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2019

Collins v. Benton

2019 WL 6728334

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana.
WAYLAND COLLINS, et al.
v.
JOHN C. BENTON, et al.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 18-7465
|
12/11/2019

NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN, CHIEF JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SECTION: “G”(5)

ORDER AND REASONS
*1 Before the Court is Defendants John C. Benton d/b/a Q & M Motor Transports, Mark Ingle, and Northland Insurance Company’s (collectively, “Defendants”) “Motion to Stay Proceedings or, in the Alternative, Motion to Continue Trial.”1 In the motion, Defendants request that this Court stay the entire case pending the outcome of an alleged ongoing criminal investigation.2 Alternatively, Defendants request that this Court continue the trial of this matter until the criminal investigation has concluded.3 Plaintiffs Wayland Collins, Candy Kelly, and Alvin Polk (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) oppose the motion.4 Having considered the motion, the memorandum in support and in opposition, the arguments made during oral argument, the record, and the applicable law, the Court denies the motion.

I. Background
On August 7, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants in this Court, seeking recovery for injuries and property damages Plaintiffs allegedly sustained in an automobile accident.5 According to the Complaint, on August 9, 2017, Plaintiff Wayland Collins was operating a vehicle on Interstate 10 and, while exiting onto Interstate 510, collided with an 18-wheeler driven by Defendant Mark Ingle.6 Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Mark Ingle was turning onto Interstate 510 and negligently misjudged his clearance, resulting in the motor vehicle incident at issue.7 Plaintiffs further allege that Defendant Mark Ingle was cited for an “improper lane change.”8 Plaintiffs bring a negligence claim against Defendant Mark Ingle and Defendant Q & M Transport, who is allegedly Defendant Mark Ingle’s principal under the doctrine of respondeat superior.9 Plaintiffs also bring claims against Defendant Northland Insurance Company, who purportedly insured the 18-wheeler operated by Defendant Mark Ingle.10

On November 13, 2018, the Court issued a Scheduling Order setting this case for trial on October 21, 2019.11 On June 11, 2019, approximately 10 months after the filing of the Complaint, all parties jointly moved for a continuance of the October 21, 2019 trial date and accompanying deadlines because all of the Plaintiffs had recently undergone surgery and were in the process of being treated by several physicians.12 On June 17, 2019, this Court granted the parties’ request because Plaintiffs appeared to not have reached maximum medical recovery at that time.13 Thereafter, the Court issued a new Scheduling Order setting this case for trial on January 27, 2020.14

On July 19, 2019, Defendants filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Counterclaim, seeking leave of Court to file a fraud claim against Plaintiffs,15 and a Motion for Leave of Court to File Supplemental and Amending Answer and Affirmative Defenses, seeking to amend their Answer to assert the affirmative defense of conspiracy to commit fraud.16 These motions were referred to the Magistrate Judge for decision pursuant to Local Rule 72.1. Plaintiffs opposed both motions.17 On August 21, 2019, the Magistrate Judge denied the Motion for Leave of Court to File Counterclaim, finding that Defendants had not pleaded fraud with particularity.18 The Magistrate Judge granted Defendants leave to amend the Answer to conform the pleading to the evidence developed during the course of discovery, including the following allegations: (1) Plaintiffs conspired to stage the alleged subject accident and that the alleged subject accident in this case was intentionally caused and/or staged by the Plaintiffs, and that Plaintiffs suffered no injury due to the fault of the Defendants; (2) certain Plaintiffs were in cellphone contact with Cornelius Garrison, Raphus Adams, and Ryan Harris within the hours after the alleged accident and that these three individuals are former and/or current clients of Plaintiffs’ counsel in this matter in cases involving alleged accidents similar to those alleged in this matter; (3) Garrison’s cellphone number has appeared on several other Plaintiffs’ phone records near the time of their respective alleged accidents in over 20 different cases; (4) Plaintiff Polk was in cellphone contact with Plaintiffs’ counsel’s fiancé, Sean Alfortish, approximately one hour before the alleged subject accident; and (5) Mr. Alfortish is a principal of Total Medical Concepts, LLC., a third-party funding company that is the guarantor on several Health Claim Forms submitted by medical providers who treated Plaintiffs, Collins and Polk, for their alleged injuries resulting from this alleged accident and which operates out of the building located at 525 Clay Street in Kenner, Louisiana, the same address used by counsel for Plaintiffs at the time this lawsuit was filed.19 Neither party sought review of the Magistrate Judge’s ruling by this Court.

*2 On October 16, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a motion requesting an extension of Plaintiffs’ October 10, 2019 expert report deadline.20 On October 28, 2019, Defendants filed an opposition to the motion.21 On November 1, 2019, Plaintiffs filed a reply brief in further support of the motion.22 On November 15, 2019, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion because Plaintiffs had not demonstrated that there was good cause to extend the expert report deadline.23

On November 26, 2019, Defendants filed the instant motion requesting that the case be stayed pending the outcome of an ongoing criminal investigation.24 The same day, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion.25 On December 3, 2019, with leave of Court, Plaintiffs filed a supplemental memorandum in further opposition to the motion.26 On December 3, 2019, the Court granted an expedited hearing on the motion, and set the motion for oral argument on December 4, 2019 at 10:00 a.m.27

II. Parties’ Arguments

A. Defendants’ Arguments in Support of the Motion
In the instant motion, Defendants request that this Court stay the entire case pending the outcome of an ongoing criminal investigation.28 Alternatively, Defendants request that this Court continue the trial of this matter until the criminal investigation has concluded.29

Defendants assert that they “have become aware of more than 30 other accidents with similar factual scenarios to the accident at issue.”30 According to Defendants, “[e]ach of these accidents involves an 18-wheeler and an alleged side-swipe or impact while the 18-wheeler was changing lanes.”31 Defendants contend that “[i]n many of the cases, the truck driver is unaware that he/she was allegedly involved in an accident.”32 Defendants aver that Mark Ingle was similarly unaware that his 18-wheeler impacted the vehicle driven by Plaintiff Wayland Collins.33

Defendants cite cellphone records obtained in this matter, showing that within hours of the accident, Plaintiff Wayland Collins was in contact with Cornelius Garrison, Raphus Adams and Ryan Harris, all of whom were allegedly involved in accidents similar to the accident in question, and who also are current or former clients of Plaintiffs’ counsel, Vanessa Motta.34 Additionally, Defendants assert that Plaintiff Alvin Polk spoke to Vanessa Motta’s fiancé, Sean Alfortish, approximately one hour before the accident.35

Defendants argue that “[t]his information, at a minimum, casts suspicion over the allegations made by [P]laintiffs in this matter.”36 Defendants contend that “[i]t is illogical and beyond coincidence that [P]laintiffs in this matter were involved in almost identical accidents to [P]laintiffs involved in numerous other alleged accidents, including plaintiffs in other cases with whom Collins spoke repeatedly within a short time after the accident in question.”37 Moreover, Defendants assert that it “is not credible that all of these individuals who are acquainted with one another were injured in accidents which occurred in almost exactly the same manner.”38 “Defendants submit that the accident in question did not occur as alleged by [P]laintiffs and believe that the accident was staged and instigated by [P]laintiffs.”39

*3 In support, Defendants cite eight cases involving similar factual allegations that were stayed by district judges in the Eastern District of Louisiana pending an ongoing criminal investigation.40 Defendants assert that five individuals have been charged in the Eastern District of Louisiana with a conspiracy “to devise a scheme and artifice to defraud and to obtain money and property from insurance companies and interstate trucking companies by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, by use of interstate wire transmissions, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343.”41 On information and belief, Defendants assert that the investigation by the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Louisiana is ongoing.42

Defendants assert that it would be prejudicial for this case to proceed to trial pending the outcome of the criminal investigation.43 According to Defendants “[t]he ongoing criminal investigation encompasses persons who may be called as witnesses at the trial of this matter, as well as counsel for plaintiffs.”44 Additionally, “[i]f a criminal investigation concludes that these accidents are staged and that [P]laintiffs are guilty of fraud,” Defendants contend that “allowing this case to move forward to judgment could result in prejudice to [D]efendants.”45 Therefore, Defendants assert that “it is in the best interest of the parties, the court and the public to stay this proceeding pending the conclusion of the criminal investigation.”46 Alternatively, Defendants request that this Court continue the trial of this matter until the criminal investigation has concluded.47

B. Plaintiffs’ Arguments in Opposition of the Motion
In opposition, Plaintiffs assert that the motion should be denied because it is based on “conclusory allegations, scandalous insinuations, and tenuous and unsubstantiated connections between members of the New Orleans East community.”48 According to Plaintiffs, “Defendants attempt to turn basic friendships, business relationships, and other common acquaintances and coincidences within a tight-knit community into something sinister.”49 Plaintiffs contend that “[d]efense counsel has personally acted in bad faith in the filing of this Motion and attaching cases that have no nexus of relationship to this case whatsoever and has made allegations which should be sanctioned to the highest degree possible by this Honorable Court.”50 Plaintiffs argue that “Defendant makes conclusory allegations but fails to tie in any factual or credible evidence…about this accident which would require the draconian measure of allowing a Stay less then [sic] two months prior to trial.”51

Plaintiffs assert that there is no connection between the cases that have been stayed and this pending case.52 According to Plaintiffs, the only fraud “involved in this case is from the Defendants who have placed numerous frivolous defenses in this matter and done all they can to avoid their liability and culpability in this matter.”53 Plaintiff contends that the claimants involved in other trucking collisions are irrelevant and immaterial to the claims in this case.54 Plaintiffs argue that these unrelated acts are insufficient to state a claim of fraud.55

Additionally, Plaintiffs assert that the fact that Wayland Collins is an acquaintance of Raphus Adams, Ryan Harris, and Cornelius Garrison has no bearing on the claims pending before this Court.56 Plaintiffs contend that Defendants should not be rewarded for speculating on the nature of these relationships and phone conversations.57 Plaintiffs note that during Wayland Collins’ deposition, Defendants did not ask Mr. Collins any questions about these relationships or the phone calls with these individuals.58 Moreover, Plaintiffs assert that Plaintiff Alvin Polk is an acquaintance of Sean Alfortish, and he contacted Mr. Alfortish on the day of the accident to obtain the phone number of a lawyer who is representing Mr. Polk in an unrelated matter.59 To support this assertion, Plaintiffs point to phone records showing that Mr. Polk called the attorney immediately after the phone conversation with Mr. Alfortish.60 Plaintiffs assert that “the defense is making a concerted attack against minority clients and alleging that they are guilty by association that they have been involved in an auto accident so there must be fraud!”61 Because there is no proof of fraud on the part of Plaintiffs in this case, Plaintiffs argue that the motion to stay should be denied.62

C. Plaintiffs’ Arguments in Further Opposition of the Motion
*4 Plaintiffs filed the supplemental opposition to clarify that Plaintiffs also oppose Defendants’ request that the trial be continued.63

III. Legal Standard

A. Legal Standard on a Motion to Stay
There is no question that a district court has inherent power to “control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants,”64 and that this authority includes the district court’s wide discretion to grant a stay in a pending matter.65 When “the interests of justice seem[ ] to require such action,” a court may exercise its discretion to stay civil proceedings, postpone discovery, or impose protective orders and conditions.66 Although it is not required to do so, a district court “may stay a civil proceeding during the pendency of a parallel criminal proceeding,”67 or “until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is ended.”68 Therefore, although “[t]he simultaneous prosecution of civil and criminal actions is generally unobjectionable,”69 a stay of a pending civil action may be appropriate “when there is a real and appreciable risk of self-incrimination.”70

Whether to stay a civil action pending resolution of a related criminal proceeding is a matter left to the court’s discretion,71 and the Fifth Circuit has determined that such a stay may be warranted where “special circumstances” exist such that a party would suffer substantial and irreparable prejudice otherwise.72 The “mere possibility of prejudice” to the criminal defendant arising from discovery in the civil case does not necessarily warrant a stay.73 The burden to show that a stay is warranted rests on the movant,74 and in determining whether a civil action should be stayed due to a criminal matter, courts within the Fifth Circuit have looked to six factors.75 These factors are:
1. The extent to which the issues in the criminal case overlap with those presented in the civil case;
2. The status of the criminal case, including whether the defendant has been indicted;
3. The private interests of the plaintiff in proceeding expeditiously, weighed against the prejudice to the plaintiff caused by the delay;
4. The private interests of and burden on the defendant;
5. The interests of the courts; and 6. The public interest.76

B. Legal Standard on a Motion to Continue Trial
*5 Federal district courts have the inherent power to enforce their scheduling orders.77 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) provides that a scheduling order “may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.”78 “The good cause standard requires the ‘party seeking relief to show that the deadlines cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party needing the extension.’ ”79 In deciding whether to grant a continuance, the Court’s “judgment range is exceedingly wide,” for it “must consider not only the facts of the particular case but also all of the demands on counsel’s time and the court’s.”80 Simply put, whether to grant or deny a continuance is within the sound discretion of the trial court.81

IV. Analysis
In the motion, Defendants request that this Court stay the entire case pending the outcome of an ongoing criminal investigation.82 Alternatively, Defendants request that this Court continue the trial of this matter until the criminal investigation has concluded.83 Plaintiffs oppose both requests.84 Therefore, the Court will address each of these issues in turn.

A. Whether Defendants Have Established that a Stay is Warranted
As discussed above, courts analyze six factors to determine whether a civil action should be stayed due to a criminal matter. The Court addresses each of these factors to determine whether a stay is appropriate in this case.

1. Extent of Overlap between Civil and Criminal Cases
Where there exists overlap between the civil and criminal proceedings, courts often feel compelled to grant a stay.85 Indeed, some courts have found that “the similarity of the issues in the underlying civil and criminal actions is considered the most important threshold issue in determining whether to grant a stay.”86 Overlap between the civil and criminal proceedings is an important factor specifically because such overlap increases the risk of a defendant’s self-incrimination in civil proceedings.87

Defendants seek a stay of this matter because they contend that a criminal investigation by the U.S. Attorney’s Office into allegedly fraudulent motor vehicle claims is ongoing.88 According to Defendants, they “have become aware of more than 30 other accidents with similar factual scenarios to the accident at issue.”89 Defendants assert that five individuals have been charged in the Eastern District of Louisiana with a conspiracy “to devise a scheme and artifice to defraud and to obtain money and property from insurance companies and interstate trucking companies by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, by use of interstate wire transmissions, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343.”90 On information and belief, Defendants assert that the investigation by the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Louisiana is ongoing.91 However, Defendants present no evidence to show that Plaintiffs are under investigation by the U.S. Attorney’s Office or that Plaintiffs are associated in any way with the defendants in the pending criminal case.

*6 As support for the instant motion, Defendants rely primarily on phone records showing that within hours of the accident, Plaintiff Wayland Collins was in contact with Cornelius Garrison, Raphus Adams and Ryan Harris, all of whom were allegedly involved in accidents similar to the accident in question, and who also are current or former clients of Plaintiffs’ counsel, Vanessa Motta.92 Additionally, Defendants assert that Plaintiff Alvin Polk spoke to Vanessa Motta’s fiancé, Sean Alfortish, approximately one hour before the accident.93 Defendants argue that “[t]his information, at a minimum, casts suspicion over the allegations made by [P]laintiffs in this matter.”94 Defendants contend that “[i]t is illogical and beyond coincidence that [P]laintiffs in this matter were involved in almost identical accidents to [P]laintiffs involved in numerous other alleged accidents, including plaintiffs in other cases with whom Collins spoke repeatedly within a short time after the accident in question.”95 Defendants do not offer any evidence to show that Plaintiffs or any of the aforementioned individuals are under investigation by the U.S. Attorney’s Office. Speculation and conjecture are insufficient to meet Defendants’ burden of showing an overlap between this civil proceeding and any alleged criminal investigation. Therefore, this factor does not weigh in favor of granting a stay.

2. Status of Criminal Proceedings
Generally, a stay of a civil case is most appropriate when a party to the civil action has already been indicted for the same conduct.96 Here, Defendants have not presented any evidence to show that the plaintiffs in this case are being investigated by the U.S. Attorney’s Office. Defendants merely speculate that Plaintiffs could be implicated in the investigation because on the date of the accident they communicated with other individuals who were involved in similar accidents and may be implicated in criminal conduct. At this time, neither Plaintiffs nor their counsel have been indicted for conduct at issue in this litigation. Additionally, the U.S. Attorney has not attempted to intervene in this case or moved to stay these proceedings. Thus, this factor weighs against the grant of a stay.

3. Plaintiffs’ Interest
Defendants assert that it would be prejudicial for this case to proceed to trial pending the outcome of the criminal investigation because that investigation involves individuals who may be called as witnesses to testify at trial and Plaintiffs’ counsel.97 Plaintiffs contend that they would be prejudiced by an indeterminate delay because they are entitled to a speedy resolution of this matter and their chances of recovery will decrease if they are forced to wait until the criminal investigation has been resolved before pursuing this civil action.98 Defendants’ requested stay presents a high risk of prejudice to Plaintiffs, who have a strong interest in resolution of this matter. At this point, it is unclear whether Plaintiffs are implicated in any criminal investigation, how long any criminal proceedings may last, and when the proceedings may be resolved. Therefore, this factor does not weigh in favor of granting a stay.

4. Defendant’s Interest
According to Defendants, allowing this case to move forward to judgment could prejudice Defendants if a criminal investigation concludes that these accidents are staged and that Plaintiffs are guilty of fraud.99 Defendants do not explain how they would be prejudiced if this case proceeds to judgment. If Plaintiffs were in fact found guilty of fraud arising from conduct in this case, Defendants may be able to recover any judgment rendered in favor of Plaintiffs as restitution in the criminal case. However, Defendants would bear the expense of trial, and recovery of the full amount of any judgment via restitution may not be guaranteed. Thus, this factor may be neutral or weigh slightly in favor of granting a stay.

5. The Court’s Interest
The Court has interests in judicial economy and expediency.100 “Further, before granting a stay pending the resolution of another case, the court must carefully consider the time reasonably expected for resolution of the ‘other case,’ in light of the principle that ‘stay orders will be reversed when they are found to be immoderate or of an indefinite duration.’ ”101

*7 The Court has an interest in moving this case forward in an efficient manner. It is possible that any criminal proceedings could last for an extended period of time, thus delaying the efficient administration of the Court’s docket. Moreover, because Defendants have only speculated that Plaintiffs could be implicated by this criminal investigation and present no evidence to show that they are actually being investigated by the U.S. Attorney’s Office, the Court’s interests are best served by proceeding with the instant action. Therefore, this factor does not weigh in favor of granting a stay.

6. The Public Interest
Although the public interest in law enforcement sometimes weighs in favor of prioritizing criminal proceedings over civil matters,102 the public also has an interest in the prompt resolution of civil cases. Here, it does not appear that the public interest would be disserved by moving forward with the civil case, and Defendants have not offered any specific reason as to why the public has an interest in staying the civil case pending the outcome of any criminal proceeding. Plaintiffs and their counsel have the right to a presumption of innocence until they are proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt at a criminal trial. Thus, this factor also weighs against a stay.

Based on the foregoing, the Court denies the instant motion because five factors weigh against staying this civil action, and only one factor is neutral or weighs slightly in favor of granting a stay.

B. Whether Defendants Have Established that a Continuance of the Trial is Warranted As an alternative ground for relief, Defendants request that this Court continue the trial of

this matter until the criminal investigation has concluded.103 However, Defendants have not shown that good cause exists to warrant an indefinite continuance of the trial date. As discussed above, Defendants present no evidence to show that Plaintiffs are under investigation by the U.S. Attorney’s Office or that Plaintiffs are associated in any way with the defendants in the pending criminal case. Therefore, because Defendants have not shown that the criminal investigation even implicates the parties involved in this case, Defendants have not demonstrated that the trial date should be continued until the criminal investigation has concluded.

V. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court denies the motion to stay because five factors weigh against staying this civil action, and only one factor is neutral or weighs slightly in favor of granting a stay. Additionally, Defendants have not demonstrated good cause to continue the trial of this matter. Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants John C. Benton d/b/a Q & M Motor Transports, Mark Ingle, and Northland Insurance Company’s “Motion to Stay Proceedings or, in the Alternative, Motion to Continue Trial”104 is DENIED.
11th NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, this _____ day of December, 2019.

NANNETTE JOLIVETTE BROWN

CHIEF JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
All Citations
Slip Copy, 2019 WL 6728334

Footnotes

1
Rec. Doc. 109.

2
Rec. Doc. 109-1 at 10.

3
Id. at 10–11.

4
Rec. Doc. 113.

5
Rec. Doc. 1 at 3.

6
Id.

7
Id.

8
Id. at 4.

9
Id. at 5.

10
Id.

11
Rec. Doc. 17.

12
Rec. Doc. 23.

13
Rec. Doc. 25.

14
Rec. Doc. 27.

15
Rec. Doc. 31.

16
Rec. Doc. 32.

17
Rec. Doc. 43.

18
Rec. Doc. 50 at 1.

19
Id. at 2.

20
Rec. Doc. 56.

21
Rec. Doc. 57.

22
Rec. Doc. 64.

23
Rec. Doc. 75.

24
Rec. Doc. 109.

25
Rec. Doc. 113.

26
Rec. Doc. 128.

27
Rec. Docs. 131, 133.

28
Rec. Doc. 109-1 at 10.

29
Id. at 10–11.

30
Id. at 2.

31
Id.

32
Id.

33
Id.

34
Id. at 2–4.

35
Id. at 4.

36
Id. at 6.

37
Id.

38
Id.

39
Id.

40
Id. at 7–8.

41
Id. at 9 (citing United States of America v. Damian K. Lebeaud, et al, Criminal Action No. 19-219).

42
Id. at 10.

43
Id.

44
Id.

45
Id.

46
Id.

47
Id. at 10–11.

48
Rec. Doc. 113 at 1–2.

49
Id. at 2.

50
Id. at 4.

51
Id. at 5.

52
Id. at 7.

53
Id. at 8.

54
Id. at 10.

55
Id. at 11.

56
Id. at 11–13.

57
Id. at 12.

58
Id. at 12, 14.

59
Id. at 15.

60
Id.

61
Id. at 17.

62
Id. at 19.

63
Rec. Doc. 128.

64
Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936).

65
In re Ramu Corp., 903 F.2d 312, 318 (5th Cir. 1990).

66
United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 12 n.27 (1970); see also Mayo v. Tri-Bell Indus., 787 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir. 1986).

67
S.E.C. v. First Fin. Grp. of Tex., Inc., 659 F.2d 660, 668 (5th Cir. 1981).

68
DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi, 488 F.3d 649, 655 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 394 (2007) (citing Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 730 (1996))).

69
First Fin. Grp., 659 F.2d at 667.

70
Kordel, 391 U.S. at 8–9.

71
Id. at 12 n.27.

72
First Fin. Grp., 659 F.2d at 668; see also United States v. Little Al, 712 F.2d 133, 136 (5th Cir. 1983).

73
In re Ramu Corp., 903 F.2d at 320.

74
Ruiz v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 854, 856 (5th Cir. 1982); Drummond v. Fulton Cty. Dep’t of Family & Children’s Servs., 532 F.2d 1001, 1002 (5th Cir. 1976).

75
See Tajonera v. Black Elk Energy Offshore Operations, LLC, No. 13-366, 2015 WL 893447, at *9 (E.D. La. Mar. 2, 2015) (Brown, J.) (citing Alcala v. Tex. Webb Cty., 625 F.Supp.2d 391, 399 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (collecting district court cases within the Fifth Circuit applying this test); see also Lebouef v. Global X-Ray and Testing Corp., No. 07-5755, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6470, at *4 (E.D. La. Jan. 29, 2008) (Barbier, J.) (“To determine whether special circumstances exist, the court must ‘balance the competing constitutional and procedural interests of the parties,’ as illustrated through the six-factor test….”) (citation omitted)).

76
Id. (internal citation omitted).

77
See Flaska v. Little River Marine Const. Co., 389 F.2d 885, 887 n.3 (5th Cir. 1968) (citing Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962)); see also Finisar v. DirecTV Group, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 2d 896, 899 (E.D. Tex. 2006).

78
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4).

79
Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. City of El Paso, 346 F.3d 541, 546 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting S&W Enterprises, L.L.C. v. SouthTrust Bank of Alabama, NA, 315 F.3d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 2003)); 6A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1522.1 (2d ed. 1990)).

80
Streber v. Hunter, 221 F.3d 701, 736 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted).

81
United States v. Alix, 86 F.3d 429, 434 (5th Cir. 1996).

82
Rec. Doc. 109-1 at 10.

83
Id. at 10–11.

84
Rec. Doc. 113.

85
Id. (internal citation omitted).

86
Id. (quoting Dominguez v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., 530 F.Supp.2d 902, 906–07 (S.D. Tex. 2008)).

87
Id. (internal citation omitted).

88
Rec. Doc. 109-1 at 2.

89
Id. at 2.

90
Id. at 9 (citing United States of America v. Damian K. Lebeaud, et al, Criminal Action No. 19-219).

91
Id. at 10.

92
Id. at 2–4.

93
Id. at 4.

94
Id. at 6.

95
Id.

96
See Tajonera, 2015 WL 893447, at *9 (internal citation omitted).

97
Rec. Doc. 109-1 at 10.

98
Rec. Doc. 113 at 4.

99
Rec. Doc. 109-1 at 10.

100
See Tajonera, 2015 WL 893447, at *10 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

101
Wedgeworth v. Fibreboard Corp., 706 F.2d 541, 545 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting McKnight v. Blanchard, 607 F.2d 477, 479 (5th Cir. 1982) (vacating an indefinite and protracted stay where the court had not weighed competing interests in ordering the stay)).

102
See Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 487 (5th Cir. 1962).

103
Rec. Doc. 113 at 10–11.

104
Rec. Doc. 109.

Ryder v. Charleston Aluminum

2019 WL 6652510

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.
RYDER SYSTEM, INC., Plaintiff,
v.
CHARLESTON ALUMINUM TRANSPORTATION, LLC and DAVID E. ALLEN, Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:17cv718-MHT
|
Filed 12/06/2019

OPINION
Myron H. Thompson UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
*1 Plaintiff Ryder System, Inc., filed this lawsuit against defendants Charleston Aluminum Transportation, LLC, and David E. Allen pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607 and 9613, and the Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Act (OPLCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 2709 and 2715, seeking reimbursement for cleanup costs incurred as a result of a truck accident. The court has subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b) (CERCLA), and 33 U.S.C. § 2717(b) (OPLCA). After entering default against Charleston Aluminum, the court granted Ryder System’s motion for default judgment and entered judgment. This opinion explains the court’s reasons for granting the default-judgment motion.

I. DEFAULT-JUDGMENT STANDARD
While entry of default is a necessary condition for obtaining a default judgment, it is not sufficient. “[A] default is not ‘an absolute confession by the defendant of his liability and of the plaintiff’s right to recover,’ but is instead merely ‘an admission of the facts cited in the Complaint, which by themselves may or may not be sufficient to establish a defendant’s liability.’ ” Capitol Records v. Rita Carmichael, 508 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1083 (S.D. Ala. 2007) (Steele, J.) (citations omitted). A default judgment, including the specific nature and extent of the relief sought, must be adequately supported in the record. See, e.g., Boswell v. Gumbaytay, No. 2:07-CV-135, 2009 WL 1515912, at *8 (M.D. Ala. June 1, 2009) (Watkins, J.) (in entering a default judgment, “[t]he court’s core duty is ‘to assure itself that there is a legitimate basis for any damage award it enters’ ”) (quoting Anheuser–Busch, Inc. v. Philpot, 317 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2003)).

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Based on the well pleaded factual allegations of the complaint, and the affidavits and exhibits submitted by plaintiff Ryder System in support of the motion for default judgment, the court found the following facts. On May 27, 2015, a vehicular accident occurred in Lowndes County, Alabama. Defendant Allen was driving a tractor-trailer in the course of his employment for defendant Charleston Aluminum at the time of accident. The tractor-trailer had been leased to Charleston Aluminum by Ryder System. Allen was following too closely to truck ahead of him, so that when that truck had to slow down, Allen could not stop in time and rear-ended it. As a result of the crash, the transformer unit carried by Allen’s trailer fell off and discharged oil and/or dieletric fluid on to the ground.

On the same day, local authorities contacted United States Environmental Services (“USES”) to clean up the spilled substances and the soil contaminated by the substances at the accident site, and Ryder System entered into a “response action contract” for USES to clean up the contamination at the accident site. After completing the cleanup, USES billed Ryder System $ 116,990.23 for the costs of the cleanup, which Ryder System paid. Ryder System repeatedly informed Charleston Aluminum that it was legally responsible for the cleanup costs and demanded reimbursement, but Charleston Aluminum did not respond.

III. DISCUSSION
*2 In the motion for default judgment, Ryder System sought reimbursement of the $ 116,990.23 it expended for cleanup costs, and for costs and attorneys’ fees in the amount of $ 19,058.73 for pursuing this action.

Ryder System sought to hold Charleston Aluminum liable under 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a) and 9613(f) of CERCLA, which governs the cleanup of hazardous substances. Section 9607(a) allows an innocent party to bring a claim for recoupment of cleanup costs, while § 9613(f) allows a responsible party to bring a claim for contribution to the costs of cleanup from other responsible parties during or after a civil action under CERCLA. See Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1996). Ryder System’s claim is best viewed as an action for recoupment under § 3607(a).1 That statute provides, in relevant part, that “the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility … shall be liable for … any … necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan.” § 9607(a)(1) & (4)(B). As noted above, “[t]o bring a cost recovery action based solely on § [9607(a) ]…, [the plaintiff] would have to be an innocent party to the contamination.” Redwing Carriers, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496 (11th Cir. 1996). Here that is the case, as there is no evidence before the court that Ryder System caused the contamination.

To prove a claim under § 9607(a), Ryder System must establish that (1) the contamination occurred in connection with a “facility” as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9); (2) “a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance has occurred;” (3) “the release or threatened release has caused the plaintiff to incur response costs consistent with the ‘national contingency plan (NCP)’ ”; and (4) Charleston Aluminum is a “covered person” under § 9607(a). Redwing Carriers, 94 F.3d at 1497 (citing Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, 1150 (1st Cir. 1989); Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 668 (5th Cir. 1989); Ascon Properties, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 1989)).

Ryder System met each of these requirements. First, the contamination occurred in connection with a “facility” as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9): that definition includes “any … motor vehicle” and the contamination occurred in connection with the operation of a tractor-trailer.

Second, a release or threatened release of hazardous substances occurred. As a result of the accident, dielectric fluid and/or oil from the transformer was spilled in the soil, local authorities immediately contacted USES to clean up the contamination, and Ryder System entered a “response action contract”2 with USES to pay for cleanup of the discharged hazardous fluids and contaminated soils. See Affidavit of Rose Mandigo (doc. no. 24-1); Agreement to Conduct Services (doc. no. 27-4). The cleanup took three weeks. See Invoice (doc. no. 27-3) at 2. As Ryder System points out, the dieletric fluid and oil in older transformers, many of which are still in use, are frequently contaminated by polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), with are highly hazardous to human health and the environment, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has developed stringent regulations governing the disposal of transformers that may contain them. See Dan Bench, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, INDENTIFICATION, MANAGEMENT, AND PROPER DISPOSAL OF PCC-CONTAINING ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT USED IN MINES, www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/pcbidmgmt. pdf. While Ryder System has not submitted any direct evidence that the dielectric fluid/oil released from the transformer contained PCBs, the court concludes based on the circumstantial evidence in the record that the spill either released hazardous substances or threatened to release hazardous substances.

*3 Third, the accident caused it to expend funds for the cleanup.

Finally, Ryder System has shown that Charleston Aluminum meets the definition of a potentially responsible person (“PRP”) in § 9607(a), which defines PRPs as including the “operators of a facility at the time the hazardous wastes were disposed.” § 9607(a); United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1553–54 (11th Cir. 1990), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Monarch Tile, Inc. v. City of Florence, 212 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2000). Charleston Aluminum was the operator of the tractor trailer at the time the hazardous substances were spilled in the accident. (As noted earlier, a tractor trailer is a “facility” under CERCLA.) Under CERCLA, the definition of “disposal” includes the “discharge,” “spilling,” or “leaking” of hazardous waste. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) (defining “disposal” by reference to the Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA)); 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (SWDA) (“The term ‘disposal’ means the discharge, … spilling, leaking, or placing of any … hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such … hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment”). Thus, Charleston Aluminum was the operator of a facility when the hazardous fluids were “disposed.”

As Ryder System established Charleston Aluminum’s liability under § 9607(a), and nothing in the record showed Ryder System to have fault in the matter, the court found Charleston Aluminum liable to Ryder System for the entire cost of the response: $ 116,990.23. In addition, the court awarded interest from September 22, 2016, pursuant to § 9607(a), which provides that “[t]he amounts recoverable in an action under this section shall include interest on the amounts recoverable,” and “[s]uch interest shall accrue from the later of (i) the date payment of a specified amount is demanded in writing, or (ii) the date of the expenditure concerned.” 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). See also Complaint (doc. no. 1) at 3 ¶ 24 (alleging that Ryder System paid USES the full amount of the invoice on or September 22, 2016).

Ryder System also sought costs of the suit and attorneys’ fees in the amount of $ 19,058.73, which covers the period through February 28, 2019, the date of filing its motions for default judgment. “CERCLA § 107 [42 U.S.C. § 9607] does not provide for the award of private litigants’ attorney’s fees associated with bringing a cost recovery action.” Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 819 (1994). However, Ryder System has submitted its lease agreement with Charleston Aluminum, which includes two relevant provisions. First, it includes an indemnification clause whereby Charleston Aluminum agreed to reimburse Ryder System for the costs of emergency response contractors, environmental clean-up and disposal costs, if any, resulting from the use of Ryder System’s vehicle. Second, it includes a provision that, if either party were to initiate litigation to enforce its rights under the contract, the prevailing party in the litigation would be entitled to receive reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. Through this litigation, Ryder System seeks to enforce its right to indemnification under the lease agreement. Therefore, the court concluded that Ryder System is entitled to an award of fees and costs against Charleston Aluminum. Furthermore, the requested $ 17,411.50 in attorneys’ fees and the $ 1,291.23 in court fees and expenses appear reasonable. Thus, the court has entered judgment for attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $ 19,058.73 against Charleston Aluminum.

*4 DONE, this the 6th day of December, 2019.

All Citations
Slip Copy, 2019 WL 6652510

Footnotes

1
It appears that Ryder System cannot proceed under § 9613(f), which “authorizes contribution claims only ‘during or following’ a civil action under” § 9606 or § 9607(a) of CERCLA. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 168 (2004). Ryder System represents in its brief that it “was under administrative enforcement measures at the time of the cleanup.” Brief (doc. no. 27) at 12. However, the record contains no allegations or evidence indicating the existence of a “civil action” under §§ 9606 or 9607(a).

2
CERCLA defines a “response action contract” as a written contract or agreement entered into by a response action contractor with a potentially responsible party to provide “any removal under this chapter, with respect to any release or threatened release of a hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant.” 42 U.S.C. § 9619(e)(1); see also § 9619 (e)(2) (defining “response action contractor” as “any person who enters into a response action contract with respect to any release or threatened release of a hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant from a facility and is carrying out such contract”).

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