United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta Division

May 14, 2024, Decided; May 14, 2024, Filed

CIVIL ACTION FILE NO. 1:22-CV-3860-TWT

Reporter

2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86340 *; 2024 WL 2171934

ALLYSON PERRY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. WILLIAM CUMMINGS, et al., Defendants.

Core Terms

negligent hiring, supervision, negligent supervision, hired, partial summary judgment, summary judgment, material fact, Undisputed, driver, genuine issue of material fact, speeding ticket, deposition, training, driving, affirmative evidence, reasonable jury, present case, truck driver, Transport, nonmovant, pleadings, genuine, lone

Counsel:  [*1] For Allyson Marie Perry, Jaquavis Mikel France, Plaintiffs: Chauncey Napoleon Brown Barnwell, LEAD ATTORNEY, Brown Barnwell PC, Johns Creek, GA.

For William Michael Cummings, Lenk Express, LLC, Ryan Ryan Transport, LLC, Defendants: Geoffrey Felix Calderaro, Freeman, Mathis & Gary, Atlanta, GA; Marc Howard Bardack, Freeman Mathis & Gary, LLP -Atl, Atlanta, GA.

Judges: THOMAS W. THRASH, JR., United States District Judge.

Opinion by: THOMAS W. THRASH, JR.

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

This is a personal injury action. It is before the Court on the Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. 47], which is GRANTED.

I. Background¹

This case arises from a car accident between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant William Cummings that occurred on March 26, 2021. (Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 1). At the time of the accident, Cummings was operating a tractor–trailer for the Defendant Ryan Transport, LLC, who was assigned to transport the load by the Defendant Lenk Express, LLC. (Pls.’ Statement of Additional Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 16-19). Ryan hired Cummings in June 2020, and Cummings was not involved in any accidents, nor did he receive any citations or points on his CDL license, prior to the accident [*2]  giving rise to this suit. (Defs.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶¶ 5, 7). Prior to his employment with Ryan, Cummings received two speeding tickets and a citation for following too closely between 2015 and 2017. (Id. ¶ 10). The Plaintiffs brought the present case against the Defendants on September 26, 2022, asserting claims of negligence, imputed liability, and negligent hiring, training, and supervision. On October 10, 2023, the Court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on the Plaintiffs’ negligent hiring and training claims against Lenk and the negligent training claim against Ryan. The Defendants now move for partial summary judgment as to the negligent hiring and supervision claims against Ryan and the negligent supervision claim against Lenk.

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits submitted by the parties show that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c). The court should view the evidence and draw any inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970). The party seeking summary judgment must first identify [*3]  grounds that show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant, who must go beyond the pleadings and present affirmative evidence to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986).

III. Discussion

The Defendants move for partial summary judgment as to the Plaintiffs’ negligent supervision claims against Lenk and Ryan and negligent hiring claim against Ryan. (Br. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., at 1). They contend that the undisputed facts establish that Cummings had an exemplary safety record while he worked for Ryan until the accident at issue and note that his lone citation for following too closely in 2017 does not require a finding of a tendency to engage in the behavior that allegedly caused the accident. (Id. at 2, 4). In response, the Plaintiffs argue that the Defendants’ Motion is untimely pursuant to the Scheduling Order and that summary judgment is premature because genuine issues of fact remain as to whether the Defendants were negligent in their hiring and supervision of Cummings. (Pls.’ Resp. Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., at 3-8).

The Court finds the Defendants’ Motion to be timely and meritorious. [*4]  As to the former, the Defendants Motion is timely under Local Rule 56.1(D) after the Court extended discovery to allow for the deposition of the Plaintiffs’ proffered expert Linda Day, which encompassed the issues of negligent supervision and hiring before the Court in this Motion. And as to the latter, the Defendants carried their initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact regarding Cummings’ driving that would support a claim of negligent hiring or supervision by the Defendants. (Br. in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Partial Summ. J., at 3-4 (citing Cummings’ driving record and the deposition and affidavit of Lenk and Ryan representatives who viewed Cummings as a safe driver)). But in response, the Plaintiffs fail to present any affirmative evidence to suggest that the Defendants negligently hired or supervised Cummings in some manner. (Pls.’ Resp. Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J., at 6-8). Instead, they merely rely on evidence of two speeding tickets and a citation for following too closely between 2015 and 2017 in support of their position that a reasonable jury could find that such evidence could support a claim for negligent supervision and hiring.

The Court disagrees [*5]  with the Plaintiffs’ argument. First, traffic citations that occurred more than three years before a driver was hired in no way implicate any potential negligent supervision of that driver. And second, “[n]o reasonable jury could find that [a truck driver] was accident-prone based on two speeding tickets [and a citation for following too closely] over the course of a decade.” Hughey v. KTV’s Transp., LLC, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56418, 2022 WL 902841, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 2022). Moreover, the lone case on which the Plaintiffs rely in support of their position is grossly distinguishable from the facts of the present case. See Collins v. GKD Mgmt., LP, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219322, 2023 WL 8351543, at *1, *12 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 3, 2023) (allowing claims of negligent hiring and supervision to proceed to a jury in a wrongful death action where the truck driver who caused the injuries had “a driving citation, three roadside inspections, a previous accident, and a ‘call-in’ report about [the truck driver’s] speeding—all occurring within or around a year prior to the accident in this case”). Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the Defendants is proper as to the negligent hiring and supervision theories against Ryan under Count V and as to the negligent supervision theory against Lenk under Count III.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. [*6]  47] is GRANTED.

SO ORDERED, this 14th day of May, 2024.

/s/ Thomas W. Thrash, Jr.

THOMAS W. THRASH, JR.

United States District Judge

End of Document

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¹ The operative facts on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment are taken from the parties’ Statements of Undisputed Material Facts and the responses thereto. The Court will deem the parties’ factual assertions, where supported by evidentiary citations, admitted unless the respondent makes a proper objection under Local Rule 56.1(B).

United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, Anderson/greenwood Division

May 3, 2024, Decided; May 3, 2024, Filed

C.A. No. 8:21-cv-02159-DCC

Reporter

2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81186 *

Quality Express, LLC, Plaintiff, v. Crane Transport, LLC, and Stanley Hart, Individually, Defendants.

Core Terms

genuine, summary judgment, material fact, non-moving, summary judgment motion, movant, driver

Counsel:  [*1] For Quality Express LLC, Plaintiff: Adrianne LaVonne Turner, LEAD ATTORNEY, Boykin and Davis, Columbia, SC.

For Crane Transport LLC, Stanley Hart, Individually, Defendants: Elizabeth Fulton Morrison, LEAD ATTORNEY, Whelan Mellen and Norris LLC, Charleston, SC; Daniel Richard Fuerst, Moore & Van Allen (Chas), Charleston, SC; Joseph D Thompson, III, Hall Booth Smith (Chas), Charleston, SC.

Judges: Donald C. Coggins, Jr., United States District Judge.

Opinion by: Donald C. Coggins, Jr.

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Crane Transport, LLC¹ (“Defendant Crane Transport”) and Defendant Stanley Hart’s (“Defendant Hart”) Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 68. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition and Amended Response in Opposition. ECF Nos. 70, 79. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted.

BACKGROUND

This case arises from commercial truck collision that occurred on September 19, 2019, in Anderson County, South Carolina. ECF No. 1-1 at 3. Plaintiff employed James Fields (“Fields”) as a commercial driver. Id. At approximately 2:45 a.m., Fields collided with a tractor trailer operated by Defendant Hart—a commercial truck driver employed by Defendant Crane Transport—and parked [*2]  in the emergency lane on Interstate 85. Id. at 2-3. Defendant Hart allegedly failed to use safety or warning signals before parking the tractor trailer. Id. at 4. On May 3, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Complaint, asserting causes of action for negligence/negligence per se, negligent entrustment, and negligent hiring, supervision and retention. ECF No. 1-1 at 4-9. On July 18, 2021, Defendants removed the case to federal court. ECF No. 1 at 3. On December 26, 2023, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 68. On January 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition, and Defendant filed a Reply. ECF Nos. 70, 71. Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend/Supplement Previously Submitted Response to Summary Judgment on February 6, 2024, to include an omitted affidavit and exhibits, which the Court granted on February 9, 2024. ECF Nos. 74 at 1; 75. On February 21, 2024, Plaintiff re-filed its Response with the omitted documents. ECF No. 79. Accordingly, this matter is ripe for review.

APPLICABLE LAW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant [*3]  is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. When determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S. Ct. 993, 8 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1962).

The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant’s position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary [*4]  judgment motion. Ross v. Commc’ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 104 L. Ed. 2d 268 (1989). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Further, Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:

A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Accordingly, when Rule 56(c) has shifted the burden of proof to the non-movant, he must produce evidence of a factual dispute on every element essential to his action that he bears the burden of adducing at a trial on the merits.

ANALYSIS

As an initial matter, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has no evidence to deny summary judgment because “Plaintiff [*5]  has not served any discovery requests on either defendant, has not noticed or taken a single deposition, and has not identified any expert witnesses.” ECF No. 68-1 at 5. Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence to support its claims for negligence, negligent entrustment, and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. Id. at 7-13. Further, Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s driver acted negligently by allegedly improperly changing lanes and crossing the fog line boundary, which “was the sole proximate cause of the collision and Plaintiff’s damages.” Id. at 13. Moreover, Defendants contend that even if Plaintiff provided some evidence that Defendants acted negligently in causing the collision, the negligence of Plaintiff’s driver “overwhelmingly exceeded 50% as a matter of law and caused Plaintiff’s alleged damages.” Id. at 14-15.

In contrast, Plaintiff contends that “Defendants are not entitled to [s]ummary [j]udgment because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether, and to what extent, [Defendant] Hart was at fault for the occurrence of the accident[.]” ECF No. 79 at 4. Plaintiff argues that it is undisputed that Defendant Hart parked the tractor [*6]  trailer on the shoulder of Interstate 85 in a non-emergency situation and allegedly failed to take “statutorily mandated precautions to ensure his own safety as well as the safety of other drivers[.]” Id. In addition, Plaintiff asserts that it has a right held inviolate to cross-examine Defendants’ theories of liability at trial. Id. at 5. Lastly, Plaintiff contends that Defendants’ Motion should be denied because it “suffered catastrophic business losses due to the Defendant[s’] negligence.” Id.

Having reviewed the arguments and submissions of the parties, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. “[S]ummary judgment is appropriate only ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'” Brocious v. United States Steel Corp., 429 F. Supp. 3d 82, 86 (D. Md. 2019). “The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute of material facts.” Id. (citing Casey v. Geek Squad, 823 F. Supp. 2d 334, 348 (D. Md. 2011)); see also Rayburn v. Forrest Cnty. Miss., C.A. No. 2:20-cv-155-KS-MTP, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206706, 2022 WL 16921824, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 12, 2022) (stating that “[a] party moving for summary judgment may meet its initial burden by pointing out ‘the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party’s case'”) (quoting Duffy v. Leading Edge Prods., Inc., 44 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 1995)). In addition, “summary judgment shall be warranted if the non-moving party fails to provide evidence [*7]  that establishes an essential element of the case.” Brocious, 429 F. Supp. 3d at 86 (citing Casey, 823 F. Supp. at 352).

Here, there is no genuine issue of material fact to warrant denying Defendants’ Motion. While Plaintiff argues that Defendants acted negligently, it has presented no evidence to support any element in the causes of action listed in the Complaint.² Although Plaintiff claims it is undisputed that Defendant Hart parked the tractor trailer on the shoulder of Interstate 85 without employing required precautions, there is no evidence in the form of affidavits, depositions, stipulations, admissions, or otherwise to support that claim. Similarly, none of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants are supported by any identifiable evidence. Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [68] is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Donald C. Coggins, Jr.

United States District Judge

May 3, 2024

Spartanburg, South Carolina

End of Document

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¹ In its Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant Crane Transport, LLC asserts that Plaintiff incorrectly identified it as such in the Complaint and that its actual name is Crane Transport, Inc. ECF No. 68-1 at 1.

² With respect to Plaintiff’s argument that it may cross-examine Defendants’ theories of liability at trial, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to defeat summary judgment and proceed to trial.