United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

CLARINET, LLC, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.

ESSEX INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant–Appellee.

 

Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri—St. Louis.Paul J. Puricelli, argued, St. Louis, MO(Robb Hellwig, on the brief), for Appellant.

 

Thomas Michael Ward, argued, Saint Louis, MO(Joseph Robert Swift and Teresa Michelle Young, on the brief), for Appellee.

 

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.

 

RILEY, Chief Judge.

*1 In this diversity of citizenship case, Clarinet, LLC (Clarinet) sued Essex Insurance Company (Essex) in Missouri state court, alleging Essex wrongfully refused to pay Clarinet under a commercial general liability insurance policy. Essex removed the case to federal court. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court FN1 granted judgment in favor of Essex, denying Clarinet relief. Clarinet appeals. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

 

I. BACKGROUND

 

A. Factual Background

 

1. Clarinet’s Property and Loss

 

Clarinet, a Missouri limited liability company whose members were all Missouri citizens, is a commercial and residential real estate development company operating in St. Louis, Missouri. Essex is an insurance company incorporated under the laws of Delaware and headquartered in Virginia.

 

In 2005, Clarinet purchased the Switzer building, “a turn of the century masonry structure” Clarinet intended to renovate “into luxury condominiums with street level retail and commerical space.” The Switzer building was a registered and protected historical building listed on the National Register of Historic Places.

 

On July 19, 2006, a windstorm struck the city of St. Louis. The storm seriously damaged the Switzer building, destroying parts of two exterior walls and part of the roof. Debris and bricks fell onto an adjacent bridge and electrical substation, damaging this city property. The parties dispute the extent of the damage, but Essex admits “[t]he [s]torm left large portions of the east and north walls with no support,” and “exposed the building’s interior to the weather, resulting in continued deterioration.”

 

As an emergency stabilization effort, Clarinet installed approximately twenty aluminum bracing towers and additional braces and netting to prevent more debris from falling from the building onto adjacent property. Clarinet’s stabilization “efforts continued for several months.” The parties dispute whether “the building remained structurally unsound” after Clarinet’s initial efforts, but Clarinet contends the building “constituted a continuing hazard and immediate threat to the public safety” in April 2007, and had to be demolished.

 

On or about January 23, 2007, Clarinet entered into a demolition contract with a third-party demolition company. Because the Switzer building was a designated historical landmark, Clarinet had to seek approval from various city agencies before demolishing the building. Clarinet maintains the city initially resisted Clarinet’s requests to demolish the building, believing it would be preferable to preserve as much of the existing structure as possible. On June 6, 2007, the city issued a Notice of Emergency Condemnation that required Clarinet to demolish the building. The notice indicated the city concluded the property could not “be made reasonably safe without the demolition and removal of” the damaged Switzer building. Clarinet demolished the building by approximately June 18, 2007, at costs exceeding $660,000.

 

2. Insurance Policy

*2 At all relevant times, Clarinet held a commercial general liability insurance policy from Essex relating to the Switzer building. Under the policy, Essex insured Clarinet against liability to third parties resulting from “bodily injury” or “property damage,” either of which must be caused by a covered “occurrence.” The insurance policy also contained several conditions and exclusions.

 

One such exclusion was the owned property exclusion, excluding from coverage “ ‘[p]roperty damage’ to … [p]roperty [Clarinet] own[ed], rent[ed], or occup [ied], including any costs or expenses incurred by [Clarinet], or any other person, organization or entity, for repair, replacement, enhancement, restoration or maintenance of such property for any reason, including prevention of injury to a person or damage to another’s property.”

 

Clarinet did not inform Essex of the storm damage to the Switzer building or the damage to city property until May 11, 2007. There is no evidence Essex knew of Clarinet’s intention to demolish the Switzer building until after the building was demolished, and Clarinet admits it did not seek Essex’s consent before proceeding with the demolition. After the demolition, Clarinet asked Essex to pay Clarinet’s expenses for stabilizing and demolishing the Switzer building, in accordance with Clarinet’s interpretation of the policy. Essex denied coverage and refused payment.

 

B. Procedural History

Clarinet sued Essex in Missouri state court, alleging Essex had a duty under the policy to cover Clarinet’s expenses in stabilizing and ultimately demolishing the Switzer building. Essex removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441(a). The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district court granted judgment in favor of Essex.

 

II. DISCUSSION

 

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

 

[1] We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, construing all facts and making all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Washington v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 655 F.3d 869, 871–72 (8th Cir.2011). We will affirm summary judgment if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).

 

[2][3][4][5] The parties agree Missouri law applies in this diversity case. See HealthEast Bethesda Hosp. v. United Commercial Travelers of Am. ., 596 F.3d 986, 987 (8th Cir.2010). Under Missouri law, courts generally give the terms of an insurance policy their ordinary meaning. See Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Republic Ins. Co., 941 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Mo.1997)(en banc). We construe ambiguities in policies in favor of the insured and against the insurance company. See Todd v. Mo. United Sch. Ins. Council, 223 S.W.3d 156, 160 (Mo.2007)(en banc.). A court may not create an ambiguity where none exists, and “must enforce clear and unambiguous” policy exclusions. See id. at 163. The insured has the burden to prove an event is covered under the policy, and the insurer has the burden to prove an exclusion applies to an otherwise covered event. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. D.T.S., 867 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Mo.Ct.App.1993).

 

B. Owned Property Exclusion

*3 [6] The owned property exclusion plainly bars coverage in this case. The exclusion provides the policy does not cover damage to Clarinet’s property, “including any costs or expenses incurred … for repair, replacement, … or maintenance of such property for any reason, including prevention of injury to a person or damage to another’s property.” (Emphasis added). Clarinet’s entire argument is based on the premise that Essex must cover the expenses Clarinet incurred in stabilizing and ultimately demolishing the Switzer building because these expenses were necessary to prevent further injury to persons and property. Yet, the policy explicitly excludes such expenses. Clarinet’s argument therefore fails.

 

Citing a case interpreting a similar provision under New York law, Clarinet argues Essex is responsible to cover any of Clarinet’s expenses that were “necessary to stop ongoing and imminent damage to property belonging to another.” Castle Vill. Owners Corp. v. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 64 A.D.3d 44, 50, 878 N.Y.S.2d 311 (N.Y.App.Div.2009). Clarinet contends Castle Village also describes the law in Missouri, but cites no Missouri case in support of its argument.FN2 Under Missouri law, “ ‘where [an] insurance polic[y is] unambiguous, [it] will be enforced as written.” ’ Todd, 223 S.W.3d at 160 (quoting Rodriguez v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 808 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Mo.1991)(en banc)). The Essex policy patently excludes such repairs, even when undertaken to prevent harm to third parties or property. We will not ignore the plain language of the policy.

 

Clarinet also relies upon Slay Warehousing Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 471 F.2d 1364 (8th Cir.1973), an Eighth Circuit case presumably applying Missouri law. See id. at 1366 n. 3. In Slay Warehousing, “[t]he primary issue [was] whether the insurer [was] liable [under an inland marine policy warehousemen endorsement FN3] for expenses incurred by [the insured] in taking reasonable means to protect chemicals stored in [the insured’s] warehouse from damage due to exposure following the collapse of [a] warehouse wall.” Id. at 1365. The policy at issue expressly required the insured to “take all reasonable means to protect, safeguard and salvage the [covered] property.” Id. at 1365. We held that the policy obligated the insurer to pay, recognizing “the obligation [of the insurer] to pay the expenses of protecting the exposed [third party] property may arise from either the insurance agreement itself, or an implied duty under the policy contract based upon general principles of law and equity.” Id. at 1367–68 (internal citation omitted).

 

Slay Warehousing provides no help to Clarinet. Clarinet does not identify any similar express language in the Essex policy, as is in the policy in Slay Warehousing, requiring Clarinet to mitigate or prevent damages. Even assuming Clarinet had an implied duty to mitigate or prevent damages, the Essex policy expressly placed the burden of such costs on Clarinet. Cf. Die–Cutting Diversified, Inc. v. United Nat’l Ins. Co., 353 F.Supp.2d 1053, 1058 (E.D.Mo.2004) (distinguishing Slay Warehousing because the policy in Slay Warehousing expressly required the insured to mitigate damages, and finding the insurer was not required to cover the insured’s mitigation expenses absent an express contractual duty to mitigate).

 

*4 Because the owned property exclusion bars coverage in this case, the district court properly granted summary judgment to Essex and denied relief to Clarinet.FN4

 

III. CONCLUSION

Anticipating the Supreme Court of Missouri’s interpretation, for the reasons stated above, we affirm.

 

FN1. The Honorable David D. Noce, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Missouri, sitting by consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).

 

FN2. Our decision in Slay Warehousing Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 471 F.2d 1364 (8th Cir.1973), discussed below, is not to the contrary. The policy in Slay Warehousing did not have an owned property exclusion expressly making the insured liable for repairs to the insured’s own property. See infra. at 6–7 & n. 3.

 

FN3. The agreement in Slay Warehousing required the insurance company to “pay on behalf of the [in]sured all sums which the [in]sured shall become legally obligated to pay by reason of liability imposed.” Id. at 1366.

 

FN4. Because we hold the owned property exclusion applies, we need not consider the effect of any other policy condition or exclusion, the city’s demolition order, or whether the storm was an “occurrence” covered under the policy.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Deborah LASHBROOK, Plaintiff–Appellant,

and

Glenn Lashbrook, Plaintiff,

v.

STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant–Appellee,

and

Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and Amerisure Insurance Company, Defendants.

 

Docket No. 307936.

March 21, 2013.

 

Oakland Circuit Court; LC No.2010–108873–NF.

 

Before: GLEICHER, P.J., and SAWYER and FORT HOOD, JJ.

 

PER CURIAM.

*1 In this first-party no-fault insurance action, plaintiff, Deborah Lashbrook, appeals by right the trial court’s order granting summary disposition in favor of defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 

Plaintiff purchased a Peterbilt tractor, and the title was issued to her in Ohio on August 24, 1999. She operated the motor vehicle through her corporate entity, M & J Express, Inc. Both plaintiff and her husband were truck drivers. Plaintiff insured the Peterbilt tractor with Owner–Operator Services, Inc, and obtained a bobtail policy. Plaintiff also owned a 1993 Ford Ranger which was insured by defendant. At the time of the accident, the Peterbilt tractor was leased to Northfield Trucking. Specifically, plaintiff testified that, six months before her accident, she and her husband drove, on a weekly basis, from Michigan to Texas pulling a Northfield trailer. On March 25, 2009, plaintiff was driving the Peterbilt tractor while her husband slept. Plaintiff was involved in a single-vehicle accident while traveling on I–70 West in Indiana. The Peterbilt tractor left the roadway, struck a guardrail, and traveled for approximately 1,000 feet before striking a tree line and coming to a stop. Plaintiff did not know the cause of the accident, but denied falling asleep. In her deposition, plaintiff testified that a representative of Northfield Trucking indicated that the Peterbilt tractor experienced a blowout.

 

This litigation involves plaintiff’s attempt to recover personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits. Plaintiff made a claim for benefits to Owner–Operator, Services, Inc., but was advised that her bobtail policy only provided PIP benefits when the Peterbilt tractor was not hauling a trailer. Therefore, plaintiff made a claim for benefits through Northfield Trucking, but was told that benefits were not available. Consequently, plaintiff filed this suit, seeking to recover PIP benefits from defendant, the insurer of her personal vehicle. Defendant moved for summary disposition, alleging that the terms of the policy did not afford plaintiff benefits and the failure to obtain PIP benefits in accordance with MCL 500.3113(b) barred plaintiff’s claim. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition, and plaintiff appeals by right.

 

Plaintiff alleges that the trial court erred by holding that her policy terms did not provide for insurance benefits arising from the accident involving the Peterbilt tractor. We agree. A trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition presents a question of law subject to review de novo. Titan Ins Co v. Hyten, 491 Mich. 547, 553; 817 NW2d 562 (2012). Initially, the moving party must support its claim for summary disposition by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence. McCoig Materials, LLC v. Galui Constr, Inc, 295 Mich.App 684, 693; 818 NW2d 410 (2012). Once satisfied, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. Id. “The nonmoving party may not rely on mere allegations or denials in the pleadings.” Id. The documentation offered in support of and in opposition to the dispositive motion must be admissible as evidence. Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109, 120–121; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). Mere conclusory allegations that are devoid of detail are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Quinto v. Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich. 358, 372; 547 NW2d 314 (1996).

 

*2 The purpose of the no-fault act is “to provide accident victims with assured, adequate and prompt reparations at the lowest cost to both the individuals and the no-fault system.” Williams v. AAA Michigan, 250 Mich.App 249, 257; 646 NW2d 476 (2002). “Given the remedial nature of the no-fault act, courts must liberally construe its provisions in favor of the persons who are its intended beneficiaries.” Frierson v. West American Ins Co, 261 Mich.App 732, 734; 683 NW2d 695 (2004) (further citation omitted). Personal protection insurance benefits are also known as “first party” or “PIP” benefits. McKelvie v. Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 459 Mich. 42, 44 n 1; 586 NW2d 395 (1998). “Under the no-fault automobile insurance act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., insurance companies are required to provide first-party insurance benefits referred to as personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits for certain expenses and losses. MCL 500.3107; MCL 500.3108. PIP benefits are payable for four general categories of expenses and losses: survivor’s loss, allowable expenses, work loss, and replacement services.” Johnson v. Recca, 492 Mich. 169, 173; 821 NW2d 520 (2012).

 

When moving for summary disposition, defendant asserted that the terms of plaintiff’s insurance policy failed to provide coverage because the Peterbilt tractor did not qualify as “your car” or “newly acquired car” pursuant to the terms of the policy. Because this policy interpretation is contrary to provisions contained in the no-fault act, MCL 500.3010 et seq., defendant’s position is without merit, and the trial court erred by granting summary disposition on this basis. In the absence of a governing statute, insurance policies are contracts subject to the principles of contract construction applicable to any other type of contract. Titan Ins Co, 491 Mich. at 554. The insurance policy and statute must be read together, incorporating the statute into the contract, because it is presumed that the policy satisfied the statutory requirements and the contract was intended to fulfill the statute’s purpose. Id. (citation omitted). “Thus, when a provision in an insurance policy is mandated by statute, the rights and limitations of the coverage are governed by that statute.” Id.

 

“[I]t is the policy of the no-fault act that persons, not motor vehicles, are insured against loss.” Lee v. Detroit Auto Inter–Ins Exch, 412 Mich. 505, 509; 315 NW2d 413 (1982). In Lee, the plaintiff, an employee of the United States Postal Service, injured his back while unloading mail from a government owned truck. Although the plaintiff obtained compensation benefits from the federal system, he filed suit against the defendant, the no-fault insurance carrier of the plaintiff’s personal vehicle, seeking PIP benefits. The defendant denied the claim because it was not the insurer of the vehicle furnished by the plaintiff’s employer. Our Supreme Court analyzed the legislative purpose of the no-fault act and held that the entitlement to benefits was contingent on the “use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle,” not whether the vehicle was “registered, insured, or covered.” Id. at 511–513 (internal quotations omitted).

 

*3 [T]he Legislature, in its broader purposes, intended to provide benefits whenever, as a general proposition, an insured is injured in a motor vehicle accident, whether or not a registered or covered motor vehicle is involved; and in its narrower purposes intended that an injured person’s personal insurer stand primarily liable for such benefits whether or not its policy covers the motor vehicle involved and even if the involved vehicle is covered by a policy issued by another no-fault insurer…. [T]he personal insurer of an injured claimant may stand liable for benefits despite the fact that it has written no coverage respecting any vehicle involved in the accident and indeed that no vehicle involved in the accident has any coverage whatever. [ Id. at 515, 517.]

 

This requirement, that the insurer of a personal vehicle must provide benefits regardless of whether the insured vehicle is involved in the accident, currently remains applicable. See Parks v. Detroit Auto Inter–Ins Exch, 426 Mich. 191, 206–207; 393 NW2d 833 (1986); Corwin v. DaimlerChrysler Ins Co, 296 Mich.App 242, 255; 819 NW2d 68 (2012); Frierson v. West American Ins Co, 261 Mich.App 732, 737–738; 683 NW2d 695 (2004); Madar v. League Gen Ins Co, 152 Mich.App 734, 742–743; 394 NW2d 90 (1986). Consequently, defendant cannot through the terms of the policy attempt to circumvent the provisions set forth in the no-fault act. “Where insurance policy coverage is directed by the no-fault act and the language in the policy is intended to be consistent with the act, the language should be interpreted in a consistent fashion, which can only be accomplished by interpreting the statute, rather than individual policies.” Rohlman v. Hawkeye–Security Ins Co, 442 Mich. 520, 530; 502 NW2d 310 (1993) (footnote omitted). When a compulsory insurance statute is in effect that declares minimum standards that must be enforced, the policy cannot be written with more restrictive coverage. Id. at 530 n 10. Accordingly, the trial court erred by concluding that the terms of the policy did not cover the Peterbilt tractor because “persons, not motor vehicles are insured against loss,” Lee, 412 Mich. at 509, and an injured person’s personal insurer stands primarily liable for payment of benefits regardless of whether the covered vehicle is involved, id . at 515, 517.

 

Next, plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred by holding that plaintiff failed to comply with the security provisions of MCL 500.3113(b). Because defendant failed to make and support its motion for summary disposition, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 

MCL 500.3101 governs security for payment of no-fault benefits and provides, in relevant part:

 

(1) The owner or registrant of a motor vehicle required to be registered in this state shall maintain security for payment of benefits under personal protection insurance, property protection insurance, and residual liability insurance. Security shall only be required to be in effect during the period the motor vehicle is driven or moved upon a highway….

 

*4 (e) “Motor vehicle” means a vehicle, including a trailer, operated or designed for operation upon a public highway by power other than muscular power which has more than 2 wheels. Motor vehicle does not include a motorcycle or a moped … Motor vehicle does not include a farm tractor or other implement of husbandry which is not subject to the registration requirements of the Michigan vehicle code

 

….

 

(h) “Owner” means any of the following:

 

(i ) A person renting a motor vehicle or having the use thereof, under a lease or otherwise, for a period that is greater than 30 days.

 

(ii ) A person who holds the legal title to a vehicle, other than a person engaged in the business of leasing motor vehicles who is the lessor of a motor vehicle pursuant to a lease providing for the use of the motor vehicle by the lessee for a period that is greater than 30 days.

 

(iii ) A person who has the immediate right of possession of a motor vehicle under an installment contract.

 

cMCL 500.3113 entitled “Persons not entitled to personal protection benefits” provides:

 

A person is not entitled to be paid personal protection insurance benefits for accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident any of the following circumstances existed:

 

(a) The person was using a motor vehicle or motorcycle which he or she had taken unlawfully, unless the person reasonably believed that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle.

 

(b) The person was the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle or motorcycle involved in the accident with respect to which the security required by section 3101 or 3103 was not in effect.

 

(c) The person was not a resident of this state, was an occupant of a motor vehicle or motorcycle not registered in this state, and was not insured by an insurer which has filed a certification in compliance with section 3163. [footnotes omitted.]

 

This statute is subject to the following rules of statutory construction, and the rules are well established:

Our primary task in construing a statute is to discern and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. The words contained in a statute provide us with the most reliable evidence of the Legislature’s intent. In ascertaining legislative intent, this Court gives effect to every word, phrase, and clause in the statute. We must consider both the plain meaning of the critical words or phrases as well as their placement and purpose in the statutory scheme. This Court must avoid a construction that would render any part of a statute surplusage or nugatory. The statutory language must be read and understood in its grammatical context, unless it is clear that something different was intended. If the wording or language of a statute is unambiguous, the Legislature is deemed to have intended the meaning clearly expressed, and we must enforce the statute as written. A necessary corollary of these principles is that a court may read nothing into an unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself. [Zwiers v. Growney, 286 Mich.App 38, 44; 778 NW2d 81 (2009) (citations and quotations omitted).]

 

*5 “When a statute specifically defines a given term, that definition alone controls.” Haynes v. Neshewat, 477 Mich. 29, 35; 729 NW2d 488 (2007). Terms that are not defined must be given their plain and ordinary meaning, and it is appropriate to consult a dictionary for definitions.   Halloran v. Bhan, 470 Mich. 572, 578; 683 NW2d 129 (2004).

 

In the present case, plaintiff purchased two policies of insurance, one with defendant for coverage of her personal vehicle, and a bobtail policy governing the Peterbilt tractor. “Generally, a ‘bobtail’ policy is a policy that insures the tractor and driver of a rig when it is operated without cargo or a trailer.” Integral Ins Co v. Maersk Container Serv Co, Inc, 206 Mich.App 325, 331; 520 NW2d 656 (1994); see also Besic v. Citizens Ins Co, 290 Mich.App 19, 22 n 1; 800 NW2d 93 (2010). “The tractor and trailer are two separate motor vehicles within the meaning of the no-fault act.” Jasinski v. Nat’l Indemnity Ins Co, 151 Mich.App 812, 819; 391 NW2d500 (1986).

 

In the present case, defendant concluded that plaintiff was the owner of the Peterbilt tractor for which she did not obtain the requisite security required by the no-fault act, and therefore, she was precluded from receiving PIP benefits pursuant to MCL 500.3113(b). As previously noted, the moving party has the initial burden to make and support its claim for summary disposition with admissible documentary evidence. McCoig Materials, LLC, 295 Mich.App at 693. If the moving party satisfies this requirement, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact exists for trial. Id. “The duty to interpret and apply the law is allocated to the courts, and the statement of a witness is not dispositive.” Id. at 698 n 4.

 

Defendant assumed that plaintiff was the owner of the Peterbilt tractor. Here, although plaintiff acknowledged that she purchased the Peterbilt tractor, at the time of the accident, she had leased the tractor to Northfield Trucking. Specifically, in her deposition, plaintiff testified that, in the six months prior to the accident, the couple drove the truck every week from Michigan to Texas, hauling a Northfield trailer. Pursuant to MCL 500.3101 (h)(i), an “owner” is defined as “[a] person renting a motor vehicle or having the use thereof, under a lease or otherwise, for a period that is greater than 30 days.” In light of the no-fault act’s definition of the term “owner,” it is unclear if plaintiff can be construed as the “owner” for purposes of MCL 500.3101(h)(i ) because of the lease agreement with Northfield Trucking. FN1 The parties did not submit this leasing agreement. Under the circumstances, we cannot determine whether plaintiff can be considered the owner for purposes of MCL 500.3113(b). Therefore, the trial court erred by granting summary disposition in favor of defendant.FN2

 

FN1. The parties did not address whether plaintiff could be deemed a registrant, however, the only registration contained in the lower court record was from Ohio. It is unclear if the lease with Northfield Trucking had any bearing on who was required to register the vehicle. Similarly, we note that MCL 500.3113(b) does not require that an insurer deem the claim to be payable. Rather, the only requirement is that insurance coverage be “in effect.” The phrase “in effect” and the term “effect” are not defined in the no-fault act. Accordingly, on remand, the parties should address, with the appropriate documentary evidence whether MCL 500.3113(b) applies in accordance with the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms, Halloran, 470 Mich. at 578.

 

FN2. We also note that the parties conceded that the entire bobtail policy was not submitted in the trial court or submitted for our review with a motion to expand the appellate record. Therefore, although the parties raise various claims regarding the bobtail policy coverage, we do not have the endorsements or any itemization to determine the total premium paid and the fee charged for the respective coverage. Moreover, the parties’ reliance on any insurance representative’s determination regarding coverage is not dispositive. It is our duty to interpret and apply the law. McCoig Materials, LLC, 295 Mich.App at 698 n 4. We further note that appellate review is hampered by the failure to provide the policy of insurance obtained by Northfield Trucking. See 49 CFR 376.12(j). Insurance policies may contain exclusionary clauses addressing PIP benefits, but further provide that PIP benefits are recoverable when coverage is not available under any other policy. See Besic, 290 Mich.App at 26; Jasinski, 151 Mich.App at 816–819. We presume that the parties will correct these deficiencies on remand.

 

Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. Plaintiff, the prevailing party, may tax costs.