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Citizens Watch Co. of America, Inc. v. Expediters Intern. of Wash., Inc.

United States District Court,

S.D. Florida.

CITIZENS WATCH COMPANY OF AMERICA, INC., Plaintiff,

v.

EXPEDITERS INTERNATIONAL OF WASHINGTON, INC. and Forward Air, Inc., Defendants.

No. 10-21326-CIV.

 

Sept. 30, 2010.

 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND

 

PATRICIA A. SEITZ, District Judge.

 

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand [DE-12]. This matter arises from a contract to transport goods from California to Florida. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges state law claims for bailment, negligence, and breach of contract. Defendant Expeditors International of Washington, Inc. (Expeditors) removed the case to this Court. This is the second time that this case has been removed from state court. Plaintiff again moves for remand based on: (1) the basis for removal was apparent from the face of the original complaint and (2) federal law does not completely preempt Plaintiff’s state law claims. Because Expeditors’ basis for removal was apparent on the face of the original complaint, the Notice of Removal was untimely. Consequently, Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is granted.

 

Procedural and Factual Background

 

Plaintiff filed this suit on April 29, 2009 in the Circuit Court of the 11th Judicial Circuit of Florida, in and for Miami Dade County, Florida. Defendant Expeditors was served with a summons and complaint on April 30, 2009. Defendant Forward Air, Inc. was served with a summons and complaint on May 4, 2009. On May 20, 2009, Forward Air filed its Notice of Removal based on diversity. On June 10, 2009, Plaintiff filed its Motion to Remand. On June 11, 2009, Expeditors filed a Notice of Consent and Joinder in Removal. On September 3, 2009, the Court granted the Motion to Remand because Expeditors’ Notice of Consent and Joinder in Removal was untimely.

 

On April 5, 2010, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint in state court. On April 23, 2010, Expeditors filed a Notice of Removal [DE-1] based on federal question jurisdiction and, on the same day, Defendant Forward Air, Inc. filed its Notice of Consent and Joinder in Removal [DE-3]. The Removal petition states that Plaintiff’s claim is governed exclusively by the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706, which preempts Plaintiff’s state law claims. On May 24, 2010, Plaintiff filed its Motion to Remand.

 

The Motion to Remand

 

The Motion to Remand argues that Expeditor’s removal was untimely because the basis for removal was apparent on the face of the original complaint. Plaintiff acknowledges that a “second notice of removal is permitted under § 1446(b), provided that it is ‘through service of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper from which it may be first ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.’ ” Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust v. Jenkins, 2008 WL 4218106 (S.D.Fla.2008) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)) (emphasis added). Plaintiff argues that this is not that case because it was apparent on the face of the original complaint that this case involved interstate commerce and the breach of an interstate shipping agreement. In the Notice of Removal, Expeditors asserts that such a claim is governed exclusively by the Carmack Amendment and therefore the case is removable because the claims arise under federal law.

 

Expeditors argues that this is not a second notice of removal because Forward Air filed the first Notice of Removal and Expeditor’s joinder was held untimely. This argument is irrelevant under the circumstances.

 

Removal statutes are strictly construed and any doubts or ambiguities must be resolved in favor of remand. See Whitt v. Sherman Int’l Corp., 147 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11 th Cir.1998). The removing party bears the burden of demonstrating that removal was proper. Id. A defendant must file its notice of removal within thirty (30) days of service of a pleading which sets forth a basis for removal. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (emphasis added). Expeditors did not do this because the original complaint set forth the allegations that form the basis of Expeditors’ removal.

 

A review of the original complaint, attached as Exhibit 1 to the Motion to Remand [DE-12-1], establishes that Plaintiff pled that: (1) Forward Air was an overland carrier of freight for hire and/or warehouseman and transported and warehoused the subject cargo; (2) Expeditors is a common carrier for the subject cargo; (3) Plaintiff contracted with Expeditors to transport the subject cargo from Torrance, California to Miami, Florida; (4) Expeditors subcontracted with Forward Air to transport the same cargo from Torrence, California to Miami, Florida; and (5) Forward Air transported the cargo by truck to Miami, Florida. A review of the Amended Complaint shows that the only relevant pleading change was Plaintiff’s addition of the allegation that it transacts business in interstate commerce. See DE-1-2 at ¶ 2. Based on the allegations in the original complaint, it is clear that Plaintiff’s claims involved the interstate transportation of goods by truck. These allegations are sufficient to put Defendants on notice that the complaint alleges claims that may fall under the Carmack Amendment. Thus, the original complaint, filed on April 29, 2009, set forth the basis on which Expeditors removed. However, Expeditors did not file the Notice of Removal until nearly a year after the complaint was filed, well beyond the thirty day time limit. Consequently, Expeditors’ Notice of Removal was untimely and Plaintiff’s motion is granted.

 

Because removal was untimely, the Court need not, and will not, address the preemption arguments. Accordingly, it is

 

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand [DE-12] is GRANTED. This case is remanded to the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami Dade County, Florida

 

2. All pending motions not otherwise ruled upon are denied as moot.

 

3. This case is CLOSED.

 

DONE AND ORDERED.

Travelers Property Cas. Co. of America v. Legacy Transp. Services, Inc.

United States District Court,

N.D. California.

TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY COMPANY OF AMERICA and Tomotherapy Incorporated, Plaintiffs,

v.

LEGACY TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, INC. and Does 1-10, inclusive, Defendants.

No. C 10-00505 JSW.

 

Sept. 30, 2010.

 

AMENDED ORDER DENYING UNITED’S MOTION TO DISMISS THIRD PARTY SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

 

JEFFREY S. WHITE, District Judge.

 

Now before the Court is the motion to dismiss filed by third-party defendant United Van Lines, LLC (“United”). The Court finds that this matter is suitable for disposition without oral argument and accordingly VACATES the hearing date of October 815 2010. See N.D. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). Having carefully reviewed the parties’ papers and considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, and good cause appearing, the Court hereby DENIES United’s motion to dismiss.

 

The case management conference shall be CONTINUED to October 15, 2010 at 1:30 p.m.

 

BACKGROUND

 

Plaintiffs originally filed a complaint for breach of contract, negligence, and breach of bailment against defendant Legacy Transportation Services, Inc. (“Legacy”) in the Superior Court for the County of Contra Costa. Thereafter, Legacy removed the state action to this Court on the basis of the preemptive effect of the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 14706 (“the Carmack Amendment”), which governs claims concerning the transportation of goods in interstate commerce.

 

Thereafter, Plaintiffs moved this Court to remand the claims to state court of the basis that removal was improper on the face of the complaint. However, on April 13, 2010, the Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to remand and held that because “the Carmack Amendment is the exclusive cause of action for contract claims alleging delay, loss, failure to deliver or damage to property,” Plaintiffs’ state law claims were completely preempted and were, accordingly, dismissed. (See Order at 6 (citing Hall v. North American Van Lines, Inc., 476 F.3d 683, 688-89 (9th Cir.2007) (citing Moffit v. Bekins Van Lines Co., 6 F.3d 305, 306-07 (5th Cir.1993))).

 

On May 24, 2010, Legacy filed an amended third-party complaint against United for equitable indemnity and contribution, express contractual indemnity, apportionment, and declaratory relief. United moved to dismiss the third-party complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted on the basis that: (1) each of the causes of action were premised upon state law which is preempted by the Carmack Amendment; (2) there were no indemnity rights against United as Plaintiffs fail to state a valid claim against Legacy; and (3) Plaintiffs’ action against United was time-barred and without liability, there is no indemnity.

 

On July 19, 2010, this Court dismissed the state court causes of action as preempted by the Carmack Amendment, but permitted Legacy to file an amended third party complaint stating a proper cause of action for indemnity under the Carmack Amendment, as well as an attendant declaratory relief claim.

 

On August 5, 2010, Legacy filed a second amended third-party complaint stating claims against United only for indemnification and declaratory relief pursuant to the Carmack Amendment. United now moves again to dismiss.

 

ANALYSIS

 

The scheme of the Carmack Amendment is “comprehensive enough to embrace responsibility for all losses resulting from any failure to discharge a carrier’s duty as to any part of the agreed transportation.” Georgia, Florida & Alabama Ry. Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U.S. 190, 196, 36 S.Ct. 541, 60 L.Ed. 948 (1916). The Carmack Amendment imposes strict liability for “actual loss or injury to property.” 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a). Additionally, the Carmack Amendment allows the “initial carrier found strictly liable under subpart (a) to be indemnified by the carrier over whose line or route the loss of injury occurred.” FNS, Inc. v. Bowerman Trucking, Inc., 2010 WL 532421,(S.D.Cal. Feb.9, 2010) (quoting PHN Corp. v. Hullquist Corp., 843 F.2d 586, 589 (1st Cir.1988)); see also 49 U.S.C. § 14706(b).

 

A claim for indemnity under the Carmack Amendment may properly lie and similarly, one for declaratory relief as to the parties’ respective status under the Carmack Amendment. See, e.g., FNS, Inc. v. Bowerman Trucking, inc., 2010 WL 532421,(S.D.Cal. Feb.9, 2010) (quoting PHN Corp. v. Hullquist Corp., 843 F.2d 586, 589 (1st Cir.1988)); see also 49 U.S.C. § 14706(b). The Court concludes that this issue is best resolved after the factual record has been developed. The Court denies United’s motion as premature and based on facts outside of the pleadings. As a general rule, “a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir.1994), overruled on other grounds, Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir.2002) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court DENIES United’s motion to dismiss the second amended third-party complaint.

 

CONCLUSION

 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES United’s motion to dismiss the second amended third-party complaint.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

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