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AXA XL Ins. Co UK Ltd. v. Exel Inc.

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

AXA XL INSURANCE COMPANY UK LIMITED, Plaintiff,

v.

EXEL INC., EXEL FREIGHT CONNECT INC. d/b/a DHL TRANSPORT BROKERAGE, VILSAINT ENTERPRISES LLC d/b/a LG XPRESS LINE, Defendants.

Civ. No. 2:23-cv-21874 (WJM)

|

Filed 02/15/2024

OPINION

WILLIAM J. MARTINI, U.S.D.J.

*1 This is a subrogation action by Plaintiff AXA XL Insurance Company UK Limited (“Plaintiff”) for monetary damages stemming from the alleged failed transportation of cargo. Defendants Exel Inc. d/b/a DHL Supply Chain USA (“DHL Supply Chain”) and Exel Freight Connect Inc. d/b/a DHL Transport Brokerage (“DHL Transport”) (jointly “DHL Defendants”) move to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) due to federal preemption, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) for improper group pleading, and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) for improper venue. ECF No. 7. The Court decides the matter without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For the reasons stated below, DHL Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied in part and granted in part.

I. BACKGROUND

On or about November 1, 2021, the DHL Defendants (or acting on behalf of Defendant Vilsaint Enterprises LLC d/b/a LG Xpress Line (“LG Xpress”)), received three separate cargos of champagne at Western Carriers in North Bergen, New Jersey. Compl. ¶ 14. The bills of lading and/or receipts1 describe the three cases of champagne and identify both “DHL” and LG Xpress as the carrier. Id.; see Bills of Lading, ECF No. 7-3. The cargo was to be transported on behalf of insured shipper Moet Hennessy USA Inc. (“Moet”) to consignee Southern Wine & Spirits in Lakeland, Florida. Id.

While en route, on November 3, 2021, the LG Xpress truck and trailer carrying the cargo of champagne rolled over resulting in a fatal highway accident in South Carolina. Id. at ¶ 15. Moet eventually arranged to have the DHL Defendants return the sorted and salvaged bottles of champagne to Western Carriers in New Jersey. Id. at ¶¶ 16-17. Upon inspection, the salvaged cargo, having sustained damage and bottle breakage, was deemed unfit for consumption. Id. at ¶ 19. Plaintiff, as assignee of the claim, seeks damages of $937,442.00. Id. at ¶ 28.

Plaintiff contends that DHL Supply Chain is an authorized broker and carrier, id. at ¶ 6, that DHL Transport is a broker and “de facto carrier,” id. at ¶¶ 7-8, (under “The Parties”),2 and that the DHL Defendants “took responsibility for the transportation of the subject cargo,” id. at ¶ 13. Count One alleges all Defendants are liable as carriers under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 14706, Id. at ¶¶ 26-27. In the second Count, Plaintiff asserts that DHL Transport is liable as a broker for breach of contract for failing to transport the cargo in good order and to “adhere to industry guidelines and applicable law.” Id. at ¶¶ 22, 30-31. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Defendants did not have on hand New Jersey alcohol permits prior to transport of alcoholic beverages. Id. at ¶ 20.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss

*2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The moving party bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated, Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005), and dismissal is appropriate only if, accepting all of the facts alleged in the complaint as true, the plaintiff has failed to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Serv., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir, 2008). This assumption of truth is inapplicable, however, to legal conclusions couched as factual allegations or to “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). That is, although a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Thus, the factual allegations must be sufficient to raise a plaintiff’s right to relief above a speculative level, see id. at 570, such that the court may “draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). While “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement’ … it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.

1. The Carmack Amendment

The Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1), states that a “carrier providing transportation or service … or any other carrier that delivers the property [is] liable to the person entitled to recover under the receipt or bill of lading” for “the actual loss or injury to the property.” It preempts all state regulation or common law remedies, including breach of contract claims, but provides a shipper recourse for damages “only against carriers.” AMG Res. Corp. v. Wooster Motor Ways, Inc., 796 Fed. App’x 96, 100 (3d Cir. 2020); Certain Underwriters at Interest at Lloyds of London v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 762 F.3d 332, 336 (3d Cir. 2014). A “carrier” is defined as a “motor carrier, a water carrier, and a freight forwarder.” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(3). In contrast, the Carmack Amendment does not hold liable “a broker—someone who merely arranges for transportation.” Tryg Ins. v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 767 Fed. App’x 284, 285 (3d Cir. 2019); AMG Resources Corp., 796 Fed. App’x. at 99. A “broker” is a “person, other than a motor carrier” that “sells, offers for sale, negotiates for, or holds itself out … as selling, providing, or arranging for, transportation by motor carrier for compensation.” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(2). The Third Circuit has expounded on the difference between carriers and brokers:

If an entity accepts responsibility for ensuring the delivery of goods, then that entity qualifies as a carrier regardless of whether it conducted the physical transportation. Conversely, if an entity merely agrees to locate and hire a third party to transport the goods, then it is acting as a broker. …[M]otor carriers are not brokers just because they “arrange or offer to arrange the transportation of shipments which they are authorized to transport and which they have accepted and legally bound themselves to transport.”

Tryg Ins. v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 767 F. App’x 284, 286–87 (3d Cir. 2019) (footnotes omitted) (citing 49 C.F.R. § 371.2(a)). Apart from this “crucial question” of “whether the party has legally bound itself to transport goods by accepting responsibility for ensuring the delivery of the goods,” courts have also considered how the party held itself out, id. at 287, “as well as the understanding among the parties.” United Granite & Quartz, Inc. v. Emuro Transp., LLC, No. 23-01673, 2023 WL 8868780, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2023) (citing Louis M. Marson Jr., Inc. v. Alliance Shippers, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 3d 326, 331-32 (E.D. Pa. 2020)); Freight Connections, Inc. v. Express Hound, LLC, No. 22-1668, 2022 WL 16362467, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 27, 2022) (listing factors).

Here, accepting as true Plaintiff’s allegation that the DHL Defendants are carriers that took responsibility for the transportation of the cargo, Plaintiff sufficiently states a claim for relief under the Carmack Amendment. See Compl., ¶¶ 8, 12, 13.

2. Breach of Contract (Count Two)

*3 Routine breach of contract claims against brokers are not preempted by federal law. See AMG Res. Corp. v. Wooster Motor Ways, Inc., No. 15-3716, 2019 WL 192900, at *4, n.7 (D.N.J. Jan. 14, 2019) (noting Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (“FAAAA”) preempts state-based common law tort claims but not breach of contract claims),3 aff’d, 796 F. App’x 96 (3d Cir. 2020); Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 2017 WL 3868702, at *3 (citing and agreeing with cases that hold FAAAA does not preempt routine breach of contract claims against brokers); see Bunis v. Masha Mobile Moving & Storage, LCC, No, 23-1237, 2023 WL 3689984, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 2023) (noting Carmack Amendment does not “ ‘preclude suit against non-carrier entities to the extent that they are liable under other law.’ ” (footnote and internal citation omitted)). Thus, in the event DHL Transport acted as a broker, Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is not preempted.

Nonetheless, Defendants move to dismiss Count Two arguing that it is inconsistent for Plaintiff to claim that DHL Transport acted as a broker while also alleging in Count One that DHL Transport acted as a carrier; however, the Federal Rules expressly permit inconsistent and alternative claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2) and (3); see e.g., Covenant Imaging, LLC v. Viking Rigging & Logistics, Inc., No. 20-00593, 2021 WL 973385, at *4 (D. Conn. Mar. 16, 2021) (noting Rule 8 specifically allows plaintiff to plead in the alternative that (1) Eagle acted as a carrier and Pioneer acted as a broker or (2) Eagle and Pioneer both acted as carriers). Moreover, whether a party is a carrier or broker is a fact intensive inquiry that is more appropriately decided at the summary judgment stage. See e.g., Beecher’s Handmade Cheese, LLC v. New Sound Transportation LLC, No. 21-12809, 2022 WL 3681258, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 25, 2022) (denying motion to dismiss as “question of whether a party has accepted such responsibility is ultimately one of fact”); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Dynamic Worldwide Logistics, Inc., No. 17-553, 2017 WL 3868702, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2017) (concluding it was inappropriate to make factual determination whether defendant was broker rather than carrier).

Although Plaintiff may proceed on its alternate breach of contract theory, the Court finds it appropriate to dismiss Plaintiff’s allegation that DHL Transport failed to comply with “industry guidelines and applicable law.” Compl., ¶ 31. Undefined guidelines and law cannot be the basis of a breach of contract claim because “privately ordered obligations” are by nature distinct from “state-imposed obligations.” American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228-29 (1995) (holding ADA4 bar on state regulation does not preempt breach of contract claims due to distinction between private and state-imposed obligations). In addition, even if parties could contract around “industry guidelines and applicable law,” the Complaint does not allege that the purported failure to purchase state permits caused any damages. Thus, the motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is granted as to the allegation that noncompliance with state-imposed obligations constitutes a breach of contract.

B. Rule 8(a) Group Pleading

*4 Defendants contend that the Complaint improperly lumps the allegations against all Defendants in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), which requires that pleadings contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The Court does not agree. Plaintiff avers that DHL Defendants acted as carriers that took responsibility for the transportation of the cargo pursuant to specific bills of lading and alternatively, that DHL Transport acted as a broker that failed to properly arrange the safe transport of the cargo. Plaintiff further explains it presently cannot discern one DHL Defendant from the other because both appear to operate under the “DHL” banner. These allegations are sufficient to put the DHL Defendants on notice of the claims against them as carriers or brokers. DHL Defendants’ motion to dismiss under Rule 8(a) is denied.

C. Rule 12(b)(3) Improper Venue

On a Rule 12(b)(3) motion, the defendant has the burden to show that venue is improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Bockman v. First Am. Mktg. Corp., 459 Fed. App’x 157, 160 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Myers v. Am. Dental. Ass’n, 695 F.2d 716, 724–25 (3d Cir. 1982)). Where applicable, special venue provisions, such as the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C.A. § 14706(d), prevail over general federal venue provisions. See Fourco Glass Co, v. Transmirra Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228–229 (1957) (citations omitted). If the special venue provision is restrictive, which is rare, “the action may only be brought in a district permitted by the special venue statute.” In re Lizza Equip. Leasing, LLC, 614 B.R. 653, 661–62 (D.N.J. 2020) (citation omitted). In contrast, where “the special venue provisions are merely permissive, the general statutes are often read as supplementing the special statute.” Id. at 661 (citing Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202, 205 (1966)).

The special venue provision applicable to motor carriers, 49 U.S.C.A. § 14706(d)(2), states that a civil action “may be brought against the carrier alleged to have caused the loss or damage, in the judicial district in which such loss or damage is alleged to have occurred.” (emphasis added). As evidenced by use of “may,” subsection (d)(2) is permissive rather than restrictive. See e.g., Starr Indem. & Liab. Co., 2017 WL 2466505, at *3-4. In comparison, the special venue provision applicable to rail carriers, 49 U.S.C. § 11706(d)(2)(A), is restrictive as it provides suit “may only be brought” in certain designated venues. See id; see also In re Lizza Equipment Leasing, LLC, 614 B.R. at 662 (concluding that “may only be brought” language in 49 U.S.C. § 11706(d)(2)(A) is restrictive); Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit. Corp., 561 U.S. 89, 98 (2010) (noting § 11706(d) can preempt “the parties’ ability to choose the venue of their suit”).5

Because 49 U.S.C.A. § 14706(d) is permissive, venue is proper not only in South Carolina where the accident occurred. First, under subsection (1) of the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), venue is also proper in a judicial district “in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located,” Where the defendant is an entity, it resides “in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(c)(2). Because each defendant conducts business in New Jersey, see Compl., ¶¶ 2-4, and is subject to personal jurisdiction in this state, under § 1391(b)(1), suit may be brought in New Jersey. Second, under subsection (2), venue is also proper where “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2). In this case, the cargo was shipped from and returned to New Jersey where the damaged cargo was unpacked and inspected. See e.g., Shore Slurry Seal, Inc. v. CMI Corp., 964 F. Supp. 152, 154 (D.N.J. 1997) (holding venue proper in New Jersey where sales agreement was signed in New Jersey and defendant shipped equipment to New Jersey where it remained). Because a substantial part of the events occurred in New Jersey, Defendants’ motion to dismiss for improper venue is denied.

III. CONCLUSION

*5 For the reasons noted above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied in part and granted in part. DHL Defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim is granted only as to ¶ 31 of the Complaint. Defendants’ motion to dismiss for improper pleading under Rule 8(a) and for improper venue pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) is denied.

All Citations

Slip Copy, 2024 WL 639327

Footnotes  

  1. Although the bills of lading and receipts not attached to the Complaint, they are referenced and are central to Plaintiff’s claims. See Compl., ¶ 14. Moreover, the parties do not dispute the authenticity of the documents, which are attached as an exhibit to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. ECF No. 7-3. Thus, the Court will consider them in deciding the pending motion. See Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002).  
  2. The Complaint contains two paragraphs that are numbered 8, one under “The Parties” and another under “Jurisdiction and Venue.”  
  3. The FAAAA bars States from “enact[ing] or enforc[ing] a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any … broker … with respect to the transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).  
  4. The language in the Airline Deregulation Act (“ADA”), 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) is identical to the language in the FAAAA. See Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transport Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 368 (2008).  
  5. Defendants’ reliance on United Granite & Quartz, Inc., 2023 WL 8868780, at *4 is misplaced. There, in noting that Carmack Amendment’s special venue statute is restrictive, the court cites the railway carrier provision, 49 U.S.C. § 11706(d)(1) and cases pertaining thereto – In re Lizza Equipment Leasing, LLC, 614 B.R. at 661-62, and Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd., 561 U.S. at 98.  

End of Document

© 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.  

Julsonnet v. Tophills Inc.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

JAMES JULSONNET and DIANE JULSONNET

v.

TOPHILLS INC. and ENRIQUE ESCOBAR

CIVIL ACTION NO. 22-10767-RGS

|

Filed 02/13/2024

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Richard G. Stearns UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

*1 Plaintiffs James and Diane Julsonnet hired Febex Moving & Storage to cart their belongings across the country, from Massachusetts to Colorado. The Julsonnets and Febex executed a moving and storage agreement (Contract) with a binding estimate of $26,998.61. The Julsonnets paid a 25% deposit to Febex upon signing. On the day of the move, a subcontractor – defendant Tophills Inc.1 – arrived at the Julsonnets’ home to collect and load their belongings. The movers did not finish loading the truck on the day of the pickup but promised to return the next day to finish the job. As the reader might suspect, the Julsonnets allege that Tophills never returned and refused to complete the pickup and delivery of their belongings, claiming that the Julsonnets had failed to pay the balance due under the Contract on the day of the pickup. Tophills further refused to return the Julsonnets’ belongings loaded the previous day.

The Julsonnets then filed a thirteen-count Complaint against Tophills, its president Enrique Escobar, Febex, and Febex’s owner, Mikhail Naryshkin. The Complaint alleges violations of the federal Motor Carrier Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 10101 et seq. (Count I); violations of the civil liability provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (Counts II and III); violations of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (Count IV); breach of contract (Counts V and VI); conversion and trespass (Count VII); violations of the Massachusetts Unfair Business Practices Act, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A (Count VIII); fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation (Count IX); breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (Count X); replevin and trover (Count XI); negligence (Count XII); and joint and several liability (Count XIII). Tophills asserted two counterclaims, alleging that the Julsonnets failed to pay it for part of the moving and packing services. It seeks recovery of damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs under a breach of contract theory or, in the alternative, quantum meruit.

Febex and Naryshkin were previously dismissed from the case because the Julsonnets failed to make proper service. See Dkt. # 26. As Febex is no longer a defendant, Count V, which alleges breach of contract against Febex, and Count XIII, which alleges joint and several liability between Febex and Tophills, are dismissed. The remaining defendants (Tophills and Escobar) now move for summary judgment on all remaining counts against them.2 Their motion is allowed in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

In 2021, James and Diane Julsonnet undertook a move from North Andover, Massachusetts, to Colorado Springs, Colorado. On August 30, 2021, James Julsonnet executed the moving Contract with Febex. Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. A (Contract) (Dkt. # 38-1). Their personal belongings, which they valued at $142,800, included household goods and Mrs. Julsonnet’s business inventory. Id. Febex gave a firm estimate of the cost of the move at $26,998.61. Id. The Contract required the Julsonnets to pay a deposit of $5,998.61 at signing (which they paid with a credit card), 65% of the balance due “on the day of pick up [sic],” and the remaining balance at the time of final delivery. Id.

*2 The parties agreed that Febex would collect the Julsonnets’ belongings in North Andover on September 12 and 13, 2021. Id. But on September 10, the movers called and asked to begin the move one day early. Pls.’ Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (Opp’n) (Dkt. # 43) at 2. The Julsonnets agreed, and on September 11, 2021, movers from Tophills arrived at their home with a truck.3

According to the Julsonnets, the following unfolded.4 Upon arrival, Tophills’s foreman “demanded” that they sign a new bill of lading before the movers began loading the truck, which Mr. Julsonnet refused to do. Opp’n at 2. The packing nonetheless commenced, although at some point during the day, Mr. Julsonnet told the foreman that he would not pay the 65% of the balance due until the truck was fully loaded. Id. at 3. Tophills did not finish loading the truck, and despite Tophills’s promise, never returned to finish. Id. When it became clear to the Julsonnets that Tophills had abandoned the job, they rented a U-Haul truck, packed the remainder of their belongings, and embarked for Colorado Springs on September 13, 2021. Id. at 4.

Three days later, on September 16, Escobar telephoned the Julsonnets and “told them they needed to come into the office in Massachusetts and sign the paperwork,” which they explained they could not physically do. Id. After many attempts to speak with employees at Febex or Tophills, the Julsonnets were finally told that their belongings would be delivered only if they paid approximately $58,000. Id.; see also id., Ex. F (Dkt. # 43-7) at 30:1-7. The Julsonnets then contacted the police, who obtained bill of lading from Tophills that included an alleged forgery of Mr. Julsonnet’s signature. Opp’n at 4; id., Ex. H (Dkt. # 43-9). The Julsonnets were finally reunited with their belongings on January 10, 2024 (although the record is not clear whether the Julsonnets paid Tophills anything to retrieve them). Opp’n at 5.

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is appropriate where the movant demonstrates that, based upon the record, “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Hayes v. Douglas Dynamics, Inc., 8 F.3d 88, 90 (1st Cir. 1993), quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The movant must “identify for the district court the portions of the record that show the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.” Flovac, Inc. v. Airvac, Inc., 817 F.3d 849, 853 (1st Cir. 2016). If the movant carries this burden, “the burden shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, with respect to each issue on which [they] would bear the burden of proof at trial, demonstrate that a trier of fact could reasonably resolve that issue in [their] favor.” Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano-Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2010). “This demonstration must be accomplished by reference to materials of evidentiary quality, and that evidence must be more than ‘merely colorable.’ ” Flovac, 817 F.3d at 853, quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (citation omitted).

Preemption

*3 Defendants argue that Counts VI5 and VII-XIII – which are state-law claims – are preempted by the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 14706. The Carmack Amendment permits “the person entitled to recover under the receipt or bill of lading” to recover for “actual loss or injury to the property” caused by the carrier. Id. § 14706(a)(1). The statute preempts state-law “liability stemming from damage or loss of goods, liability stemming from the claims process, and liability related to the payment of claims.” Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc., 104 F.3d 502, 506 (1st Cir. 1997); see also Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 505 (1913). However, Carmack preemption does not apply to state-law liability “arising from separate harms—apart from the loss or damage of goods.” Rini, 104 F.3d at 506.

The Julsonnets urge that Carmack preemption cannot apply because the statute applies only to the interstate shipments of goods, while Tophills never left Massachusetts with their personal effects. This argument is foreclosed by United States Supreme Court precedent. The intended destination at the time of contracting is the touchstone by which to determine whether the “character of the commerce” is interstate or intrastate. Sprout v. City of S. Bend, 277 U.S. 163, 168 (1928); see also Swift Textiles, Inc. v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 799 F.2d 697, 699 (11th Cir. 1986) (character of the commerce is “reflected by the ‘intention formed prior to shipment.’ ”), quoting Great N. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 222 F. Supp. 573, 582 (D.N.D. 1963). Based on the Contract, the transaction was intended to be “incident to an interstate journey,” so it is “within the ambit of the Interstate Commerce Act.” New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co. v. Nothnagle, 346 U.S. 128, 130 (1953).

Counts VI, VIII, IX, and X allege harms apart from the loss or damage of goods and therefore are not preempted.6 See Rini, 107 F.3d at 506. However, Counts VII, XI and XII allege that the defendants lost, “damaged[,] or destroyed” the Julsonnets’ property. Compl. (Dkt. # 1) ¶¶ 85, 102, 107. These claims are preempted and are therefore dismissed.

Count I – Federal Motor Carrier Safety Act

Defendants’ sole argument for dismissing Count I is that the Julsonnets have “provided no evidence of what [the] actual loss or injury to their property is.” This is contrary to undisputed facts in the record: the Contract valued the property at $142,800, and Ms. Julsonnet testified that the business inventory alone was worth “at least several hundred thousand dollars,” and that her business made “[p]robably maybe [$]40,000” each year. Opp’n Ex. F (Dkt. # 43-7) at 42:3, 46:13. The court will thus deny summary judgment on Count I.

Counts II and III – Civil RICO

The Julsonnets allege RICO violations against both Tophills and Escobar. However, “[i]t is only a person, or one associated with an enterprise, not the enterprise itself, who can violate the provisions of [18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)].” Schofield v. First Commodity Corp. of Boston, 793 F.2d 28, 30 (1st Cir. 1986), quoting Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of California, 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1136 (D. Mass. 1982); see also Crimson Galeria Ltd. P’ship v. Healthy Pharms, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 3d 20, 41 (D. Mass. 2018) (same, for § 1962(d)). Counts II and III will accordingly be dismissed as against Tophills.

*4 RICO makes it unlawful for “any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in … interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt,” or to conspire to do so. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), (d); see also id. § 1964(c) (creating a private right of action to “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of [the criminal RICO provisions]”). The statute defines “racketeering activity” broadly “to include a host of so-called predicate acts.” Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 647 (2008). As relevant here, racketeering activity includes “any act or threat involving … extortion” and “any act which is indictable under” the federal mail fraud and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 (mail fraud), 1343 (wire fraud). 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).

Proof of a predicate act alone is insufficient to generate civil RICO liability; the Julsonnets must also prove a pattern of racketeering activity by showing both continuity and relatedness of the predicate acts. See Giuliano v. Fulton, 399 F.3d 381, 386-387 (1st Cir. 2005). They may show continuity by proving either a “closed period of repeated conduct” that “amounted to … continued criminal activity” or “past conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition.” H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 237, 241 (1989). Predicate acts are related when they “embrace[ ] criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events.” Id., quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e).

Escobar asserts, without citation, that the sole conduct the Julsonnets allege gives rise to their RICO claims is that defendants “forged their signature on the bill of lading and converted their belongings.” Mot. for Summ. J. at 7 (footnote omitted). This is both contrary to the record, see Opp’n, Ex. A (Dkt. # 43-2), and patently deficient to carry his burden, see Flovac, 817 F.3d at 853. Although Escobar need not negate the Julsonnets’ factual bases for their RICO claims, see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986), he has not identified anything in the record showing that there is no genuine factual dispute about the conduct that gives rise to the RICO claims. Summary judgment cannot be granted on so thin a showing by Escobar.

Count VI – Breach of Contract

To prove that defendants breached the moving Contract, the Julsonnets must show that: (1) the parties had a valid contract; (2) defendants breached the contract; and (3) the Julsonnets sustained damages because of the breach. Brooks v. AIG SunAmerica Life Assurance Co., 480 F.3d 579, 586 (1st Cir. 2007).7 Defendants claim that the Contract is invalid for want of consideration because the Julsonnets did not pay the amount owed to Tophills and because they received a refund of their deposit from their credit card company. Mot. for Summ. J. at 4.

Defendants’ argument is better characterized as an affirmative defense meant to justify their breach on grounds that the Julsonnets failed to perform.8 But even this more accurate framing is unsuccessful. The Contract provides that the Julsonnets were required to pay 65% of the balance due “[o]n the day of pick up [sic]” and defines the pickup date as “09/12/2021-09/13/2021.” Contract at 3. As noted, the parties orally modified the agreement to schedule the pickup on September 11 and 12. But as the Contract defined the pickup date as two days, the most reasonable interpretation of this is that the Julsonnets were required to pay the 65% of the balance due on completion of the pickup on the second day.

*5 The undisputed facts are that the Julsonnets were ready to perform on September 12. But they were not required to perform before defendants completed the pickup the next day.9 Opp’n at 10. The court will therefore deny summary judgment on Count VI.

Count VIII – Chapter 93A

To prevail on their Chapter 93A claim, the Julsonnets must show “1) that the defendant[s] … committed an unfair or deceptive act or practice; … 2) a loss of money or property suffered as a result; and 3) a causal connection between the loss suffered and the defendant’s unfair or deceptive method, act, or practice.” Auto Flat Car Crushers, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 469 Mass. 813, 820 (2014) (footnote omitted). Defendants argue that the Julsonnets failed to serve a pre-suit demand letter as is required to pursue a § 9 claim under Chapter 93A. The Julsonnets concede that they did not send a demand letter, but argue they are pursuing a § 11 claim, which does not require pre-suit notice.

Section 11 protects “[a]ny person who engages in the conduct of any trade or commerce” from suffering damages from another’s unfair or deceptive act or practice. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 11. “The question of whether a private individual’s participation in an isolated transaction takes place in a ‘business context,’ ” and is thus within § 11’s ambit, is “determined from the circumstances of each case.” Begelfer v. Najarian, 381 Mass. 177, 190-191 (1980). The relevant circumstances include “the frequency of similar transactions, the motivation behind the transaction, and the role of the participant in the transaction.” Kunelius v. Town of Stow, 588 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2009).

The court finds that the Julsonnets’ engagement of Febex and Tophills is not a commercial transaction. Although Ms. Julsonnet intended to move her business inventory along with their household belongings, there is no evidence that “the nature of the transaction was grounded in business.” See Garango & Assocs., P.C. v. John Swider & Assocs., 55 Mass. App. Ct. 256, 263 (2002). That is, it is not clear that the decision to hire a moving company was “motivated by business” rather than “personal reasons.” See Begelfer, 381 Mass. at 191. The Julsonnets’ Chapter 93A claim is thus better characterized as a § 9 claim. As they failed to serve the requisite demand letter on defendants, Count VIII is dismissed.

Count IX – Misrepresentation

The Julsonnets concede that their misrepresentation claim “is based on the misrepresentations made to [them] to induce [them] to enter into the contract.” Opp’n at 12. The only alleged misrepresentations were made by Febex. As Febex is no longer a defendant, the court will allow summary judgment on Count IX.

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED as to Counts VII, VIII, IX, XI, and XII against all defendants, ALLOWED as to Counts II and III as against Tophills, DENIED as to Counts I, VI, and X as against all defendants, and DENIED as against Escobar as to Counts II and III. The court hereby DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Counts II and III as against Tophills and Counts V, VII, VIII, IX, XI, XII, and XIII as against all defendants.

*6 SO ORDERED.

All Citations

Footnotes  

  1. Although Tophills was doing business as Five Star Movers during the relevant period, the court will refer to Tophills by its name of incorporation.  
  2. The court previously dismissed Count IV for failure to state a claim. Dkt. # 32.  
  3. The Contract permitted Febex to hire independent subcontractors for pickup and delivery. See Contract at 5.  
  4. Defendants do not expressly dispute any of these facts, and they identify only six “undisputed” facts, nearly all of which the Julsonnets dispute. See Pls.’ Statement of Disputed Facts (Dkt. # 45).
  5. Defendants’ Motion states that they are moving to dismiss “Count IV – Breach of Contract.” Mot. for Summ. J. (Dkt. # 39) at 1. Count VI alleges breach of contract, so the court assumes this is a typographical error.  
  6. Defendants’ only argument as to why Count X should be dismissed is that it is preempted by the Carmack Amendment. Because it is not, the motion for summary judgment will be denied on Count X.  
  7. As a technical matter, “causation of damages is not an element of breach of contract [under the Massachusetts rule], as a plaintiff is entitled to at least nominal damages upon proving a breach.” Boston Prop. Exch. Transfer Co. v. Iantosca, 720 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2013), citing Nathan v. Tremont Storage Warehouse, Inc., 328 Mass. 168, 171 (1951).  
  8. The requisite consideration that created a valid contract was the 25% deposit.  
  9. Defendants’ (very brief) argument that payment was a condition precedent to completing the move also fails. This may be true, but the Julsonnets’ belongings needed to be loaded onto the truck before beginning the move.  

End of Document

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