Louis v. Milton Transp., Inc
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Fort Myers Division
July 20, 2020, Filed
Case No: 2:20-cv-6-FtM-29NPM

Reporter
2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126709 *

MAXO LOUIS and INASE FRANCOIS, Plaintiffs, v. MILTON TRANSPORTATION, INC., a Pennsylvania Corporation, BTR, INC., a Pennsylvania Corporation, and WILLIAM DAVIS, Defendants.

Notice: Decision text below is the first available text from the court; it has not been editorially reviewed by LexisNexis. Publisher’s editorial review, including Headnotes, Case Summary, Shepard’s analysis or any amendments will be added in accordance with LexisNexis editorial guidelines.

[*1] OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on review of defendants’ Renewed Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Doc. #20) filed on April 23, 2020. After being ordered to do so, plaintiffs filed a Response (Doc. #22) on May 26, 2020. For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted.
I.
A. Parties
Plaintiffs Maxo Louis and his wife Inase Francois are residents of Lee County, Florida. (Doc. #5, ¶¶ 2-3.) Defendants Milton Transportation, Inc. and BTR, Inc. are Pennsylvania corporations with their principal places of business in that state. (Doc. #1, ¶¶ 6-7.) Finally, defendant William Davis is an individual domiciled in Pennsylvania.1 (Id. ¶ 8.)

A. Factual Background
According to the allegations in the Complaint, Louis was operating his motor vehicle in New Hampshire on August 2, 2018. (Doc. #5, ¶ 11.) At approximately 8:13 a.m., Davis, who was operating a semi-tractor-trailer vehicle, collided with the rear and side of Louis’s vehicle. (Id. ¶ 13.) Due to the accident, Louis has sustained serious personal injuries and significant financial damages. (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.) The Complaint alleges Davis was an employee of Milton and BTR, and that Milton and BTR are the registered owners [*2] of the tractor trailer. (Id. ¶¶ 9-10.)

B. Procedural Background
In December 2019, plaintiffs initiated this action by filing a Complaint for Damages in the Circuit Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit in and for Lee County, Florida. (Id. p. 1.) The Complaint contains the following three claims: (1) negligent operation of a motor vehicle against Milton and BTR; (2) negligent operation of a motor vehicle against Davis; and (3) loss of consortium against all three defendants. (Id. pp. 2-5.) The first two claims are alleged by Louis, while the third claim is alleged by Francois. (Id.)
On January 6, 2020, defendants removed the case to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (Doc. #1.) The same day, defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing the case should be dismissed because the only connection to Florida is plaintiffs’ residency. (Doc. #3, p. 1.) In response, plaintiffs argued the Court [*3] could exercise personal jurisdiction or, alternatively, allow for evidentiary discovery related to defendants’ business ties with Florida. (Doc. #16, p. 5.) The Court granted the latter request, denying the motion without prejudice and permitting plaintiffs to conduct factual discovery on the personal jurisdiction issue within forty-five days of the Court’s Order. (Doc. #17, p. 2.) The Court also permitted plaintiffs to file an amended complaint within sixty days, and defendants to file a renewed motion to dismiss within fourteen days of the amended complaint or the expiration of the time to file an amended complaint. (Id.)
No amended complaint was subsequently filed and on April 23, 2020, defendants filed the Renewed Motion to Dismiss currently before the Court. (Doc. #20.) In the motion, defendants argue they do not have sufficient contacts with Florida to permit the Court from exercising personal jurisdiction over the matter. (Id. p. 3.) In their Response, plaintiffs acknowledge that their previous opposition to dismissal was based on defendants’ prior assertion that they were registered to do business in Florida and had appointed agents for service of process. (Doc. #22, pp. 1-5.) [*4] However, because defendants have since stated this was an erroneous assertion, plaintiffs request the motion be denied with prejudice, but the case transferred to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. (Id. pp. 5-6.)
II.
A. Personal Jurisdiction
This Court has previously described the personal jurisdiction requirements as follows:
To hear a case, a federal court must have jurisdiction over both the subject matter of the action and the parties to the action. Ruhrgas AG v. MarathonOil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584, 119 S. Ct. 1563, 143 L. Ed. 2d 760 (1999). Absent either, “the court is powerless to proceed to an adjudication.” Id.
A federal court sitting in diversity may exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant if: (1) personal jurisdiction is authorized under the forum state’s long-arm statute and (2) the exercise of such jurisdiction comports with constitutional due process. Carmouche v. Tamborlee Mgmt., Inc., 789 F.3d 1201, 1203 (11th Cir. 2015); Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 1280, 1283 (11th Cir. 2008). The exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with due process if the non-resident defendant has established “certain minimum contacts with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Helicopteros Nacionales deColombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945)).
The plaintiff “bears the initial burden of alleging in the complaint sufficient facts to make out [*5] a prima facie case of jurisdiction.” United Techs. Corp. v.Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009). A prima facie case is established if the plaintiff alleges enough facts to withstand a motion for directed verdict. SEC v. Carrillo, 115 F.3d 1540, 1542 (11th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). “First, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts in [its] complaint to initially support long arm jurisdiction before the burden shifts to the defendant to make a prima facie showing of the inapplicability of the statute.” Future Tech. Today,Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 218 F.3d 1247, 1249 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). If the defendant sustains its burden by raising “a meritorious challenge to personal jurisdiction” “through affidavits, documents[,] or testimony,” the burden shifts back to the plaintiff. Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 627 (11th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff is then required to “substantiate the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint by affidavits or other competent proof, and not merely reiterate the factual allegations in the complaint.” Future Tech. Today, Inc., 218 F.3d at 1247 (citation omitted).
Pennisi v. Reed, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130589, 2018 WL 3707835, *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 3, 2018) (footnote and marks omitted). If the plaintiff’s complaint and the defendant’s evidence conflict, “the district court must construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Thomas v. Brown, 504 Fed. App’x 845, 847 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990)). Defendants argue (1) plaintiffs have alleged insufficient facts to bring this action within the ambit of Florida’s long-arm statute, and (2) defendants [*6] do not have sufficient contacts with Florida to satisfy due process requirements. (Doc. #22, pp. 4-13.) The Court will address these arguments in turn.
1. Florida’s Long-Arm Statute
Florida’s long-arm statute authorizes general and specific personal jurisdiction. § 48.193(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. Section 48.193(2) addresses the exercise of general personal jurisdiction, providing that “[a] defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises from that activity.” In contrast, “specific personal jurisdiction authorizes jurisdiction over causes of action arising from or related to the defendant’s actions within Florida and concerns a nonresident defendant’s contacts with Florida only as those contacts related to the plaintiff’s cause of action.” LouisVuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1352 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Based on the language in the Complaint, it appears plaintiffs are asserting both general and specific jurisdiction for each defendant. (Doc. #5, ¶ 7.) Accordingly, the Court will address each assertion as it applies to each defendant.
a. General Jurisdiction
“Although no connexity is required [*7] for general jurisdiction, the ‘substantial and not isolated activity’ requirement means’ continuous and systematic general business contact with Florida.'” Gazelles FL, Inc. v. Cupp, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 224581, 2018 WL 7364591, *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2018) (quoting Woods v. Nova Companies Belize Ltd., 739 So. 2d 617, 620 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)). For general jurisdiction to apply, the non-resident defendant’s affiliations with a state must be “so continuous and systematic as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127, 134 S. Ct. 746, 187 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2014) (marks and citations omitted).
Having reviewed the allegations in the Complaint, the Court finds plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case of general jurisdiction over any of defendants. The Complaint alleges Milton and BTR operate “an interstate trucking and transportation business in the State of Florida,” and actively “transact business throughout Florida, including Lee County.” (Doc. #5, ¶¶ 4-5.) However, Milton and BTR are both Pennsylvania corporations (id.), and the allegations in the Complaint are insufficient to show that these defendants have “continuous and systematic general business contact with Florida.” See Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137 (“[O]nly a limited set of affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable to all-purpose jurisdiction there. For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise [*8] of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.” (citations and marks omitted)); Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014) (“It is . . . incredibly difficult to establish general jurisdiction in a forum other than the place of incorporation or principal place of business”).
The Complaint’s allegations regarding Davis are even less sufficient than those regarding Milton and BTR. While the Complaint generally alleges all the defendants engage in “substantial and not isolated activity” within Florida (Doc. #5, ¶ 7), the allegations specifically as to Davis simply state he is a Pennsylvania resident who caused the vehicular accident in New Hampshire in the course of his employment for Milton and BTR (id.
Because the Complaint’s allegations regarding all three defendants are insufficient to establish a prima facie case of general jurisdiction, the Court will turn to the Complaint’s alternative [*9] allegation of specific jurisdiction.
b. Specific Jurisdiction
Florida’s long-arm statute provides a variety of ways in which a defendant can subject themselves to personal jurisdiction, including by “[o]perating, conducting, engaging in, or carrying on a business or business venture in this state or having an office or agency in this state.” § 48.193(1)(a)1., Fla. Stat. In the Complaint, the plaintiffs allege jurisdiction is appropriate because the defendants “are actively engaged in business” in Florida. (Doc. #5, ¶ 7.) The Court will assume for purposes of this Opinion and Order that this is an assertion of specific jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(a)1.
To establish that a defendant is “carrying on a business” for purposes of section 48.193(1)(a)1., “the activities of the defendant must be considered collectively and show a general course of business activity in the state for pecuniary benefit.” FutureTech. Today, Inc., 218 F.3d at 1249. Factors relevant, but not dispositive, to this analysis include the presence and operation of an office in Florida, the possession and maintenance of a license to do business in Florida, the number of Florida clients served, and the percentage of overall revenue gleaned from Florida clients. Horizon Aggressive Growth, L.P. v. Rothstein-Kass, P.A., 421 F.3d 1162, 1167 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).
From the outset, it is clear [*10] that section 48.193(1)(a)1. does not apply to Davis, who, as an employee of Milton and BTR, is not “carrying on a business” within Florida. Furthermore, the Court finds that the allegations related to Milton and BTR are insufficient to establish a prima facie case of specific jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(a)1. The Complaint alleges that Milton and BTR actively “transact business throughout Florida, including Lee County.” However, this allegation, by itself, is insufficient. See Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1318 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting “vague and conclusory allegations” “are insufficient to establish a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction”); Am. Registry, LLC v. Hanaw, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101158, 2014 WL 12606501, *8 (M.D. Fla. July 16, 2014) (“Plaintiff also alleges that Levy and Showmark Media ‘conduct business within this judicial district.’ This allegation is conclusory and cannot serve as the basis for personal jurisdiction.” (citations omitted)). In reviewing the Complaint, the Court finds there are no allegations applicable to the factors discussed above. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiffs have failed to establish a prima facie case of specific jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(a)1. over any of the defendants. See Gazelles, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 224581, 2018 WL 7364591, *9 (“In this case, the Court finds that Plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie [case] that § 48.193(1)(a)(1) permits specific jurisdiction over the Defendants. [*11] In the Amended Complaint, there are no allegations that Defendants have an office in Florida, a license to do business in Florida, any Florida clients, nor any information regarding the percentage of overall revenue received from Florida residents.”); Am. Registry, LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101158, 2014 WL 12606501, *8 (“Due to the absence of factual allegations showing a general course of business activity in Florida, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to plead a prima facie case of jurisdiction against Levy under Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(1).”).
2. Minimum Contacts
The Court’s conclusion that plaintiffs have failed to plead a prima facie case of specific jurisdiction2 under Florida’s long-arm statute moots the issue of whether defendants have sufficient contacts to satisfy due process concerns. See Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Only if both prongs of the analysis are satisfied may a federal or state court exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.”); Goldberg v. U.S., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77945, 2014 WL 2573060, *6 (S.D. Fla. June 9, 2014) (“Because the Court determines that Goldberg failed to allege sufficient facts to satisfy Florida’s long-arm statue, it is unnecessary to address whether minimum contacts exist.”). Nonetheless, even if the Complaint’s allegation of specific jurisdiction [*12] under section 48.193(1)(a)1. was sufficient as to Milton and BTR, the Court finds these defendants lack the minimum contacts with Florida necessary to satisfy due process.
In specific personal jurisdiction cases, the Court applies the following three-part due process test: (1) whether the plaintiff’s claims “arise out of or relate to” at least one of the defendant’s contacts with the forum; (2) whether the nonresident defendant “purposefully availed” himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefit of the forum state’s laws; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Mosseri, 736 F.3d at 1355 (citations [*13] omitted). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the first two prongs, and if the plaintiff does so, “a defendant must make a ‘compelling case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction would violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. (quoting Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc.v. Food Movers Int’l, Inc., 593 F.3d 1249, 1267 (11th Cir. 2010)).
Here, the Court need not make it past the first prong of the analysis. See Waite v. All Acquisition Corp., 901 F. 3d 1307, 1313 n.2 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Because we conclude that the plaintiffs’ claims do not arise out of or relate to at least one of Union Carbide’s contacts with Florida, we need not address whether Union Carbide purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Florida or whether the exercise of jurisdiction would violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”). In determining whether a plaintiff’s claims arise out of or relate to a defendant’s contacts with the forum state, the Court “look[s] to the ‘affiliation between the forum and the underling controversy,’ focusing on any ‘activity or . . . occurrence that [took] place in the forum State.'” Id. at 1314 (quoting Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S.Ct. 1773, 1780, 198 L. Ed. 2d 395 (2017)). From the allegations in the Complaint, it is clear plaintiffs’ injuries and claims arise from a vehicle accident that occurred in New Hampshire, and therefore do not “arise [*14] out of or relate to” any of the defendants’ contacts with Florida. Therefore, plaintiffs have failed to establish the minimum contacts required for personal jurisdiction and dismissal is required.

B. Transfer
As an alternative to dismissal, plaintiffs request the case be transferred to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). (Doc. #22, p. 6.) Section 1404(a) provides that “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.” “In this Circuit, a court lacking personal jurisdiction of the defendant may transfer the case under either [§] 1404(a) or [§] 1406(a).” Roofing & SheetMetal Servs., Inc. v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 689 F.2d 982, 992 n.16 (11th Cir. 1982). As the party requesting the transfer, it is plaintiffs’ burden “of persuading the trial court that transfer is appropriate and should be granted,” Am. Aircraft SalesInt’l, Inc. v. Airwarsaw, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1351 (M.D. Fla. 1999), and “the decision whether to transfer a case is left to the sound discretion of the district court,” Roofing & SheetMetal Servs., Inc., 689 F.2d at 985. As plaintiffs have failed to offer any argument as to why this matter should be transferred rather than dismissed, the Court finds they have failed to meet their burden [*15] under section 1404(a). See Interim Healthcare, Inc.v. Interim Healthcare of Se. La., Inc., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101841, 2020 WL 3078531, *16 (S.D. Fla. June 10, 2020) (“[A]lthough Defendants mention in the heading of their Motion to Dismiss that the case should be transferred pursuant to § 1404(a), they present no arguments regarding the issue of transfer. Thus, the Court will not address the issue of transfer pursuant to § 1404(a).”).
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
Defendant’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss For Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Doc. #20) is GRANTED and the Complaint is dismissed without prejudice to filing such claims in a jurisdiction in which personal jurisdiction can be asserted against the defendants.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 20th day of July, 2020.
Copies:
Parties of record

Neutral As of: July 22, 2020 5:29 PM Z
Blue v. Hill
United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, Western Division
July 13, 2020, Decided; July 13, 2020, Filed
No. 5:18-CV-00445-M

Reporter
2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122428 *

Anthony Blue, Administrator of the Estate of James E. Blue, Sr., Plaintiff, v. Randy L. Hill, et al., Defendants.

Prior History: Blue v. Hill, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83360 (E.D.N.C., May 12, 2020)

Order
The parties return to the court for a second time over Plaintiff Anthony Blue’s request that Defendant Ruan Transport Corp. provide information on prior instances of injuries or accidents involving a Ruan driver. The court previously found this information to be relevant and proportional to the needs of the case. Ruan now claims, for the first time, that it cannot produce the requested information without violating the California Constitution and confidentiality provisions in various settlement agreements.
Ruan’s arguments are unpersuasive. It has not shown that the information called for implicates a privacy interest protected under California law. And the settlement agreements it relies on to support its argument only protect the terms of the settlement agreements, which is not what the interrogatory at issue [*2] requires it to produce. But, out of an abundance of caution, the court will enter a protective order limiting the use of this information to the purposes of this litigation. Thus, the court will grant both Blue’s Motion to Compel (D.E. 72) and Ruan’s Motion for Protective Order (D.E. 77).

I. Background
In November 2017, James Blue, Sr. was driving a pickup truck on I-85 when he slowed and turned on his hazard lights. Compl. ¶¶ 21, 26, D.E. 1-5. Randy Hill was driving a tractor trailer; Ruan owned the cab and Airgas owned the trailer he was pulling. Id. ¶ 22. Hill struck Blue, Sr.’s truck from the rear, causing him injuries, which led to his death. Id. ¶¶ 26-27. Anthony Blue sued Defendants on behalf of Blue Sr.’s Estate.
Blue claims that the Defendants are responsible for the traffic accident that led to his father’s death. During discovery, he sought information from Ruan about prior instances when the actions or omissions of a Ruan driver caused a person to be injured or killed. For each instance, Blue requests the case caption (or the names of parties, the jurisdiction, and the case number), the circumstances of the suit or claim, and the disposition of the claim. D.E. 75-1. Ruan refused [*3] to produce this information and Blue filed a motion to compel. The court granted the motion and required Ruan to produce the requested information. D.E. 64.
But Ruan has not fully complied with the court’s order. It claims that it cannot turn over the requested information without violating the California Constitution and the terms of various settlement agreements the company has entered into. D.E. 75 at 2. Blue filed another motion to compel asking the court to require Ruan to turn over the information. D.E. 72. Ruan, in turn, filed a motion for a protective order that sought to relieve it from turning over all of the requested information or limiting its dissemination. D.E. 77.

II. Discussion
This dispute requires the court to interpret the protections the people of California have enacted to protect their privacy rights1 and the terms of settlement agreements between Ruan and various claimants. None of these documents provide a basis for Ruan to withhold the information Blue seeks. Ruan has not established that the California Constitution prevents it from responding because it has not shown that anyone has a recognized privacy interest in the requested information. And divulging the [*4] requested information would not violate the terms of Ruan’s settlement agreements because those agreements only protect the terms of the settlement agreement, which is not the type of information the interrogatory calls for. Thus, the court will grant Blue’s motion to compel. But the court will also grant Ruan’s motion for a protective order and limit the further use of this information.

A. California Privacy Law
The people of California believe that the right to privacy is so important that they have explicitly included it among the inalienable rights protected in the state constitution. Cal. Const. Art. 1, § 1. The right “prevents government and business interests from [1] collecting and stockpiling unnecessary information about us and from [2] misusing information gathered for one purpose in order to serve other purposes or to embarrass us.” Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Assn., 7 Cal. 4th 1, 36, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834, 865 P.2d 633, 654 (1994) (brackets in original). But “the right to privacy is not absolute.” Id. at 35, 865 P.2d at 654.
The California Supreme Court has established a three-part test to assess whether a disclosure would violate the right to privacy. First, a court must consider whether the information implicates “a specific, legally protected privacy interest.” Id. “[P]rivacy interests do not encompass all conceivable [*5] assertions of individual rights” and thus they are “best assessed separately and in context.” Id.
Under California law, there are two types of legally protected privacy interests. First, there is informational privacy, which “preclud[es] the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential information[.]” Id. The California Supreme Court has explained that “[a] particular class of information is private when well-established social norms recognize the need to maximize individual control over its dissemination and use to prevent unjustified embarrassment or indignity.” Id. In assessing whether social norms require protecting a class of information, the court should consider “the usual sources of positive law governing the right to privacy—common law development, constitutional development, statutory enactment, and the ballot arguments accompanying the Privacy Initiative.” Id. at 36, 865 P.2d at 654.
The second type of privacy the amendment protects is autonomy privacy. This type of privacy protests a person’s “interest[] in making intimate personal decisions or conducting personal activities without observation, intrusion, or interference[.]” Id. at 35, 865 P.2d at 654. The purpose of protecting autonomy privacy is to “safeguard[] [*6] certain intimate and personal decisions from government interference in the form of penal and regulatory laws.” Id. at 36, 865 P.2d at 654.
After considering whether the information is subject to a legally recognized privacy interest, the court must consider whether a person has “a reasonable expectation of privacy” in that information. Id., 865 P.2d at 655. A reasonable expectation of privacy “is an objective entitlement founded on broadly based and widely accepted community norms.” Id. at 37, 865 P.2d at 655. It considers “customs, practices, and physical settings surrounding particular activities”; whether a person received notice before a disclosure; and with whether a person had “opportunities to consent voluntarily to activities impacting privacy interests[.]” Id.
Finally, the court must assess whether disclosure of the requested information would cause a serious invasion of the privacy interest. Id. A serious invasion is one that would “constitute an egregious breach of the social norms underlying the privacy right.” Id.
Ruan refers the court to two California Supreme Court cases to support its position, Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553, 542 P.2d 977 (1975), and Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 4th 360, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 150 P.3d 198 (2007). But these cases do not establish that the California Constitution prohibits disclosure of the information Blue seeks.
Valley Bank involved [*7] a dispute over a request for bank records. The California court’s analysis focused on whether bank customers had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their bank records.2 In Valley Bank, unlike here, the California Supreme Court had “recently discussed at length the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ which a bank customer entertains with respect to financial information disclosed to his bank.” Id. at 656, 542 P.2d at 979. The court also noted that it was “the general rule in other jurisdictions that a bank impliedly agrees not to divulge confidential information without the customer’s consent unless compelled by court order.” Id. at 657, 542 P.2d at 979. Ruan has presented no evidence that similar protections apply to the litigation-related information Blue asks for.
The second case Ruan relies on is Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 4th 360, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 150 P.3d 198 (2007). In Pioneer Electronics, the court confronted whether the California Constitution prohibited a party from turning over the name, address, and telephone number of people who had filed complaints about defective DVD players. Id. at 364, 150 P.3d at 200. On appeal, the appellate courts considered whether “Pioneer’s former customers had a constitutional privacy right to object to Pioneer disclosing their identifying information[.]” Id. at 366, 150 P.3d at 201. Although [*8] the Supreme Court found that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to require notice to the customers3 before turning over the information, it explained that the former customers did not have a “reasonable expectation that the information would be kept private unless they affirmatively consented[.]” Id. at 372, 150 P.3d at 205 (italics removed).
Unlike in Valley Bank, Ruan has not identified a statutory or common law basis providing confidentiality to the information Blue has asked for. And even if it did, Pioneer Electronics establishes that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in this type of information. The court also does not believe that turning over this type of information would cause a serious invasion of privacy. There is no indication that the disclosure will allow Blue to contact these individuals directly. To the contrary, Blue has represented to the court that he wants this information to contact counsel involved in the various matters. So the court will not allow Ruan to withhold this information because of the privacy provision in the California Constitution.

B. Settlement Agreement Terms
Next, the court turns to whether disclosing the requested information [*9] would require Ruan to violate the terms of settlement agreements it has entered. There are two types of settlement agreements at issue—those resolved before a party sued and those resolved after a suit has been filed. But neither type of settlement agreement restricts the disclosure of the information Blue asks for.
Ruan requires parties resolving matters before going to court to execute a settlement agreement containing a confidentiality clause. The clause requires the parties “to keep the terms of the settlement between them strictly confidential and not to disclose the terms of the Agreement to any other person[.]” Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prot. Order at 8, D.E. 78. But parties “may respond to a validly issued court order after each Party has had the opportunity to be heard.” Id.
The effect of the confidentiality provision on Ruan’s ability to respond depends on what “terms” means in the context of the agreement. Under North Carolina law, settlement agreements “are governed by general principles of contract law.” Chappell v. Roth, 353 N.C. 690, 692, 548 S.E.2d 499, 500 (2001). Ruan has not shown that the settlement agreements gave the word “terms” a defined meaning. So the court will give the word a meaning consistent with its “use[] in ordinary [*10] speech, unless the context clearly requires otherwise.” Wachovia Bank & Tr. Co. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 276 N.C. 348, 354, 172 S.E.2d 518, 522 (1970).
Sources on the ordinary meaning of language all point to a similar definition of the word “terms.” Black’s Law Dictionary explains that the word means, “[p]rovisions that define an agreement’s scope; conditions or stipulations[.]” Term, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Accord Term, Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed. Mar. 2017) (“A condition under which something may be done, settled, agreed, or granted; a stipulated requirement or limitation.”). Claimants names, the general circumstances involved in the dispute, and the outcome of a matter do not fall within these definitions. Thus, the confidentiality provision in the non-litigation settlement agreement does not prohibit Ruan from turning over the documents.
Similarly, Ruan includes a confidentiality clause in settlement agreements signed after a plaintiff has begun litigation. The relevant language in these settlement agreements provides that the “releasing parties shall not disclose the terms of this agreement, the facts and circumstances giving rise to this agreement, or the existence of any claim that releasing parties have, or may have, that is subject to the release [*11] of claims contained in this agreement, to anyone[.]” Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Prot. Order at 8. But there is an exception for disclosures made “pursuant to court order[.]” Id. The court’s January 2020 order required it to turn over the requested information, so Ruan has no basis to claim that the settlement agreement in litigated matters prevents it from doing so.
As a result, the court grants Blue’s motion to compel. The court will also grant Ruan’s motion for a protective order to the extent that it seeks to limit the use of this information to this litigation. And if, after this order, there remains a valid reason to designate the information as confidential, Ruan may do so.

C. Attorney’s Fees
The Federal Rules provide that if a court grants a motion compelling discovery, it “must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party . . . whose conduct necessitated the motion . . . to pay the movant’s reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney’s fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A). But if “the opposing party’s nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially justified” or “other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust[,]” the court must not order payment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(ii), (iii). “A [*12] legal position is ‘substantially justified’ if there is a ‘genuine dispute’ as to proper resolution or if ‘a reasonable person could think it correct, that is, if it has a reasonable basis in law and fact.'” Decision Insights, Inc. v. Sentia Grp., Inc., 311 F. App’x 586, 599 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565-66 n.2, 108 S. Ct. 2541, 101 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1988)).
There are two reasons why, in most cases, the court would award Blue the fees and costs he incurred in connection with this motion. To begin with, this is the second time that Blue had to come to the court asking for an order compelling the disclosure of the same information. What’s more, as discussed above, neither the California Constitution nor the terms of settlement agreements provided a basis to withhold the requested information.
But Ruan’s actions were motivated, at least in part, on California’s requirement that parties actively resist disclosing information that may be protected by its Constitution. See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Protective Order at 5 (quoting Craig v. Mun. Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d 69, 77, 161 Cal. Rptr. 19, 23 (1979)). While Ruan’s argument was not persuasive, it was not frivolous. Thus, the court finds that it would be unjust to award fees here and will decline to do so.

III. Conclusion
For all these reasons, the court grants both Ruan’s Motion for Protective Order (D.E. 77) and Blue’s Motion to Compel (D.E. 72). Within [*13] 14 days from the date of entry of this order, Ruan must produce complete responses to Interrogatory 3 about prior lawsuits and claims required by this court’s January Order. Blue may not use the information provided in response to Interrogatory 3 for purposes beyond this litigation. Ruan may designate information as confidential if there is, considering this order, a valid basis to do so.
Dated: July 13, 2020
/s/ Robert T. Numbers, Ii
ROBERT T. NUMBERS, II
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE