2020 WL 5294713

United States District Court, S.D. California.
SKANSKA USA CIVIL WEST CALIFORNIA DISTRICT INC., Plaintiff,
v.
NATIONAL INTERSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.
Case No.: 20-cv-367-WQH-AHG
|
Signed 09/03/2020
Attorneys and Law Firms
Ramiro Morales, Morales Fierro & Reeves, Concord, CA, for Plaintiff.
Bruce Daniel Celebrezze, Matthew S. Harvey, Clyde & Co US LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant.

ORDER
HAYES, Judge:
*1 The matter before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant National Interstate Insurance Company. (ECF No. 7).

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 27, 2020, Plaintiff Skanska USA Civil West California District Inc. (“Skanska”) filed a Complaint against Defendant National Interstate Insurance Company (“National Interstate”). (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff Skanska, “for itself and as assignee of Zurich American Insurance Company” (“Zurich American”), alleges that National Interstate breached its duty to defend Skanska in a 2016 lawsuit and brings claims for 1) declaratory relief; 2) breach of insurance contract; 3) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; 4) assigned claim for equitable indemnity; and 5) assigned claim for equitable contribution. (Id. at 1).

On April 16, 2020, National Interstate filed a Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 7). National Interstate moves under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the second cause of action for breach of insurance contract “to the extent that cause of action is based on the ‘assignment’ alleged in the [C]omplaint,” the fourth cause of action for equitable indemnity, and the fifth cause of action for equitable contribution. (Id. at 1).

On May 12, 2020, Skanska filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 9). On May 19, 2020, National Interstate filed a Reply. (ECF No. 10). On May 26, 2020, Skanska filed a Sur-Reply. (ECF No. 13).

II. ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT
Plaintiff Skanska is “a contractor that was involved in a highway reconstruction project at Interstate 805 in San Diego County.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 28). In February 2016, Skanska hired “Reeve Trucking Co., Inc. and/or Reeve Trucking Company” (“Reeve”) “to transport thirteen 100-foot long steel I-beams from a construction site near Sorrento Valley, California to a storage site in Lakeside, California.” (Id. ¶¶ 12, 29).

On February 12, 2016, “Peter Chavarin was driving a motorcycle heading northbound on State Route 67 when he collided” with Reeve’s tractor-trailer carrying the I-beams, driven by Reeve employee Christopher Collins, as the tractor-trailer was “making a left turn from southbound State Route 67 toward the entrance of the storage site….” (Id. ¶¶ 33-34). “Chavarin sustained severe injuries, including traumatic brain injury, coma, thoracic spine fracture, and other bone fractures.” (Id. ¶ 35).

On April 6, 2016, Chavarin and his wife filed a complaint for damages against Skanska, Reeve, and Collins in the Superior Court for the State of California County of San Diego, Peter Chavarin, et al. v. Christopher Collins, et al., No. 37-2016-00011241-CU-PA-CTL (the “Chavarin Action”). “[O]ne of the Chavarins’ theories of liability against Skanska was that Skanska is vicariously liable for the conduct of Reeve and/or Collins under the doctrine of peculiar risk….” (Id. ¶ 39).

Skanska is insured under “a commercial general liability policy” issued by Zurich American (the “Zurich American Policy”). (Id. ¶ 23). The Zurich American Policy affords coverage to Skanska “in excess of any and all ‘other insurance, whether primary, excess, contingent on or on any other basis,’ in cases where the loss arises out of the maintenance or use of an ‘auto’ not owned or operated by Skanska.” (Id. ¶ 25). “Under the Zurich American Policy and subject to Skanska’s [$500,000] deductible obligation, Zurich American provided a defense in the Chavarin Action….” (Id. ¶ 38).

*2 Skanska is also “an insured under commercial motor carrier liability insurance and excess liability insurance policies issued [to Reeve] by National Interstate….” (Id. ¶ 3).
National Interstate issued to Reeve … a commercial motor carrier liability insurance policy (the “Primary National Interstate Policy”) … with limits of $1,000,000 per accident for “all sums an ‘insured’ legally must pay as damages because of ‘bodily injury’ or ‘property damage’ to which this insurance applies, caused by an ‘accident’ and resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of a covered ‘auto.’ ”
(Id. ¶ 12). Under the Primary National Interstate Policy, the following are included as “insureds:”
a. You [i.e., Reeve] for any covered “auto.”
b. Anyone else while using with your permission a covered “auto” you own hire or borrow [i.e., Christopher Collins]….
…
e. Anyone liable for the conduct of an “insured” described above but only to the extent of that liability.
(Id. ¶ 15). “The Reeve-owned tractor-trailer involved in the accident is a ‘covered auto’ under the Primary National Interstate Policy.” (Id. ¶ 14). “National Interstate has a duty to defend an insured in a suit asserting a claim for which a potential for coverage under the Primary National Interstate Policy exists.” (Id. ¶ 13).

“National Interstate also issued to Reeve an excess liability insurance policy …” (the “Excess National Interstate Policy”) with a limit of “$5,000,000 Each Incident.” (Id. ¶¶ 19, 21). “Status as an insured under the Excess National Interstate Policy is conferred to those same persons and entities which qualify as an insured under the Primary National Interstate Policy.” (Id. ¶ 22).

“On or about April 15, 2016, tender was made to National Interstate for Skanska’s defense and indemnity against the claims asserted against Skanska in the Chavarin Action.” (Id. ¶ 44). “On April 21, 2016, National Interstate denied its obligation under the National Interstate Policies, or either of them, to defend and indemnify Skanska in the Chavarin Action.” (Id. ¶ 45). After the Chavarins filed a first and second amended complaint, National Interstate again declined to provide any defense to Skanska.

“[I]n early May of 2017 National Interstate [ ] agreed to pay $6,000,000 to settle the Chavarins’ claims against Reeve and Collins only….” (Id. ¶ 69). “On or about May 26, 2017, a copy of the Chavarins’ proposed Third Amended Complaint was provided to National Interstate,” and Skanska “demand[ed] … that National Interstate provide a defense….” (Id. ¶ 78). “On June 2, 2017, National Interstate wrote a letter advising that it will agree to participate in the defense of Skanska.” (Id. ¶ 80). “The Third Amended Complaint in the Chavarin Action was filed August 18, 2017.” (Id. ¶ 88). National Interstate agreed to “continue to contribute toward the cost of the defense of Skanska in the Chavarin Action….” (Id. ¶¶ 91, 93).

In April 2018, “[t]he Chavarins agreed to settle their claims against Skanska in the Chavarin Action in exchange for payment of $2,950,000.” (Id. ¶ 112). “Zurich American, without contribution by National Interstate or by any other insurer, paid $2,950,000, subject to reservation of rights, to indemnify Skanska in settlement of the Chavarins’ liability claims asserted against Skanska in the Chavarin Action.” (Id. ¶ 117). “National Interstate has not paid its full and equitable share of the fees and costs, incurred after May 26, 2017, of Skanska’s defense in the Chavarin Action.” (Id. ¶ 95). “National Interstate has paid no amount for the fees and costs incurred in Skanska’s defense in the Chavarin Action incurred prior to May 26, 2017.” (Id. ¶ 96).

*3 “Zurich American has assigned to Skanska all of its rights and claims against National Interstate regarding the Chavarin Action, including without limitation those rights and claims it obtained by virtue of its payments for Skanska’s defense [and indemnity] in the Chavarin Action.” (Id. ¶¶ 100, 118).

III. LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits dismissal for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In order to state a claim for relief, a pleading “must contain … a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) “is proper only where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citation omitted). However, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). A court is not “required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

IV. ASSIGNMENT OF ZURICH AMERICAN’S CLAIMS
Defendant National Interstate requests that “this Court dismiss Skanska’s causes of action for breach of contract (for those amounts exceeding $500,000), equitable indemnity, and equitable contribution on the ground that Skanska does not have a valid assignment and therefore is not the real party in interest as to these claims.” (ECF No. 7-1 at 15). National Interstate contends that an assignment is valid only if the assignor does not retain any power to control the action or the attorney assigned to prosecute the action. National Interstate contends that Zurich American’s assignment of its claims to Skanska is invalid because the heavily redacted “Joint Prosecution and Common Interest Agreement” “indicates that the redacted sections not only require Skanska to remit to Zurich American some (or perhaps all) of any proceeds of the litigation, but also that Zurich American retains at least some control over this litigation.” (Id. at 13 (emphasis omitted)).

Skanska contends that “[f]rom the unredacted portion of the agreement at issue here, quite clearly and explicitly, Zurich assigned to Skanska all of Zurich’s rights with regard to any payment it made for the defense or indemnity of Skanska in relation to the underlying action giving rise to this coverage suit.” (ECF No. 9 at 10). Skanska represents that “[a]s part of the agreement in which Zurich assigned all of its claims, Zurich and Skanska agreed to share in certain tasks associated with the prosecution of these claims (e.g., providing evidence to support the claims, both in the form of documents and live, witness testimony, if necessary).” (Id. at 5-6). Skanska represents that “the assignment of rights provision is clear, unequivocal, and absolute: Zurich maintains no rights, claims or causes of action against National Interstate … in relation to the Chavarin suit — all have been assigned to Skanska for Skanska to prosecute and resolve in this suit…. National faces no risk of a second suit by Zurich.” (Id. at 6, 7). Skanska contends that National Interstate “provides no legal support for its contention that there is some element of ‘control’ over the litigation which vitiates an assignment.” (Id. at 11).

*4 Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[a]n action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a). “Such a requirement is in place to protect the defendant against a subsequent action by the party actually entitled to recover, and to insure generally that the judgment will have its proper effect as res judicata.” Sung Ho Cha v. Rappaport (In re Sung Ho Cha), 483 B.R. 547, 551 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). “[T]he assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor.” Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000); see Sprint Commc’ns. Co. v. APCC Servs., 554 U.S. 269, 275, 128 S.Ct. 2531, 171 L.Ed.2d 424 (2008) (“Assignees of a claim, including assignees for collection, have long been permitted to bring suit.”). In a diversity action, whether the plaintiff is the proper party to maintain the action is determined by state law. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 358 F.3d 1089, 1093-94 (9th Cir. 2004), as amended.

A “chose in action”—“an interest in property not immediately reducible to possession … includ[ing] a financial interest such as a debt, a legal claim for money, or a contractual right”—is assignable. Sprint Commc’ns. Co., 554 U.S. at 275, 278, 128 S.Ct. 2531; see Cal. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 203 Cal. App. 4th 1328, 1335, 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 24 (2012) (“An assignment is a commonly used method of transferring a cause of action.” (citation omitted)). “A complete assignment passes legal title to the assignee who is the real party in interest and may sue in his or her real name.” Fink v. Shemtov, 210 Cal. App. 4th 599, 610, 148 Cal.Rptr.3d 570 (2012) (quoting Cal. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 203 Cal. App. 4th 1328, 1335, 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 24 (2012)). “[A]n assignment of a chose in action for collection vests the legal title in the assignee whether or not any consideration is paid therefor. In such case the assignee may maintain a suit thereon in his own name, even though the assignor retains an equitable interest in the thing assigned.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Nat’l Reserve Co. v. Metro. Trust Co., 17 Cal. 2d 827, 831, 112 P.2d 598 (1941)).

Under California law, “[i]n determining whether an assignment has been made, ‘the intention of the parties as manifested in the instrument is controlling.’ ” Cal. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 203 Cal. App. 4th at 1335, 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 24 (quoting Nat’l Reserve Co. v. Metro. Trust Co., 17 Cal. 2d 827, 832, 112 P.2d 598 (1941)). “An assignment requires very little by way of formalities and is essentially free from substantive restrictions.” Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1756, 46 Cal. 4th 993, 1002, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 605, 209 P.3d 937 (2009). To be effective, an assignment “must include manifestation to another person by the owner of his intention to transfer the right, without further action, to such other person or to a third person….” 203 Cal. App. 4th at 1335, 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 24 (alteration in original) (quoting Recorded Picture Co. [Prods.] Ltd. v. Nelson Entm’t, 53 Cal. App. 4th 350, 368, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 742 (1997), as corrected and modified on denial of reh’g, 1997 WL 155029, 1997 Cal. App. LEXIS 265 (Apr. 3, 1997)).

In Fink, the California Court of Appeal determined that an assignment of “all rights to the debt allegedly owed” was “complete and absolute” even though the assignee agreed to split with the assignor any recovery obtained in prosecuting the assigned claims. 210 Cal. App. 4th at 612-13, 148 Cal.Rptr.3d 570; see Sprint Commc’ns. Co., 554 U.S. at 285-86, 128 S.Ct. 2531 (holding that assignees of payphone operators’ claims against long distance carriers had standing, even though monetary recovery from the suit would be remitted to the payphone operators); Klamath-Lake Pharm. Ass’n v. Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau, 701 F.2d 1276, 1282-83 (9th Cir. 1983) (the retention by pharmacies of an interest in outcome of an action did not prevent the assignee pharmaceutical association from being treated as the real party in interest for purposes of Rule 17(a)).

*5 In this case, Skanska alleges that “Zurich American has assigned to Skanska all of its rights and claims against National Interstate regarding the Chavarin Action, including without limitation those rights and claims it obtained by virtue of its payments for the defense and indemnity of Skanska in the Chavarin Action.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 6). National Interstate attaches a copy of the heavily redacted “Joint Prosecution and Common Interest Agreement” (the “Agreement”) between Skanska and Zurich American to the Motion to Dismiss. Under the “incorporation by reference” doctrine, the court may consider “documents ‘whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the [plaintiff’s] pleading.’ ” Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 2005) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 986 (9th Cir. 2002)). The incorporation by reference doctrine has been extended to “situations in which the plaintiff’s claim depends on the contents of a document, the defendant attaches the document to its motion to dismiss, and the parties do not dispute the authenticity of the document, even though the plaintiff does not explicitly allege the contents of that document in the complaint.” Id. (citing Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1998)). Neither party has challenged the authenticity of the Agreement.

The Agreement provides, in part:
1. Skanska and Zurich each have, and may have, and/or may acquire claims, demands, damages, rights of action and/or causes of action against National Interstate Insurance Company arising from, arising out of, or relating to (a) the attorneys’ fees, costs, and other expenses incurred and paid by the Parties in defending Skanska against the Chavarin Action, (b) the indemnification of Skanska against liability claims asserted in the Chavarin Action, and/or (c) the conduct, acts or omissions of National Interstate Insurance Company in connection with the defense and indemnification of Skanska relating to the Chavarin Action. These claims, demands, damages, rights of action and/or causes of action described in this paragraph include, without limitation, claims for breach of contract, bad faith, negligence, indemnity, subrogation and/or contribution.
Collectively, these claims, demands, damages, rights of action and/or causes of action described in this paragraph are referred to as the “National Interstate Claims.”
2. To facilitate the pursuit of the National Interstate Claims, Zurich agrees to and does hereby assign to Skanska those National Interstate Claims that Zurich has, may have or may acquire, specifically including, without limitation, any claims that Zurich has, may have or may acquire against National Interstate Insurance Company for equitable subrogation, equitable contribution, equitable indemnity and/or any other claims against National Interstate Insurance Company based upon Zurich’s payments made in connection with the defense and/or indemnity of Skanska in the Chavarin Action. [Redacted]
2. a Zurich represents and guarantees that it has not previously made, and has not promised or agreed to make, to anyone other than Skanska any assignment of its National Interstate Claims other than the assignment set forth in the foregoing paragraph 2 of this Agreement.
3. The Parties further agree that any litigation that may be filed for the prosecution of the National Interstate Claims (hereinafter, the “Litigation”) will be brought in the name of Skanska.1
[Redacted]
(Agreement, Ex. 3, Decl. of Matthew S. Harvey, ECF No. 7-5 at 5-6).

In the unredacted sections of the Agreement, Zurich American explicitly “assign[ed] to Skanska” its “claims, demands, damages, rights of action and/or causes of action” against National Interstate for “breach of contract, … indemnity, [ ] and/or contribution” relating to the Chavarin Action. (Id.). Zurich American “manifest[ed] … [its] intention to transfer the right” to Zurich American’s “claims, demands, damages, rights of action and/or causes of action” to Skanska. Cal. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 203 Cal. App. 4th at 1335, 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 24; Agreement, Ex. 3, Decl. of Matthew S. Harvey, ECF No. 7-5 at 5. The allegations in the Complaint and the unredacted sections of the Agreement demonstrate that the assignment of Zurich American’s claims is “complete and absolute” at this stage in the proceedings. See Fink, 210 Cal. App. 4th at 612-13, 148 Cal.Rptr.3d 570 (holding that there was insufficient evidence for the trial court to determine an assignee lacked standing where the “assignment was complete and absolute,” the assignee agreed to provide the assignor with 50% of the recovery, the assignee did not agree to represent the assignor or provide any legal advice, the assignee “filed the complaint against defendants in his own name and was the sole plaintiff,” and “there was no evidence that [the assignor] retained any control over, or the right to control, the litigation of the assigned claims …”).

*6 Based on the facts alleged in the Complaint and the unredacted sections of the Agreement available to the Court at this time, the Court concludes that Skanska has stated facts that demonstrate an intent by Zurich American to completely assign its claims against National Interstate to Skanska, entitling Skanska to pursue the claims alleged in the Complaint at this stage in the litigation. National Interstate’s Motion to Dismiss Skanska’s causes of action for breach of contract (for those amounts exceeding $500,000), equitable indemnity, and equitable contribution on the ground that Skanska does not have a valid assignment and therefore is not the real party in interest is denied.

V. EQUITABLE INDEMNIFICATION
National Interstate contends that Skanska’s claim for equitable indemnity is invalid because equitable indemnity only applies to joint tortfeasors, not to claims based on an insurance contract. Skanska contends that “[e]quitable indemnity is routinely applied as between insurers where one insurer asserts that it paid a loss which should have been paid primarily by another.” (ECF No. 9 at 16). Skanska contends that “[b]ecause Skanska alleges that the obligation owed by Zurich was excess to that owed by National, equitable indemnity is properly pled.” (Id. at 17).

Equitable indemnity is one of three equitable claims potentially available where several insurers cover the same event: equitable indemnity, equitable contribution, and equitable subrogation.
The case law discussing the three principles of contribution, indemnification and subrogation in the insurance context is surprisingly muddled; courts have often confused the principles, thereby providing a fertile supply of quotations for parties seeking to utilize any one of the three concepts as the need arises. As one California appellate court noted, “[I]t is hard to imagine another set of legal terms with more soporific effect than indemnity, subrogation, contribution, co-obligation and joint tortfeasorship.” Herrick Corp. v. Canadian Ins. Co., 29 Cal. App. 4th 753, 756, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 844 (1994).
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co., No. C-98-1060 VRW, 2000 WL 1721080, at *5, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17688 at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2000). “Equitable indemnity ‘applies in cases in which one party pays a debt for which another is primarily liable and which in equity and good conscience should have been paid by the latter party.’ ” United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Alaska Ins. Co., 94 Cal. App. 4th 638, 644-45, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 449 (2001) (quoting Phoenix Ins. Co. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1511, 235 Cal.Rptr. 185 (1987), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Cal. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., 128 Cal. App. 4th 307, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 845 (2005)). “The basis for the remedy of equitable indemnity is restitution,” i.e., “[o]ne person is unjustly enriched at the expense of another when the other discharges liability that it should be his responsibility to pay.” AmeriGas Propane, L.P. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 184 Cal. App. 4th 981, 989, 109 Cal.Rptr.3d 686 (2000) (citation omitted).

*7 In Stop Loss Insurance Brokers, Inc. v. Brown & Toland Medical Group, the California Court of Appeal stated, “It is well settled in California that equitable indemnity is only available among tortfeasors who are jointly and severally liable for the plaintiff’s injury.” 143 Cal. App. 4th at 1040, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d 609 (citing Leko v. Cornerstone Bldg. Inspection Serv., 86 Cal. App. 4th 1109, 1115, 103 Cal.Rptr.2d 858 (2001) (“Joint and several liability is a prerequisite for equitable indemnity.” (citation omitted)); Munoz v. Davis, 141 Cal. App. 3d 420, 425, 190 Cal.Rptr. 400 (1983) (“[U]nless the prospective indemnitor and indemnitee are jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff there is no basis for indemnity.” (citation omitted))). However, neither Stop Loss nor the cases cited in Stop Loss address an action between insurers. See Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 2000 WL 1721080, at *5, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17688, at *16 (“The policies for apportioning damages in tort cases … are separate and distinct from the concerns of apportioning liability among insurers.”).

California courts have not foreclosed the possibility of an equitable indemnity claim in an action between insurers. See Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 65 Cal. App. 4th 1279, 1289, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 (1998) (“[O]ne insurer’s settlement with the insured is not a bar to a separate action against that insurer by the other insurer or insurers for equitable contribution or indemnity.”); Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp v. Yosemite Ins. Co., 58 Cal. App. 4th 389, 394, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 906 (1997) (“[A]n insurer may settle a claim against its insured without prejudice to its right to seek equitable indemnity from other insurers potentially liable on the same risk on the ground that, although the settling insurer’s policy does not provide coverage, there is coverage under the other policies.”) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted); but see Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 5th 215, 228 and n. 5, 260 Cal.Rptr.3d 822, 460 P.3d 1201 (2020) (stating that “the insured may seek indemnification from every policy that covered a portion of the loss, up to the full limits of each policy…. The insurers can then sort out their proportional share through actions for equitable contribution or subrogation” (citations omitted)); see also Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn. v. Hudson Ins. Co., 442 F.Supp.3d 1259, 1270 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (holding that insurer Travelers “can assert a cause of action for equitable indemnification” against insurer Hudson), appeal filed (Mar. 31, 2020); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., No. 15-CV-02744-LHK, 2016 WL 1191808, at *6, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41659, at *23 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2016) (allowing an insurer to proceed on a claim against another insurer for equitable indemnity based on an unjust enrichment theory).

In this case, Skanska alleges that it is an insured under policies issued by Zurich American and National Interstate. Skanska alleges that under the terms of the National Interstate policies, National Interstate was obligated to provide a defense in the Chavarin Action. Skanska alleges that Zurich American provided a defense, paid defense costs, and indemnified Skanska in the Chavarin Action. Skanska alleges that National Interstate failed to provide any defense or pay defense costs in the Chavarin Action before May 26, 2017, and failed to pay its share of defense costs owed after May 26, 2017. The Court concludes that National Interstate fails to show that the facts alleged in the Complaint demonstrate that Skanska’s equitable indemnity claim is barred as a matter of law. See Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 65 Cal. App. 4th at 1289, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 296; Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp, 58 Cal. App. 4th at 394, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 906. National Interstate’s Motion to Dismiss is denied.

IV. CONCLUSION
*8 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant National Interstate Insurance Company (ECF No. 7) is denied.

All Citations
Slip Copy, 2020 WL 5294713

Footnotes

1
The subsequent two and a half pages of the Agreement are redacted.

2020 WL 5351048

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Waycross Division.
MILFORD CASUALTY INS. CO., Plaintiff,
v.
William Stacy MEEKS; Abdi Mahad; and BIH Express, Inc., Defendants.
CV 5:20-cv-36
|
Signed 09/04/2020
Attorneys and Law Firms
Elizabeth G. Howard, William S. Allred, Barrickman, Allred & Young, LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.
Brent J. Savage, Jr., Savage & Turner, PC, Savannah, GA, Franklin Sean Simmons, Sean Simmons-Attorney at Law, Waycross, GA, for Defendants.

ORDER
LISA GODBEY WOOD, JUDGE
*1 Before the Court is Plaintiff Milford Casualty Ins. Co.’s (“Milford”) Motion for Summary Judgment, dkt. no. 16, wherein Milford seeks declaratory relief against Defendants William Stacy Meeks, Abdi Mahad, and BIH Express, Inc. (“BIH”) (collectively “Defendants”). Defendants Mahad and BIH have not responded to Milford’s motion, and the Court will therefore assume that they do not oppose it. See S.D. Ga. L.R. 7.5. Defendant Meeks, however, has responded, and the motion as it concerns Meeks has been fully briefed and is ripe for review. Separately before the Court is Defendant Meeks’ Motion to Dismiss asking that this Court exercise its discretion not to hear Milford’s action under the Declaratory Judgement Act because a parallel state action is pending. Dkt. No. 30. For the reasons below, Meeks Motion to Dismiss will be DENIED and Milford’s Motion for Summary Judgment will be GRANTED.

BACKGROUND
For purposes of summary judgment, the Court will construe the facts in a light most favorable to Meeks. See S.E.C. v. Monterosso, 756 F.3d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir. 2014). In the early morning hours of December 18, 2016, Mahad was driving a tractor trailer on behalf of BIH when he lost control of the vehicle, which overturned and began to slide across the highway and into the lane of travel in which Defendant Meeks was driving. See Dkt. No. 14 ¶ 9; see also Dkt. No. 27 at 1; Dkt. No. 27-1; Dkt. No. 28 ¶ 1-3, 6. Meeks’ vehicle collided into Mahad’s truck, knocking Meeks unconscious. Dkt. No. 27 at 1–2. When Meeks awoke sometime later, he called 911 on his phone, and then walked to the overturned truck to check on Mahad. Id. at 2. According to Meeks, when he arrived at the truck, he saw Mahad standing up in the overturned cab with papers stuffed under his arm and looking through other papers scattered about the floor. Id. at 2. Mahad informed Meeks that he was okay, and Meeks walked away. Id.

Sometime thereafter, vehicles driven by non-parties Scott Buchanan and Roy Johnson also collided into Mahad’s truck, injuring both. See Dkt. No. 27-5; see also Dkt. No. 27-6; Dkt. No. 27-4 at 14-15; Dkt. No. 35. However, the timing of those accidents is unsettled. Meeks testified in his deposition that he does not know how long he was unconscious after the accident nor does he know how long he remained in his car after he regained consciousness. Dkt. No. 27-4 at 13. He also does not know the amount of time that passed between his accident and the second collision, but he believed it was greater than five minutes. See id. at 15. He introduced a recording of his 911 call after the accident which, according to his interpretation, shows that six minutes and twelve seconds passed between his initial call and the second wreck involving Buchanan and that another one minute and twenty-five seconds passed between Buchanan’s wreck and the final wreck involving Johnson. See Dkt. No. 27 at 3 (citing Dkt. No. 27-7).

BIH is the named insured under a motor carrier liability policy (the “Policy”) that was issued in Kentucky and assumed by Milford. Dkt. No. 28 ¶¶ 10–11. The Policy obligates Milford to pay all applicable bodily injury or property damage claims “caused by an ‘accident’ and resulting from the ownership, maintenance, or use of covered ‘autos’.” Id. ¶ 15 (quoting Dkt. No. 14-1 at 128). The term “Accident” is defined as “continuous or repeated exposure to the same conditions resulting in ‘bodily injury.’ ” See Dkt. No. 28 ¶ 13 (quoting Dkt. No. 14-1 at 148).

*2 The Policy also contains a “Limit of Insurance” provision that states, in pertinent part:
Regardless of the number of covered ‘autos’, ‘insureds’, premiums paid, claims made or vehicles involved in the ‘accident’, the most we will pay for the total of all damages … combined resulting from any one ‘accident’ is the Limit of Insurance for Covered Autos Liability Coverage … All ‘bodily injury’ [and] ‘property damage’ … resulting from continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same conditions will be considered as a resulting from one ‘accident’.”
Dkt. No. 14-1 at 136. The limit of insurance, as stated on the declarations page, is one million dollars per accident. See Dkt. No. 14-1 at 24.

At some point after the accident, Buchannan, Johnson, and Meeks asserted claims against BIH for injuries sustained in the accident. See Dkt. No. 28 ¶ 9. Though the parties seemingly dispute the nature and timing of the payout, it is undisputed that Milford paid at least one million dollars in settlement of the claims of one or more parties other than Meeks. See id.; see also Dkt. No. 33 at 2. In August 2018, Meeks filed an action in the Superior Court of Charlton County, Georgia, contending that BIH and Mahad were liable to him for his injuries; the Complaint also named Milford as a party under O.C.G.A. § 40-2-140.1 Dkt. No. 18-1. While that action was pending, Milford filed the present action seeking a declaration under the Declaratory Judgment Act that it has exhausted its limits under the Policy and that it “owes no indemnity coverage” to Meeks nor has any obligation to provide a defense to any party in the underlying action. Dkt. No. 14. Milford thereafter filed the present motion for summary judgment, contending that it was entitled to judgment on this issue as a matter of law. Meeks opposes Milford’s motion, contending that his collision with Mahad’s truck was a separate “accident” under the Policy and therefore Milford’s settlement with other parties did not exhaust coverage available to him. For the reasons below, Milford is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

I. Motion to Dismiss
In his Motion to Dismiss, Meeks argues that courts are vested with discretion under the Declaratory Judgment Act to decline to hear an action for declaratory relief and that because a separate parallel action is pending in state court, the Court should decline to hear Milford’s action here. For two reasons, the Court rejects Meeks’ request that the Court dismiss Milford’s action.

First, Meeks’ motion is untimely. After Milford filed its action in March 2020, Meeks and the other named Defendants failed to timely respond. In June, the Court entered an order granting Milford’s Motion for Entry of Default against all Defendants. Dkt. No. 15. In July, Meeks moved to set aside the default, dkt. no. 18, which the Court granted at a hearing on July 21, 2020, providing Meeks until July 23, 2020 to file a responsive pleading, see dkt. no. 24. On July 23, Meeks filed an Answer to Milford’s pleading, dkt. no. 26, and, on the following day, Meeks separately filed the present Motion to Dismiss, dkt. no. 30. Even assuming that Meeks’ Motion to Dismiss was properly filed under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Skitch v. Thornton, 280 F. 3d 1295, 1306 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding that pursuant to Rule 12, a motion to dismiss is inappropriate after an answer has been filed), his motion was plainly untimely pursuant to this Court’s July 21, 2020 Order.

*3 Furthermore, even if Meeks’ motion had been timely, the Court finds that it would not be appropriate in this case to exercise its discretion to abstain from hearing Milford’s action. In Ameritas Variable Life Insurance Company v. Roach, the Eleventh Circuit identified nine factors for courts to consider in determining whether to dismiss a pending declaratory judgment action in favor of a parallel state action:
(1) The strength of the state’s interest in having the issues raised in the federal declaratory action decided in the state courts;
(2) whether the judgment in the federal declaratory action would settle the controversy;
(3) whether the federal declaratory action would serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations at issue;
(4) whether the declaratory remedy is being used merely for the purpose of “procedural fencing”—that is, to provide an arena for a race for res judicata or to achieve a federal hearing in a case otherwise not removable;
(5) whether the use of a declaratory action would increase the friction between our federal and state courts and improperly encroach on state jurisdiction;
(6) whether there is an alternative remedy that is better or more effective;
(7) whether the underlying factual issues are important to an informed resolution of the case;
(8) whether the state trial court is in a better position to evaluate those factual issues than is the federal court;
(9) whether there is a close nexus between the underlying factual and legal issues and state law and/or public policy, or whether federal common or statutory law dictates a resolution of the declaratory judgment action.
411 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2005). Some of these factors are more pertinent to the instant action than others, and the Eleventh Circuit expressly noted that the above list is “neither absolute nor is any one factor controlling.” Id. Rather the factors are to serve as “guideposts” in determining whether to exercise discretion to abstain. Id.

Here, the Court finds that the balance of the relevant factors weigh in favor of deciding the declaratory judgment action in this Court. Milford argues—and Meeks does not dispute—that because the Policy was issued and delivered in Kentucky, the law of that state should govern the Court’s decision. Dkt. No. 16-1 at 6. Therefore, the Georgia Superior Court in which this action is pending has no greater interest—nor is it any more proficient—in interpreting Kentucky law than this Court. Accordingly, factors one, five, eight, and nine weigh heavily in favor of retaining the action.

Meeks argues under factor four that Milford is simply using this action as a means to obtain a judgment from this Court rather than rely on a state court decision. However, Meeks concedes that he did not file a motion for summary judgment in the state court on the coverage issue until after Milford filed its declaratory judgment action in this Court. See Dkt. No. 30 at 3. Furthermore, while Meeks argues that the state action was pending long before Milford filed its federal action, Milford adequately explains that because of the pending global pandemic,2 there have been understandably substantial delays in the state action such that federal court has become a more effective forum to obtain relief before Milford incurs substantial defense costs. The Court is persuaded that this is an acceptable basis for seeking federal relief.

*4 Meeks also argues under factor seven that underlying factual issues are important to resolution of this case. Specifically, Meeks points out that factual issues related to causation will play a significant role in determining whether one or multiple accidents took place. However, as the Court explains below, Milford’s motion for summary judgment requires that the Court construe the facts in favor of Meeks in reaching a determination. Because the Court will find that, even under that standard, only a single accident took place, it is difficult to imagine any advantage Meeks might obtain at the state level in terms of the state court’s construction of the facts.

Finally, Meeks points to a 2013 decision from this Court quoting language from the Supreme Court decision Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942) to seemingly support the proposition that “if an issue can be resolved in a pending action between the same parties in state court, federal courts should decline to exercise jurisdiction.” Dkt. No. 30 at 7 (citing Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Dasher, Bi, 6:12cv63, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2260 (S.D. Ga. 2013)). However, the factors developed in Ameritas were expressly aimed at creating “guideposts in furtherance of” certain Supreme Court decisions, including Brillhart. See 411 F.3d at 1331. Clearly, the Eleventh Circuit did not interpret Brillhart to suggest that federal courts must always decline jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions in favor of the state courts.3 To the contrary, Brillhart stated that “[o]rdinarily it would be uneconomical as well as vexatious” for a federal court to decide declaratory judgment suits under certain circumstances. 316 U.S. 491 at 495 (emphasis added). The Court finds, in reliance on the relevant Ameritas factors, that the circumstances merit retaining Milford’s declaratory judgment action and deciding Milford’s pending summary judgment motion.

II. Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment “shall” be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is “genuine” where the evidence would allow “a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” FindWhat Investor Group.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A fact is “material” only if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Id. Factual disputes that are “irrelevant or unnecessary” are not sufficient to survive summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The movant must show the Court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. See id. at 325. If the moving party discharges this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of fact does exist. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257.

The nonmovant may satisfy this burden in one of two ways. First, the nonmovant “may show that the record in fact contains supporting evidence, sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion, which was ‘overlooked or ignored’ by the moving party, who has thus failed to meet the initial burden of showing an absence of evidence.” Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1116 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 332 (Brennan J. dissenting)). Second, the nonmovant “may come forward with additional evidence sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion at trial based on the alleged evidentiary deficiency.” Id. at 1117. Where the nonmovant attempts to carry this burden instead with nothing more “than a repetition of his conclusional allegations, summary judgment for the [movant is] not only proper but required.” Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1033-34 (11th Cir. 1981) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)).

*5 The central dispute at hand is whether the three collisions on the date in question constitute a single accident or multiple accidents as that term is defined in the Policy. Under Kentucky law—which, as explained above, the parties concede is controlling—contract interpretation is a question of law for the courts. See Maze v. Bd. of Dirs. for Commonwealth Postsecondary Educ. Prepaid Tuition Trust Fund, 559 S.W. 3d 354, 363 (Ky. 2018); see also Equitania Ins. Co. v. Slone & Garret, P.S.C., 191 S.W.3d 552, 556 (Ky. 2006). In interpreting a contract, courts first look to whether the contract is ambiguous. Bs. of Trustees of Ky. Sch. Bds. Ins. Trust v. Pope, 528 S.W.3d 901, 906 (Ky. 2017). Ambiguity exists in a contract where “a reasonable person would find it susceptible to different or inconsistent interpretations.” Maze, 559 S.W.3d at 363 (quoting Hazard Coal Corp. v. Knight, 325 S.W.3d 290, 298 (Ky. 2010)). Where no ambiguity exists, the court must interpret the contract “strictly according to its terms,” which it does “by assigning language its ordinary meaning and without resort to extrinsic evidence.” Ky. Shakespeare Festival, Inc. v. Dunaway, 490 S.W.3d 691 (2016).

Alternatively, where contract language is ambiguous, “the court’s primary objective is to effectuate the intentions of the parties.” Maze, 559 S.W.3d at 298 (citing Cantrell Supply, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 94 S.W.3d 381, 384 (Ky. 2002)). However, “[t]he fact that one party may have intended different results … is insufficient to construe a contract at variance with its plain and unambiguous terms.” Dunaway, 490 S.W.3d at 695. Indeed, while “ambiguous terms are to be construed in favor of the insured, ‘[the court] must also give the policy a reasonable interpretation, and there is no requirement that every doubt be resolved against the insurer.’ ” Davis v. Ky. Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 495 S.W.3d 159, 162 (Ky. Ct. App. 159) (quoting Stone v. Ky. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 34 S.W.3d 809, 811 (Ky. App. 2000)). “The mere fact that [a party] attempt[s] to muddy the water and create some question of interpretation does not necessarily create an ambiguity.” Id. (quoting Ky. Ass’n of Ctys. All Lines Fund Trust v. McClendon, 157 S.W.3d 62, 633-34 (Ky. 2005)).

Here, the term “accident” as defined in the Policy is unambiguous, and, according to its plain meaning, encompasses all three collisions on the day in question. Indeed, the term is explicitly and clearly defined in the Policy and contemplates not just a single event that causes injury but also “continuous or repeated exposure to the same conditions” that cause injury. See Dkt. No. 14-1 at 148. Moreover, the “Limit of Insurance” section of the Policy further clarifies that multiple vehicle collisions may constitute the same “accident” for purposes of the Policy’s coverage limits, noting that “repeated exposure” to the same conditions “will be considered as resulting from one ‘accident.’ ” Dkt. No. 14-1 at 136. In this case, each of the claimants’ injuries were undoubtedly caused by “repeated exposure”—i.e. repeated collisions—to a single condition—the overturned truck. Accordingly, there can be no doubt that each of these collisions constituted a single “accident” under the plain language of the Policy.

Meeks argues that the separate collisions were not part of the same “accident” because “different conditions” were at play during his collision in contrast with those of Buchanan and Johnson. Dkt. No. 27 at 11. Principally, Meeks points out that he collided with Mahad’s overturned vehicle as it slid into the intersection whereas Buchanan and Johnson collided with the truck when it was unlit and stationary in the road. Meeks further alleges that the Buchanan and Johnson wrecks occurred approximately ten to fifteen minutes after his own. Dkt. No. 27 at 4. However, Meeks argument is merely an effort to create an ambiguity that does not exist. See Davis, 495 S.W.3d at 162. As the Supreme Court of Georgia noted under a similar set of facts, defining “accident” by the number of impacts “would mean that there can never be one accident … in a multiple vehicle collision … because it is virtually impossible for multiple vehicles to collide truly simultaneously.” State Auto Property & Cas. Co. v. Matty, 286 Ga. 611, 613 (2010). Likewise, it is difficult to imagine a scenario where each collision in a multi-vehicle collision was not characterized by slightly different conditions. Thus, the fact that Meeks is able to identify marginal differences between the collisions is not sufficient to render the term “accident” ambiguous.

*6 Alternatively, Meeks argues that “different causative factors” played a role in the separate collisions such that they should be considered separate accidents. See Dkt. No. 27 at 11. Specifically, he contends that Mahad “failed to do anything to prevent the second and third wrecks,” such as place reflective triangles or flares beside the scene or otherwise try to warn oncoming drivers. Id. at 4-6.4 Kentucky courts, however, have rejected this theory. Both parties agree that Kentucky follows the “cause” approach to determining whether one or multiple “accidents” occurred under an insurance agreement. See Dkt. No. 16-1 at 8 (citing Continental Ins. Co. v. Hancock, 507 S.W.2d 146 (Ky. App. Ct. 1973)); see also Dkt. No. 27 at 11-12 (citing Davis, 495 S.W.3d at 163). Pursuant to this theory, Kentucky courts have found that multiple occurrences or accidents do not arise merely because “there were multiple negligent and intentional acts and persons injured.” Davis, 495 S.W.3d at 163 (describing the courts’ holding in Continental).5 Rather, the cause theory simply asks whether there is “but one proximate, uninterrupted and continuing cause which resulted in all of the injuries and damages.” Id. (quoting Appalachian Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 61 (3rd Cir. 1982)). Even assuming that Mahad was negligent in failing to prevent the last two collisions, such negligence does not convert an otherwise single “accident” to multiple accidents where, as here, Mahad’s overturned truck was a single “uninterrupted and continuing cause” that resulted in all of the subsequent injuries. Id.6 Accordingly, the fact that Mahad may have been culpable for other negligent acts that contributed to the second and third wrecks does not render those wrecks separate accidents for purposes of the Policy.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, Meeks’ Motion to Dismiss, dkt. no. 30, is DENIED, and Milford’s Motion for Summary Judgment, dkt. no. 16, is GRANTED. It is hereby DECLARED that Milford will have no further coverage obligations once the million dollars have been paid in connection with the December 18, 2016 tractor-trailer accident. The Clerk is DIRECTED to close this case.

SO ORDERED, this 4th day of September, 2020.

All Citations
Slip Copy, 2020 WL 5351048

Footnotes

1
O.C.G.A. § 40-2-140(d)(4) provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ny person having a cause of action, whether arising in tort or contract … may join in the same cause of action the motor carrier and its insurance carrier.”

2
As of the writing of this opinion, the United States continues to experience the effects of a global pandemic because of the spread of a novel Coronavirus commonly known as COVID-19. See In re: COVID-19 Public Health & Safety, No. MC120-004 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 17, 2020).

3
Even in Dasher, the court noted that the relevant Ameritas factors “do not decisively counsel in favor of deference” to the state action. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2260, at *19.

4
Meeks also argues that the trooper who responded to the scene drafted separate accident reports for the three collisions. See Dkt. No. 27 at 6. However, he does not cite to any case law to suggest that separate accident reports play any dispositive role in determining the number of accidents that took place for insurance coverage purposes.

5
In Davis, the court held that “merely because there were multiple negligent acts that combined to cause a single injury or multiple causes of action may be asserted does not mean there were multiple occurrences as that term is unambiguously defined … There are frequently multiple acts of negligence that cause a single injury.” 495 S.W.3d at 166. In that case, the term “occurrence” was defined similarly to the way the Policy here defines “accident”: “Occurrence is defined in the policy as ‘an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.’ ” Id. at 160.

6
This is not to suggest that separate negligent acts can never form separate accidents under an insurance policy. Rather, the Court finds only that where, as in this case, there is a single continuous and uninterrupted cause of all of the injuries, the fact that other negligent acts may have also contributed to those injuries does not disrupt the continuous nature of the underlying cause so as to create separate accidents.