Taurean STEPHENS, Plaintiff,

v.

SWIFT TRANSPORTATION CO. OF ARIZONA, LLC, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:22-CV-01403-JPB

|

Signed August 1, 2024

Attorneys and Law Firms

James Foster, Foster Law LLC, Mobile, AL, Charles Michael Denney Jr., Eric Funt, Darl Champion, The Champion Firm, P.C., Marietta, GA, for Plaintiff.

Amelia Kay Ortiz, Sharon Rachel Opila, Melissa C. Greene, Copeland Stair Valz & Lovell, LLP, Atlanta, GA, Tim Peacock, Hudson Lambert Parrott, LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant WHV Transportation LLC.

ORDER

J. P. BOULEE, United States District Judge

*1 This matter is before the Court on WHV Transportation, LLC’s (“WHV”) Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 121] and Swift Transportation Company of Arizona, LLC’s (“Swift”) Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 122]. This Court finds as follows:

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This lawsuit arises from a hit and run accident that occurred on November 30, 2021. On April 11, 2022, Taurean Stephens (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Swift. [Doc. 1]. On July 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint against both Swift and WHV (collectively, “Defendants”). [Doc. 21]. With permission of the Court, on March 24, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint against Defendants seeking to recover damages for injuries that he sustained in the hit and run. [Doc. 50]. In addition to Defendants, Plaintiff served Amerisure Insurance Company (“Amerisure”) as an unnamed defendant under the theory that Defendants are uninsured or underinsured motorists under O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11.

Discovery in this matter closed on November 9, 2023. Thereafter, on December 11, 2023, WHV filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. [Doc. 121]. The same day, Swift also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. [Doc. 122]. While Amerisure filed oppositions to both motions, Plaintiff did not. Both motions are ripe for review.

BACKGROUND

The Court derives the facts of this case from WHV’s Statement of Material Facts [Doc. 121-4], Amerisure’s Response to Statement of Material Facts [Doc. 133], Swift’s Statement of Material Facts [Doc. 122-8], WHV’s Response to Statement of Material Facts [Doc. 129-1] and Amerisure’s Response to Statement of Material Facts [Doc. 135].

As an initial matter, the Court notes that portions of WHV’s Statement of Material Facts do not comply with the Local Rules. The Local Rules state that the Court will not consider any fact that is “(a) not supported by a citation to evidence (including page or paragraph number); (b) supported by a citation to a pleading rather than to evidence; [or] (c) stated as an issue or legal conclusion.” LR 56.1(B)(1), NDGa. Here, some of WHV’s facts are supported only by a pleading, are legal conclusions or cite to a deposition generally. In accordance with the Local Rules, this Court will not consider unsupported facts or facts couched as conclusions.

The Court also notes that both WHV and Amerisure’s Responses to Swift’s Statement of Material Facts fail to comply with the Local Rules. The Local Rules of this Court require a respondent to a summary judgment motion to include with his responsive brief “a response to the movant’s statement of undisputed facts.” LR 56.1(B)(2)(a), NDGa. The Local Rules state that the Court

will deem each of the movant’s facts as admitted unless the respondent: (i) directly refutes the movant’s fact with concise responses supported by specific citations to evidence (including page or paragraph number); (ii) states a valid objection to the admissibility of the movant’s fact; or (iii) points out that the movant’s citation does not support the movant’s fact or that the movant’s fact is not material or otherwise has failed to comply with the provisions set out in LR 56.1(B)(1).

*2 LR 56.1(B)(2)(a)(2), NDGa. Here, in response to some of Swift’s facts, WHV responded that it has “conducted a reasonable inquiry into this matter and the information known or readily obtainable by it is insufficient for it to admit or deny this statement.” [Doc. 129-1, p. 2]. Similarly, Amerisure¹ stated that it “has conducted a reasonable inquiry and is unable to admit or deny these allegations.” [Doc. 135, p. 4]. Because neither WHV nor Amerisure directly refuted those specific facts, stated a valid objection to the facts or pointed out that the facts are not material, the Court deems those facts admitted. Consequently, for the purpose of adjudicating the instant motion, the facts of this case are as follows:

On November 29, 2021, a Swift driver pulling a Swift trailer (SWFZ 130264) delivered a load to the Amazon facility located in or near Jefferson, Georgia. [Doc. 122-8, p. 2]. After delivering the load, the Swift driver unhooked the Swift trailer and departed the Amazon facility with a different, empty trailer. Id. at 3.

On November 30, 2021, the day after the Swift driver delivered the trailer, the Swift trailer was involved in an accident. Indeed, Plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle when a tractor-trailer driven by an unknown person struck his vehicle and failed to stop. Id. at 1. During the accident, Plaintiff observed information on both the subject tractor and trailer. As to the tractor specifically, Plaintiff noted the tractor number (2808143), the United States Department of Transportation number (3291416) and the Standard Carrier Alpha Code (AGHPR).² Id. at 2. Particularly relevant here, it is undisputed that the United States Department of Transportation number, which was on the tractor, belonged to WHV. Id. For the trailer, Plaintiff noted the trailer number (SWFZ 130264) and the license plate number (P319212). Id. While this is the same Swift trailer that was delivered to the Amazon facility on November 29, 2021, it is undisputed that neither a Swift driver nor a Swift tractor was involved in the accident on November 30, 2021. Id. at 3. It is also undisputed that Swift did not know, authorize or approve WHV (or anyone else) to pull the trailer from the Amazon facility on November 30, 2021. Id. at 4.

After learning about the incident, Swift conducted its own investigation of the accident. [Doc. 133, p. 4]. As part of that investigation, Hannah Osborne, a Swift employee, sent an email to Sonya Nussbaum, an Amazon employee, to inquire about who took the Swift trailer from the Amazon facility on the day in question. Id. Replying through email, Nussbaum told Osborne that she “contacted the facility, and was notified that WHV Transportation LLC pulled the trailer out with tractor 2808143” on November 30, 2021. Id. at 6; [Doc. 122-8, p. 4].

LEGAL STANDARD

*3 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a “court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” A material fact is any fact that “is a legal element of the claim under the applicable substantive law which might affect the outcome of the case.” Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997). A genuine dispute exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Ultimately, “[t]he basic issue before the court on a motion for summary judgment is ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’ ” Allen, 121 F.3d at 646 (citation omitted).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact, “and in deciding whether the movant has met this burden the court must view the movant’s evidence and all factual inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Id. After the movant satisfies this initial burden, the nonmovant bears the burden of showing specific facts that indicate summary judgment is improper because a material issue of fact does exist. Id. However, “[a] mere ‘scintilla’ of evidence supporting the opposing party’s position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). If the record taken as a whole cannot lead “a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is ‘no genuine issue for trial.’ ” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

Two summary judgment motions are pending in this case. The Court will address WHV’s Motion for Summary Judgment first.

I. WHV’s Motion for Summary Judgment

WHV contends that it is entitled to summary judgment because the only evidence against it—the email written by Nussbaum (an Amazon employee) to Osborne indicating that WHV pulled out the trailer—constitutes inadmissible hearsay³ that cannot be considered when deciding the instant motion. Specifically, WHV argues that the email cannot be considered because the person that Nussbaum contacted at the Amazon facility is unknown or has otherwise not been identified. In contrast, Amerisure argues that the email should be considered because “it remains possible that the declarant will be called to testify at trial” and “Nussbaum likely knows who she contacted” at the Amazon facility. [Doc. 132, p. 5]; [Doc. 133, p. 7].

The Court need not decide whether it can consider the email in deciding the instant motion because Plaintiff is not without other evidence to support his claim. Specifically, the record contains evidence that Plaintiff observed the United States Department of Transportation number on the side of the tractor. Evidence also exists that the number belongs to WHV, which ties WHV to the accident. Because Plaintiff is not without other evidence to support his claim, WHV’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 121] is DENIED.

II. Swift’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Swift argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff has not, and cannot, come forward with evidence showing that a Swift driver or Swift tractor was involved in the subject accident. The Court agrees.

*4 As a general rule, “[t]o recover damages based upon a defendant’s negligence, a plaintiff must show that the defendant’s acts or omissions proximately caused the injury.” Biddy v. City of Cartersville, 638 S.E.2d 874, 876 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006). Importantly, “Georgia law is abundantly clear that the mere presence of lettering or a logo on the side of a vehicle, without more, is insufficient to establish liability.” Id.

This Court acknowledges that Swift’s trailer was involved in the accident in this case. Swift, however, presented undisputed evidence that neither a Swift driver nor a Swift tractor was involved in the accident.⁴ Swift also presented uncontroverted evidence that it did not know, authorize or approve of anyone pulling the subject trailer from the Amazon facility on November 30, 2021. Because Plaintiff failed to show that Swift had any involvement with the accident at issue or that his alleged injuries were caused by an act or omission of Swift, Swift’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 122] is GRANTED.⁵

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court DENIES WHV’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 121] and GRANTS Swift’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. 122].

The remaining parties are HEREBY ORDERED to file the Consolidated Pretrial Order required by Local Rule 16.4 within twenty-one days of entry of this Order. The parties are notified that a failure to comply with this Order may result in sanctions, including dismissal of the case or entry of default judgment. In the event that a Consolidated Pretrial Order is not filed, the Clerk is DIRECTED to submit the case at the expiration of the twenty-one-day period.

If the parties would like a stay of this deadline to allow them to conduct mediation, they may file a motion to that effect. The parties are reminded that the Court can refer this case to mediation before a Magistrate Judge at no cost. If the parties would like such a referral, they may make such a request in the motion.

SO ORDERED this 1st day of August, 2024.

All Citations

Slip Copy, 2024 WL 3626635

Footnotes
1	Amerisure also did not comply with the Local Rules in a critical respect. In its Response to Swift’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Amerisure sets forth numerous facts that are included only in the brief and not in a separate Statement of Additional Material Facts. The Local Rules provide that a respondent to a summary judgment motion shall include with its response brief “[a] statement of additional facts which the respondent contends are material and present a genuine issue for trial. Such separate statement of material facts must meet the requirements set out in LR 56.1(B)(1).” LR 56.1(B)(2)(b), NDGa. The facts provided by Amerisure do not comply with the requirements of Local Rule 56.1(B)(1) because they are not provided in a separate document and are not numbered. These facts will thus not be considered.
2	WHV disputes that Plaintiff wrote down the USDOT number or had personal knowledge of the USDOT number. Plaintiff, however, stated in his interrogatories that he wrote down the USDOT number from the truck. [Doc. 122-2, p. 18]. Whether he wrote down the number or not is a jury issue.
3	The email drafted by Nussbaum and sent to Osborne is undoubtedly hearsay to the extent that it is used to prove the truth of the matter asserted—i.e., that WHV pulled out the trailer. It is hearsay because Nussbaum is conveying to Osborne facts that she learned from someone else at the Amazon facility.
4	Swift presented deposition testimony to support this assertion that it was not involved in the accident. In response, both WHV and Amerisure stated that a reasonable inquiry was conducted, and the fact could not be admitted or denied. The fact was thus deemed admitted pursuant to the Local Rules.
5	While Amerisure admits that “a jury may well accept Swift’s explanation that it only owned the trailer, and through no fault of Swift’s, someone hooked it up to a truck and pulled it to a different part of the country without Swift’s knowledge or permission,” Amerisure argues that “one of two things plausibly happened in this case.” [Doc. 134, p. 8–9]. “One possibility is that Swift continued to contract with an operator after knowing that operator hauled Swift’s equipment around impermissibly, indifferent to the consequences of failing to safeguard its own equipment.” Id. at 8. “The other possibility is that the relationship between Swift and WHV pertaining to the subject trailer … was in reality a joint venture wherein Swift was not compelled to ‘authorize’ WHV to do anything.” Id. These possibilities offered by Amerisure are pure speculation and unsupported by the evidence. As stated previously in this order, Amerisure did not submit a Statement of Material Facts to be considered by the Court.

End of Document

© 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

Elisa RIVERA, Administratrix of the Estate of Samantha Figueroa, Plaintiff,

v.

CONVOY, INC., Procter & Gamble Distributing, LLC, Premier Trailer Leasing, Inc. Prowheeler, LLC, Trans Terra Express, LLC, and Uriel Estrada, Defendants.

3:23-CV-01353 (SVN)

|

Signed August 13, 2024

Attorneys and Law Firms

Kevin Ferry, Samuel Martin, Law Office of Kevin C. Ferry, LLC, New Britain, CT, for Plaintiff.

Kenneth B. Walton, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Boston, MA, Jennifer Elyse Karr, Christy E. Jachimowski, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Hartford, CT, for Defendants Convoy, Inc.

Kevin J. Greene, Kevin M. Roche, Halloran & Sage, LLP, Hartford, CT, for Defendant Premier Trailer Leasing, Inc.

Michael P. Kenney, Steven H. Malitz, Tara Anne Sheldon, Freeman Mathis & Gary LLP, Hartford, CT, for Defendants Prowheeler LLC, Uriel Estrada.

Christy E. Jachimowski, Jennifer Elyse Karr, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP, Hartford, CT, Kenneth B. Walton, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Boston, MA, for Defendant Procter & Gamble Distributing, LLC.

RULING AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT PREMIER TRAILER LEASING, INC.’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Sarala V. Nagala, United States District Judge.

*1 In this diversity action, Plaintiff Elisa Rivera, Administratrix of the Estate of Samantha Figueroa, brings claims related to the death of Ms. Figueroa following a highway collision. Plaintiff has sued Uriel Estrada, the driver of a tractor–trailer that collided with Ms. Figueroa; Convoy, Inc., a company that brokered a load of freight carried by Estrada; Procter & Gamble Distributing, LLC, whose freight Estrada was carrying; Premier Trailer Leasing, Inc., which had leased the trailer Estrada had been pulling; and Prowheeler, LLC and Trans Terra Express, LLC, trucking companies associated with Estrada. Compl., ECF No. 1–1, ¶¶ 2, 4, 13, 28, 31–32; id. at 34, ¶ 95–98.

Relevant here, Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant Premier negligently entrusted the trailer to Estrada. Id. at 56–57, ¶¶ 106–08. Premier has moved to dismiss this claim, arguing that the Graves Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 30106, bars it, and that Plaintiff has not otherwise stated a claim for negligent entrustment. For the following reasons, the Court agrees with Premier. Count Fourteen of the complaint is thus DISMISSED, and Plaintiff is granted leave to amend.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The complaint contains the following allegations, which are accepted as true for the purpose of this motion. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 55 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

The defendants named by Plaintiff operate in different roles in the trucking industry. Estrada owns Prowheeler, a trucking company with one truck and one operator (Estrada). Compl., ¶¶ 2, 31, 49; id. at 34, ¶ 95.¹ Plaintiff alleges Estrada has a history of driving violations, including that he had received several traffic citations, was arrested for driving under the influence, had been involved in two crashes, and had his commercial license suspended on various occasions, including the night of his collision with Ms. Figueroa. Id. ¶¶ 37–48.

Convoy is a trucking logistics startup company that operates an application through which trucking companies can be engaged to carry loads of freight. Id. ¶¶ 5–10. Convoy has an agreement to haul freight for Procter & Gamble. Id. ¶ 56. In late October 2021, Convoy posted a load of Procter & Gamble freight on the Internet, and Estrada, who was then in Pennsylvania, agreed on October 24, 2021, to haul the load through his company Prowheeler. Id. ¶¶ 63–65, 72–73. Prowheeler had leased a trailer from Premier. Id. ¶ 28. Estrada drove his tractor, with Premier’s trailer in tow, to pick up the load. Id. ¶¶ 73–77. Estrada proceeded to the Rochambeau Bridge on I-84 East near Newtown, Connecticut, in rainy, foggy, and misty conditions. Id. ¶¶ 79–81.

Around 3:28 a.m., Ms. Figueroa’s vehicle had become disabled on the bridge, and she exited her vehicle to flag down help. Id. ¶ 83. Although the shoulder was narrow where she had stopped, another car safely avoided her. Id. ¶ 85. Two minutes later, Estrada’s tractor-trailer collided with Ms. Figueroa’s vehicle, which then hit Ms. Figueroa and projected her onto the pavement, causing her severe injuries. Id. ¶¶ 83, 86–87. Ms. Figueroa died at the hospital later that morning. Id. ¶ 92.

*2 Plaintiff Elisa Rivera, the Administratrix of Ms. Figueroa’s estate, subsequently brought this action, alleging various types of negligence claims against Defendants, including a claim for negligent entrustment against Premier (Count Fourteen).² Plaintiff alleges that Premier and Prowheeler are parties to various agreements that allow Premier to collect rent from Prowheeler and otherwise enforce certain requirements, such as failure to maintain proper licensing, by demanding return of the trailer. Id. at 57, ¶ 107. Plaintiff further alleges that Premier knew, or reasonably should have known, that Estrada would use the trailer it leased to Prowheeler in a manner that would cause an unreasonable risk of injury to others, and that it nonetheless permitted Estrada to use it when it should have known he was unqualified to do so. Id. at 58, ¶ 108. Premier now moves to dismiss that claim as barred by the Graves Amendment, a statute that shields commercial owners of motor vehicles from liability in certain situations. Def. Premier Trailer Leasing, Inc.’s Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 39.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a defendant may move to dismiss a case or cause of action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, highly detailed allegations are not required, but the complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. This plausibility standard is not a “probability requirement,” but imposes a standard higher than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. In undertaking this analysis, the Court must “draw all reasonable inferences in [the plaintiff’s] favor, assume all well-pleaded factual allegations to be true, and determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The Court is not “bound to accept conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions,” Rolon v. Henneman, 517 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2008), and “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Consequently, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Ultimately, “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will … be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.

III. DISCUSSION

The Court holds that Count Fourteen of the Complaint fails to state a claim against Premier. The Graves Amendment shields Premier from liability because Plaintiff has not adequately pleaded that Premier negligently entrusted its trailer to Estrada.

The Graves Amendment was “enacted to protect the vehicle rental and leasing industry against claims for vicarious liability where the leasing or rental company’s only relation to the claim was that it was the technical owner.” Rein v. CAB E. LLC, No. 08-CV-2899 (PAC), 2009 WL 1748905, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2009) (citing 151 Cong. Rec. H 1034, 1200 (2005) (statement of Rep. Graves)). The Amendment provides, in relevant part:

(a) In general.—An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the vehicle to a person (or an affiliate of the owner) shall not be liable under the law of any State or political subdivision thereof, by reason of being the owner of the vehicle (or an affiliate of the owner), for harm to persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation, or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease, if—

*3 (1) the owner (or an affiliate of the owner) is engaged in the trade or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles; and

(2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of the owner (or an affiliate of the owner).

49 U.S.C. § 30106(a).

The Amendment thus preempts state law vicarious liability claims against owners of motor vehicles under certain circumstances, if the owner is not itself negligent or criminally liable. See Merchants Ins. Grp. v. Mitsubishi Motor Credit Ass’n, 356 F. App’x 548, 551 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order). Here, it is undisputed that Premier is an owner of a motor vehicle—the trailer—that was leased to Prowheeler, and that Prowheeler is engaged in the trade of leasing motor vehicles. Compl., ¶ 27. The dispositive question for the Court, then, is whether there is negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of Premier, as required by subsection (a)(2).

Subsection (a)(2), known as the savings clause, builds into the Graves Amendment an analysis of whether there was some direct wrong committed by the owner of the vehicle. Its considerations get to the core of the Amendment’s purpose—if a covered owner has done nothing negligent or criminal, it cannot be liable simply for the actions of a renter or lessee. But if a covered owner is itself responsible for some negligent or criminal conduct, then claims under state law may proceed against it.

Because Plaintiff alleges no criminal wrongdoing against Premier, the controlling question is whether Plaintiff has adequately pleaded that Premier acted negligently in some respect. To do so, Count Fourteen would have to meet both the substantive elements of a negligent entrustment claim under Connecticut law and also satisfy basic federal pleading requirements. Count Fourteen fails to do either.

Under Connecticut law, in order to establish a negligent entrustment claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: “(1) the defendant entrusted a potentially dangerous instrumentality to a third person (2) whom the entrustor knows or should know intends or is likely to use the instrumentality in a manner that involves unreasonable risk of physical harm, and (3) such use does in fact cause harm to the entrustee or others.” Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms Int’l, LLC, 331 Conn. 53, 81 (2019). Although the parties do not dispute that Estrada’s use of Premier’s trailer caused harm to Ms. Figueroa, Premier contends that it entrusted the trailer to Prowheeler, not directly to Estrada; and that, in any event, it did not know or should know that Estrada was likely to use the trailer in a manner that involved unreasonable risk of physical harm.

The Court agrees that Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege that Premier entrusted the trailer directly to Estrada, as required under Connecticut law. In Connecticut, liability for negligent entrustment stems only from the conduct of the direct entrustee and not necessarily from the actions of subsequent entrustees. Id. at 80–81 (holding that “a cause of action for negligent entrustment will lie only when the entrustor knows or has reason to know that the direct entrustee is likely to use a dangerous instrumentality in an unsafe manner.”) (emphasis added). In Soto, which involved claims by administrators of the estates of students and faculty who died in the Sandy Hook massacre against the manufacturer of the semiautomatic firearm used by the shooter, Adam Lanza, the plaintiffs argued that the defendants had negligently entrusted the firearm used in the shooting to Lanza’s mother, who intended to give it to her son. Id. at 71–77. The Connecticut Supreme Court refused to extend negligent entrustment liability that far. The court surveyed the history of negligent entrustment case law and noted that it “never has suggested that a cause of action for negligent entrustment—whether involving a vehicle, a weapon, or some other dangerous item—will lie in the absence of evidence that the direct entrustee is likely to use the item unsafely.” Id. at 81. Because the plaintiffs had not alleged that there was any reason to expect that Lanza’s mother, the direct entrustee, was likely to use the firearm in an unsafe manner, they had not stated a claim for negligent entrustment under Connecticut law. Id. at 80–82.

*4 Here, Plaintiff seeks to stretch negligent entrustment liability beyond the direct entrustee, just as the unsuccessful Soto plaintiffs did. Nowhere does Plaintiff allege that Estrada was the direct entrustee of the trailer. Instead, Plaintiff herself alleges that the trailer was leased to Prowheeler “and/or” Convoy and that Premier supplied a trailer “for use by Prowheeler and/or Convoy.” Compl., at 57–58, ¶¶ 106–08. Plaintiff does allege that Premier “permitted” Estrada, Prowheeler, and Convoy to use its trailer. Id. ¶ 108. But given the direct contractual relationship Plaintiff herself alleges between Premier and Prowheeler and the employment relationship she also alleges between Prowheeler and Estrada, the Court cannot reasonably infer that Premier entrusted the trailer specifically to Estrada.

Plaintiff’s attempts to distinguish Soto are not persuasive. She argues that a firearm manufacturer, unlike a motor vehicle leasing company, does not maintain the right to repossess a firearm after its use in an unsafe manner. Pl.’s Opp. Br., ECF No. 45 at 7. But Plaintiff fails to identify any authority supporting this distinction. While Premier may have retained more control over the trailer than the firearms manufacturers did over the firearm in Soto, the fact remains that Premier leased the trailer to Prowheeler, not Estrada. Nor is it correct that firearms cases are in a different category altogether. To the contrary, the Soto court relies on an automobile case in its reasoning and even says that automobiles have become “the primary context” in which negligent entrustment claims have arisen. Soto, 331 Conn. at 79–80 (citing Greeley v. Cunningham, 116 Conn. 515 (1933)).

Plaintiff seeks to have the Court infer that, because Prowheeler is a single-truck, single-operator company, Compl., ¶ 31, Premier should have known that Estrada would haul any trailer it leased to Prowheeler. But Plaintiff fails to allege that Premier knew of Prowheeler’s single-truck, single-operator status, such that this inference would be reasonable. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (noting that a court must draw all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s favor). Perhaps the discovery that has been undertaken in this matter thus far will allow Plaintiff to cure this defect in an amended complaint. The operative complaint, however, does not set forth sufficient facts from which the Court can reasonably ascribe knowledge to Premier of Estrada’s status as Prowheeler’s only driver.³

While Plaintiff’s failure to satisfy the first element of a negligent entrustment claim means the Graves Amendment bars Count Fourteen, the Court nonetheless proceeds with analyzing the constructive knowledge element, for purposes of completeness. It concludes that Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts demonstrating that Premier knew or should have known the entrustee of the trailer was likely to use the trailer in a manner that involves unreasonable risk of physical harm.

*5 Plaintiff’s allegations on this point amount to “threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. While Plaintiff alleges that Estrada had a “long string of driving violations and accidents with numerous license suspensions,” she alleges no facts to support the inference that Premier should have been on notice that Estrada was “an extremely dangerous driver who should not have been behind the wheel of a tractor-trailer truck.” Compl., ¶ 37. She instead seems to argue that the mere existence of past violations and incidents necessitates Premier’s constructive knowledge of those violations and incidents. Not so. Plaintiff has failed to identify any avenues through which Premier should have discovered the driving record of any driver employed by Prowheeler or any other company to which it leased trailers, much less Estrada’s record specifically. Her allegation that Premier “knew, or reasonably should have known, the person to whom the product is supplied is likely to, and does, use the product in a manner involving unreasonable risk of physical injury to the person or others,” Compl., at 58, ¶ 108, is conclusory. In trying to establish that Premier knew or should have known that an entrustee was likely to use the trailer in a manner that involves unreasonable risk or physical harm, Plaintiff simply states just that in plainly formulaic fashion, with no factual support.

Thus, Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege a claim for negligent entrustment under Connecticut law. As a result, the requirements of the Graves Amendment’s savings clause are satisfied, and it bars Plaintiff’s claim against Premier in Count Fourteen.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons described herein, Defendant Premier’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend. See Oliver Schools, Inc. v. Foley, 930 F.2d 248, 253 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Where the possibility exists that the defect can be cured and there is no prejudice to the defendant, leave to amend at least once should normally be granted as a matter of course.”). Plaintiff may file an amended complaint to attempt to remedy the deficiencies identified in this ruling on or before September 3, 2024.

SO ORDERED at Hartford, Connecticut, this 13 day of August, 2024.

All Citations

Slip Copy, 2024 WL 3791183

Footnotes
1	Trans Terra is another trucking company alleged to have been operated by Mr. Estrada. Id. at 34, ¶¶ 95-98.
2	Plaintiff also alleges recklessness claims against Estrada.
3	Plaintiff argues that Premier has not provided an affidavit refuting that it knew or should have known that Estrada would be towing a Premier trailer on the night of the collision, and otherwise argues at various points that a reasonable jury could find in her favor. These arguments misunderstand the legal standard applicable to a motion to dismiss. Premier is under no obligation to present evidence, and the Court need not assess whether a reasonable jury could find for Plaintiff. Instead, the Court is limited to assessing the sufficiency of the allegations within the four corners of the complaint. See Mayo v. Fed. Gov’t, 558 F. App’x 55, 56 (2d Cir. 2014) (summary order) (“A court normally may not look beyond the four corners of the complaint in considering a motion to dismiss.”) (citing Friedl v. City of New York, 210 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2000)).

End of Document

© 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.