2019 WL 4737753

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division.
HELIENE, INC., Plaintiff,
v.
TOTAL QUALITY LOGISTICS, LLC, Defendant.
Case No. 1:18-cv-799
|
Signed 09/27/2019
Attorneys and Law Firms
Eric W. Beery, Beery & Spurlock Co. LPA, Columbus, OH, for Plaintiff.
Matthew J. Wiles, David A. Lockshaw, Jr., Dickinson Wright PLLC, Columbus, OH, for Defendant.

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS
Timothy S. Black, United States District Judge
*1 This civil action is before the Court on Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 2) (the “Motion to Dismiss”), as well as the parties’ responsive memoranda (Docs. 6–7).

I. FACTS AS ALLEGED BY PLAINTIFF1
The Motion to Dismiss arises in the context of a shipping dispute. Plaintiff is a solar company, with its principal place of business in Ontario; Defendant is a logistics company, with its principal place of business in Ohio. (See Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 1–2, 5–6).

In February 2018, Plaintiff hired Defendant “to broker, [i.e.,] arrange for,” the transportation of four trucks (containing solar panels) from Ontario to Iowa: BOL102765-6, BOL102765-7, BOL102765-8, and BOL102765-5. (Id. at ¶¶ 4–7). Plaintiff told Defendant to get the trucks across the U.S. border by February 6, 2018—so that it could avoid a duty/tariff effective February 7, 2018. (Id. at ¶ 7).

Defendant told Plaintiff that it would meet this deadline in an email dated February 2, 2018. (Id. at ¶ 8; Doc. 1-1 at 2 (“Ok I will … make sure it all gets across the border on … Tuesday.”)). And Defendant told Plaintiff that it had met this deadline in a text dated February 7, 2018. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 10; Doc. 1-1 at 10). Nonetheless, none of the four trucks crossed the U.S. border by February 6, 2018.2 (Doc. 1 at ¶ 11).

As a result of the delay, Plaintiff incurred over $60,000 in duties/tariffs, over $30,000 in lost profits, and over $20,000 in storage fees (in addition to other damages). (Id. at ¶¶ 12–16). On November 19, 2018, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant, asserting fraud and breach of contract. (Id. at ¶¶ 17–23). On December 17, 2018, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s case, on the basis of preemption. (Doc. 2).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) operates to test the sufficiency of the complaint and permits dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To show grounds for relief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) requires that the complaint contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

While Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ … it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Pleadings offering mere “ ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In fact, in determining a motion to dismiss, “courts ‘are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’ ” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Further, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.

*2 Accordingly, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is plausible where a “plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Plausibility “is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ ” and the case shall be dismissed. Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

III. ANALYSIS
In the Motion to Dismiss, Defendant argues that federal law—i.e., 49 U.S.C. § 14706 and 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1)—preempts Plaintiff’s state law claims against Defendant.3 (Doc. 2). The Court agrees in part: while federal law preempts Plaintiff’s fraud claim, federal law does not preempt Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim.

A. The Carmack Amendment
The Carmack Amendment does not preempt either of Plaintiff’s state law claims against Defendant.

The Carmack Amendment creates a “national scheme of carrier liability.” Exel, Inc. v. S. Refrigerated Transp., Inc., 807 F.3d 140, 148 (6th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added). It provides shippers with a cause of action against carriers, for loss sustained in connection with the transit of property. 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1). And it preempts all state law claims on “the subject.” Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 505–06 (1913) (stating that the Carmack Amendment “embraces the subject of the liability of the carrier” so completely that it “supersede[s] all state regulation with reference to it”).

However, the Carmack Amendment says nothing of broker liability. 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1). Indeed, its provisions do not mention brokers at all. Id.

In light of this omission, courts in this Circuit have concluded that, while the Carmack Amendment preempts state law claims against carriers,4 the Carmack Amendment does not preempt state law claims against brokers. Universal Med. Sys., Inc. v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-126, 2013 WL 12138550, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 6, 2013); Schneider Elec., USA v. Landstar Inway, Inc., No. 1:11-CV-801, 2012 WL 3234244, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 7, 2012); Mid-W. Materials, Inc. v. Packard Logistics, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-2045, 2007 WL 893890, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2007); Oliver Prod. Co. v. Foreway Mgmt. Servs., Inc., No. 1:06-CV-26, 2006 WL 2711515, at *1 (W.D. Mich. May 24, 2006); Delta Research Corp. v. EMS, Inc., No. 5:04-CV-60046, 2005 WL 2090890, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2005).

The “overwhelming majority” of courts in other Circuits have reached the same conclusion. Atlas Aerospace LLC v. Advanced Transp., Inc., No. 6:12-CV-1200, 2013 WL 1767943, at *3 (D. Kan. Apr. 24, 2013) (holding that “the [Carmack] Amendment does not preempt claims against brokers”); Chatelaine, Inc. v. Twin Modal, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 2d 638, 641 (N.D. Tex. 2010) (same); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Forward Air, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 255, 257–59 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (same); Custom Cartage, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., No. 1:98-CV-5182, 1999 WL 89563, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 16, 1999) (same).5

*3 A “carrier” is a motor carrier, water carrier, or freight forwarder. 49 U.S.C. § 13102(3). A “broker” is a “person, other than a motor carrier[,]” who sells, negotiates for, or holds itself out as selling transit by motor carrier. 49 U.S.C. § 13102(2).

Here, there is no question that Defendant acted as a broker, with respect to the delivery at-issue. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 6 (alleging as much); Doc. 2 at 4 n.2 (confirming as much)). In light of this fact, and per the cases cited supra, the Court will not hold that the Carmack Amendment preempts Plaintiff’s state law claims against Defendant.

B. Section 14501(c)(1)
Section 14501(c)(1) preempts one of Plaintiff’s state law claims against Defendant, to wit: Plaintiff’s fraud claim.

Section 14501(c)(1) preempts state-imposed trucking regulations. Ware v. Tow Pro Custom Towing & Hauling, Inc., 289 F. App’x 852, 855 (6th Cir. 2008). It prohibits states from enforcing laws, regulations, or “other provision[s,]” “related to” the price, route, or service of a “broker,” with respect to the transportation of property.6,7 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).

The United States Supreme Court interprets section 14501(c)(1)’s “related to” language broadly in favor of preemption. Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251, 260 (2013) (stating that “related to” means having a connection with, directly or indirectly); cf. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383–84 (1992) (interpreting a near-identical provision of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978).

As a general matter, section 14501(c)(1) preempts tort—but not breach of contract—claims. See Nature’s One, Inc. v. Spring Hill Jersey Cheese, Inc., No. 2:15-CV-2820, 2017 WL 4349065, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2017) (negligence claims preempted by section 14501(c)(1)); Total Quality Logistics, LLC v. Lith Transp., Inc., No. 1:16-CV-789, 2016 WL 5476148, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2016) (breach of contract claim not preempted by section 14501(c)(1)); see, e.g., Chatelaine, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 641 (holding that a shipper could bring a breach of contract claim—but not negligence claims—against a broker, after the broker failed to arrange for the timely delivery of goods).

The rationale is that, while section 14501(c)(1) preempts state-imposed obligations, section 14501(c)(1) does not preempt self-imposed obligations. Solo v. United Parcel Serv. Co., 819 F.3d 788, 797–98 (6th Cir. 2016).

Here, Section 14501(c)(1) preempts Plaintiff’s fraud claim. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant committed fraud, because Defendant told Plaintiff that the trucks had crossed the U.S. border by February 6, 2018—when, in fact, they had not. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 21). Plaintiff’s allegations relate to the service Defendant provided Plaintiff as a broker. 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). Indeed, providing updates to clients is one of a broker’s primary responsibilities. As Plaintiff’s allegations relate to the service Defendant provided Plaintiff as a broker, Plaintiff’s fraud claim is preempted.

*4 In contrast, section 14501(c)(1) does not preempt Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant committed breach of contract, because Defendant agreed to get the trucks across the U.S. border by February 6, 2018—then failed to arrange for the same. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 18). Plaintiff’s allegations concern self-(not state-) imposed obligations. Solo, 819 F.3d at 797–98. Indeed, they arise from an email dated February 2, 2018 (the alleged contract). As Plaintiff’s allegations concern self-(not state-) imposed obligations, Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is not preempted.8,9

IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 2) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff’s fraud claim is DISMISSED with prejudice. In all other respects, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

All Citations
Slip Copy, 2019 WL 4737753

Footnotes

1
For purposes of the Motion to Dismiss, the Court must: (1) view the Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff; and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. (Doc. 1); Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009).

2
Two of the trucks crossed the U.S. border on February 7, 2018; two of the trucks are still sitting in Canada. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 11–14).

3
Hereafter, the Court refers to 49 U.S.C. § 14706 as the “Carmack Amendment,” and 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) as “section 14501(c)(1).”

4
Or, more precisely, “shippers’ state law claims against carriers.” See Total Quality Logistics, LLC v. O’Malley, No. 1:16-CV-636, 2016 WL 4051880, at *2 (S.D. Ohio July 28, 2016) (noting that the Carmack Amendment does not preempt brokers’ state law claims against carriers).

5
Notwithstanding the case law cited supra, Defendant asks the Court to hold that the Carmack Amendment preempts all “cargo claims” (i.e., all claims arising in connection with the transit of property). (See Doc. 2 at 5). The Court declines to do so. As the Carmack Amendment only provides for carrier liability, what Defendant really asks the Court to hold is that shippers can never recover from brokers, for loss sustained in connection with the transit of property. (See Doc. 7 at 5 (claiming that Plaintiff has “no path to recovery” against Defendant)). Numerous courts have rejected this argument. See Commercial, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 257 (“[T]his case requires the court to decide whether the Carmack Amendment, in omitting reference to the liability of brokers for damage to shipped goods, intended to afford brokers total immunity from such a suit. The Court concludes that the Carmack Amendment does not bar suits against brokers.”); Custom, 1999 WL 89563, at *3 (stating that the Carmack Amendment does not grant “entities which arrange for the transportation of goods absolute immunity for breach of contract or tort actions arising out of the interstate shipment of goods”).

6
State common law constitutes an “other provision,” within the meaning of section 14501(c)(1). See Creagan v. Wal-Mart Transp., LLC, 354 F. Supp. 3d 808, 812 n.2 (N.D. Ohio 2018).

7
As stated supra, there is no question that Defendant acted as a broker, with respect to the delivery at-issue. (See Doc. 1 at ¶ 6 (alleging as much); Doc. 2 at 4 n.2 (confirming as much)).

8
At this time, the Court expresses no opinion on the validity of the alleged contract. (Doc. 1-1 at 2). Defendant moved to dismiss the Complaint on the sole basis of preemption. (Doc. 2 at 1). This Order has been decided on that sole basis.

9
The parties argue over the contents of a document neither attached to nor referenced in the Complaint. (Doc. 6-1). The Court will not consider the contents of such a document in the context of this Motion to Dismiss. Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 487 (6th Cir. 2009) (stating that, as a general rule, a court cannot consider evidence extrinsic to the pleadings in the context of a motion to dismiss).

2019 WL 4920874

United States District Court, D. Oregon.
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY a/s/o GREGORY POOLE EQUIPMENT CO., a corporation, Plaintiff,
v.
ROYAL AUTO TRANS INC., a corporation; STRATEGIC TRANSPORT, INC., a corporation; and T.G.R. LOGISTICS INC., a corporation, Defendants.
No. 3:18-cv-02065-HZ
|
Filed 10/04/2019
Attorneys and Law Firms
Kevin M. Anderson, Anderson And Yamada, P.C., 9755 SW Barnes Road, Suite 675, Portland, OR 97225, Attorney for Defendant Strategic Transport, Inc.
Martha J. Payne, Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff, LLP, 225 Escondido Avenue, Lincoln City, OR 97367, Marc S. Blubaugh, Kelly E. Mulrane, Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff, LLP, 41 S. High Street, Suite 2600, Columbus, OH 43215, Attorneys for Defendant T.G.R. Logistics, Inc.

OPINION & ORDER
MARCO A. HERNÁNDEZ United States District Judge
*1 Before the Court is Defendant T.G.R. Logistics, Inc. (“T.G.R.”)’s motion to dismiss Defendant Strategic Transport, Inc. (“STI”)’s crossclaims. For the reasons that follow, the motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND
Defendant STI is an authorized property broker registered pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 13904. STI Amended Answer and Crossclaims ¶ 31, ECF 40. T.G.R. is a Washington corporation that operates as an authorized motor carrier registered pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 13902. Id. ¶ 32. Both STI and T.G.R. are defendants in the lawsuit brought by Plaintiff Federal Insurance Company a/s/o Gregory Poole Equipment Co.

Relevant to this motion, STI, acting as a broker on behalf of Gregory Poole Equipment Co., alleges that it entered into a contract with T.G.R. Id. ¶ 33. Under the terms of that contract, T.G.R. agreed to transport an industrial air compressor from Oregon to North Carolina using its own equipment. Id. STI alleges that T.G.R. breached that contract when it “double brokered the shipment” to Defendant Royal Auto Trans Inc. without STI’s knowledge or consent. Id. ¶ 34.

STI brings crossclaims against T.G.R. for (1) breach of contract; (2) contractual indemnity; and (3) common law indemnity.

STANDARDS
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the claims. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). “All allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Am. Family Ass’n, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 277 F.3d 1114, 1120 (9th Cir. 2002). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[,]” meaning “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint must contain “well-pleaded facts” which “permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct[.]” Id. at 679.

However, the court need not accept conclusory allegations as truthful. Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003). (“[W]e are not required to accept as true conclusory allegations which are contradicted by documents referred to in the complaint, and we do not necessarily assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations”) (internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) will be granted if a plaintiff alleges the “grounds” of his “entitlement to relief” with nothing “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)[.]” Id. (citations and footnote omitted).

DISCUSSION
*2 T.G.R. moves to dismiss STI’s crossclaims, alleging that each cause of action is preempted by 49 U.S.C. § 14706 (the “Carmack Amendment”). The Carmack Amendment “established a uniform national liability policy for interstate carriers, and preempts all state and common law claims against a carrier for damage to or loss of goods.” InTransit, Inc. v. Excel N. Am. Rd. Transp., Inc., 426 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1139–40 (D. Or. 2006).

STI first argues that T.G.R. is a broker and the Carmack Amendment does not preempt claims against brokers. See, e.g., Chubb Group of Ins. Companies v. H.A. Transp. Systems, Inc., 243 F.Supp.2d 1064 (C.D. Cal. 2002); Rohr, Inc. v. UPS-Supply Chain Solutions, Inc., 939 F.Supp.2d 1041 (S.D. Cal. 2013); Professional Communications, Inc. v. Contract Freighters, Inc., 171 F.Supp.2d. 546, 551 (D. Md. 2001); Independent Machinery, 867 F.Supp. 752, 761 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Adelman v. Hub City Los Angeles Terminal, 856 F.Supp. 1544, 1547–48 (N.D. Ala. 1994).

In response, T.G.R. argues that STI has not, in fact, alleged that T.G.R. is a broker. Rather, STI has alleged that T.G.R. is a motor carrier that “double-brokered” the product at issue. Even assuming T.G.R. is right—and STI has failed to allege (at least in the alternative under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(2)) that T.G.R. is a broker—the Court agrees with STI’s second argument: that because STI is a broker, the claims at issue are not preempted by the Carmack Amendment.

The Ninth Circuit has not resolved the question of whether the Carmack Amendment preempts claims by brokers against motor carriers. Based on the weight of authority, and InTransit, Inc. v. Excel North American Road Transport, Inc., a persuasive District of Oregon case, the Court finds that it does not.

In InTransit, the court examined claims brought by a broker against a motor carrier. 426 F. Supp. 2d at 1139. The court acknowledged that “the case law is not clearly developed in this area,” but held that the Carmack Amendment did not preempt a broker’s claim that was based on “direct contractual indemnity and not [ ] an assignment of rights by the shipper” under the bill of lading.1 426 F. Supp. 2d at 1141. The court noted, however, that the Amendment may apply in a “true subrogation case where the suing party stands in the shoes of the shipper.” Id. at 1141.2

The majority of cases found by this Court support the InTransit conclusion and reasoning. See Complete Distribution Services, Inc. v. All States Transport, LLC, 3:13-cv-00800-SI, 2015 WL 5764421 (D. Or. Sept. 30, 2015) (citing InTransit and applying Oregon law to a contract claim between a broker and a motor carrier); RLI Insurance Company v. G S Transport Inc., No. C-12-03391(EDL), 2012 WL 13070149 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2012) (concluding that “contractual indemnity claims under a separate contract—not direct claims by a shipper or its subrogee under a bill of lading— … are not preempted by the Carmack Amendment.”); Total Quality Logistics, LLC v. O’Malley, Case No. 1:16-cv-636, 2016 WL 4051880 (S.D. Ohio July 28, 2016) (“[T]his preemption does not extend to disputes between a broker and carrier over a broker-carrier contract.”); Traffic Tech, Inc. v. Arts Transp., Inc., No. 15 C 8014, 2016 WL 1270496 (N.D. Ill, Apr. 1, 2016) (claims by broker against carrier under broker-carrier agreement are “separate and distinct claims outside the scope of the Carmack Amendment”); Nat’l Bankers Trust Corp. v. Peak Logistics, LLC, No. 12–2268, 2014 WL 5343639, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 20, 2014) (holding that the Carmack Amendment did not preempt claims brought by a broker against a carrier); TransCorr Nat. Logistics, LLC v. Chaler Corp., No. 1:08-cv-00375-TAB-SEB, 2008 WL 5272895, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 19, 2008) (explaining that “[t]he purpose of the Carmack Amendment is to prevent carriers from being placed in the untenable position of having to determine what their liability may be in many jurisdictions with differing laws” and that “[l]iability issues under broker-carrier contracts do not raise the same concern because parties to the contracts may reasonably expect that their contracts will be interpreted consistently by the law of the jurisdiction in which the contract was made”). In fact, courts have found that brokers also cannot bring Carmack Amendment claims in their capacity as brokers. See, e.g., Exel, Inc. v. Southern Refrigerated Transport, Inc., 807 F.3d 140 (6th Cir. 2015).

*3 T.G.R. argues, in the alternative, that the InTransit holding should be limited to contractual indemnity claims, and therefore STI’s general breach of contract and state law indemnity claims should still be found preempted. The Court does not agree. First, the InTransit court allowed both a contractual indemnity claim and a breach of a brokerage agreement claim to proceed, reasoning that the “action [wa]s sufficiently removed from a shipper or some other party who has rights under the bill of lading to sue a carrier for damage to goods shipped.” InTransit, 426 F.Supp.2d at 1141; see also Keystone Logistics, Inc. v. Struble Trucking LLC, 3:14cv1938, 2014 WL 6750052 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 1, 2014) (“[Broker] is seeking to recover on a contract which is not a bill of lading, the Carmack Amendment does not apply and there is no preemption.”).

Second, STI’s breach of contract and state law indemnity claims are not alleged to arise out of the bill of lading or an assignment of rights. Rather, STI alleges that T.G.R. breached its contract by failing to transport goods using the agreed upon equipment; thus, the breach would arise even if the goods were never damaged. Additionally, while STI’s common law indemnity claim would not have arisen if the goods were not damaged, T.G.R. has not provided the Court with a persuasive reason to limit the InTransit holding to claims for contractual, rather than state common law, indemnity. Thus, because STI is not “stepping into the shoes” of the shipper to sue the carrier, the Court finds that STI’s claims are not preempted by the Carmack Amendment.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, T.G.R.’s motion to dismiss is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this 4 day of October, 2019.

All Citations
Slip Copy, 2019 WL 4920874

Footnotes

1
A bill of lading is “the basic transportation contract between the shipper-consignor and the carrier.” S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Comm. Metals Co., 456 U.S. 336, 342 (1982); OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. Haas Industries, Inc., 634 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2011).

2
The Court notes that Federal Insurance Company—the plaintiff in this case—filed this action “as subrogee of” the shipper.