2019 WL 2017556

United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma.
Deborah KIZER, Individually and as Mother and Next Friend of R.J.K., a Minor, Plaintiffs,
v.
STARR INDEMNITY & LIABILITY CO., North American Transport Services, LLC, and Daniel Palma, Defendants.
Case No. CIV-18-846-D
|
Signed 05/06/2019
Attorneys and Law Firms
Daniel K. Jones, Mehry Taremi, Mills & Jones PLLC, Norman, OK, for Plaintiffs.
Andrew S. Leibowitz, The Berry Firm PLLC, Dallas, TX, Bart A. Chancellor, D. Bowen Berry, The Berry Firm PLLC, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendants.

ORDER
TIMOTHY D. DEGIUSTI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
*1 Before the Court is Defendants North American Transport Services, LLC, (“NATS”) and Daniel Palma’s (“Palma”) Amended Objection and Motion to Quash the Subpoenas to T-Mobile Subpoena Compliance Department (“T-Mobile”) [Doc. No. 25]. Plaintiffs have filed a response in opposition [Doc. No. 34]. The matter is fully briefed and at issue.

BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a motor vehicle accident involving Plaintiffs’ Nissan Pathfinder and Palma’s tractor-trailer which occurred on May 16, 2018 at approximately 1:15 p.m. Plaintiffs brought this action alleging various claims for negligence related to: (1) Palma’s operation of the tractor-trailer while in the course and scope of his employment with NATS; (2) both Defendants’ maintenance of the tractor-trailer; (3) NATS’ hiring of Palma; and, (4) NATS’ negligent entrustment of the tractor-trailer to Palma. During the course of discovery both have parties sought cell phone records from the other. Plaintiffs objected to the production of Plaintiff Deborah Kizer’s cell phone records for the thirteen (13) hours preceding and eleven and one half (11.5) hours after the accident as overbroad and irrelevant. Plaintiffs’ Responses to Requests for Production at 8. Plaintiffs eventually agreed to produce records for the five hours preceding and forty (40) minutes after the accident. Response at 12-13.

With respect to their contention that Palma was negligent in his operation of the tractor-trailer at the time of the accident, Plaintiffs issued a subpoena duces tecum to T-Mobile for all of Palma’s cell phone records for the three days prior to and one day after the accident, specifically from 12:00 a.m. om May 14, 2018, through 12:00 p.m. on May 17, 2018. The records sought by the subpoena include, but are not limited to, “all call registers, (incoming and outgoing), text message logs (incoming and outgoing), call details [sic] records (CDR), multimedia logs, and all other electronic data usage.” Subpoena Duces Tecum [Doc. No. 25-1] at 2. Both parties agree that the records sought also include application usage. Motion at 4, 5; Response at 13, 14.

The parties conferred pursuant to LCvR 37.1 in an attempt to resolve Defendants’ objections to the temporal scope of the request for Palma’s cell phone records. Motion at 2. As a result of that conference Defendants agreed to production of cell phone records limited to thirty (30) minutes before the accident. Id. However, Plaintiffs declined that limitation and refused to withdraw or limit the time frame of the Subpoena. Id.; Email from Plaintiff’s Counsel, December 24, 2018, [Doc. No. 25-2] at 1.

Plaintiffs assert that the full scope of the information sought by the subpoena is relevant to determine whether Palma: (1) took sufficient rest stops; (2) was fatigued at the time of the accident; (3) was using his cell phone at the time of the accident; (4) had a habit of using his cell phone during mandated periods of rest; and, (5) communicated with NATS regarding maintenance issues. Response at 1, 6-7. Plaintiffs also contend the requested records will indicate Palma’s work schedule and periods of rest for the days preceding the accident and the NATS personnel with whom Palma communicated after the collision. Id. at 7.

*2 Defendants move to quash the subpoena on the basis that it is overly broad and violates Palma’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Defendants request that any production of Palma’s cell phone records “be limited to a relevant time frame and should not contain any information other than his text and call history.” Motion at 5. Plaintiffs respond that: (1) NATS lacks standing to challenge the subpoena; (2) the subpoena is not overbroad; and (3) Palma does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in his cell phone records.

STANDARD OF DECISION
A subpoena served on a third party is considered discovery within the meaning of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant to Rule 45. Rice v. United States, 164 F.R.D. 556, 556-57 (N.D. Okla. 1995). Accordingly, considerations of both relevance and proportionality govern the subpoenas at issue. “A party or attorney responsible for issuing and serving a subpoena must take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1). The Court is authorized under Rule 45(d)(3) to quash a subpoena under specified circumstances, including when the subpoena requires disclosure of privileged or protected materials (when an exception or waiver does not apply), or when the subpoena subjects a person to undue burden. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iii) and (iv).

Further, Rule 26(b)(1) sets forth the scope of discovery and provides:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.
Fed. R. Civ.P. 26(b)(1). Under this standard, “relevance” has been broadly defined to include “any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter[s] that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” United States v. Childs, No. CR-09-146-D, 2018 WL 775018, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 7, 2018) (citations omitted). The Advisory Committee Notes for the 2000 Amendments to Rule 26 direct the parties and courts to “focus on the actual claims and defenses involved in the action” in determining relevance for purposes of discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, Advisory Committee Notes, 2000 Amendments, Subdivision (b)(1). As such, the Court “has the authority to confine discovery to the claims and defenses asserted in the pleadings, and signals to the parties that they have no entitlement to discovery to develop new claims or defenses.” Id.

The moving party bears the burden of establishing grounds for quashing the subpoena, with the party seeking to quash a subpoena carrying a particularly heavy burden as opposed to one seeking only limited protection. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prod. Antitrust Litig., 669 F.2d 620, 623 (10th Cir. 1982). The objecting party must submit “a particular and specific demonstration of fact, as distinguished from stereotyped and conclusory statements.” Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 102 n. 16 (1981) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. Standing
As an initial matter, Plaintiffs contend NATS lacks standing to challenge the subpoena. “Generally, absent a claim of privilege, or personal or proprietary interest, a party lacks standing to challenge a subpoena served on a third party.” Clark v. Johnson, 14-CV-582-JED-PJC, 2015 WL 4694045, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 6, 2015) (citing Howard v. Segway, Inc., 2012 WL 2923230, *2 (N.D. ΔOkla. July 18, 2012)). “Courts have long held that in the context of civil discovery, an individual has a personal interest in certain records … sufficient to provide standing to challenge a subpoena for their disclosure, even where that information is maintained by a third party.” Id. (citations omitted). Courts have held that cell phone records are included among such records. Id. at *2 (citations omitted).

*3 NATS has presented no claim of privilege or personal or proprietary interest in the T-Mobile cell phone records. Therefore, the Court finds that NATS does not have standing to challenge the subpoena. However, the Motion was raised by both NATS and Palma. Because Palma has a personal interest in the privacy of his cell phone records, he has standing to challenge the subpoena issued by Plaintiffs. See Clark, 2015 WL 4694045, at *2 (recognizing a plaintiff has a privacy interest in his cell phone records and, therefore, has standing to challenge a subpoena for those records).

II. Relevance and Scope of the Request
Palma asserts that he has a privacy interest in his cell phone records and Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a legitimate need for the records that outweighs his privacy interests. Motion at 6. Based on his privacy interest, Palma states the subpoena should be quashed. Motion at 6. Generally, “a reasonable person would not expect the numbers they dial on their personal cell phone to become public knowledge.” Clay v. Lambert, 17-CV-00085-PAB-MEH, 2017 WL 4755152, at *4 (D. Colo. Oct. 20, 2017). Nevertheless, after review of the briefing submitted on this matter, the Court finds that pursuant to the scope of discovery and relevance standards set forth in Rule 26(b)(1), Palma’s cell phone records contain relevant, discoverable information.

Central to Plaintiffs’ claims is the assertion that Palma was negligent in that he failed to adequately inspect and maintain the tractor-trailer prior to the accident and was fatigued and distracted during his operation of the vehicle at the time of the accident. Response at 1, 2, 5, 6-7, 10, 11. The Court finds that Palma’s cell phone records, excluding the substance of any particular communications, are relevant to determining whether Palma was distracted and/or fatigued at the time of the accident. This clear relevance outweighs any privacy interest Palma might have, subject to the limitations discussed herein. See Clark, 2015 WL 4694045, at *2.

The Court finds, however, that the time frame for which the records are requested is too broad. See Coleman v. Reed, CIV-15-1014-M, 2016 WL 4523915, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 22, 2016) (finding that similar cell phone records were relevant as to whether the defendant was using his phone, and in what ways, at the time of the accident but that the requested three-day period was overbroad). The Court modifies the subpoena to require production of cell phone records for the twenty-four (24) hours prior to the accident and two hours after the accident.

Plaintiffs agree that the subpoena does not request “the content of Palma’s communications.” Response at 5, 13. Therefore, the Court finds that records to be produced are limited to records containing incoming and outgoing call and text logs and logs of application use. T-Mobile shall not produce any information regarding the content or substance of any communications.

CONCLUSION
As stated above, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ Amended Objection and Motion to Quash the Subpoena to T-Mobile Subpoena Compliance Department [Doc. No. 25] and MODIFIES the time period of the subpoena to the twenty-four (24) hour period immediately before and two hours immediately after the accident.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 6th day of May 2019.

All Citations
Slip Copy, 2019 WL 2017556

2019 WL 1924717

UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.
UNPUBLISHED
Court of Appeals of Michigan.
Waleed YOUHANNA, Plaintiff,
and
Mendelson Orthopedics, PC and Omega Rehab Services, LLC, Intervening Plaintiffs,
v.
AUTO CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, Defendant,
and
Hudson Insurance Company, Defendant-Appellant,
and
Amerisure Insurance Company, Defendant-Appellee.
Silver Pine Imaging, LLC, Plaintiff,
v.
Auto Club Insurance Association, Defendant,
and
Hudson Insurance Company, Defendant-Appellant,
and
Amerisure Insurance Company, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 342436, No. 342736
|
April 30, 2019
Wayne Circuit Court, LC No. 16-000282-NF, LC No. 16-004895-NF
Before: Markey, P.J., and Fort Hood and Gadola, JJ.
Opinion

Per Curiam.

*1 In these consolidated appeals, defendant Hudson Insurance Company (Hudson) appeals as of right the trial court’s stipulated order of dismissal, challenging a previous order granting defendant Amerisure Insurance Company’s (Amerisure) motion for summary disposition. We affirm.

I. FACTS
This is an action to determine the priority of insurers under Michigan’s no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq. The underlying facts are essentially undisputed. In 2015, plaintiff Waleed Youhanna purchased a commercial tractor-trailer and registered the truck in his name and the name of his business, Wally Transportation, Inc. (Wally). Wally purchased from Hudson a policy of no-fault insurance known as a “bobtail” policy. “Bobtailing” is trucking vernacular for driving a tractor without an attached trailer. Hunt v. Drielick, 496 Mich. 366, 373; 852 N.W.2d 562 (2014). The purpose of a “bobtail” policy generally is to provide insurance coverage when the tractor is being operated without a trailer. Id. at 376.

On September 1, 2015, Wally leased the tractor-trailer to Safe Transport, LLC (Safe Transport), and thereafter plaintiff drove the tractor-trailer to deliver loads for Safe Transport. Safe Transport had purchased a policy of no-fault insurance issued by Amerisure. The Amerisure policy listed four tractor-trailers as “covered autos” under the policy, but did not include the tractor-trailer leased to Safe Transport by Wally. On September 14, 2015, plaintiff agreed to transport a load in the tractor-trailer for Safe Transport from Livonia to Louisiana. Early the next morning, while driving the tractor-trailer through Tennessee, plaintiff was injured in an accident that occurred when another tractor-trailer hit the back of his vehicle.

Plaintiff initiated this action against defendant Auto Club Insurance Association (Auto Club), from whom plaintiff had purchased a policy of no-fault insurance covering his personal vehicle, seeking payment of personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits for his injuries arising from the collision. Plaintiff’s medical providers, intervening-plaintiffs Mendelson Orthopedics, PC and Omega Rehab Services, LLC, intervened in the action before the trial court. Plaintiff thereafter amended his complaint, adding Hudson, and later adding Amerisure, as defendants. Meanwhile, another medical provider, plaintiff Silver Pine Imaging, LLC, initiated an action against Auto Club, Hudson, and Amerisure, seeking reimbursement for medical costs incurred in treating plaintiff. The two actions were consolidated before the trial court.

The three insurers moved for summary disposition. Auto Club moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that it was not first in priority because it insured plaintiff regarding plaintiff’s personal automobile only. Amerisure moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10), arguing that is was not obligated to pay PIP benefits to plaintiff because the vehicle in question was not covered under its policy with Safe Transport. Hudson also moved for summary disposition, contending that under MCL 500.3114(3), plaintiff, as an employee of Safe Transport, was entitled to PIP benefits from Amerisure as the insurer of the furnished vehicle. The trial court granted summary disposition to Auto Club and Amerisure.1 The trial court thereafter denied Hudson’s motion for reconsideration of its order granting Amerisure summary disposition. Hudson now appeals to this Court.

II. DISCUSSION
*2 Hudson contends that the trial court erred in granting Amerisure2 summary disposition. Hudson argues that the trial court incorrectly determined that plaintiff’s tractor-trailer was not covered by the Amerisure policy at the time of plaintiff’s accident, and that Amerisure therefore was not liable for payment of plaintiff’s PIP benefits. We disagree.

A. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review de novo the trial court’s decision to grant or deny summary disposition. Dawoud v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 317 Mich. App. 517, 520; 895 N.W.2d 188 (2016). A motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint; we accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and construe them in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 119-120; 597 N.W.2d 817 (1999). A motion for summary disposition under this section is properly granted when, considering only the pleadings, the alleged claims are clearly unenforceable as a matter of law and no factual development could justify recovery. Id. at 120. When reviewing an order granting summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), we consider all documentary evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. Summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) is warranted when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

The question of the priority of insurers under the no-fault act is one of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. See Titan Ins. Co. v. American Country Ins. Co., 312 Mich. App. 291, 296; 876 N.W.2d 853 (2015). The construction and interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law that we also review de novo. Hunt, 496 Mich. at 372.

B. PRIORITY UNDER THE NO-FAULT ACT
The purpose of the Michigan no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., is to ensure compensation of persons injured in motor vehicle accidents. Allstate Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 321 Mich. App. 543, 552; 909 N.W.2d 495 (2017). The sections of the act governing priority, MCL 500.3114 and MCL 500.3115, determine the party against whom a person injured in a motor vehicle accident may claim benefits. Covenant Med. Ctr., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 500 Mich. 191, 215; 895 N.W.2d 490 (2017). To determine the priority of insurers liable for PIP benefits under the no-fault act in this case, we look to MCL 500.3114, which provides, in relevant part:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (2), (3), and (5), a personal protection insurance policy described in section 3101(1) [MCL 500.3101(1) ] applies to accidental bodily injury to the person named in the policy, the person’s spouse, and a relative of either domiciled in the same household, if the injury arises from a motor vehicle accident….
*3
* * *
(3) An employee … who suffers accidental bodily injury while an occupant of a motor vehicle owned or registered by the employer, shall receive personal protection insurance benefits to which the employee is entitled from the insurer of the furnished vehicle.

MCL 500.3101(2)(k)(i ), as in effect at the time of plaintiff’s injuries, defined an “owner” of a vehicle to include “[a] person renting a motor vehicle or having the use of a motor vehicle, under a lease or otherwise, for a period that is greater than 30 days.” Because plaintiff was an employee3 injured while an occupant of a motor vehicle “owned” by Safe Transport by virtue of its lease with Wally, MCL 500.3114(3) applies to dictate that plaintiff “shall receive personal protection insurance benefits to which [he] is entitled from the insurer of the furnished vehicle.” Besic v. Citizens Ins. Co., 290 Mich. App. 19, 32; 800 N.W.2d 93 (2010), quoting MCL 500.3114(3).

The question, then, is who is the insurer of the furnished vehicle in this case. Hudson argues that because Amerisure issued a policy of no-fault insurance to Safe Transport, Amerisure is the insurer of the vehicle from whom plaintiff is entitled to receive PIP benefits under MCL 500.3114(3) as an employee suffering accidental bodily injury while an occupant of a vehicle owned by Safe Transport. The parties do not dispute, however, that the Amerisure policy issued to Safe Transport explicitly covers just four vehicles, none of which is the vehicle Safe Transport leased from Wally in which Youhanna was injured.

When ascertaining the scope of coverage provided by an insurance policy, traditional principles of contract interpretation apply, and we determine and give effect to the intent of the parties. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Churchman, 440 Mich. 560, 566; 489 N.W.2d 431 (1992). We read the policy as a whole and construe the language in accordance with the plain and ordinary meaning of the language to avoid technical or strained construction. Radenbaugh v. Farm Bureau Gen. Ins. Co., 240 Mich. App. 134, 138; 610 N.W.2d 272 (2000). Contractual language is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation. Barton-Spencer v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. of Mich., 500 Mich. 32, 40; 892 N.W.2d 794 (2017). If the contract is ambiguous, we construe the policy against the insurer in favor of coverage. Radenbaugh, 240 Mich. App. at 139.

Hudson argues that the “after acquired vehicle” provision of the Amerisure policy provides for coverage in this instance. That section of the Amerisure policy provides, in relevant part:
B. Owned Autos You Acquire After The Policy Begins
* * *
2. But, if Symbol 46 is entered next to a coverage in Item Two of the Declarations, an “auto” you acquire will be a covered “auto” for that coverage only if:
a. We already cover all “autos” that you own for that coverage or it replaces an “auto” you previously owned that had that coverage; and
*4 b. You tell us within 30 days after you acquire it that you want us to cover it for that coverage.

Hudson argues that plaintiff’s tractor-trailer falls under this provision because Safe Transport insured all the automobiles it owned through Amerisure, Safe Transport acquired ownership of plaintiff’s tractor-trailer through a lease with Wally Transportation, and plaintiff’s injury occurred within 30 days of Safe Transport acquiring plaintiff’s tractor-trailer. The parties do not dispute that Safe Transport never notified Amerisure that it wanted to add plaintiff’s tractor-trailer as a covered vehicle under the Amerisure policy. But Hudson contends that the after acquired vehicle provision of the policy provided a 30-day grace period in which plaintiff’s tractor-trailer was automatically covered.

Hudson’s argument relies on this Court’s holding in Hobby v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 212 Mich. App. 100; 537 N.W.2d 229 (1995). There, this Court held that the insurance policy in that case provided automatic insurance coverage for a replacement vehicle during a 30-day “grace period” following the acquisition of the replacement vehicle, despite the insurer not having been notified. The language of the policy in that case stated that coverage was provided for the replacement of the insured’s vehicle “which is acquired by you after the effective date of this policy, when it replaces the vehicle described in the Declarations. We must be told about it within 30 days after the date of acquisition.” Id. at 101. This Court held that the insurer was obligated under the policy to provide PIP benefits, stating:
This is a classic description of the operation of a grace period during which insurance is continued in force until it expires by the terms of the contract, i.e., thirty-one days after acquisition of a replacement vehicle unless notice has been given. Where notice is not given within the thirty-day contractual period, as in this case, the insurance is canceled on the thirty-first day by the terms of the contract, but that does not void coverage agreed upon by the parties for the first thirty days after acquisition. When an insured is involved in an accident, the rights created under the insurance policy become fixed on the date of the accident, and the parties may not retroactively cancel the coverage. Id. at 104.

However, this Court observed that the insurer in Hobby “contracted to provide insurance coverage with or without notice for thirty days, so its risk is not in any way increased or altered by this holding,” and that the policy language in that case did not “provide that the automatic insurance agreement is void or does not apply if notice is not furnished.” Id. at 103. In doing so, this Court distinguished the language of the policy in Hobby from the language of the policy in Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Winter, 188 Mich. App. 230; 469 N.W.2d 314 (1991). In Winter, the defendant was involved in an accident in a newly acquired vehicle. The insurance policy in that case provided for coverage for newly acquired vehicles, but also provided that the policy did not apply “unless the named insured or spouse notifies the Company within 30 days following the acquisition of an additional automobile…” Id. at 232.

*5 In this case, the Amerisure policy specifies that an automobile that was acquired after the policy went into effect will be covered under that policy “only if” two conditions are met, one condition being that Safe Transport notify Amerisure to add the newly acquired vehicle to the policy. Unlike the situation in Hobby, which involved a replacement vehicle, the tractor-trailer at issue in this case was, like the vehicle involved in Winter, an after-acquired vehicle.4 The policy language in this case is also distinct from the policy language in Hobby and comparable to the policy language of Winter, with the policy in Winter stating that coverage does not take effect “unless” notice is given the insurer, and the policy here stating that it takes effect “only if” notice is given. The effect of these provisions is the same—coverage will not occur in the absence of notice. We therefore conclude that, as in Winter, and unlike Hobby, the policy language in this case did not create a grace period that affords coverage despite the failure of Safe Transport to advise Amerisure of its intention to add the vehicle to the existing policy.

We also reject Hudson’s argument that the after acquired vehicle provision of the Amerisure policy is ambiguous because it is equally susceptible of meaning either that coverage was automatically extended for the newly acquired vehicle during the 30-day notice period, or that coverage was not provided unless Safe Transport notified Amerisure within 30 days to add the vehicle to the policy. Again, a contractual term is ambiguous only if it is equally susceptible of more than one meaning. Barton-Spencer, 500 Mich. at 40. Here, the Amerisure policy provides that an automobile that is acquired after the policy becomes effective may be covered under that insurance policy “only if” certain conditions are met. Because we perceive only one meaning of this language, we decline to find it ambiguous.

Affirmed.

All Citations
Not Reported in N.W. Rptr., 2019 WL 1924717

Footnotes

1
At the hearing on the motions, the trial court stated on the record that it was denying Hudson’s motion for summary disposition, but our review of the record has not revealed an order to this effect.

2
We reject Amerisure’s suggestion that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear these appeals because Hudson did not file a cross-claim against it in the trial court and is therefore not an “aggrieved party” under MCR 7.203(A). See Tevis v. Amex Assurance Co., 283 Mich. App. 76, 79-80; 770 N.W.2d 16 (2009), in which this Court held that, in a priority dispute between two defendant insurers, the insurer held liable by the trial court to pay PIP benefits had suffered a particularized injury that affected its pecuniary interest, and it therefore was an aggrieved party under MCR 7.203(A) with respect to that ruling.

3
The parties do not dispute that the priority language of MCL 500.3114 extends to a plaintiff who works as a self-employed independent contractor as described in Besic v. Citizens Ins. Co., 290 Mich. App. 19, 32; 800 N.W.2d 93 (2010).

4
One can readily understand why an insurer would insist upon notice before agreeing to increase its risk by covering an additional, after-acquired, vehicle, though the language of the Amerisure policy at issue here appears to require notice for both replacement and after-acquired additional vehicles.