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CASES (2020)

Rafanello v. Taylor-Esqivel

2020 WL 6833857

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.
Ronald RAFANELLO, Plaintiff,
v.
Jorge S. TAYLOR-ESQUIVEL, Intek Auto Leasing, Inc., Encompass Insurance and Esurance, Defendants-Appellant,
and
Encompass Property & Casualty Insurance Company of New Jersey, Third-Party Plaintiff/Appellant,
v.
American Millennium Insurance Company, NAB Trucking, LLC, AVS Insurance Agency, Inc., Intek Auto Leasing, Inc., Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company, Third-Party Defendants/Respondent,
and
Ameriprise Insurance as Subrogee of John Henderson, Fourth-Party Plaintiff,
v.
NAB Trucking LLC, Jorge Taylor-Esquivel, Intek Auto Leasing Inc., Fourth-Party Defendants.
Encompass Property & Casualty Insurance Company of New Jersey, Individually and as Subrogee of Ronald Rafanello, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Intek Auto Leasing, Inc., NAB Trucking, LLC, Jorge S. Taylor-Esquivel, American Millennium Insurance Company & Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Company, AVS Insurance Agency, Inc., and Admiral Insurance Company, Defendants-Respondents.
Encompass Insurance Company of New Jersey as Subrogee of Neil Prupis and Encompass Insurance Company of New Jersey, Plaintiffs,
v.
Jorge Taylor-Esquivel, NAB Trucking and Intek Auto Leasing, Inc., Defendants.
DOCKET NO. A-4397-18T2
|
Submitted September 16, 2020
|
Decided November 23, 2020
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Docket Nos. L-3488-15 and L-1721-17.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Hardin, Kundla, McKeon & Poletto, PA, attorneys for appellant Encompass Property & Casualty Insurance Company of New Jersey; and Steven G. Kraus, attorney for appellant Encompass Property & Casualty Insurance Company of New Jersey, individually and as subrogee of Ronald Rafanello and Neil Prupis (James L. Fant and Steven G. Kraus, Warren, on the joint briefs).
Mintzer Sarowitz Zeris Ledva & Meyers, LLP, attorneys for respondent American Millennium Insurance Company (Kimberly A. Murphy and Christopher A. Gulla, Cherry Hill, on the brief).
Before Judges Fuentes, Rose and Firko.
Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

FIRKO, J.A.D.

*1 Defendant and third-party plaintiff Encompass Property & Casualty Insurance Company of America (Encompass) appeal from a January 18, 2019 order granting summary judgment to third-party defendant American Millennium Insurance Company (AMIC) and denying Encompass’s cross-motion for summary judgment as to AMIC. The trial court found that in this multi-vehicle accident involving a commercial dump truck, the step-down provision in the AMIC policy was triggered because defendant Jorge S. Taylor-Esquivel, the dump truck driver, was not listed in the Covered Driver’s section of the policy procured by his employer, NAB Trucking, LLC (NAB). The trial court determined that NAB’s exposure was capped at $35,000.

The issue on appeal is whether New Jersey law requires a commercial motor vehicle carrier, such as NAB, to provide the minimum insurance coverage amount of $750,000, when engaged in interstate or intrastate commerce, as prescribed by N.J.S.A. 39:5B-32 and N.J.A.C. 13:60-2.1, even in the event an individual is not listed as a covered driver on the policy. We answer in the affirmative and conclude, as a matter of law, that the AMIC insurance policy issued to NAB requires a mandatory minimum insurance coverage amount of $750,000 and the step-down provision in the insured’s combined single limit (CSL) policy is not triggered. Therefore, we reverse and remand.

I.
We discern the following facts from the summary judgment record and view them in the light most favorable to the respective non-moving parties. See Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 523, 666 A.2d 146 (1995). On September 22, 2015, plaintiff Ronald Rafanello was rear-ended by a dump truck operated by Taylor-Esquivel in West Orange on Route 280, during the course of his employment with NAB. Upon impact, Rafanello’s vehicle struck a third motor vehicle owned by plaintiff Neil Prupis. Debris was dumped onto a fourth motor vehicle owned by Angelo Abrego and a fifth motor vehicle owned by fourth-party plaintiff John Henderson. Rafanello suffered personal injuries as a result of the accident. Notably, the dump truck was a 2006 Sterling L-9800 and weighed in excess of 26,001 pounds. NAB leased the dump truck from Intek Auto-Leasing, Inc. (Intek). At the time of the accident, Taylor-Esquivel was hauling a load of dirt obtained from Four Landscaping in New Jersey to Newark.

Encompass is the automobile insurance provider for Rafanello. The policy issued by Encompass to Rafanello provided uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage of $250,000 per person and $500,000 per accident.

The lease agreement between NAB and Intek provided that NAB
will be responsible for providing and maintaining the following insurance coverages in the minimal amounts and the maximum deductibles listed below: Personal injury liability: $1,000,000/$1,000,000
….
If for any reason you fail or refuse to secure insurance coverage on amount stated above or cease to maintain such coverage during the term of the lease, lessor [Intek] shall supply the insurance to the lessee [NAB].

*2 In August 2015, NAB, through its insurance broker, AVS Insurance Agency, Inc. (AVS), secured coverage for the dump truck from AMIC. NAB submitted information to AVS about its owner, Jaime Colindres Mejia, and dump truck drivers, Mejia and Taylor-Esquivel. Copies of Taylor-Esquivel’s driver’s license and social security card were provided to AVS with the intent to include him as a covered driver on the NAB policy.

A Commercial Insurance Application and Supplemental Commercial Application were submitted by AVS on behalf of NAB and listed two additional drivers, Luis Vega and Donald Colindres. While motor vehicle record searches for Vega and Colindres were submitted with the Commercial Insurance Application to AMIC, a motor vehicle search was not submitted for Taylor-Esquivel. Taylor Stroud, an AVS representative, advised NAB that Taylor-Esquivel would not qualify as a covered driver because his driving history was “unacceptable.”

The Commercial Insurance Application identified Keasbey as NAB’s business location and stated NAB hauled sand and gravel within a “[seventyfive] mile radius.” In the Supplemental Commercial Application submitted by NAB, the following answers were given to questions regarding interstate commerce:
2. Do you require filings (Y/N)? N DOT1 #? 2560477
MC2 # (if applicable)? NA.
3. Does your company conduct any business or travel outside of the [S]tate of New Jersey (Y/N)? Y.
If so, identify all states in which your company does business or travels to. Pennsylvania.
At a deposition, AMIC’s underwriter acknowledged that based upon NAB’s answer on the Supplemental Commercial Application, NAB engaged in “interstate transport.”

AMIC issued a Commercial Automobile Policy to NAB for the policy period from August 6, 2015 to August 6, 2016. The policy provided liability coverage of $750,000 per accident on the declarations page. The dump truck involved in the subject accident is identified in the schedule of “Specifically Described Autos.” The AMIC policy provides coverage to the “Named Insured,” NAB Trucking, and any permissive user of a covered “auto.”

The “Who is an Insured” section of the AMIC policy defines the following as “insureds”:
a. You for any covered “auto.”
b. Anyone else while using with your permission a covered “auto” you own, hire or borrow …
c. Anyone liable for the conduct of an “insured” described above but only to the extent of that liability.

The policy also includes a step-down provision, which provides for a maximum coverage limit of $35,000 for liability arising from incidents involving an individual who is not listed as a “Covered Driver” under the policy. Taylor-Esquivel was not listed as a covered driver in the “Schedule of Covered Drivers” section of the policy.

The policy did not include an MCS-90 endorsement,3 a federal endorsement for interstate truckers. Mejia testified that NAB was not involved in interstate commerce. Tim O’Shea, an AMIC representative, testified that
[a]s a matter of practice in underwriting, we normally react to the presence of an MC number, so if an insured is engaged in interstate commerce, we leave it up to the insured that they should be aware that they’re engaging in interstate commerce and it would be up to the insured to obtain a[n] MC number, which, then, if that number is provided to the insurance company, would enable us to complete a federal filing and attach the MCS 90 endorsement.

*3 Mejia ultimately signed the policy, which did not include Taylor-Esquivel as a covered driver or an MCS-90 endorsement. On August 6, 2015, AVS issued a Certificate of Liability Insurance representing to Intek that the AMIC policy was issued to NAB and afforded $1,000,000 in liability coverage; included the dump truck involved in the accident; and named Intek as an additional insured under the policy.

On October 19, 2015, Rafanello filed an amended complaint against Taylor-Esquivel, Intek, and Encompass alleging he was entitled to underinsured (UIM) motorist coverage from Encompass because there was insufficient insurance coverage under the AMIC policy issued to NAB. On September 16, 2016, the trial court entered an order permitting AMIC to deposit its $35,000 policy limit into court pursuant to Rule 4:57-1.4 In accordance with the terms of the order, on November 16, 2016, AMIC deposited its $35,000 payment with the Superior Court Trust Fund.

On May 8, 2017, Encompass filed a complaint against AMIC, NAB, Intek, Taylor-Esquivel, and Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Company for reimbursement of Personal Injury Protection (PIP) benefits. On June 26, 2017, AMIC filed an answer to the complaint. Thereafter, on March 27, 2018, Encompass filed a second amended third-party complaint against AMIC, NMAB, AVS, Intek, and Empire. Encompass alleged it was not required to provide underinsured motorist coverage benefits to Rafanello because his claims did not exceed the $1,000,000 policy limit required under the lease agreement between NAB and Intek. On April 16, 2018, AMIC filed an answer to Encompass’s second amended third-party complaint.

On November 7, 2018, AMIC filed a motion for summary judgment arguing it deposited the “full $35,000 policy limit into the [c]ourt” because the policy’s step-down provision was triggered. On December 11, 2018, Encompass filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.

On January 18, 2019, the Law Division judge heard oral argument and placed his decision on the record. The judge granted AMIC’s motion and denied Encompass’s cross-motion. In his decision, the judge found that the step-down provision in the policy was triggered because the policy was clear and unambiguous, and AMIC’s exposure was $35,000 because Taylor-Esquivel was not listed as a covered driver on NAB’s policy. The appeal followed.

II.
On appeal, Encompass argues that the judge erred by granting AMIC’s motion for summary judgment. Encompass contends AMIC is obligated to provide liability coverage for claims against NAB and Taylor-Esquivel in the amount of $750,000 as mandated by New Jersey state law and federal law because the dump truck involved in this accident was a commercial motor vehicle engaged in interstate commerce, intrastate commerce, or both. In the alternative, Encompass argues there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether NAB was engaged in interstate commerce, which would trigger federal statutes requiring AMIC to provide NAB with a minimum insurance coverage amount of $750,000. AMIC argues that NAB was not involved in interstate commerce at the time of the accident and did not execute an MCS-90 Endorsement, requiring affirmance.

*4 “An appellate court reviews an order granting summary judgment in accordance with the same standard as the motion judge.” New Jersey Transit Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 461 N.J. Super. 440, 452, 221 A.3d 1180 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38, 84 A.3d 583 (2014)). Rule 4:46-2(c) provides that summary judgment shall be granted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law.”

“If there exists a single, unavoidable resolution of the alleged disputed issue of fact, that issue should be considered insufficient to constitute a ‘genuine’ issue of material fact for purposes of Rule 4:46-2.” Brill, 142 N.J. at 540, 666 A.2d 146 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). The court “should not hesitate to grant summary judgment” if “the evidence ‘is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505).

We review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo under the same standard as the trial court. Templo Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 224 N.J. 189, 199, 129 A.3d 1069 (2016). Where there is no issue of material fact and only a question of law remains, we give “no special deference to the legal determinations of the trial court.” Ibid., (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, 658 A.2d 1230 (1995)).

For the first time on appeal, Encompass argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Taylor-Esquivel should have been identified in the “Covered Driver” section of the policy, in which case the AMIC policy should be deemed to conform to NAB’s reasonable expectations. Here, AMIC argues that the trial court properly held “no facts exist to support a finding that [Taylor-Esquivel] was listed as a ‘Covered Driver’ on the AMIC policy and/or that NAB had a reasonable expectation that [Taylor-Esquivel] would be a ‘Covered Driver.’ ”

Encompass contends that regardless of whether NAB was engaged in intrastate commerce or both intrastate and interstate commerce, N.J.S.A. 39:5B-32 and N.J.A.C. 13:60 to -2.1 required AMIC to provide NAB with a minimum liability coverage amount of $750,000. On the other hand, AMIC contends that N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1 governs the minimum liability insurance coverage for NAB, and N.J.S.A. 39:5B-32 or N.J.A.C. 13:60-2.1 are not applicable.

To determine a question of statutory construction, our Court recently confirmed the guiding principles judges must follow:
Our objective in interpreting any statute is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent. Frugis v. Bracigliano, 177 N.J. 250, 280 [827 A.2d 1040] (2003). When the clear language of the statute expresses the Legislature’s intent, our analysis need go no further. Shelton v. Restaurant.com, Inc., 214 N.J. 419, 429 [70 A.3d 544] (2013). When a plain reading of the statute allows for more than one plausible interpretation or leads to an absurd result or a result at odds with the overall statutory scheme, we may turn to extrinsic evidence. DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492-93 [874 A.2d 1039] (2005).
[McClain v. Bd. of Review, Dept. of Labor, 237 N.J. 445, 456, 206 A.3d 353 (2019).]

Importantly, when interpreting a statute, it must be read “in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole.” DiProspero, 183 N.J. at 492, 874 A.2d 1039. “Additionally, ‘whatever the rule of [statutory] construction, it is subordinate to the goal of effectuating the legislative plan as it may be gathered from the enactment read in full light of its history, purpose, and context.’ ” Chasin v. Montclair State Univ., 159 N.J. 418, 426-27, 732 A.2d 457 (1999) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Haliski, 140 N.J. 1, 9, 656 A.2d 1246 (1995)).

*5 Under Title 39, the Legislature has promulgated regulations to differentiate certain classes of motor vehicles from the general class of motor vehicles. See N.J.S.A. 39:3B-1 to -28; N.J.S.A. 39:3C-1 to -36; N.J.S.A. 39:4-31.1 to -31.5; N.J.S.A. 39:5H-1 to -27. Additionally, the Legislature has specified the mandatory insurance requirements for these differing classes of motor vehicles, which either align with the minimum insurance coverage requirements mandated by N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1 or an increased minimum insurance coverage requirement. See N.J.S.A. 39:6B-1; N.J.S.A. 39:3C-20; N.J.S.A. 39:4-31.3(b).

However, where the Legislature has adopted a separate statutory scheme for a class of motor vehicles and has not specified the amount of compulsory liability insurance coverage required, it has delegated that authority to the Commissioner of Insurance in consultation with the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles. N.J.S.A. 17:1-1; see N.J.S.A. 39:4-14.3(e). Moreover, where our Legislature has adopted federal statutes and regulations into its own regulatory scheme for a specific class of motor vehicle, it has clearly delineated the portions of the federal law applicable in our State. See N.J.S.A. 39:3B-27.

In distinguishing vehicles transporting hazardous materials from the general class of motor vehicles, our Legislature enacted a statutory scheme pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:5B-1 to -32. N.J.S.A. 39:5B-18 to -31.1 establishes standards for the transportation of hazardous materials within the State of New Jersey. Specifically, N.J.S.A. 39:5B-26 provides:
The [Department of Transportation], in consultation with the Department of Environmental Protection, the Department of Labor, the Department of Commerce and Economic Development, the Divisions of Motor Vehicles and State Police of the Department of Law and Public Safety, and other appropriate State departments and agencies shall adopt, within [twelve] months of the effective date of this act and pursuant to the provisions of the “Administrative Procedure Act,” P.L.1968, c. 410 (C. 52:14B-1 to -31), rules and regulations concerning the transportation of hazardous materials, which shall, to the maximum extent practicable, conform to the requirements established by 49 CFR Parts 100-199, adopted by the United States Department of Transportation pursuant to the provisions of the “Hazardous Materials Transportation Act,” Pub.L. 93-633 (49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812).

However, the Legislature also afforded additional authority to the Superintendent of the State Police to promulgate additional regulations:
The Superintendent of the State Police shall adopt, within six months of the effective date of this amendatory and supplementary act and pursuant to the “Administrative Procedure Act,” P.L. 1968, c. 410 (C. 52:14B-1 to -31), rules and regulations concerning the qualifications of interstate motor carrier operators and vehicles, which shall substantially conform to the requirements established pursuant to sections 401 to 404 of the “Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982,” Pub.L.97-424 [49 U.S.C. §§ 31101-31104].5
[N.J.S.A. 39:5B-32(a) (emphasis added).]

These sections of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 establish a federally funded Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program for the purpose of improving “motor carrier, commercial motor vehicle, and driver safety to support a safe and efficient surface transportation system,” which would be implemented by states. 49 U.S.C. § 31102(b). 49 U.S.C. § 31101(1)6 defines a commercial motor vehicle as
*6 a self-propelled or towed vehicle used on the highways in commerce principally to transport passengers or cargo, if the vehicle—
(A) has a gross vehicle weight rating or gross vehicle weight of at least 10,001 pounds, whichever is greater;
(B) is designed to transport more than 10 passengers including the driver; or
(C) is used in transporting material found by the Secretary of Transportation to be hazardous under section 5103 of this title and transported in a quantity requiring placarding under regulations prescribed by the Secretary under section 5103.
[ (Emphasis added).]
Further, a motor carrier is defined as “a person providing motor vehicle transportation for compensation.” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(14).

To ensure federal funding under this program, states are required to create a plan, which, among many other requirements, requires the state to “cooperate in the enforcement of financial responsibility requirements under sections 13906, 31138, and 31139 and regulations issued under those sections.” 49 U.S.C. § 31102(c)(2)(Q). Additionally, 49 U.S.C. § 31102(c)(2)(Y)(i) provides: “the State will conduct safety audits of interstate and, at the State’s discretion, intrastate new entrant motor carriers under section 31144(g)[.]” (Emphasis added). Further, 49 U.S.C. § 31102(e) provides:
The Secretary shall prescribe regulations specifying tolerance guidelines and standards for ensuring compatibility of intrastate commercial motor vehicle safety laws, including regulations, with [f]ederal motor carrier safety regulations to be enforced under subsections (b) and (c). To the extent practicable, the guidelines and standards shall allow for maximum flexibility while ensuring a degree of uniformity that will not diminish motor vehicle safety.

As a prerequisite to adopting the federal scheme, New Jersey had to comply with the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program. The Legislature provided:
b. The superintendent, in consultation with the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission and with the Department of Transportation, shall revise and readopt, within six months of the effective date of P.L. 1991, c. 491, the rules and regulations adopted pursuant to subsection a. of this section to provide that the regulations:
(1) Substantially conform to the requirements concerning the qualifications of interstate motor carrier operators and vehicles established pursuant to sections 401 to 404 of the “Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982,” Pub.L. 97-424 [49 U.S.C. § 31101-31104] and the federal “Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984,” Pub.L. 98-554 [49 U.S.C. § 31131-31151];7 and
(2) Include provisions with regard to motor carrier operators and vehicles engaged in intrastate commerce or used wholly within a municipality or a municipality’s commercial zone, except for farm vehicles weighing 26,000 pounds or less that are operated exclusively in intrastate commerce and are registered pursuant to [N.J.S.A.] 39:3-24 and [N.J.S.A.] 39:3-25, that are compatible with federal rules and regulations.
Notwithstanding subsection c. of this section, the hours of service variances as adopted in 49 CFR § 350.341(e), as amended and supplemented, are hereby adopted effective immediately for commercial motor vehicles weighing 26,001 pounds or more operating in intrastate commerce provided that these vehicles are not designed to transport 16 or more passengers, including the driver, or used in the transportation of hazardous materials and required to be placarded in accordance with 49 CFR § 172.500-172.521 or display a hazardous materials placard. The superintendent shall adopt rules and regulations that conform to the requirements established in 49 CFR § 350.341(e) as amended and supplemented.
*7 [N.J.S.A. 39:5B-32(b)(1) to -32(b)(2) (emphasis added).]

Against this backdrop, our Legislature clarified:
Notwithstanding any provision of law or regulation to the contrary, no person shall operate a commercial motor vehicle, as defined in rules adopted pursuant to this section, in this State unless the operation of the commercial motor vehicle is in accordance with the rules adopted by the Superintendent of State Police pursuant to this section.
[N.J.S.A. 39:5B-32(c) (emphasis added).]

Our Legislature clarified that “[t]he superintendent shall enforce financial responsibility requirements under 49 U.S.C. 13906 and 31139, and 49 CFR Part 387.” N.J.S.A. 39:5B-32(e). 49 U.S.C. § 31139(b) provides that “[t]he Secretary of Transportation shall prescribe regulations to require minimum levels of financial responsibility sufficient to satisfy liability amounts established by the Secretary covering public liability, property damage, and environmental restoration for the transportation of property by motor carrier[,]” and “[t]he level of financial responsibility … shall be at least $750,000.” Further, 49 CFR § 387.9 provides:

Type of carriage

Commodity transported

January 1, 1985

(1) For-hire (In interstate or foreign commerce, with a gross vehicle weight rating of 10,001 or more pounds)

Property

(nonhazardous)

$ 750,000

Under N.J.S.A. 39:5B-32, our Legislature authorized the Superintendent of the State Police to promulgate corresponding rules and regulations in the Administrative Code, N.J.A.C. 13:60 to 13:60-2.1. N.J.A.C. 13:60-1.1 explains the purpose for this section of the Administrative Code:
This chapter establishes rules and regulations concerning the qualifications of motor carrier operators and vehicles engaged in interstate or intrastate commerce or used or operated wholly within a municipality or a municipality’s commercial zone, which substantially conform to the requirements established pursuant to sections 401 to 404 of the “Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982,” Pub. L. 97-424 (49 U.S.C. §§ 31101-31104) and the Federal “Motor Carrier Safety Act,” Pub. L. 98-554 (49 U.S.C. §§ 31131-31151), by adopting and incorporating by reference: the “Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations,” and all supplements and amendments thereto; and Appendices to the “Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations,” and all supplements and amendments thereto.
[ (Emphasis added).]
N.J.A.C. 13:60-1.2 explains the application of this chapter of the Code:
(a) The provisions of this chapter are applicable to every motor carrier and every person, including drivers, agents, employees, and representatives, involved or in any manner related to:
1. The transportation in a commercial motor vehicle of any cargo in interstate or intrastate commerce;
2. The operation of a commercial motor vehicle, with or without a cargo, in interstate or intrastate commerce or wholly within a municipality or a municipality’s commercial zone;
3. The transportation in any motor vehicle in intrastate commerce of materials determined by the Secretary of the United States Department of Transportation to be hazardous for the purposes of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (49 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5128) and which materials are transported in a quantity requiring hazardous material(s) placarding under Federal Hazardous Materials Regulations (49 C.F.R. Parts 171, 172, 173, 174, 177, 178, 179, and 180) and all supplements and amendments thereto;
*8 4. The operation of a commercial motor vehicle, with or without a cargo, displaying hazardous material(s) placarding in intrastate commerce or wholly within a municipality or a municipality’s commercial zone;
5. The transportation in a commercial motor vehicle, as defined at 49 CFR 390.5, to the extent and not inconsistent with this chapter and N.J.A.C. 13:60-2.1(d), in intrastate commerce of any non-hazardous material(s) cargo; and
6. The operation of a commercial motor vehicle, as defined at 49 CFR 390.5, and subject to any prevailing requirements of (a)3 above, in intrastate commerce or wholly within a municipality or a municipality’s commercial zone.
[ (Emphasis added).]

Further, N.J.A.C. 13:60-1.3 provides:
(c) This chapter establishes minimum standards of compliance concerning the qualifications of motor carrier operators and vehicles, operating in this State in interstate or intrastate commerce or used or operated wholly within a municipality or a municipality’s commercial zone. Therefore, in the event of a conflict between this chapter and any other State regulation, except as otherwise provided by statute or law, the stricter, more stringent standard shall apply and govern.
(d) Whenever the term “interstate” is used in the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, adopted and incorporated, by reference, herein, and all supplements and amendments thereto, it shall, for the purpose of this chapter, mean or include both “interstate” and “intrastate” transportation in commerce and those vehicles used or operated wholly within a municipality or a municipality’s commercial zone except where stated otherwise.
….
(g) The provisions and requirements of these regulations as well as the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations adopted and incorporated, by reference, herein, and all supplements and amendments thereto, and made a part hereof as if set forth in full, are applicable to all motor vehicles, as defined in this chapter, engaged in transportation in interstate and intrastate commerce or operating in interstate and intrastate commerce or used or operated wholly within a municipality or a municipality’s commercial zone, as well as all motor vehicles engaged in transportation of hazardous material(s) in a quantity requiring hazardous material(s) placarding or displaying hazardous material(s) placarding unless specifically stated otherwise.
[ (Emphasis added).]

Importantly, N.J.A.C. 13:60-2.1(b) provides:
The Parts and Appendices of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations and all supplements and amendments thereto, adopted as final rule action by the Federal Administration, United States Department of Transportation, and adopted and incorporated, by reference, herein, by the Superintendent, are summarized below. Within that list some sections, subparts, or parts may have been modified, revised, amended, made subject to a different effective date, and/or intentionally omitted by the Superintendent. Those sections, subparts, or parts are clearly identified in (d) below.
….
10. Part 387, Minimum Levels of Financial Responsibility for Motor Carriers.

Thereafter, N.J.A.C. 13:60-2.1(d) provides:
(d) As stated in (a) and (b) above, this chapter generally incorporates 49 CFR Parts 40, 325, 350, 355, 380, 382, 383, 384, 385, 387, 388, and 390 through 398, inclusive, by reference. The following modifications, additions, and deletions apply to those parts:
*9 1. The definition of “commercial motor vehicle” in 49 CFR 390.5 (relating to definitions) is modified to read as follows:
“Commercial motor vehicle” means any self-propelled or towed motor vehicle used on a highway in intrastate commerce to transport passengers or property when the vehicle:
i. Has a gross vehicle weight rating or gross combination weight rating, or a registered weight of 4,536 kg (10,001 pounds) or more, whichever is greater;
….

Here, the express language of N.J.S.A. 13:5B-32 and N.J.A.C. 13:60 to 13:60-2.1 clearly establishes a separate statutory scheme for commercial motor vehicles having a registered weight of 10,001 pounds or more, like the NAB dump truck involved in the subject accident. Moreover, by adopting a statutory scheme that mirrors the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Act, our Legislature clearly intended to enroll into the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program, which provides funding for improving “motor carrier, commercial motor vehicle, and driver safety to support a safe and efficient surface transportation system.” N.J.S.A. 39:5B-32(a); 49 U.S.C. § 3112(b). The Legislature intended that these statutes and regulations apply to both intrastate and interstate commerce.

Importantly, N.J.A.C. 13:60-1.3(d) provides “[w]henever the term “interstate” is used in the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, adopted and incorporated, by reference, herein, and all supplements and amendments thereto, it shall, for the purpose of this chapter, mean or include both “interstate” and “intrastate” transportation in commerce[.]” (Emphasis added). N.J.A.C. 13:60-1.3(g) also provides “[t]he provisions and requirements of these regulations as well as the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations … are applicable to all motor vehicles … engaged in transportation in interstate and intrastate commerce or operating in interstate and intrastate commerce[.]” (Emphasis added). Additionally, N.J.A.C. 13:60-1.2(a)(1) provides “[t]he provisions of this chapter are applicable to every motor carrier …, involved or in any manner related to … [t]he transportation in a commercial motor vehicle of any cargo in interstate or intrastate commerce[.]” (Emphasis added).

Here, the NAB dump truck operated by Taylor-Esquivel fits squarely within the definition of a commercial motor vehicle because at the very least, the dump truck was engaged in intrastate commerce. And, the NAB dump truck satisfies the specifications of a commercial motor vehicle as defined by the applicable statutes and regulations. See 49 U.S.C. § 31101(1); 49 C.F.R. § 390.50; N.J.A.C. 13:60-2.1(d) (defining commercial motor vehicles). Moreover, the fact that Taylor-Esquivel was not listed as a covered driver on NAB’s policy is irrelevant because that would distort and ignore the impact of the statutes and regulations adopted to insure safety for drivers on public roadways and would be in conflict with the bedrock principles enacted by the ICC. Here, the accident occurred while Taylor-Esquivel was engaged in NAB’s business of trucking and hauling dirt, with permission of the owner. Taylor-Esquivel was acting within the scope of his employment, and there is no basis to relieve the insurer of its contractual obligation to its insured.

*10 We recognize that the intent of the statutes and regulations enacted by Congress was to protect drivers and shippers traveling public highways and to guarantee compensation to accident victims injured by vehicles transporting cargo and individuals in interstate commerce. Our Legislature reacted with an express intent on the subject by adopting the federally mandated minimum of $750,000 in insurance coverage for commercial motor vehicles. See N.J.S.A. 39:5B-32(e); N.J.A.C. 13:60-2.1(b); 49 U.S.C. § 31102(c)(2)(Q); 49 U.S.C. § 31139(b); and 49 CFR § 387.9. Saliently, our Legislature expanded upon the federal mandate by expanding the law to cover all motor vehicles engaged in interstate and intrastate commerce transporting cargo. Therefore, we conclude that NAB was engaged in interstate or intrastate commerce, as defined in N.J.S.A. 39:5B-32 and N.J.A.C. 13:60-2.1, and AMIC must provide the minimum insurance coverage of $750,000. The step-down provision is not triggered.

Reversed and remanded.

All Citations
— A.3d —-, 2020 WL 6833857

Footnotes

1
United States Department of Transportation. Interstate movers transporting passengers or hauling cargo must be registered with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) and have a USDOT number.

2
Motor Carrier number. An MC number is assigned by the FMCSA to companies operating in interstate commerce hauling cargo across state lines.

3
An MCS-90 endorsement is attached to an insurance policy issued to a motor carrier and is proof that the motor carrier has met the financial requirements of the federal regulations for motor carriers. See 49 U.S.C. § 13906.

4
Rule 4:57-1 provides in pertinent part:
In any action in which any part of the relief sought is a judgment for a sum of money or the disposition of a sum of money, a party, on notice to every other party, and by leave of court, may deposit with the Superior Court Trust Fund all or any part of the sum.

5
Formerly found at 49 U.S.C. App. § 2301-2304.

6
See also 49 C.F.R. § 390.5.

7
Formerly found at 49 U.S.C. § 2501 to 2519.

Nash v. Badgett

2020 WL 6928321

United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana.
DEWAYNE NASH
v.
JAMES CARL BADGETT, ET AL.
CASE NO. 3:20-CV-00273
|
Filed 11/24/2020

RULING
TERRY A. DOUGHTY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
*1 Pending here is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants James Carl Badgett (“Badgett”), Texas Intrastate Carriers, Inc. (“Texas Intrastate”), and Southern County Mutual Insurance Company (“Southern County”) (collectively, “Defendants”) [Doc. No. 19]. Plaintiff Dwayne Nash (“Nash”) has filed an opposition [Doc. No. 27].

For the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This lawsuit arises from an accident which occurred in Ouachita Parish, Louisiana, on the evening of February 4, 2019. Nash was operating a Ford Taurus traveling eastbound in the outside lane of Interstate 20 at a speed of 21 miles per hour (“mph”) when his vehicle was rear-ended by a Peterbilt tractor/trailer operated by Defendant Badgett.

On January 28, 2020, Nash filed suit in the Fourth Judicial District Court for Ouachita Parish, Louisiana, for the damages he sustained in the accident. Named as defendants were Badgett, Texas Intrastate as the employer of Badgett and as the owner of the tractor/trailer, and Southern County as the insurer of the tractor/trailer. On March 3, 2020, Defendants removed the case to this Court.

Defendants contend they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law dismissing Nash’s claims because Nash has no evidence of any substandard conduct or breach of duty on the part of Badgett. Defendants contend that Badgett was operating the tractor/trailer at the posted 70 mph speed limit when he suddenly came upon a hazard, i.e., a slow-moving Taurus impeding the flow of interstate travel, moving about 50 mph below the speed limit. Defendants further contend that Nash was solely at fault for operating the Taurus with a spare “donut” tire that had separated, instead of pulling the Taurus off onto the shoulder.

Nash, on the other hand, contends that Badgett was at fault for not maintaining a proper lookout, for driving the tractor/trailer in a reckless manner, and for traveling at an excessive speed.

The issues are fully briefed, and the Court is prepared to rule.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), “[a] party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense–or the part of each claim or defense–on which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion by identifying portions of the record which highlight the absence of genuine issues of material fact. Topalian v. Ehrmann, 954 F.2d 1125, 1132 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (AA party asserting that a fact cannot be … disputed must support the assertion by … citing to particular parts of materials in the record … ). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the lawsuit under applicable law in the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could render a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

*2 If the moving party can meet the initial burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Norman v. Apache Corp., 19 F.3d 1017, 1023 (5th Cir. 1994). In evaluating the evidence tendered by the parties, the Court must accept the evidence of the nonmovant as credible and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. However, “a party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence.” Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.)

B. Analysis

1. Defendants’ Contentions
Defendants seek summary judgment on the grounds that Nash cannot prove an essential element of his claim because there is no evidence of any substandard conduct or breach of duty on the part of Badgett. They assert that the physical evidence and the computer downloads of both vehicles demonstrate that Badgett was operating the tractor/trailer at the posted speed limit when he came upon Nash’s slow-moving Taurus impeding the flow of Interstate travel.

Defendants offer the Declaration of Louisiana State Trooper George Harper (“Trooper Harper”) in support of their arguments. Trooper Harper investigated the accident and prepared the Uniform Motor Vehicle Traffic Crash Report (the “accident report”) [Declaration of Trooper Harper, Doc. No. 19-5, p. 1]. Upon arrival at the crash scene, Trooper Harper observed a white Ford Taurus with moderate rear damage and a Peterbilt tractor/trailer with minor damage to the front grill. [Id.]. Trooper Harper identified Nash as the operator of the Taurus and Badgett as the operator of the tractor/trailer. [Id., p. 2]. Trooper Harper interviewed Nash, who advised that he did not remember anything about the events prior to the accident. [Id.].

Trooper Harper also interviewed Badgett, who said he was traveling eastbound on Interstate 20 in the outside lane, that he had seen the Taurus ahead of him for approximately 5 miles, and that the Taurus operator was driving normally without any erratic driving behavior. [Id.]. Badgett further stated that suddenly the Taurus’s brake lights came on, and he attempted to move the tractor/trailer into the left inside lane but was unable to do so because there was another vehicle in that lane, and so, instead, he abruptly braked, but was unable to avoid a collison. [Id.]. Badgett also stated that he thought the Taurus had fully stopped in the outside travel lane because it was moving so slowly. [Id.].

Trooper Harper further declared that the physical evidence showed that both vehicles were traveling in the outside eastbound travel lane of Interstate 20 when the Taurus driver applied its brakes and began abruptly coming to a stop in the outside lane. [Id.]. The tractor/trailer driver attempted to change lanes to avoid the Taurus but was unable. [Id.]. The tire marks matching the tread of the Taurus were located and show the Taurus traveled off the roadway after impact. The tractor/trailer came to rest at a controlled stop on the southern shoulder of Interstate 20. [Id.].

At the conclusion of his investigation, Trooper Harper found Badgett not to be at fault for the accident. [Id.]. Trooper Harper cited Nash for expired license, no insurance, and careless operation. [Id.]. The careless operation citation was based on the driver interviews and physical evidence which showed the Taurus slowed so significantly in the travel lane as to impede the flow of normal traffic on an Interstate zoned at 70 mph. [Id.].

*3 In support of their motion, Defendants also offer the Affidavit of Bryan Corb (“Corb”), an Accident Reconstructionist with A & M Forensics Engineering, who conducted an investigation into the accident. [Affidavit of Bryan Corb, Doc. No. 19-6, p. 1]. An inspection of the tractor/trailer was conducted by Cobb on April 12, 2019 at the Rush Truck Center in Irving, Texas. [Id., p. 2]. The damage was to the front of the vehicle, consistent with the information contained within the accident report. [Id.]. Corb downloaded data from the tractor/trailer engine, and, according to the ECM (Electronic Control Module) data report, the commercial truck tractor ECM began recording 44 seconds prior to the crash. [Id.]. The data revealed that 2 seconds before the crash, the tractor/trailer was traveling at 70 mph, then the brakes were applied, and that the tractor/trailer had slowed to 50 mph at the time of impact. [Id.].

On April 23, 2019, Corb traveled to T&T Towing in West Monroe, Louisiana, to conduct an inspection of the Taurus. [Id.] Upon initial observation of the vehicle, damage was seen to the front left and the rear. [Id.]. Upon closer inspection, it was noted that the front left tire was a small, donut style, where the tread had separated. The tread appeared to have separated prior to the crash. [Id., p. 3].

Corby downloaded the Taurus’ Airbag Control Module (ACM) during the April 23, 2019 inspection of the vehicle. [Id.]. The ACM data report indicated the Taurus was traveling 21.7 mph, 5 seconds prior to impact, and, was traveling at 21 mph at the time of impact. [Id.]

On April 26, 2019, Corb traveled to the area of Interstate 20 where the crash occurred and observed that the roadway has two lanes eastbound and two lanes westbound, separated by a grassy median. [Id., p. 4]. The roadway was observed to be free from visual obstructions for over 1000 feet prior to the location of impact. [Id.]. There is a hard asphalt surface shoulder, approximately 8’5” in width, adjacent to the outside travel lane. Pieces of crash debris found at this location indicated this was the crash location. [Id., p. 5].

During the inspection of the scene on April 26, 2019, the Peterbilt tractor skid marks were located by Corb in the outside travel lane and shoulder on Interstate 20, consistent with the information contained within the accidentash report. [Id.]. The skid marks are an indication of perception and reaction by Badgett to the hazard of the slower moving Taurus driven by Nash. [Id.]. Corb found that there was no visible ambient lighting in this area. His review of photographs taken by the State Police, at the time of the crash, confirmed that the scene area is dark. [Id., p. 6].

Corb states that Louisiana state law prohibits a person from operating a motor vehicle upon the highways at such a slow speed as to impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic. [Id., p. 7]. Corb opines that Nash, while experiencing vehicle issues with his tire, should have pulled safely off the roadway and onto the 8’5” wide shoulder. [Id., p. 8]. The shoulder had ample room for his vehicle and would have provided more safety for him to obtain help. Instead, Nash continued to drive at a speed that impeded the normal flow of traffic. [Id., pp. 8, 9].

Using data obtained from the ECM data report of the tractor/trailer, the ACM data report from the Taurus, along with information obtained during the scene inspection, Corb used the Interactive Driver Response Research software (“IDRR”) to determine that Badgett did appropriately perceive and respond to the hazard of the Taurus, traveling at a slow speed. [Id., p. 8]. Corb concludes from his investigation that Badgett had no expectation or anticipation of a vehicle traveling 49 mph slower than the posted speed limit. [Id.]

Defendants conclude that there is no evidence of any substandard conduct or breach of duty on the part of Badgett. Trooper Harpter concluded his investigation and found no fault on the part of Badgett. Corb completed his investigation and found no fault on the part of Badgett. Consequently, there is no factual basis or actual evidence to impose liability upon Badgett, who was traveling at the speed limit and reacted appropriately to attempt to avoid the hazard presented.

2. Plaintiff Nash’s Contentions
*4 In opposition to Defendants’ motion, Nash offers the Affidavit of his own expert, Michael S. Gillen (“Gillen”), of National Collision Technologies, Inc. [Affidavit of Michael S. Gillen, Doc. No. 27-2]. Gillen reviewed documents including the accident report, the pleadings, the ECM Download from the tractor/trailer, the CDR Download from the Taurus, Northwestern Traffic Crash Reconstruction, Site Research, Google Aerial and Street Views, Vehicle Research, NHTSA Vehicle Database, NAVO Database, and NCTI Calculations. [Id., p. 2].

Gillen states that the evidence and Badgett’s own statement to the police indicate that Badgett did not suddenly encounter Nash ahead of him. [Id., p. 6]. Rather, Badgett was traveling for over 4 minutes following Nash, saw Nash’s brake lights come on, and realized that Nash’s Taurus was slowing ahead of him for 11 seconds. [Id.]. Based on the CDR data, Nash held a speed of 22 mph to 21 mph for an additional 5 seconds before the impact, for a total time of 16 seconds. In that total time, Badgett would have had sufficient time to react and to match the speed of Nash’s Taurus. As a professional, commercially licensed driver, familiar with the handling characteristics of his 18-wheeler, Badgett, did not maintain a proper lookout, and, further, applied a defective driver strategy in an attempt to change lanes. As a result, Badgett crashed into the rear of Nash’s Taurus. [Id.].

Based on Gillen’s Affidavit, Nash argues that there is a genuine issue as to material fact, and that Defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, since the contested facts present legal issues.

3. Court’s Analysis
Jurisdiction in this matter is based on diversity. The Court will apply Louisiana negligence law. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Louisiana employs a duty-risk analysis in determining liability for negligence. Bufkin v. Felipe’s Louisiana, LLC, No. 2014-0288, 171 So.3d 851, 855 (La. 10/15/14). A plaintiff must prove five elements:
(1) the defendant had a duty to conform his or her conduct to a specific standard of care; (2) the defendant failed to conform his or her conduct to the appropriate standard of care; (3) the defendant’s substandard conduct was a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injuries; (4) the defendant’s substandard conduct was a legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries; and (5) actual damages.
Id. The question of whether a duty is owed, and the scope of that duty, is a question of law. Whether there was a breach of the duty, whether the substandard conduct was the cause-in-fact and legal cause of the damages, and whether damages resulted, are questions of fact. Teter v. Apollo Marine Specialties, Inc., No. 2012-1525, 115 So. 3d 590, 598 (La. App. 4 Cir. 4/10/13).

Louisiana courts have recognized the five-factor negligence inquiry presents a particularly difficult challenge at the summary judgment stage, because “a negative answer to any of the inquiries of the duty/risk analysis results in a determination of no liability.” Hanks v. Entergy Corp., No. 2006-477, 944 So.3d 564, 579 (La. 12/18/06).

Under Louisiana Civil Code article 2323, in any action for damages where a person suffered injury,
the degree or percentage of fault of all persons causing or contributing to the injury … or loss shall be determined, regardless of whether the person is a party to the action or a nonparty, and regardless of the person’s insolvency, ability to pay, immunity by statute, including but not limited to the provisions of R.S. 23:1032, or that the other person’s identity is not known or reasonably ascertainable. If a person suffers injury … the result partly of his own negligence and partly as a result of the fault of another person or persons, the amount of damages recoverable shall be reduced in proportion to the degree or percentage of negligence attributable to the person suffering the injury … or loss.
*5 Id. “Ordinarily, the determination of whether negligence exists in a particular case is a question of fact; therefore, cases involving a question of negligence ordinarily are not appropriate for summary judgment … This principle extends to a question of comparative fault as well.” Pruitt v. Nale, 45,483 (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/11/10), 46 So. 3d 780, 783 (citing Freeman v. Teague, 37, 932 (La. App. 2d Cir. 12/10/03), 862 So.2d 371; Powers v. Tony’s Auto Repair, Inc. 98–1626 (La.App. 4th Cir.4/28/99), 733 So.2d 1215, writ denied, 99–1552 (La.7/2/99), 747 So.2d 28.). “However, where reasonable minds cannot differ, a question of comparative fault is a question of law that may be resolved by summary judgment.” Id. (citing Rance v. Harrison Co., 31,503 (La.App.2d Cir. 1/20/99), 737 So.2d 806, writ denied, 99–0778 (La.4/30/99), 743 So.2d 206.).

Summary judgment “may not be granted for purposes of determining a particular element of liability where such a determination is not completely dispositive of the question of liability between the parties concerning the claim and where other issues such as comparative fault remain unresolved.” Williams v. City of New Orleans, 637 So. 2d 1130, 1132 (La. App. 4th Cir. 5/17/94), writ denied, 644 So. 2d 632 (La. 10/7/94).

On the road, drivers have a duty to maintain a proper lookout and to see what should be seen. Davis v. Smith, 796 So.2d 765, 769 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/02/01) (citing Thissel v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 476 So.2d 851 (La. App. 2 Cir. 9/25/85)). A driver may assume that the road ahead is safe for travel, but when driving in darkness or circumstances of low visibility, the driver must observe the road carefully and maintain control of his vehicle so as to avoid discernible objects in his path; that is, in adverse conditions, a greater degree of care must be exercised. Id.

In the instant case, Defendants assert that there is no evidence of any substandard conduct or breach of duty on the part of Badgett. However, while Defendants argue that Badgett was safely traveling at 70 mph when he suddenly saw the slower moving Taurus ahead of him, Nash has presented summary judgment evidence that Badgett had been following Nash for approximately four minutes before he saw Nash’s brake lights come on. Nash’s expert opines that Badgett had sufficient time to safely react and slow down to Nash’s speed. Instead of immediately slowing down, Badgett used a defective driver strategy to try to change lanes, and as a result, rear-ended Nash.

Further, Trooper Harper did not have access to the engine data downloads when he prepared the accident report and issued Nash citations.

The Court finds that reasonable minds could differ as to whether Badgett was at least partly at fault. Therefore, there remain disputed issues to be determined by the finder of fact. These questions will need to be answered when applying Louisiana’s “duty/risk” analysis. See LeJeune v. Union Pacific Railroad, 712 So.2d 491, 494 (La. 1998).

The issue of comparative fault remains unresolved.

III. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 19] is DENIED.

Monroe, Louisiana, this 24th day of November, 2020.

All Citations
Slip Copy, 2020 WL 6928321

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