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CASES (2020)

Johnson v. ABF Freight System, Inc.

2020 WL 7320994

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division.
JAMES JOHNSON, JR., and ERICKA JOHNSON, Plaintiffs,
v.
ABF FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC. and MARK EUGENE MASSINGILL, Defendants.
Case No.: 2:18-cv-01835-MHH
|
12/11/2020

MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
*1 The parties in this case are preparing for trial. Pursuant to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, plaintiffs James and Ericka Johnson have asked the Court to bar the defendants’ accident reconstruction expert, Dr. Lars Reinhart, from testifying at trial. (Docs. 67, 73, 76).

This case concerns a collision between Mr. Johnson’s 18-wheel tractor-tanker truck and an 18-wheel tractor-trailer truck. Defendant Mark Massingill, driving the tractor-trailer truck for defendant ABF Freight System, Inc., turned left at an intersection and tried to squeeze his trailer past the right side of Mr. Johnson’s tanker while Mr. Johnson was stopped at a railroad crossing, waiting for a train to pass. Mr. Massingill missed and struck the right rear side of the tanker. Mr. Johnson already has established accident causation as a matter of law. (Doc. 57). At trial, he must prove injury causation and damages.

Mr. Massingill and ABF rely on an accident reconstruction performed by Dr. Reinhart to demonstrate that the collision between Mr. Johnson’s tanker and Mr. Massingill’s trailer could not have produced the severe injuries Mr. Johnson attributes to the accident. According to Dr. Reinhart, ABF hired him as an accident reconstruction expert to testify as “to the injury mechanisms and injury causation involved in this accident based upon a biomechanical assessment of the accident scenario.” (Doc. 77-6, p. 1). Mr. Johnson challenges Dr. Reinhart’s qualification to offer his opinions, (Doc. 67); the reliability of the methodology that Dr. Reinhart used to reach his opinions, (Doc. 76); and the ability of Dr. Reinhart’s opinions to help a jury understand the injury causation issues in this case, (Doc. 73).

Under Rule 702, an expert may be qualified “by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,” and an expert may testify at trial and offer an expert opinion if:
(a) The expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit requires district courts to use a “rigorous three-part inquiry” when considering the admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702. A district court must determine whether:
(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters he intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches his conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined by the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert; and (3) the testimony assists the trier of fact, through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (quoting City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998)). The party offering testimony from an expert must demonstrate that the anticipated testimony is admissible under Rule 702. Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1260. In this opinion, the Court, exercising the gatekeeping function conferred on district courts by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), considers whether Rule 702 precludes the defendants from calling Dr. Reinhart as a witness at trial and asking Dr. Reinhart to offer his opinions concerning injury causation.

Dr. Reinhart’s Qualifications
*2 Dr. Reinhart’s opinion concerns the biomechanics of the movement of Mr. Johnson’s body in the cabin of his tractor when the ABF tractor collided with his tanker. Mr. Johnson argues that because Dr. Reinhart is not a biomechanical engineer, he is not qualified to testify about biomechanics and injury causation. (Doc. 74, p. 2). “Biomechanics…is the application of mechanical principles to living organisms, such as humans….” Bernardo Innocenti, Biomechanics: A Fundamental Tool with a Long History (And Even Longer Future!), MUSCLE, LIGAMENTS AND TENDONS JOURNAL, 2017 Oct-Dec; 7(4): 491–92, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5908324/. Mr. Johnson acknowledges that Dr. Reinhart is a mechanical engineer and an emergency room physician but argues that because Dr. Reinhart is not a biomechanical engineer, he is not qualified to offer an opinion about the movements that caused his (Mr. Johnson’s) injuries or the extent of those injuries.

Dr. Reinhart does not have to have a degree in biomechanical engineering to qualify as an expert in this case. (Doc. 74, p. 2).1 “While scientific training or education may provide possible means to qualify, experience in a field may offer another path to expert status. In fact, the plain language of Rule 702 makes this clear: expert status may be based on ‘knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.’ ” Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1260–61 (emphasis and internal citations omitted). Dr. Reinhart is qualified by education, training, and experience to offer his accident reconstruction opinion.

Dr. Reinhart holds a Bachelor of Science in mechanical engineering from the University of Texas at Austin, and he received his Medical Doctorate from the University of Texas – Southwestern Medical School in 1996. In 1999, he completed his residency in emergency medicine at the University of Virginia Medical Center. (Doc. 77-6, p. 1). He has completed coursework and is fully accredited by the Accreditation Commission for Traffic Accident Reconstruction (ACTAR). (Doc. 90-1, p. 3). ACTAR “is recognized…as an independent accrediting organization for those who work in the field of Accident Investigation and Reconstruction.” ACTAR, ABOUT ACCREDITATION, https://actar.org/accreditation/about (last visited Dec. 7, 2020). The ACTAR accreditation exam covers the following topics:

Airborne, Kinetic Energy, Momentum, Time and Distance, Tire Evidence, Change in Velocity (Dv), Principal Direction of Force, Lamp Examination, Scene Examination, Scene Measurements, Tire Mark Evaluation, and Vehicle Evidence. The practical portion of the exam “requires the candidate complete an accident reconstruction analysis based on problem data provided by ACTAR.” ACTAR, THE ACTAR EXAMINATION EXPLAINED, https://actar.org/accreditation/exam (last visited Dec. 7, 2020).
Dr. Reinhart has extensive experience in accident reconstruction. He has worked as an accident reconstructionist since 2013. (Doc. 90-1, p. 2). He estimates that he has “reviewed over 650 cases in which injuries were claimed and in which [he] applied biomechanical analyses and ICA methodology.” (Doc. 90-1, p. 3). In doing so, he has used his “engineering and medical training and applied engineering principles in understanding the effects of forces and accelerations when applied to the human body.” (Doc. 90-1, p. 3).

Based on his education, experience, and training, the Court concludes that Dr. Reinhart is qualified to offer opinions based on principles of biomechanical engineering. For the reasons discussed during the December 2, 2020 hearing in this matter (Doc. 114), the Court finds that Dr. Reinhart, as an emergency room physician, is not qualified to interpret images of Mr. Johnson’s spine and offer his opinion that the radiological findings “were consistent with preexisting degenerative changes and not indicative of any acute traumatic injury as a result of the subject collision.” (Doc. 114, pp. 24–25). Dr. Reinhart does not have a background in radiology or in orthopedics that would qualify him to offer opinions about preexisting degenerative conditions in Mr. Johnson’s spine.

The Reliability of Dr. Reinhart’s Accident Reconstruction Opinion
*3 Mr. Johnson argues that Dr. Reinhart’s “opinions regarding injury mechanisms rely on faulty and incomplete facts and data, do not articulate his methodology, and are applied in an outcome-oriented way.” (Doc. 77, p. 6). Mr. Johnson’s concerns about Dr. Reinhart’s data are fair. As Mr. Johnson points out, Dr. Reinhart did not visit the accident scene (so he did not take measurements at the accident scene), did not inspect Mr. Johnson’s vehicle, did not review “black box” data from Mr. Massingill’s vehicle, did not conduct witness interviews, does not have Mr. Massingill’s actual speed at the time of the accident, and does not know the weight of Mr. Johnson’s trailer at the time of the accident. (Doc. 77, pp. 6–7).

Though Mr. Johnson correctly points to gaps in Dr. Reinhart’s data, his criticism of Dr. Reinhart’s methodology is not accurate. In an affidavit, Dr. Reinhart has explained that he conducted an Injury Causation Analysis of the crash. (Doc. 90-1, p. 4). ICA “is the examination of an event in order to understand its nature and to determine its essential features, including the causation of injuries.” (Doc. 90-1, p. 4). ICA uses a five-step “process analysis” in which “each subsequent step builds upon its predecessor.” (Doc. 90-1, p. 7). The five steps are: analysis of event, analysis of human kinematics, analysis of biomechanics, determination of injury potential, and validation through medical analysis. (Doc. 90-1, p. 7). The ICA approach “relies on supporting research using various recognized research methods, such as: experimental method; correlational method; time-series design; single-subject experimental design; case histories; multi-method approach; survey method; and statistical methods.” (Doc. 90-1, p. 8). According to Dr. Reinhart, “[t]he methodology of ICA was formalized shortly after World War II,” and “ICA [has] emerged as a…specialized activity that is used daily in the evaluation of any vehicle impact or collision.” (Doc. 90-1, p. 11).2

Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, the distinction between method and data establishes the boundary between a district court’s gatekeeping function and a jury’s factfinding function. A court must address flaws in methodology; a jury must address flaws in data. Ordinarily, when an expert uses “a method that, in the abstract, is reliable,” but the expert inputs inaccurate or improper data, a district court should admit the evidence, and the party challenging the result of the expert’s analysis should identify errors to a jury through cross-examination. Quiet Tech. DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1345 (11th Cir. 2003) (“The identification of such flaws in generally reliable scientific evidence is precisely the role of cross-examination.”). “Normally, failure to include variables will affect the analysis’ probativeness, not its admissibility.” Quiet Tech., 326 F.3d at 1346 (quoting Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 400 (1986)). A district court should intercede and exclude expert evidence when an expert’s flawed methodology makes his opinion “facially authoritative but substantively unsound.” Quiet Tech., 326 F.3d at 1346. In the latter scenario, cross-examination will not suffice to correct an invalid opinion.

Here, vigorous cross-examination will expose flaws in Dr. Reinhart’s data and in the terminology that Dr. Reinhart uses to describe the accident. As Mr. Johnson points out, Dr. Reinhart interchangeably uses the phrases “rear-end” and “side-swipe” to describe the accident. Though the diagrams on which Dr. Reinhart relied in formulating his opinions unambiguously depict an angled collision at the right rear corner of Mr. Johnson’s tanker (Doc. 74-5, p. 3) that could have involved “two types of impacts,” (Doc. 74-3, p. 122), Dr. Reinhart stated in his written report that the “principle direction of force (PDOF)” within Mr. Johnson’s tractor during the collision was “directed from six o’clock,” (Doc. 74-5, p. 22), and Dr. Reinhart testified that studies about rear-end collisions would be applicable to Mr. Johnson’s collision. (Doc. 74-3, pp. 23-24). Dr. Reinhart is not concerned that the studies on which he relies in formulating his opinion do not involve tractor-trailer trucks because, in Dr. Reinhart’s opinion, all vehicles will “respond in similar means and fashion.” (Doc. 74-3, p. 26). This overlooks the fact that, unlike a passenger car, Mr. Johnson’s tractor was connected to his tanker by a kingpin that allows a tanker to articulate from the tractor. (Doc. 74-5). These criticisms of Dr. Reinhart’s analysis are simple and logical and can be identified and highlighted through cross-examination at trial.

*4 Under Quiet Tech, because the the ICA methodology appears scientifically sound and because Mr. Johnson can vigorously cross-examine Dr. Reinhart on inconsistencies, erroneous assumptions, and potential flaws in data inputs, the Court cannot exclude Dr. Reinhart’s opinions based on Mr. Johnson’s reliability argument. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596 (“Vigorous cross-examination [and] presentation of contrary evidence…are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”).

Helpfulness
Finally, Mr. Johnson argues that the Court should exclude Dr. Reinhart’s testimony because Dr. Reinhart’s opinions, “based on experience at amusement parks,” are “nothing more than general types of statements you would expect lawyers to make in closing arguments—they are opinions based on lay experience, not expert experience.” (Doc. 74, p. 9). But as Mr. Johnson notes, Dr. Reinhart’s “testimony involving accident reconstruction, biomechanics, and quantifying force are not within the experience of laypersons….” (Doc. 74, p. 9). If jurors find that Dr. Reinhart’s data and assumptions are credible, then his opinions will “help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” FED. R. EVID. 702(a).

The helpfulness requirement turns on:
the common sense inquiry [of] whether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute.
See FED. R. EVID. 702, Advisory Committee Notes (citations omitted). “By this requirement, expert testimony is admissible if it concerns matters that are beyond the understanding of the average lay person. Proffered expert testimony generally will not help the trier of fact when it offers nothing more than what lawyers for the parties can argue in closing arguments.” Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1262–63 (internal quotations and citations omitted). As Mr. Johnson acknowledges, most laypeople do not have experience in or knowledge about accident reconstruction or biomechanics, and most laypeople are not capable of quantifying force.

Therefore, if jurors accept the data, studies, and assumptions on which Dr. Reinhart’s accident reconstruction rests, then his opinions concerning the movement of Mr. Johnson’s body in his tractor during the collision will help jurors decide whether the collision caused movement that could produce the injuries that Mr. Johnson attributes to the collision.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated above and during the December 2, 2020 hearing in this matter, the Court will not exclude Dr. Reinhart’s opinions regarding biomechanics and accident reconstruction, but the Court will exclude Dr. Reinhart’s opinion concerning medical causation. The Court directs the Clerk to please term Docs. 67, 73, and 76.

DONE and ORDERED this December 11, 2020.

MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
All Citations
Slip Copy, 2020 WL 7320994

Footnotes

1
As a practical matter, degrees in biomechanical engineering are not readily available. See Loren Peck, Note, How Sound is the Science? Applying Daubert to Biomechanical Experts’ Injury Causation Opinions, 73 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1063, 1077–78 (2016) (“While some schools, including Stanford University, offer a biomechanical engineering program, most schools do not. Apparently, there is no single route to obtaining biomechanical expertise.”).

2
See In re Air Crash at Lexington, August 27, 2006, 2009 WL 1918270, at *3 (E.D. Ky. July 2, 2009) (explaining that ICA “is relied up by the FAA, NTSB and NASA.”).

Brown v. Nikloads, LLC.

2020 WL 7130786

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia.
STEPHANIE A. BROWN, Plaintiff,
v.
NIKLOADS, LLC, And JOSHUA HULSEY, Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:20-cv-493
|
Filed 12/04/2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Raymond A. Jackson United States District Judge
*1 Before the Court is Stephanie A. Brown’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to Remand this case to the Circuit Court for the City of Portsmouth, Virginia for the Defendants’ failure to remove the case to federal court within the thirty (30) day time period required under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). ECF No. 6. The Defendants’ responded in opposition and the Plaintiff replied. ECF Nos. 8, 9. Having been fully briefed, this matter is ripe for judicial determination. For the reasons below, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This case is based on a civil action for personal injuries arising out of a motor vehicle collision in Portsmouth, Virginia. According to the Complaint, on January 27, 2020, Plaintiff was operating a motor vehicle on Effingham Street in Portsmouth when she was struck by a tractor-trailer owned and operated by defendant Nikloads, LLC (“Nikloads”) that was being driven by its driver employee, defendant Joshua Hulsey (“Hulsey”), while in the course and scope of his employment. ECF No. 1 at Exhibit 1. On August 10, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the Circuit Court for the City of Portsmouth, Virginia against defendants Nikloads and Hulsey alleging $750,000 for compensatory damages. Id. The state court action was assigned civil action number 3:20-cv-762. Id.

On August 26, 2020, the Commissioner of the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) transmitted the Summons and Complaint in this civil action, along with an attached Notice from the DMV, to Hulsey at his address in Temple, Georgia by means of certified mail. See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-308 and 3101; See ECF No. 6 at Exhibit 1. On August 29, 2020, Hulsey received the Summons and Complaint along with a Notice from the DMV. Id. at Exhibits 1 and 2. Notably, the “green card” receipt was signed by Husley when he received the Summons, Complaint, and Notice on August 29, 2020. Id. On September 29, 2020, thirty-one (31) days after receiving service of process, Hulsey removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (Norfolk Division). ECF No. 1. Defendant Nikloads filed its Notice of Consent to Removal on October 2, 2020. ECF No. 4.

*2 On October 28, 2020, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand to State court. ECF Nos. 6. Defendants responded in opposition and Plaintiff replied. ECF Nos. 8, 9.

II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may not exercise jurisdiction absent a statutory basis. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005). “A court is to presume, therefore, that a case lies outside its limited jurisdiction unless and until jurisdiction has been shown to be proper.” United States v. Poole, 531 F.3d 263, 274 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)).

A defendant may remove any action from state court to federal court in which the federal court has jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), (b). But, “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Specifically, a defendant must file the notice of removal within 30 days after the receipt by the “defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within 30 days after the service of summons upon the defendant.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(b). When a case involves multiple defendants, if all of the defendants are served on the same day, the notice of removal must be filed within thirty days of the date of service, and all the defendants must consent to and join the notice of removal. See Creasy v. Coleman Furniture Corp., 763 F.2d 656, 660 (4th Cir. 1985) (noting that “all of the defendants must agree to the removal of the state court action”). Moreover, the McKinney Intermediate Rule requires a notice of removal to be filed within the first-served defendant’s thirty-day window but gives later-served defendants thirty days from the date they were served to join the notice of removal. See McKinney v. Bd. of Trustees of Mayland Cmty. Coll., 955 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1992); see also, Barbour v. Int’l Union, 640 F.3d 599, 607 (4th Cir. 2011).

A motion to remand may be submitted after removal of a case from state court, but the motion must be filed within thirty days of removal, unless the defect asserted is subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1447. On a motion to remand, the burden of establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction remains with the party seeking removal to the federal forum. Strawn v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 530 F.3d 293, 296 (4th Cir. 2008). Removal jurisdiction is strictly construed in light of federalism concerns. See Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994). Therefore, if federal jurisdiction is doubtful, remand to state court is required. See Marshall v. Manville Sales Corp., 6 F.3d 229, 232 (4th Cir. 1993).

Unless a matter involves an area over which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction, a district court has subject matter jurisdiction over a case only where the matter involves a federal question arising “under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“federal question jurisdiction”), or if “the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs, and is between citizens of different States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (“diversity jurisdiction”). In examining whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over a case, the Court looks at the allegations and claims set forth in the Complaint. See Flying Pigs, LLC v. RRAJ Franchising, LLC, 757 F.3d 177, 181 (4th Cir. 2014).

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Receipt Rule
*3 The federal removal statue provides:
[t]he notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within thirty days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever period is shorter.

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). The defendant bears the burden of proof in a removal action. See Leverton v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 991 F.Supp. 481, 483 (E.D.Va.1997) (“The advocate of the federal forum carries the burden of demonstrating compliance with the 30–day removal period mandated by Section 1446(b).”) (citing Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994)). The thirty-day window for removal is designed to prevent “undue delay in removal and the concomitant waste of state judicial resources.” Lovern v. Gen. Motors Corp., 121 F.3d 160, at 163 (4th Cir. 1997). Moreover, removal statutes are to be construed strictly, narrowly, and against removal. See Kluksdahl v. Muro Pharmaceutical, Inc., 886 F.Supp. 535, 539 (E.D.Va.1995) (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108–09, (1941)). The first-served defendant “must petition for removal within thirty days” from when they receive service. See McKinney, 955 F.2d 924, at 926. Accordingly, if the first-served defendant does file a notice of removal, the later-served defendants may either join the notice or decline to do so. Barbour v. Int’l Union, 640 F.3d 599, 611 (4th Cir. 2011)

Plaintiff argues that the defendant Husley did not properly remove the instant case to federal court within the 30-day period, which Plaintiff contends commenced on August 29, 2020—the date that Hulsey received the Summons and Complaint along with the attached Notice from the DMV by certified mail. ECF No. 6. at Exhibits 1 and 2. Accordingly, Plaintiff urges the Court to adopt the “receipt rule” for computing the time in which a defendant must remove a case to federal court. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that while the Summons and Complaint were delivered to Hulsey’s address on August 29, 2020, Hulsey was not at his house at that time and he did not actually possess the Summons and Complaint until September 1, 2020. See ECF No. 8 at 3. Thus, Defendants urge the Court to follow a rule of “actual possession.” Id.

There exists a split of authority respecting the commencement of the 30-day period provided in Section 1446(b). On one hand, historically a majority of federal circuit courts have adopted the “receipt rule,” which holds that the 30–day period commences when the defendant actually receives a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claims for relief.2 However, other courts have followed the “proper service rule,” under which the language of Section 1446(b) is interpreted to mean that the statutory time period commences only upon proper service of process.3

*4 In the Eastern District of Virginia, courts have adopted the “receipt rule” and held that the 30–day period commences when the defendant comes into possession of a copy of the initial pleading, without regard to whether the delivery thereof satisfies the formalities of state service-of-process rules. See, e.g., Miller v. Chemetron Fire Sys., Inc., Civ.A.No.2:94CV1264, 1996 WL 650141, at *3 (E.D.Va. July 1, 1996); Barreca v. Air Structures, Inc., Civ.No.3:93CV711, 1994 WL 827110 (E.D.Va. Jan. 24, 1994); Kluksdahl v. Muro Pharmaceutical, Inc., 886 F.Supp. 535, 539–40 (E.D.Va.1995); Hamilton v. Chrysler Corp., No. Civ.A.96–0992–R, 1997 WL 17662, at *1 (W.D.Va. Jan. 16, 1997); Moore v. K–Mart Corp., Civ.A.No.94–0057–L, 1994 WL 824518 (W.D.Va. Dec. 15, 1994); Shoemaker v. GAF Corp., 814 F.Supp. 495, 498 (W.D.Va. 1993); Murphy v. Allora, 977 F. Supp. 748, 750 (E.D. Va. 1997).

Notably, in Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant’s time to remove “is triggered by simultaneous service of the summons and complaint, or receipt of the complaint, ‘through service or otherwise,’ after and apart from service of the summons, but not by mere receipt of the complaint unattended by any formal service.” 526 U.S. 344, at 348 (1999).

Therefore, consistent with other courts, the Court, based on the plain language of § 1446(b), also adopts the receipt rule rather than the proper service rule. The removal statute explicitly ties the running of the thirty-day removal period to “receipt by the defendant,” and not to service on the defendant. See Kurihara v. CH2M Hill, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 2d 533, 535 (E.D. Va. 1998). Accordingly, the defendant’s time to remove commences when he or she receives both service of the summons and complaint through formal process. See Murphy Bros. Nothing in the statute itself and the case law reasonably suggests any other interpretation, and the Court therefore will adopt the receipt rule for computing the time in which a defendant must remove a case to federal court. The Court declines to reject the receipt rule in light of the plain and clear language of the removal statute.

B. Notice of Removal Was Not Timely Filed
Having adopted the receipt rule, the next step is to apply that rule to the facts of this case to determine whether the notice of removal was timely filed. It is undisputed that on August 29, 2020, Hulsey received the Summons and Complaint along with an attached Notice from the DMV by certified mail. ECF No. 6. at Exhibits 1 and 2. The question, however, is whether receipt of both the Summons and Complaint with the Notice was sufficient to trigger the running of the removal period. Again, the plain language of § 1446(b) provides that receipt must be of “a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based.” Based on Murphy Bros., receipt is triggered by simultaneous service of the summons and complaint. 526 U.S. 344, at 348 (1999). Here, defendant Hulsey received the Summons and Complaint by certified mail with an attached Notice from the DMV, on August 29, 2020 at his address in Temple, Georgia pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-308 and 310. see, ECF No. 6. at Exhibits 1 and 2. Notably, Hulsey signed the “green card” receipt when he received the Summons, Complaint, and Notice. Id. Although Defendants argue that Hulsey did not actually “lay eyes” on the Summons and Complaint until September 1, 2020, the removal statute explicitly starts the 30-day removal period to “receipt by the defendant” through proper formal service. ECF No. 8 at 3.

*5 Therefore, the Court finds that defendant’s Hulsey’s period to remove commenced on August 29, 2020. Accordingly, Hulsey’s removal to federal court, filed on September 29, 2020, was untimely.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s case is remanded to the Circuit Court for the City of Portsmouth, Virginia.

The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to provide a copy of this Order to the parties.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Norfolk, Virginia

All Citations
Slip Copy, 2020 WL 7130786

Footnotes

1
Any operation in the Commonwealth of a motor vehicle by a nonresident, including those nonresidents defined in subdivision 2 of § 8.01-307, either in person or by an agent or employee, shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment by such nonresident of the Commissioner of the Department of Motor Vehicles, and his successors in office, to be the attorney or statutory agent of such nonresident for the purpose of service of process in any action against him growing out of any accident or collision in which such nonresident, his agent, or his employee may be involved while operating motor vehicles in this Commonwealth. Acceptance by a nonresident of the rights and privileges conferred by Article 5 (§ 46.2-655 et seq.) of Chapter 6 of Title 46.2 shall have the same effect under this section as the operation of such motor vehicle, by such nonresident, his agent, or his employee. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-308.

2
See Reece v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 839 (5th Cir. 1996) (reversed by Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, (1999)); Roe v. O’Donohue, 38 F.3d 298 (7th Cir. 1994) (reversed by Murphy Bros., Inc.); Tech Hills II Assocs. v. Phoenix Home Life Mut. Ins. Co., 5 F.3d 963 (6th Cir. 1993); Mermelstein v. Maki, 830 F.Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Trepel v. Kohn, Milstein, Cohen & Hausfeld, 789 F.Supp. 881 (E.D. Mich. 1992); Pillin’s Place, Inc. v. Bank One, 771 F.Supp. 205 (N.D. Ohio 1991); Conticommodity Servs., Inc. v. Perl, 663 F.Supp. 27 (N.D. Ill. 1987).

3
See Bowman v. Weeks Marine, Inc., 936 F.Supp. 329 (D.S.C.1996); Bullard v. Am. Airlines, 929 F.Supp. 1284 (W.D.Mo.1996); Estate ofBaratt v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins., Co., 787 F.Supp. 333 (W.D.N.Y.1992); Marion Corp. v. Lloyds Bank. PLC, 738 F.Supp. 1377 (S.D. Ala. 1990); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Fuji Photo Film Co., 645 F.Supp. 37 (S.D.Fla. 1986); Thomason v. Republic Ins., Co., 630 F.Supp. 331 (E.D.Cal. 1986); Love v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., Co., 542 F.Supp. 65 (N.D.Ga.1982) (Implied Overruling Recognized by Beal Bank, S.S.B. v. CJP, L.L.C., N.D.Ga., November 6, 1997).

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