with customs is strictly on the shipper under the Convention and the contract. BDM responds that FedEx can be held liable to BDM because FedEx insisted that BDM use a wood pallet that would not clear Chinese customs since it was not heat treated. BDM contends that it did not intend for the pallet to be used all the way to China, and that by overruling BDM’s chosen form of packaging, FedEx took it upon itself to ensure that its chosen form of packaging complied with Chinese and international law.

 

These arguments highlight the preliminary issue of why the shipment failed to clear customs that must be addressed in order to determine whether FedEx is entitled to summary judgment dismissing BDM’s breach of contract claim. Thus, the Court first considers whether the record reflects a genuine issue of material fact regarding the reason the shipment was held in Chinese customs and eventually destroyed.

 

The only evidence in the record concerning the reason the shipment was held by Chinese customs appears in the Customer Exception Request, attached as Exhibit “D” to the Declaration of Bonnie Bridwell in support of FedEx’s summary judgment motion. Dkt. # 14. This exhibit contains entries tracking telephone communications between FedEx and the consignee and/or the shipper after the shipment failed to clear customs. Careful review of this exhibit reveals a number of entries that flesh out the reasons the shipment failed to clear customs. Those entries are charted in the following table:

 

The consignee Mr. Zheng named as Ms. Gao as the person that he would ask to contact FedEx regarding the shipment after it failed to clear Chinese Customs. See Dkt. 14, Ex. G at 11.

 

 

 

——————————————————————————-

DATE        TEXT ENTRY

——————————————————————————-

10/5/2004   Notify: Ship and Cnee of required clearance documentation and info

Reason: CPW–Call Shp/Cnee; Nd ppwk/info

——————————————————————————-

10/6/2004   Shpt has been caged by SZX customs due to need formal entry

——————————————————————————-

11/9/2004   Origin, Pls note Shpr the shpt has been in Shenzhen Customs cage

for

such a long time and Cnee isn’t working in clearing the shpt … By

the way the value is too low to be accepted by China customs …

 

 

 

and

if the shpt stay in customs cage more longer, it wl be destroyed by

customs.

——————————————————————————-

11/15/2004  Cld Ms. Gao [] …, she has asked the factory to enhance the

value

The consignee Mr. Zheng named as Ms. Gao as the person that he would ask

to contact FedEx regarding the shipment after it failed to clear Chinese

Customs. See Dkt. 14, Ex. G at 11.

——————————————————————————-

11/15/2004  Cld Ms. Gao …, Ms. Gao tld me there are two way to resolve the

problem / / / /one is maybe she wl destroy the shpt; another is she

wl

enhance the value to clear the shpt, but she has to consult with

the

boss of the factory….She won’t rtn the shpt to shpr

——————————————————————————-

11/17/2004  Cld Ms. Gao …, she tld me she has try her best to descuss the

price

with the factory … when there is a result she wl cb

——————————————————————————-

 

 

 

11/18/2004  Cld Ms. Gao …, she tld me she wl still want Tianyichengcin to

handle this case, she wl let them to check the shpt and enhance the

value to a relative reasonable price

——————————————————————————-

11/19/2004  Cld Ms. Gao …, asked how about the process//

1. Tianyichengxin asked their shpr to provide a suffocating testify

Ms. Go has sent e-mail to their shpr

——————————————————————————-

11/22/2004  Origin, Pls help cnee to etc shpr to provide the above ppwk

——————————————————————————-

11/23/2004  Origin Pls help etc shpr that Cn Customs required certificate of

heat

treatment of wood pallet first, or it could not be clred. We had

informed Cnee Ms. Gao on the above. She tld me she wl also etc

Shpr when he was on duty for it

——————————————————————————-

11/24/2004  Cld Ms. Gao …, tld her the heat treatment on wood pallet shoul[d]

be provided by Shpr, she noted and she wl send e-mail to Shpr and

urge them to provide the approval

——————————————————————————-

11/25/2004  Cld Ms. Gao …, she tld me T/Y has contacted her yesterday and she

 

 

 

has noted Shpr very clearly in e-mail to provide the heat treatment

on

wood pallet//Now is just waiting for Shpr to send the information

——————————————————————————-

12/1/2004   Cld Ms Gao …, she tld me that Shpr had mailed certification of

heat

treatment to her. Now it was in Shanghai. After she got it, she wl

mailed it to Tianyi Broker Ms Liu to help do formal entry

——————————————————————————-

12/3/2004   Cld Tianyichengxin Ms Liu Lin, she tld me she didn’t receive the

heat

treatment … she tld me the value of this shpt is still relative

low

according to customs, this shpt’s HS code is 70181000 and the D/T

cage fee, delay charge, plus them together is nearly 12000RMB …

Ms. Liu tld me to note Ms. Gao the above

——————————————————————————-

12/14/2004  Cld Cnee Ms Gao, she asked Tianyi Broker Co to do formal entry

 

——————————————————————————-

12/17/2004  Origin Pls be noted if Cnee could not do formal entry before

 

 

 

1/5/2005, the shpt wl be handed to Cn Customs to dispose. That is

to

say, both Cnee n Shpr wl lose right to handle it.

If Cnee want to do formal entry, she must pay 0.5% of D/V due to

delaying declaration to Cn Customs n fee of renting warehouse

——————————————————————————-

12/20/2004  FedEx China, called Shpr & spk w/ Graham and Arcus Kelley … per

shpr, this is a standard wooden warehouse pallet that was shrink

wrapped becasue FedEx (USA) adv them the only way this shpmnt

would be accepted was to be shrink wrapped on a pallet & shipped to

China … Shpr stated you have their full authority to destroy the

pallet only and delv pkgs.

——————————————————————————-

12/20/2004  According to Cn Customs n CIQ’s Policy … we had no right to

destroy the wood pallet n Cnee/Shpr must provide heat treatment

certificate and other ppwk to clear it.

——————————————————————————-

12/27/2004  Ld Ms Gao …, she tld me she has ctced Shpr for wanting the heat

steam … if Shpr can’t provide the document, she wl not respons

for

the result

 

 

 

——————————————————————————-

1/4/2005    Cld Ms. Gao …, noted her the shpt has been in Customs cage for 3

months … Now Cn Customs wl handle this case … she tld me she

wl send e-mail to note Shpr the above

——————————————————————————-

1/7/2005    Applied to Destroy this Shpt….CN Customs wl handle this case

——————————————————————————-

 

 

 

Dkt. # 14, Ex. G at 11-21.

 

These entries show that the reason the shipment was held by Chinese customs was the absence of certain documentation and information needed for formal entry of the shipment, including both information enhancing the value of the shipment, as well as a certificate of heat treatment of the wood pallet. It further shows that the shipment was destroyed only after three months had lapsed without resolution of these customs clearance issues. Thus, the undersigned concludes that there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding the reason the shipment was held by Chinese Customs.

 

Consequently, in this case, assessment of whether there is a genuine issue of material fact on FedEx’s claim that it did not breach the contract turns on the issue of who bore the responsibility for satisfying the customs requirements. Here, the Court agrees with FedEx that the Convention and the contract place all burden of properly completed paperwork on the shipper.

 

The relevant provisions of the Convention that address this issue are Articles 10 and 16. Article 10 provides:

(1) The consignor shall be responsible for the correctness of the particulars and statements relating to the goods which he inserts in the air waybill.

(2) The consignor shall indemnify the carrier against all damage suffered by him, or by any other person to whom the carrier is liable, by reason of the irregularity, incorrectness or incompleteness of the particulars and statements furnished by the consignor.

Additionally, Article 16 states:

(1) The consignor must furnish such information and attach to the air waybill such documents as are necessary to meet the formalities of customs, octroi, or police before the goods can be delivered to the consignee. The consignor shall be liable to the carrier for any damage occasioned by the absence, insufficiency, or irregularity of any such information or documents unless the damage is due to the fault of the carrier or his agents.

(2) The carrier is under no obligation to enquire into the correctness or sufficiency of such information or documents.

 

In this case, these Articles of the Convention make it clear that to the extent the paperwork and documentation necessary for the shipment to clear Chinese Customs was insufficient or incomplete, the responsibility for preparation and correctness of those documents lay with the consignor, BDM, not the carrier, FedEx.

 

Moreover, several provisions of the applicable FedEx Service Guide also relieve FedEx of responsibility under the circumstances of this case. First, the “Customs Clearance” section of the Service Guide states in pertinent part:

D. When shipments are held by customs or other agencies due to incorrect or missing documentation, we may attempt first to notify the recipient. If local law requires the correct information or documentation to be submitted by a recipient and recipient fails to do so within a reasonable time as we may determine, the shipment may be considered undeliverable…. If the recipient fails to supply the required information or documentation, and local law allows the sender to provide the same, we may attempt to notify the sender. If sender also fails to supply the required information or documentation, and local law allows the sender to provide the same, we may attempt to notify the sender. If sender also fails to provide the information or documentation within a reasonable time as we may determine, the shipment will be considered undeliverable. We assume no responsibility for our inability to complete a delivery due to incorrect or missing documentation, whether or not we attempt to notify the recipient or sender.

Dkt. 14, Ex. E at 29 (emphasis added). The record reflects that FedEx repeatedly contacted the recipient and the sender in efforts to obtain clearance of the shipment through Chinese customs. See Dkt. 14, Ex. G. However, because neither BDM nor its consignee ever resolved the customs issues concerning the missing or incomplete documentation needed for formal entry of the shipment into China, FedEx’s inability to complete delivery falls squarely within the scope of this provision.

 

Furthermore, the “Liabilities Not Assumed” section of the applicable FedEx Service Guide provides:

We will not be liable for, nor will any adjustment, refund, or credit of any kind be given as a result of, any loss, damage, delay, misdelivery, nondelivery, misinformation or failure to provide information caused by or resulting in whole or in part from:

* * *

G. Our inability to complete a delivery, or a dely to any delivery due to acts or omissions of customs or other regulatory agencies.

Dkt. 14, Ex. E at 31-32 (emphasis added). The nondelivery in this case resulted from the acts of Chinese Customs in placing a hold on the shipment and in ultimately destroying the shipment. Thus, under this provision, FedEx was relieved of any liability to BDM resulting from the loss and nondelivery of this shipment.

 

In an effort to avoid FedEx’s relief from liability under these provisions of the Convention and the contract, BDM argues that its gems were destroyed because they were placed on a wood pallet that was not heat treated, and BDM seeks to narrow the focus to who is responsible for the wood pallet being untreated. In that regard, BDM claims that because FedEx required BDM to place its 21 packages on a pallet, FedEx took this case out of its standard contract and took upon itself to ensure that its chosen form of packaging complied with Chinese and international law.

 

However, the Court finds these arguments to be without merit. While it is undisputed that the FedEx courier told BDM the shipment needed to be palletized, BDM itself chose the wood pallet on which the 21 boxes were shipped and it packed the boxes onto the pallet. There are absolutely no facts in the record to suggest that FedEx was involved in selecting the pallet that BDM used for this shipment. Moreover, the “Packaging and Marking” provisions of the FedEx Service Guide, squarely places the burden on the shipper to “comply with all applicable laws (including, but not limited to, local state, federal and international laws), including those governing packing, marking and labeling for all shipments.” See Dkt. # 14, Ex. E at 22. Thus, the Court finds that BDM alone bore responsibility for selection of a wood pallet that was untreated.

 

C. Remaining Claims

 

FedEx’s summary judgment motion also presents arguments that this suit is barred because BDM failed to file a timely written notice of claim with FedEx, and that FedEx’s liability, as a matter of law, is limited to 17 SDRs per kilogram because the shipper failed to declare, or pay for, a value for carriage for the shipment. In light of the Court’s conclusion that FedEx did not breach its contract with BDM, it is unnecessary to address these remaining issues.

 

VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment on grounds that FedEx did not breach its contract with BDM. Therefore, the Court GRANTS FedEx’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt.# 13) and dismisses all of BDM’s claims against FedEx with prejudice.

Well v. Gulf Insurance Co.

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United States District Court,

E.D. Texas, Marshall Division.

Jason WELLS, Plaintiff,

v.

GULF INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.

No. 2-05-CV-162 (TJW).

 

March 28, 2006.

 

ORDER

 

WARD, J.

 

The above entitled and numbered civil action was referred to United States Magistrate Judge John D. Love pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §  636. The Report of the Magistrate Judge which contains his proposed findings of fact and recommendations for the disposition of such action has been presented for consideration. Plaintiff filed objections (# 85) to the Report and Recommendation (# 71) but the Court is of the opinion that the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge are correct. Therefore, the Court hereby adopts the Report of the United States Magistrate Judge as the findings and conclusions of this Court.

 

Accordingly, it is ordered that Defendant, Gulf Insurance Company’s Motion for Summary Judgement (# 51) is denied. Further, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation, the Court will assume for summary judgment purposes that the MCS-90 was attached to Gulf’s policy. Accordingly, and in light of this Court’s adoption of Judge Love’s Report and Recommendation, the Court hereby grants Plaintiff Jason Wells’ Motion for Summary Judgment (# 45).

 

All other pending motions are hereby denied as moot.

 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

 

LOVE, Magistrate J.

 

Before the Court are Plaintiff, Jason Wells’ (“Wells”), motion for summary judgment (Doc. 45) and Defendant, Gulf Insurance Company’s (“Gulf”), cross motion for summary judgment (Doc. 51). Wells was involved in an automobile accident with a truck operated by self-insured Builder’s Transport, Inc. (“BTI”). Wells suffered extensive injuries in the accident and received a $417,771.00 judgment against BTI who has since become insolvent and unable to satisfy the judgment. Now Wells seeks to recover the judgment from Gulf who provided BTI with excess liability insurance with an attachment point of $3.782 million. Although Wells’ judgment is significantly below the attachment point, he argues that an endorsement attached to the insurance policy makes Gulf a surety under these circumstances, and Gulf must pay the judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Court RECOMMENDS that Wells motion for summary judgment (Doc. 45) be GRANTED IN PART and Gulf’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 51) be DENIED.

 

BACKGROUND

As a motor carrier transporting goods in interstate commerce, BTI was subject to the terms of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 (“MCA”). The MCA was passed to assure that carriers operating in interstate commerce would be financially responsible to members of the public injured by the carrier’s negligence. To qualify financially under the MCA, a carrier must file a bond, insurance policy, or other type of security approved by the Secretary of Transportation (“Secretary”) establishing that the carrier meets the minimum financial requirements set by the Secretary. 49 U.S.C. §  13906(a)(1). Under the regulatory scheme applicable to this case the minimum level of financial responsibility was $1 million. 49 C.F.R. §  387.9.

 

A carrier may provide proof of financial security by submitting to the Secretary: (1) proof of insurance; (2) proof of a guarantee; (3) a surety bond issued by a bonding company authorized to do business in the United States; or (4) proof of qualification as a self-insurer. 49 U.S.C. §  31139(e). BTI qualified as a self-insurer up to the regulatory minimum of $1 million, but secured additional coverage for liability exceeding $1 million from excess insurers Reliance Insurance Company (“Reliance”), Gulf Insurance Company, Royal Indemnity Company (“Royal”), and Federal Insurance Company (“Federal”). Reliance provided $1 million in coverage subject to a $1.782 minimum annual deductible meaning that BTI would pay the first $2.782 million and Reliance would pay the next $1 million up to $3.782 million. From there, Gulf was responsible for amounts between $3.782 and $16.782 million, and Royal and Federal were responsible for amounts in excess of $16.782 million.

 

After receiving his $417,771.00 judgment, Wells unsuccessfully attempted to collect from BTI who had since filed for bankruptcy. Wells then attempted to recover from excess insurer Reliance who refused the claim because the judgment was below the policy’s $2.782 attachment point. Reliance filed for declaratory judgment in the Beaumont Division of the Eastern District of Texas on October 17, 2000, but before that matter was resolved, Reliance was declared insolvent. See Order of Liquidation, Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, Cause No. 269 M.D.2001. On April 29, 2005, Wells filed this action against Gulf seeking enforcement of the judgment entered against BTI arguing that an endorsement attached to the policy operates to eliminate any clauses that would bar an injured member of the public from recovering under these circumstances. The endorsement known as an MCS-90 is a part of the MCA and reads, in relevant part, as follows:

The insurance policy to which this endorsement is attached provides automobile liability insurance and is amended to assure compliance by the insured, within the limits stated herein, as a motor carrier of property, with Sections 29 and 30 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 and the rules and regulations of the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).

In consideration of the premium stated in the policy to which this endorsement is attached, the insurer (the company) agrees to pay, within the limits of liability described herein, any final judgment recovered against the insured for public liability resulting from negligence in the operation, maintenance or use of motor vehicles subject to the financial responsibility requirements of Sections 29 and 30 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 regardless of whether or not each motor vehicle is specifically described in the policy and whether or not such negligence occurs on any route in any territory authorized to be served by the insured or elsewhere ….. It is understood and agreed that no condition, provision, stipulation, or limitation contained in the policy, this endorsement, or any other endorsement thereon, or violation thereof, shall relieve the company from liability or from the payment of any final judgment, within the limits of liability herein described, irrespective of the financial condition insolvency or bankruptcy of the insured. However, all terms, conditions, and limitations, in the policy to which the endorsement is attached shall remain in full force and effect as binding between the insured and the company. The insured agrees to reimburse the company for any payment made by the company on account of any accident, claim, or suit involving a breach of the terms of the policy, and for any payment that the company would not have been obligated to make under the provisions of the policy except for the agreement contained in this endorsement.

It is further understood and agreed that, upon failure of the company to pay any final judgment recovered against the insured as provided herein, the judgment creditor may maintain an action in any court of competent jurisdiction against the company to compel such payment.

 

Following the close of discovery, Wells moved for summary judgment (Doc. 45), but Gulf contends that genuine issues of material fact exist concerning whether the MCS-90 endorsement was attached to the policy and whether all of Plaintiff’s damages are recoverable under the MCS-90. Further, Gulf moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Wells’ judgment does not trigger the MCS-90, the MCS-90 is unenforceable, and because Plaintiff’s claim is barred by limitations. The Court finds that Wells motion for summary judgment should be granted as to every issue except whether the MCS-90 was attached to the policy.

 

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary Judgment is proper if the movant demonstrates there are no genuine issues of material fact. Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125 (5th Cir.1992) citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Such a showing entitles the movant to summary judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment is proper, “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Contested facts preclude summary judgment if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). However, although all the evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom are considered in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the nonmoving party may not rest on the mere allegations or denials of his or her pleadings, but must respond by setting forth specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial.” Rushing v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 185 F.3d 496, 505 (5th Cir.1999), cert. denied.

 

The substantive law will identify what facts are material. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. While fact questions are considered with deference to the nonmovant, Reid v. State Farm Mutual Auto.Ins.Co., 784 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir.1986), a dispute as to a material fact is genuine only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

 

ANALYSIS

The MCS-90 Covers Plaintiff’s Judgment

 

The parties each move for summary judgment on the issue of whether the MCS-90 renders Gulf liable for Wells’ judgment. The Court finds that it does. The Policy provides for an attachment point of $3.782 million, but the MCS-90 compels Gulf to act as a surety where necessary to accomplish the MCA’s clear goal of protecting the public. McGirt, 399 F.Supp.2d at 659; Canal Ins. Co. v. Distribution Services, Inc., 320 F.3d 488 (4th Cir.2003).

 

The interpretation of the MCS-90 is a matter of federal law. Minter v. Great American Insurance Co. of New York, 423 F.3d 460, 470 (5th Cir.2005); Carter v. Vangilder, 803 F.2d 189, 191 (5th Cir.1986). The MCS-90 provides that the insurer agrees to pay any final judgment resulting from the carrier’s negligence notwithstanding any, “condition, provision, stipulation, or limitation contained in the policy, this endorsement, or any other endorsement thereon.” By reading out provisions that would prevent payment of the judgment the MCS-90 essentially creates a “suretyship by the insurance carrier to protect the public–a safety net.” T.H.E. Ins. Co. v. Larsen Intermodal Svcs., Inc., 242 F.3d 667, 672 (5th Cir.2001)(quoting Canal Ins. Co. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 59 F.3d 281, 283 (1st Cir1995)). However, the endorsement does not, “render the insurer primary as a matter of law.” T.H.E. Ins., 242 F.3d at 672; Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Underwriters Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 304, 312 (5th Cir.1978). Only when the attached policy does not provide coverage to the insured is the MCS-90 triggered. Minter, 423 F.3d at 470.

 

Gulf does not dispute that the MCA is designed to protect the public, but argues that the mechanisms MCA provides to for that protection are the financial responsibility requirements alone. In the case of self-insured authorized carriers, Gulf argues that the regulatory scheme places the risk that the carrier will be able to satisfy judgments arising from its negligence on the public. See 46 Fed.Reg. 30974 (1981). This characterization may be accurate in some cases as where a self-insured carrier does not maintain any further security against judgments for its negligence beyond its self-insured status, but that is not the situation before the Court. BTI obtained excess liability coverage and, if the MCS-90 was incorporated into the Policy, secured a suretyship that shifted the risk in some circumstances to Gulf.

 

Furthermore, Gulf maintains that, “[n]o authority holds an ‘excess’ insurer responsible from ‘dollar one’ when the ‘primary’ insurer is unable to respond despite the express limits of the MCS-90,” and urges the Court to follow the lead of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania and the District Court for the Western District of Michigan in finding that the MCS-90 does not require excess insurers to “drop down,” and satisfy judgments from the first dollar. (Gulf Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 38; Doc. 51); See August 23, 2005 Memorandum Opinion and Order, No. 269 M.D.2001, Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania; Kline v. Gulf Ins. Co., 2005 WL 2206458,(W.D.Mich.2005). However, Kline is distinguishable and Gulf’s declaration ignores McGirt v. Royal Insurance Company of America (cite omitted), which the Court finds to be factually on all fours with the case at bar and in accord with the Fifth Circuit view that, “the policy embodied in the statutes and regulations was to assure that injured members of the public would be able to obtain judgments collectible against negligent authorized carriers.” Canal Ins. Co. v. First General Ins. Co., 889 F.2d 604, 611 (5th Cir.1989).

 

In Kline, a $3.2 million judgment was entered against an insolvent motor carrier self-insured up to $1 million who carried excess insurance with Reliance and Gulf. Therefore, the first $1 million was uncollectible, the second $1 million satisfied the deductible under the Reliance excess policy and was uncollectible, Reliance paid the third $1 million, Gulf’s attachment point was $3 million so it paid the final $200,000. Plaintiff sought to collect the remaining $2 million from Reliance and Gulf. The Court refused to order the excess insurers to pay that amount because Plaintiff had recovered the regulatory minimum $1 million. Therefore, the policy goal of protecting the public was fulfilled and the MCS-90 was never activated.

 

The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania found, “that there is no support in statute or case law to justify a fundamental change in the contractual terms of a policy whereby an excess insurer under a self-insured retention policy becomes a primary insurer.” August 23, 2005, Memorandum Opinion and Order at 4. After researching this issue, the Court disagrees with the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania’s conclusion, and would point out that it made that statement before the Court in McGirt handed down its decision.

 

McGirt addressed a situation encompassing facts almost identical to this case and the Court in that case found that the MCS-90 required payment of the plaintiff’s judgment. McGirt, 399 F.Supp.2d at 669-670. The Court is in agreement with the Court in McGirt that, “[t]he effect, then of an MCS-90 endorsement attached to any policy, be it primary, excess or umbrella, is to act as a surety, in the absence of payment by the insured or another insurer, of regulatory minimum, in this case $1 million.” McGirt 399 F.Supp.2d at 666-667. Thus, the MCS-90 requires Gulf to act as a surety as to Wells’ judgment.

 

MCS-90’s Enforceability

 

As discussed above, the MCA requires motor carriers operating in interstate commerce to meet minimum levels of financial responsibility. If the carrier elects to satisfy this obligation by obtaining insurance it must maintain a certificate illustrating that it has obtained compliant insurance and must retain proof of its financial responsibility in the form of an MCS-90. 49 C.F.R. §  387.7(d). However, BTI chose to illustrate its financial responsibility by qualifying as a self-insurer and, therefore, no certificate of insurance was filed with the Secretary and no MCS-90 was necessary for the regulatory minimum security of $1 million. As the MCS-90 is required for a carrier that secures insurance to satisfy the regulatory minimum, Gulf argues that the MCS-90 is unenforceable as a legal nullity because BTI qualified as a self-insurer and the MCS-90 was unecessarily attached to the excess policy. The Court disagrees.

 

After qualifying as financially responsible under the applicable regulations, BTI sought excess insurance from several carriers and both BTI and Gulf were free to enter into any arrangement they saw fit. If the excess policy contained the MCS-90 endorsement, Gulf offers no reason that the Court should not enforce the contract that the parties entered into. The fact that BTI was not legally required to attach the MCS-90 to the excess policy does not render the MCS-90 unenforceable if it is attached. Further, Gulf cites no authority indicating that the MCS-90 may not be incorporated as an endorsement into an insurance policy obtained in excess of the regulatory minimum. Accordingly, if the MCS-90 was incorporated into the Policy, the Court will enforce whatever effect it has on the Policy. See McGirt v. Royal Insurance Company of America, 399 F.Supp.2d 655, 661 (D.Md.2005).

 

Was the MCS-90 Attached to the Policy?

 

Gulf claims that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the MCS-90 was incorporated into the Policy and supports its contention with three arguments. First, Gulf argues that it did not receive a separate premium for the MCS-90. Considering that the MCS-90 exposes the insurer to additional risk, Gulf insists that it would have collected an additional premium from BTI had the MCS-90 been a part of the policy. This argument is not terribly compelling because the MCS-90 states that it is incorporated, “in consideration for the premium stated in the policy to which this endorsement is attached.” Were the MCS-90 attached as an endorsement amending the underlying policy it would become a part of that policy and, presumably, the insurance company would collect one premium for the entire policy. Gulf’s argument assumes that a distinct premium would have been collected for the MCS-90 had it been attached to the policy, which seems like an implausible assumption. With the information before it, the Court is not persuaded that the absence of a premium for the MCS-90 establishes that the MCS-90 was not incorporated into the Policy. However, Gulf’s remaining two arguments raise a genuine issue of material fact. The arguments are closely related so the Court will consider them together.

 

The MCS-90 is a separate document that would, presumably, be attached to the back of an insurance policy at the time the policy was issued. It was Gulf’s practice to list the attached endorsements in the main policy, but the Policy in this case does not contain a listing for an MCS-90. Although the MCS-90 could have been attached later, Gulf insists that were that the case, the endorsement would bear an endorsement number, a counter-signature and the underwriting file would contain correspondence forwarding the endorsement to the broker and reinsurer. See Deposition of Karin Zimmerly, p. 59, In. 9. Wells counters that the MCS-90 must have been attached because another endorsement cancelled the original MCS-90, but Gulf maintains that the cancellation only establishes that a Gulf representative believed that the MCS-90 was in effect.

 

The fact that the endorsement was not listed on the Policy could have been an oversight, as could the absence of a countersignature, endorsement number, and correspondence to the broker and reinsurer. Further, the MCS-90 could have been mistakenly cancelled. Wells’ evidence is not particularly compelling and certainly cannot foreclose a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the MCS-90 was actually attached to the Policy. Therefore, Wells’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED as to the issue of whether the MCS-90 was attached to the Policy.

 

MCS-90 Covers Wells’ Entire Judgment

 

The goal of the regulatory scheme also requires that the Court reject Gulf’s argument that the MCS-90 does not authorize Wells to collect damages for diminished earning capacity, mental anguish or pre- and post-judgment interest awarded in the underlying judgment. The MCS-90 covers judgments, “recovered against the insured for public liability,” where public liability includes “liability for bodily injury, property damage, and environmental restoration,” bodily injury is defined as, “injury to the body, sickness, or disease to any person,” and property damage is defined as “[d]amage to or loss of use of tangible property.” Wells argues that his damages should be covered because they result from his “bodily injury.”

 

The Texas Supreme Court has held that bodily injuries under a commercial general liability insurance policy do not include injuries that are solely mental in nature, but did not offer guidance further narrowing the definition. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Tex.1997)(“Bodily injury” within liability coverage of homeowners’ insurance policy does not contemplate purely emotional injuries or pure mental anguish, but requires injury to physical structure of human body); see also Fielder Road Baptist Church v. Guideone Elite Ins. Co., 139 S.W.3d 384, 390 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2004, pet. granted)(finding that allegations of emotional injuries arising from physical injury supported a claim for “bodily injury” under insurance policy). In light of the purpose of the MCS-90, the Court is inclined to interpret “bodily injury” broadly enough to include the entire judgment including past and future economic damages and interest arising from Wells’ physical injuries.

 

Statute of Limitations

 

Gulf argues that Wells’ suit is time barred because he brought it after the applicable four year statute of limitations expired. The parties generally agree that a four year statute of limitations applies, but disagree about when the limitations period began to run. Gulf argues that its obligation to pay is the event that triggered the limitations’ period to run, and that obligation arose when Wells’ first received his judgment on April 11, 2000, more than four years before this suit was filed on April 29, 2005. Gulf alternatively identifies several later events that could have triggered its obligation but rejects Wells’ argument that Reliance’s insolvency on October 3, 2001 is the event that triggered its obligation to pay.

 

Neither the MCA nor the MCS-90 contains an express limitations period applicable to this case, so the Court must look to the most analogous Texas limitations period. Graham County Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, ante,–U.S.–, 125 S.Ct. 2444, 2448–L.Ed.2d–, — U.S. —-, 125 S.Ct. 2444, 162 L.Ed.2d 390, 2005 WL 1421316 (2005); North Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 33-34, 115 S.Ct. 1927, 132 L.Ed.2d 27 (1995). Chapter 16 of Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code sets limitations periods based on the type of action. The agreement between the parties consists of both an insurance contract and an endorsement that transforms Gulf’s role from insurer to surety when necessary to protect an injured member of the public. In either case, this action is subject to a residual four year limitations period where the limitations period begins to run, “the day the cause of action accrues.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code §  16.051.

 

When an action accrues is a matter of law. Burke v. Insurance Auto Auctions Corp., 169 S.W.3d 771, 776 (Tex.App.–Dallas 2005, pet. denied); Wexler v. Household Credit Services, Inc., 106 S.W.3d 277, 279 (Tex.App.–Dallas 2003, no pet.). Generally speaking, a cause of action accrues when facts exist that authorize a claimant to seek a judicial remedy. Schneider Nat. Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264, 279 (Tex.2004); see also Lowenberg v. City of Dallas, 168 S.W.3d 800, 802 (Tex.2005)(holding that a cause of action accrues when a wrong produces an injury). Wells’ cause of action arises from Gulf’s obligation under the MCS-90, which, in the event that no other source of payment is available, reads out clauses or limitations preventing payment of the judgment. T.H.E. Ins. Co. v. Larsen Intermodal Services, Inc., 242 F.3d 667, 672 (5th Cir.2001). The Policy provided excess coverage to BTI with an attachment point of $3.782 million, but upon Reliance’s insolvency, the MCS-90 eliminated the excess coverage language and obligated Gulf to satisfy Wells’ judgment. Thus, Gulf’s obligation to pay was conditioned upon BTI and Reliance’s insolvencies.

 

Under Texas law, a cause of action under a conditional contract does not begin to run until the condition occurs. Thigpen v. Thigpen, 563 S.W.2d 868 (Tex.Civ.App.–San Antonio 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.) Dunn v. Reliance Life & Acc. Ins. Co. of America, 405 S.W.2d 389 (Tex.Civ.App.1966, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Pitts v. Wetzel, 498 S.W.2d 27, 27 (Tex.App.–Austin, 1973, writ refused n .r.e.); Bowers v. Bowers, 99 S.W.2d 334 (Tex.Civ.App.1936, wr.dism.). Gulf’s obligation to pay Wells’ judgment did not arise until Reliance became insolvent on October 3, 2001. As the statute of limitations did not begin to run until that date, this action is timely.

 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 45) be DENIED as to the issue of whether the MCS-90 was attached to the Policy, but otherwise GRANTED, and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 51) be DENIED.

 

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 1st day of March, 2006.

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