2020 WL 2126829

NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.
Court of Appeals of Mississippi.
Joe Willie YATES, Appellant
v.
TRIPLE D, INC., Nancy Denton, Scotchie Denton, Individually and Benchmark Insurance Company (Triple D Inc.), Appellees
NO. 2019-WC-00796-COA
|
05/05/2020
MISSISSIPPI WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Attorneys and Law Firms
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: RAYNETRA LASHELL GUSTAVIS, Jackson
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: LORALEIGH CHRISTINE PHILLIPS, PAUL M. MOORE JR., Calhoun City
BEFORE J. WILSON, P.J., TINDELL AND C. WILSON, JJ.
Opinion

TINDELL, J., FOR THE COURT:

*1 ¶1. On December 22, 2016, Joe Willie Yates filed a workers’ compensation claim against Triple D Inc., Nancy Denton, Scotchie Denton, and Benchmark Insurance Company, alleging that he sustained work-related injuries from a motor vehicle accident on June 14, 2016. Triple D, Nancy, Scotchie, and Benchmark Insurance Company denied Yates’s claim, arguing that Yates worked solely for Nancy as a farm laborer, which is exempted from mandatory workers’ compensation coverage.

¶2. Upon hearing the merits of Yates’s claim, an administrative judge entered an order on October 17, 2018, finding that Yates’s work constituted farm labor, which is exempted from workers’ compensation coverage under Mississippi Code Annotated section 71-3-5 (Rev. 2011). Accordingly, the judge determined that Yates’s injuries were non-compensable. Yates filed a petition for review with the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission, arguing that (1) the administrative judge’s finding that Yates was a farm laborer was not supported by substantial evidence, and (2) the Appellants were “dual or alter ego employers,” thereby waiving the farm-labor exemption under the section 71-3-5. On April 25, 2019, the Commission affirmed the decision of the administrative judge and additionally found that the Appellees are not alter ego employers within the confines of workers’ compensation law. Yates now appeals from the Commission’s decision, and finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶3. On June 14, 2016, Yates was involved in a motor vehicle accident wherein he sustained injuries to his neck, back, pelvis, sternum, kidneys, and body as a whole. Yates filed a petition to controvert on December 22, 2016, alleging that his injuries were work-related because he was driving a service truck owned by Scotchie when the accident occurred. Nancy, Scotchie, and Triple D filed their answers, arguing that Yates worked as an employee for Nancy, not Scotchie or Triple D and that Yates worked as a farm laborer, which is exempted from compensation coverage under the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act.

¶4. On June 11, 2018, an administrative judge conducted a hearing on the merits of Yates’s claim to determine who employed Yates at the time of his accident and whether Yates sustained compensable injuries under the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act. At the hearing, the judge heard testimony from several witnesses, including Yates, Yates’s wife Linda, Scotchie, and Nancy.

¶5. Yates testified that he was a 64-year-old man who began working for the Denton family when he was eight years old. Yates first worked for Nancy’s father and then for Nancy’s husband on their family farm. In 1996, Nancy’s husband died, and Yates continued to work for Nancy from that time until his accident in 2016.

¶6. Regarding his typical workday, Yates testified that he began each day by reporting to the workshop behind Nancy’s house at 7:30 a.m. Upon arriving at the workshop, Yates checked all of the machines to make sure they were working properly. Yates stated that his day-to-day work primarily included spraying and picking cotton, cutting and hauling hay, planting and hauling corn and grain, and driving and maintaining tractors. Yates testified he used some of Nancy’s tools that were in the workshop, and sometimes, he used tools from Scotchie’s service truck. When asked about the types of tools he used, Yates replied, “[R]eally anything that you need to farm with ….” Opposing counsel asked Yates about the work he was doing on the day of the accident:
*2 Counsel: Okay. So were you farming on June 14th, 2016?
Yates: Farming?
Counsel: Yes.
Yates: Yes, ma’am.

¶7. Yates’s attorney also asked the following:
Counsel: Did you ever do anything other than farm work?
Yates: Not really, no, ma’am.

¶8. According to Yates, Nancy was “the boss,” and he worked for her along with one other employee, Ray Bumgard. Yates also testified that he received his weekly pay from Nancy. The parties submitted “General Exhibit 2,” which was copies of checks from a bank account with Nancy and Scotchie listed as the account holders. Yates testified Nancy primarily signed his checks, and Scotchie only signed his checks if Nancy was not available. Yates also stated that while working for Nancy, Yates would help Scotchie occasionally. But Yates testified that Nancy’s work always came first. Yates also stated Scotchie never paid him for this work, and he was always paid by Nancy.

¶9. Yates further testified that Nancy, Scotchie, and Scotchie’s brother, David, all have their own farms and businesses. Nancy owns and manages the farm where Yates and Ray Bumgard work, and David owns and manages his own grain farm. Yates also stated that he had been working for Nancy and Nancy’s husband for so long that he remembered when Scotchie first opened Triple D. Yates stated that Triple D was a hauling company owned and managed by Scotchie. Scotchie, Scotchie’s son Kasey, and one other Triple D employee drive 18-wheelers for the company. Yates further testified that he does not drive 18-wheelers for Triple D and does not know any of Triple D’s customers.

¶10. Yates’s wife, Linda, also testified that she and Yates had been married for forty-one years, and it was her understanding that Yates worked for Denton Farms. Throughout their marriage, Linda helped Yates complete any tax and employment forms because he could not read or write. Linda stated that after the accident, she assisted Yates in completing the forms to receive Social Security benefits. Linda also confirmed that Yates’s forms listed his occupation as “farm laborer” and “tractor driver.” Linda testified that Yates did not have a commercial driver’s license and did not drive 18-wheelers as a part of his job.

¶11. Scotchie also provided testimony at the hearing. Scotchie testified that he owned approximately 840 acres of his own farm land and farmed approximately 650 acres. Scotchie testified that he owned and managed his own farm while Nancy and David both owned and managed their own separate farms. Scotchie also owned and managed Triple D. Scotchie described Triple D as a separate entity from his farm, with a separate tax ID number and separate banking account. Scotchie testified that Nancy was not an owner or manager of Triple D and was not on Triple D’s banking account. Scotchie testified that Triple D is a “haul-for-hire” trucking company that uses two 18-wheelers to haul farm and farm-related products for their customers, including Nancy’s farm, David’s farm, and his own farm. Scotchie does not charge himself for Triple D’s services, but he does charge Nancy, David, and his other customers. Triple D has two employees—Scotchie’s son, Kasey, and Louis Conley—who drive the 18-wheelers for the company.

*3 ¶12. Scotchie testified that Yates has never worked for Triple D and has never driven one of his 18-wheelers. Scotchie stated that he has never paid Yates from one of his accounts and does not have the authority to fire Yates. Scotchie further testified that Yates drove tractors and worked in Nancy’s cotton fields.

¶13. Scotchie further testified that on the day of the accident, Yates and Scotchie were first in Nancy’s workshop. Scotchie asked Yates if he would pick up Kasey from David’s farm and take him back to Nancy’s workshop. Yates then drove to David’s farm to pick up Kasey and to retrieve a nitrogen applicator for Nancy’s farm. The accident occurred while Yates was on his way to David’s farm.

¶14. Nancy was the final witness at Yates’s hearing. Nancy testified that she owned approximately 500 acres of land, which she farmed with her husband until his death in 1996. At that point, Nancy began operating the farm by herself with her own farm equipment. On the day of the accident, Nancy had two employees—Yates and Bumgard. Nancy testified that Yates had worked for her husband on their farm until her husband’s death, and after that, Nancy allowed Yates to remain her employee when she took over the farm.

¶15. Nancy further testified that Yates primarily worked on her farm and farm equipment. If the weather prevented them from farming, Nancy stated that she would send Yates home. Nancy further testified that sometimes Yates would assist Scotchie if a task needed to be done. But Nancy was the only one who paid Yates, and as such, Yates always performed Nancy’s work first.

¶16. Nancy stated that she paid Yates $275 every week from an account that was once in Nancy’s and her late husband’s names. To Nancy’s understanding, once her husband passed away, the bank requested that she replace her husband’s name on the checks with Scotchie’s name. But Nancy confirmed that Scotchie never wrote checks from this account.

¶17. Nancy testified that she did not own any part of Triple D and did not manage this company. Nancy testified that she was not an employee of Triple D. Nancy stated that she considered herself to be a farmer and, to her knowledge, Triple D was a hauling company. Nancy also testified that she was a customer of Triple D, and she paid for Triple D’s hauling services.

¶18. After hearing the merits of Yates’s claim, the administrative judge entered an order on October 17, 2018, finding that “the character of the work regularly performed by … Yates was that of a farm laborer,” which included his activities on the day of the accident. The administrative judge further found that Yates’s work was not covered by the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act, and as such, his injuries were not compensable.

*4 ¶19. Following the administrative judge’s order, Yates appealed to the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission. On April 25, 2019, the Commission affirmed the administrative judge’s decision, finding that (1) Yates’s work constituted farm labor, and, therefore, his injuries were non-compensable under the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act and (2) Nancy, Scotchie, and Triple D were not alter-ego employers, and therefore, Triple D’s purchase of workers’ compensation insurance does not waive the statutory farm exemption. Aggrieved, Yates now appeals to this Court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶20. In workers’ compensation cases, “[o]ur review of the Commission’s decision ‘is limited to determining whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence, was arbitrary and capricious, was beyond the scope or power of the agency to make, or violated one’s constitutional or statutory rights.’ ” Bridgeman v. SBC Internet Servs. Inc., 270 So. 3d 112, 114 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Gregg v. Natchez Trace Elec. Power Ass’n, 64 So. 3d 473, 475 (¶8) (Miss. 2011)). The Commission acts as the fact-finder, judges the witnesses’ credibility, and determines the sufficiency of the evidence in workers’ compensation cases, and we will not reweigh those findings in our review. Id. As long as substantial evidence supports the Commission’s decisions, we are bound by its determinations, “even if the evidence would convince us otherwise if we were the fact-finder.” Forrest Gen. Hosp. v. Humphrey, 136 So. 3d 468, 471 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014). But we review legal questions de novo, reversing only “where the Commission has misapprehended the controlling legal principles.” Id.

ANALYSIS

I. Whether the Commission erred in determining that Yates’s work constituted farm labor, which is exempted from mandatory coverage under the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act.
¶21. On appeal, Yates first asserts that the Commission’s findings and determinations were not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Yates argues that he was not performing farm labor at the time of his accident. The Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act provides relief for employees “for disability … from injury … arising out of and in the course of employment, without regard to fault as to the cause of the injury ….” Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-7(1) (Rev. 2012). But the Act expressly excludes “[d]omestic servants, farmers and farm labor” from mandatory workers’ compensation coverage. Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-5. We determine whether the farm-labor exemption applies by looking at “the character of the work regularly performed by the employee, not according to the nature of the employer’s business.” Nowlin v. Lee, 203 So. 2d 493, 495 (Miss. 1967). Additionally, where the employee’s injuries “arose out of and in the course of his farming activities … [, the employee is] excluded from the coverage of the act.” Wilkins v. Wood, 229 Miss. 553, 91 So. 2d 560, 564 (1956).

¶22. In this case, the Commission found that Yates’s work constituted farm labor under the purview of the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act and that his injuries arose while he was performing the tasks of a farm laborer. Upon review, the record clearly provides substantial evidence to support these findings, including Yates’s own testimony. Throughout his testimony, Yates repeatedly stated that he performed farm labor for Nancy for over fifty years. When asked by his own attorney whether he performed anything other than farm labor, Yates definitively replied, “No.” Opposing counsel asked Yates if he was farming on the date of his accident, and Yates responded, “Yes.” Both Nancy and Scotchie also testified that Yates had begun his workday on the farm and had been putting nitrogen and fertilizer on Nancy’s crops when the accident occurred.

*5 ¶23. Again, the Commission serves as the fact-finding body for workers’ compensation cases, not this Court. Bridgeman, 270 So. 3d at 114 (¶4). If we find that substantial evidence supports the Commission’s determinations, we are bound by its decisions. Forrest Gen. Hosp., 136 So. 3d at 471 (¶14). Here, we find sufficient evidence to support the Commission’s determination that Yates was a farm laborer and thereby exempt from coverage under the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act. We therefore find that this issue is without merit.

II. Whether the Commission erred in determining that Nancy Denton, Scotchie Denton, and Triple D are not alter egos.
¶24. Yates also argues that the Commission erroneously determined that Nancy, Scotchie, and Triple D were not alter egos or dual employers within the confines of the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act. Yates contends that Nancy, Scotchie, and Triple D’s operations are “one and the same,” and, therefore, this Court should hold them jointly and severally liable for Yates’s injuries. Further, because Triple D purchased workers’ compensation insurance, Yates argues that Triple D should compensate him for his injuries.

¶25. Employers exempt from providing compensation under the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act may still assume liability through the purchase and acceptance of valid workers’ compensation insurance. Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-5. But the question of who exactly employed Yates must be answered before making a determination of who (if anyone) is liable for compensating his claims. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Holliman, 765 So. 2d 564, 568 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000). The Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act gives the Commission “the authority to address all issues related to the payment of compensation claims,” including the determination of whether parties constitute alter egos or dual employers. Id. at 570 (¶13).

¶26. In this case, the Commission made its decision based upon the factors outlined in Smith v. St. Regis Corp., 850 F. Supp. 1296, 1311 (S.D. Miss. 1994), which include whether the business entities “have substantially the same management; the same business purpose; and the same operation, equipment, customers, supervision, and ownership.” The Commission further considered whether “such a unity of interest and ownership” exists between the entities that “adherence to the fiction of separate corporate existence would under the circumstances sanction a fraud or promote injustice.” Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 765 So. 2d at 570 (¶14) (quoting FMC Finance Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413, 422 (5th Cir. 1980)).

¶27. After applying these factors, the Commission found that Nancy, Scotchie, and Triple D were not alter egos or dual employers operating under a “unity of interest or ownership.” Based upon the record, we find that sufficient evidence exists to support these findings. The Commission stated in its order that “[w]hile the businesses are intertwined, there are clear differences in their operation, customers, supervision, and ownership.” We agree. The record reflects that Yates is an employee of Nancy, and Nancy has owned and managed her farm using her own farm equipment since her husband’s death. As the Commission stated, Nancy’s farm “does not have the same business purpose, operation, customers, or ownership of Triple D Trucking.” Triple D is Scotchie’s own separate business that uses two 18-wheelers to haul farm and farm-related products for many different customers. Nancy does not have any ownership or authority over Triple D and is only a customer of the business. Furthermore, Yates confirmed on the record that he does not have a commercial driver’s license and has never driven a truck for Triple D. Also, Yates repeatedly testified that he primarily worked on Nancy’s farm and that Nancy was “the boss.”

*6 ¶28. Based upon these findings, we conclude that sufficient evidence exists to support the Commission’s decision that Nancy, Scotchie, and Triple D are not alter egos or dual employers. As such, Triple D’s purchase of workers’ compensation insurance does not waive the farm-labor exemption and bring Yates’s claim under the coverage of the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act. We therefore affirm the Commission’s order of non-compensability.

CONCLUSION
¶29. We are bound by a limited standard of review in these cases. As such, we find that substantial evidence supports the Commission’s determinations that (1) Yates was an employee of Nancy, and he performed the work of a farm laborer, which is exempted from mandatory workers’ compensation coverage under Mississippi Code Annotated section 71-3-5 and (2) Nancy, Scotchie, and Triple D are not alter egos or dual employers; therefore, Triple D’s purchase of workers’ compensation insurance did not waive the farm-labor exemption. Because we find no error, we affirm the Commission’s order of non-compensability.

¶30. AFFIRMED.

BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND J. WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, LAWRENCE, McCARTY AND C. WILSON, JJ., CONCUR. McDONALD, J., CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY WITHOUT SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION.
All Citations
— So.3d —-, 2020 WL 2126829

2020 WL 2314972

THIS IS AN UNREPORTED PANEL DECISION OF THE COMMONWEALTH COURT. AS SUCH, IT MAY BE CITED FOR ITS PERSUASIVE VALUE, BUT NOT AS BINDING PRECEDENT. SEE SECTION 414 OF THE COMMONWEALTH COURT’S INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES.
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.
Edward Balczarek, Petitioner
v.
Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Evans Delivery Corporation), Respondent
No. 1492 C.D. 2019
|
Submitted: February 28, 2020
|
FILED: May 11, 2020
BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge HONORABLE J. ANDREW CROMPTON, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED
J. ANDREW CROMPTON, Judge
*1 Edward Balczarek (Claimant) petitions for review from an order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board) that affirmed an order of a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) denying his claim petition based on his independent contractor status.1 Critically, the WCJ determined Claimant was not an employee of Evans Delivery Corporation (Evans Delivery) under the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act).2 Claimant argues the WCJ disregarded the control Evans Delivery exercised over his day-to-day job duties and seeks reversal of the Board order upholding the WCJ on that basis. He also contends the WCJ failed to issue a reasoned decision pursuant to Section 422(a) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 834. In the alternative, Claimant asks for a remand with directions to the WCJ to reconsider the record and issue a reasoned decision. Upon review, we affirm the Board’s order.

I. Background
Claimant, who was 77 years old at the time of the incident, worked as a truck driver moving and delivering cargo for Evans Delivery for almost 30 years. At all times, Claimant used his own truck to move cargo in the Parker Avenue Pier under a truck lease with Evans Delivery. In January 2014, he signed an Equipment & Hauling Lease whereby he leased his truck to Evans Delivery (Agreement). The Agreement designated Claimant as a contractor who owned the truck.

On March 13, 2017, Claimant suffered a right leg crush injury when struck by cargo that fell from his truck while unloading a container for Evans Delivery. He reported the injury to the general manager of Evans Delivery the same day and continued his work. He did not seek medical attention for several days. Subsequently, Claimant filed a claim petition, seeking full disability benefits as of the injury date and ongoing. Initially, Evans Delivery did not respond to the claim; subsequently, it answered that Claimant was an independent contractor, and thus, ineligible for benefits. The matter was assigned to a WCJ.

The WCJ held a series of hearings where he accepted evidence regarding the relationship between the parties. The record included testimony by Claimant on his own behalf, and testimony of Matthew Bates, Vice President of Safety and Risk Management (Vice President) for Evans Delivery. Both parties testified regarding their respective businesses and material terms of the Agreement. Vice President also testified about Evans Delivery’s operations and its payment of Claimant and other owner/operators of trucks as independent contractors.

Based on the testimony and documentary evidence, the WCJ found the following facts. Claimant was a truck driver for 30 years, delivering containers to customers for Evans Delivery. WCJ Dec., 7/23/18, Finding of Fact (F.F.) No. 4. The container would be hooked to the back of the truck leased to Evans Delivery under the Agreement. Claimant started his day at the same Philadelphia depot, and contacted the Evans Delivery dispatcher about his delivery order. Evans Delivery did not control Claimant’s delivery route. Claimant had the opportunity to work for other companies, selected his assignments, and was responsible for securing his own workers’ compensation insurance. Also, he received no training from Evans Delivery, and while his truck bore Evans Delivery’s insignia, he did not wear a uniform.

*2 The Agreement that Claimant signed in 2014, which was in effect at the time of his injury, governed the parties’ relationship. Under the Agreement, Evans Delivery paid for use of the truck, such that if Claimant was no longer able to drive, “[t]here would have to be another driver[,] but the financial relationship is with the truck.” F.F. No. 5. The Agreement stated Claimant was an independent contractor. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 134a. Under its terms, Claimant was paid by the load.

The WCJ also made specific credibility determinations. F.F. Nos. 6-7. He found “Claimant is not credible that he did not read the documents and contracts including the [Agreement] before signing those documents [when he] … admittedly leased his truck to [Evans Delivery] and received a 1099 at the end of that year.” F.F. No. 6. By contrast, the WCJ credited Vice President’s testimony that “Claimant was an independent contractor and not an employee of [Evans Delivery]” because it was supported by the documentary evidence (i.e., tax forms, Agreement). F.F. No. 7.

Concluding Claimant did not establish an employment relationship, the WCJ dismissed the claim petition. Claimant appealed this decision to the Board.

Ultimately, the Board affirmed the WCJ’s conclusion that Claimant did not prove his status as an employee of Evans Delivery. It emphasized the Agreement, “signed and initialed by Claimant, indicates that the nature of their relationship was one of independent contractor.” Bd. Op., 10/01/19, at 9. The Board rejected Claimant’s challenges to the WCJ’s credibility determinations which are binding on appeal. Reviewing the undisputed facts regarding Claimant’s operation as a sole proprietorship and his responsibility for truck maintenance and related expenses, the Board concluded that substantial evidence supported the WCJ’s findings.

Claimant petitions for review from the Board’s order. After briefing,3 the matter is ready for disposition.

II. Discussion
On appeal, Claimant argues the Board erred in concluding he was an independent contractor. Primarily, Claimant contends he was converted to an employee because he chose to work for Evans Delivery exclusively for 15 years.

Whether an employer/employee relationship exists is a question of law that is determined based on the unique facts of each case. Am. Rd. Lines v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Royal), 39 A.3d 603 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012). Our review of matters of law is plenary. Id.

However, we defer to the fact-finder on matters of fact and credibility. The WCJ, as the ultimate fact-finder in workers’ compensation cases, “has exclusive province over questions of credibility and evidentiary weight ….” Anderson v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Penn Ctr. for Rehab), 15 A.3d 944, 949 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). The WCJ’s authority over questions of credibility, conflicting evidence and evidentiary weight is unquestioned. Minicozzi v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Indus. Metal Plating, Inc.), 873 A.2d 25 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). Indeed, “[t]he WCJ may accept or reject the testimony of any witness … in whole or in part.” Edwards v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Epicure Home Care, Inc.), 134 A.3d 1156, 1161 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). This Court is bound by the WCJ’s credibility determinations. A & J Builders, Inc. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Verdi), 78 A.3d 1233 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013).

*3 This appeal presents the threshold legal question of whether Claimant established an employment relationship with Evans Delivery.

A. Substantial Evidence-Employment Status
Independent contractors cannot recover benefits under the Act, “making employment status critical.” Am. Rd. Lines, 39 A.3d at 610 (citing Cox v. Caeti, 279 A.2d 756 (Pa. 1971)). Claimant bore the burden of proving all the elements necessary to support his claim petition. Id. This includes establishing the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Universal Am–Can, Ltd. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Minteer), 762 A.2d 328 (Pa. 2000). Although there is no bright-line rule to determine the existence of an employment relationship, certain established guidelines and various factors must be taken into consideration. Hammermill Paper Co. v. Rust Eng’g Co., 243 A.2d 389 (Pa. 1968).

In determining whether a relationship is that of employer/employee or owner/independent contractor, courts consider a number of factors, including:
(1) control [over the] manner the work is done; (2) responsibility for result only; (3) terms of agreement between the parties; (4) nature of the work/occupation; (5) skill required for performance; (6) whether one is engaged in a distinct occupation or business; (7) which party supplies the tools/equipment; (8) whether payment is by time or by the job; (9) whether work is part of the regular business of employer; and (10) the right to terminate employment.
Am. Rd. Lines, 39 A.3d at 611 (citing Hammermill Paper). No one factor is dispositive. However, “[t]he key factor is whether the alleged employer had the right to control the work to be done and the manner in which the work is performed.” Id. (emphasis added). Courts analyze these factors when examining employment status in the truck driver/delivery company context. See Universal Am–Can; Am. Rd. Lines; Baykhanov v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Onixe Exp.) (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 245 C.D. 2018, filed Oct. 12, 2018), 2018 WL 4940168 (unreported) (holding non-owner truck driver was independent contractor).4 In this context, we assess the degree of supervision and control over delivery routes and timing of work or schedule. Am. Rd. Lines.

Control exists “where the alleged employer: possesses the right to select the employee; the right and power to discharge the employee; the power to direct the manner of performance; and, the power to control the employee.” Id. at 361. The existence of the right to control is most significant, regardless of whether that control is actually exercised. Qian Hu Zhang v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1674 C.D. 2018, filed Aug. 2, 2019), 2019 WL 3504464 (unreported).

Relevant here, Claimant represented that he: (1) received a 1099 form at the end of the year and filed it with his taxes; (2) operated his truck business as a sole proprietor; (3) owned his own truck; (4) selected his assignments; (5) was paid by the load; (6) did not wear a uniform; (7) was responsible for obtaining his own insurance; and (8) signed the Agreement designating him an independent contractor. F.F. No. 5; R.R. at 28a-38a. Collectively, these admissions support the WCJ’s determination that Claimant was not Evans Delivery’s employee.

*4 Further, Claimant signed the Agreement in January 2014. R.R. at 33a. The Agreement expressly states there is no employment relationship based on the lease of his truck to Evans Delivery. Specifically, it provides: “It is expressly understood and agreed that [Claimant] is an independent contractor for the Equipment [ (i.e., truck) ] and driver services provided pursuant to this Agreement.” R.R. at 134a. Claimant acknowledged that he understood the Agreement related to the lease of his truck for deliveries, not to him as a truck driver. Stated differently, another truck driver could have continued operating Claimant’s truck and performing deliveries under the Agreement.

Significantly, Claimant did not substantiate the requisite control by Evans Delivery over his work performance. Aside from the clear statement in the 2014 Agreement that he was an independent contractor, Claimant was free to work for other companies. There is nothing in the record to substantiate that he had a supervisor observing the manner in which he unloaded containers. Also, there was no evidence that Evans Delivery had the right to exercise any control over Claimant’s delivery route. Thus, the requisite control was not present. Am. Rd. Lines.

Crucially, the WCJ did not find Claimant credible when he insisted that he had not read the 2014 Agreement. F.F. No. 6. By contrast, he credited Vice President’s testimony that Evans Delivery is a “for hire trucking company” that operates through lease agreements with truck owners. F.F. No. 5. Such credibility determinations are solely in the province of the WCJ as fact-finder. Edwards.

Claimant’s contentions that, notwithstanding the Agreement, this Court should construe an employment relationship between the parties based on his long-standing relationship with Evans Delivery are unavailing. Claimant asserts he was different from other truck drivers in that he occasionally performed non-driver tasks as assigned for which he received payment. He noted he performed specific tasks on a cash basis for the prior general manager, “as a favor.” R.R. at 38a. He contends the payment for those tasks suggests he had duties in addition to driving his truck, forming the basis for an employment relationship. We disagree.

Claimant’s testimony about tasks assigned to him by the prior general manager, who retired five years ago, does not establish an employment relationship at the time of his accident in 2017. First, there is no evidence that Evans Delivery assigned the tasks or paid for their performance, which were paid in cash. Claimant confirmed that Evans Delivery only paid him as shown on the 1099 form. R.R. at 34a. Regardless, his contentions that he was working in this non-driver capacity are directly contradicted by his testimony that he was securing cargo after speaking with the dispatcher at the time of injury. See Always Moving, LLC v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Sutton) (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1183 C.D. 2016, filed Apr. 20, 2017), 2017 WL 1422895 (unreported) (claimant must prove employee status in both capacities).

Additionally, Claimant’s reported belief that he was an employee of Evans Delivery, based on working for them exclusively for 15 years, does not create an employment relationship. Universal Am–Can; Am. Rd. Lines. Despite their long-term affiliation, there is no credited evidence showing Claimant had an employment relationship with Evans Delivery.

Moreover, Claimant admitted that he operated as a sole proprietorship, leasing his truck to Evans Delivery. R.R. at 33a. He admitted that he was never issued a W-2 form; rather, he received a 1099 tax form for contractors. Claimant filed taxes using the 1099 forms, and was paid by the load. To the extent Claimant cites the use of Evans Delivery’s Department of Transportation number and insignia on his own truck as showing his status as an employee, our Supreme Court squarely rejected that as an indicator of employment status. See Universal Am–Can.

*5 Therefore, we discern no error by the Board in upholding the WCJ’s determination that Claimant was an independent contractor and not an employee. As a result, Claimant is not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits.

B. Reasoned Decision
Next, we consider Claimant’s contention that the WCJ did not issue a “reasoned decision” in accordance with Section 422(a) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 834. To satisfy the reasoned decision requirements of Section 422(a), “a WCJ must set forth the rationale for the decision by specifying the evidence relied upon and reasons for accepting it.” A & J Builders, 78 A.3d at 1243.

To constitute a reasoned decision within the meaning of Section 422(a), a WCJ’s decision must permit adequate appellate review. Daniels v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Tristate Transp.), 828 A.2d 1043 (Pa. 2003). “[S]ome articulation of the actual objective basis for the credibility determination must be offered for the decision to be a ‘reasoned’ one which facilitates effective appellate review.” Dorsey v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Crossing Constr. Co.), 893 A.2d 191, 194-95 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (quoting Daniels, 828 A.2d at 1053).

The WCJ’s decision was sufficient to enable adequate appellate review. Here, Claimant merely challenged the credibility determinations, and asks this Court to deem the decision as not reasoned on that basis. However, a disagreement regarding credibility does not render the WCJ’s decision not reasoned. Daniels.

Further, the WCJ offered an objective basis for his credibility determinations. See F.F. Nos. 5-6. The WCJ explained he credited the testimony of Vice President of Evans Delivery over the testimony of Claimant because the documents supported Vice President’s testimony. By contrast, Claimant’s testimony was not consistent with the Agreement he admitted to signing. F.F. No. 5.

Because we can adequately review the matter, and the WCJ explained his credibility determinations, the WCJ’s decision qualifies as reasoned.

III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Board’s order.

ORDER
AND NOW, this 11th day of May 2020, the order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board is AFFIRMED.

Judge Fizzano Cannon did not participate in the decision in this case.
All Citations
Not Reported in Atl. Rptr., 2020 WL 2314972

Footnotes

1
The WCJ also denied a joinder petition and a penalty petition that are not at issue on appeal.

2
Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4, 2501-2710.

3
Two different insurers filed briefs purportedly on Evans Delivery’s behalf, National Interstate Insurance (Evans Delivery’s insurer) and One Beacon Insurance (Claimant’s occupational insurer).

4
We may cite unreported cases for their persuasive value in accordance with Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).