MERNA C. MORRIS, Plaintiff, v. MAYFLOWER TRANSIT, LLC, LINCOLN MOVING & STORAGE, INC., and APACA VAN LINES, INC., Defendants.

 

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:14-cv-189-WHA (WO)

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA, NORTHERN DIVISION

 

2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65331

 

 

May 13, 2014, Decided

May 13, 2014, Filed

 

 

COUNSEL:  [*1] For Merna C. Morris, Plaintiff: Cynthia Underwood, LEAD ATTORNEY, Attorney at Law, Montgomery, AL.

 

For Mayflower Transit, LLC, Defendant: Burgin H. Kent, LEAD ATTORNEY, Bishop, Colvin, Johnson & Kent LLP, Birmingham, AL.

 

For Lincoln Moving & Storage, Inc., APACA Van Lines, Inc., Defendants: John W McClurkin, LEAD ATTORNEY, John W. McClurkin, Mobile, AL; Robert Scott Traweek, LEAD ATTORNEY, Galloway Johnson Tompkins Burr & Smith, Pensacola, FL.

 

JUDGES: W. HAROLD ALBRITTON, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

 

OPINION BY: W. HAROLD ALBRITTON

 

OPINION

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

 

I. INTRODUCTION

This action is before the court on a Motion to Remand (Doc. # 11) filed by the Plaintiff, Merna C. Morris (“Morris”), on April 7, 2014.

The Plaintiff originally filed a Complaint in this case in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama on February 14, 2014. The Plaintiff brings a claim for the replacement cost of household items that were allegedly damaged or not delivered in connection with her move from Dupont, Washington to Montgomery, Alabama.

On March 19, 2014, Mayflower Transit, LLC timely removed the case to this court on the basis of federal-question jurisdiction, alleging that removal was proper because the action “is  [*2] a civil action against a motor carrier of household goods to recover damages for the alleged loss, damage or injury of an interstate shipment of household goods arising under 49 U.S.C. § 14706 [“the Carmack Amendment”], wherein the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs.” (Doc. # 1 ¶ 7). Defendants Lincoln Moving & Storage, Inc. and APACA Van Lines, Inc. consented to removal. (Doc. # 1-3).

For reasons to be discussed, the Motion to Remand is due to be DENIED.

 

II. MOTION TO REMAND STANDARD

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 128 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1994); Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (1994); Wymbs v. Republican State Exec. Comm., 719 F.2d 1072, 1076 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1103, 104 S. Ct. 1600, 80 L. Ed. 2d 131 (1984). As such, federal courts only have the power to hear cases that they have been authorized to hear by the Constitution or the Congress of the United States. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. Because federal court jurisdiction is limited, the Eleventh Circuit favors remand of removed cases where federal jurisdiction is not absolutely clear. See Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095.

 

III. FACTS

The Complaint  [*3] alleges the following facts:

Morris is enlisted in the United States Army and has been assigned to attend school at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Alabama since July, 2013. On June 6, 2013, Morris contracted with Defendant Lincoln Moving and Storage, Inc. to move household items from Dupont, Washington to Montgomery, Alabama. The Army “paid Lincoln Moving and Storage, Inc. with the expectation that . . . they would deliver Plaintiff’s household items on time and in good condition.” (Doc. # 1-4 ¶ 7). Defendant APACA Van Lines, Inc., an agent of Lincoln Moving and Storage, Inc., delivered the household items to Morris, but “Defendants failed to deliver items as specified in the contract and were two weeks late making the first delivery.” (Id. ¶ 8). Further, the Defendants “still to-date have not delivered all the items picked up from the Plaintiff[,] and some of the items delivered were damaged.” (Id.). As a result, Morris “has spent the last six months trying to resolve this matter[,] but Defendants [have] refuse[d] to adequately compensate [Morris] for the items lost or misplaced.” (Id. ¶ 9). Morris requests $30,000 as the replacement cost for the damaged and missing items.1

 

1   This  [*4] satisfies the jurisdictional requirement of $10,000 in Carmack Amendment cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1445(b) (“A civil action in any State court against a carrier or its receivers or trustees to recover damages for delay, loss, or injury of shipments, arising under section 11706 or 14706, may not be removed to any district court of the United States unless the matter in controversy exceeds $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs.”).

 

IV. DISCUSSION

In her Motion to Remand, Plaintiff argues that “[f]ederal question jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of [a] plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” (Doc. # 11 ¶ 2). Accordingly, “[t]he plaintiff is relying on the ‘well pleaded doctrine rule’ [in support of remand,] where the plaintiff is the master of the claim and relie[s] exclusively on state law for this action.” (Id. ¶ 3). In response, the Defendants argue that the Carmack Amendment is one of the few examples of complete preemption, whereby this court has federal-question jurisdiction over the claim despite the absence of a federal claim on the face of the complaint. Specifically, because the Carmack Amendment completely preempts state-law claims “arising  [*5] from failures in the transportation and delivery of goods,” the Plaintiff’s claim arises under federal law. (Doc. # 15 at 5).

The court first notes that the Complaint in this case does not specifically allege a federal claim on its face. Thus, under normal circumstances, the well-pleaded complaint rule might dictate that federal-question jurisdiction would be lacking. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 96 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1987) (“The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.”).

“There does exist, however, an ‘independent corollary’ to the well-pleaded complaint rule . . . known as the ‘complete pre-emption doctrine.” Id. Under that doctrine, “the pre-emptive force of a statute [can be found to be] so ‘extraordinary’ that it ‘converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.'” Id. (quoting Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65, 107 S. Ct. 1542, 95 L. Ed. 2d 55 (1987)). The issue in this case is whether the Carmack Amendment completely  [*6] preempts Morris’s claim, such that the complaint in this case is converted “‘into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule.'” Id.

The court finds that the claim in this case is completely preempted by the Carmack Amendment, and thus the case was properly removed pursuant to this court’s federal-question jurisdiction.

In Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson, the Supreme Court stated that, for purposes of determining whether the complete preemption doctrine applies, “the proper inquiry focuses on whether Congress intended the federal cause of action to be exclusive rather than on whether Congress intended that the cause of action be removable.” 539 U.S. 1, 9 n.5, 123 S. Ct. 2058, 156 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2003).

While the Eleventh Circuit has yet to examine the Carmack Amendment in light of Anderson, two Circuit Courts of Appeals have. The Fifth Circuit analyzed Anderson in determining whether the Carmack Amendment completely preempted state-law negligence, breach of contract, and deceptive trade practices claims “stemming from the loss or damage to [a plaintiff’s] personal belongings as a result of a move from Texas to Virginia.” Hoskins v. Bekins Van Lines, 343 F.3d 769, 771 (5th Cir. 2003).  [*7] After determining that “the legal landscape surrounding the complete preemption doctrine has shifted” as a result of Anderson, id. at 775, and after examining both Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit precedent that evidenced the Carmack Amendment’s “broad pre-emptive purpose,” id. at 776, the Hoskins court found that “Congress intended for the Carmack Amendment to provide the exclusive cause of action for loss or damages to goods arising from the interstate transportation of those goods by a common carrier,” id. at 778 (emphasis in original). Thus, the Court held “that the complete preemption doctrine applies” and that, “[b]ecause the Carmack Amendment provides the exclusive cause of action for such claims,” the plaintiff in that case’s claims arose under federal law. Id.; see also Hall v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 476 F.3d 683, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We hold that the Carmack Amendment is the exclusive cause of action for contract claims alleging delay, loss, failure to deliver or damage to property. . . . Because [the plaintiff’s] completely preempted contract claim presents a federal question, the district court properly denied [the plaintiff’s] motion to remand.”).

This court agrees  [*8] with the analyses of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits and finds that Morris’s claim is completely preempted by the Carmack Amendment. This is consistent with Eleventh Circuit precedent. The pre-Anderson Eleventh Circuit case of Smith v. United Parcel Service, while not directly on-point from a procedural standpoint, held that the Carmack Amendment has a broad preemptive purpose. 296 F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2002) (“To accomplish the goal of uniformity, the Carmack Amendment preempts state law claims arising from failures in the transportation and delivery of goods.” (citing Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 505-06, 33 S. Ct. 148, 57 L. Ed. 314 (1913)). Although evaluating the preemptive effect of the Carmack Amendment as a defense to state-law claims, rather than as a basis for federal-question jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit’s Smith decision is consistent with the cases analyzed by the Fifth Circuit in Hoskins and the Ninth Circuit in Hall. Thus, as was held in Hoskins, actions “for loss or damages to goods arising from the interstate transportation of those goods by a common carrier” are completely preempted by the Carmack Amendment, and a Complaint alleging such an action would be removable under  [*9] the court’s federal-question jurisdiction. 343 F.3d at 778 (emphasis omitted).

In this case, the only allegations contained in the Complaint are that the Defendants failed to deliver some of Morris’s household items and that, of those items that were delivered, some were damaged, with an ad damnum of more than $10,000. These alleged failures by the Defendants in transporting the household items from Washington to Alabama relate to “loss or damages to goods arising from the interstate transportation of those goods by a common carrier.” Id. Because Congress intended the Carmack Amendment to act as the exclusive cause of action for such claims, Morris’s claim is completely preempted by the Carmack Amendment. Thus, this court has federal-question jurisdiction, and the case was properly removed to this court.

 

V. CONCLUSION

For the stated reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that Plaintiff Morris’s Motion to Remand is DENIED.

DONE this 13th day of May, 2014.

/s/ W. Harold Albritton

W. HAROLD ALBRITTON

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

James H. Streets, Plaintiff, v. Putnam Inc., et al., Defendants.

 

Case No: 2:13-cv-803

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO, EASTERN DIVISION

 

2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66309

 

 

May 14, 2014, Decided

May 14, 2014, Filed

 

 

PRIOR HISTORY: Streets v. Putnam, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136712 (S.D. Ohio, Sept. 24, 2013)

 

COUNSEL:  [*1] James H. Streets, Plaintiff, Pro se, Coshocton, OH.

 

For Putnam, Inc., Patrick Hennessey, Daniel Hennessey, Ralph Hennessey, Ronald Kunkel, Defendants: Kevin P Foley, LEAD ATTORNEY, Reminger & Reminger Co., L.P.A. – 2, Columbus, OH; Brent Allan Stubbins, Stubbins Watson & Erhartd Co LPA – 2, Zanesville, OH.

 

For Hankook Tire America Corp., Defendant: Douglas N Godshall, LEAD ATTORNEY, Pelini Campbell Williams Traub LLC, North Canton, OH; John R Chlysta, Robert L Tucker, Hanna Campbell & Powell LLP, Akron, OH.

 

JUDGES: JAMES L. GRAHAM, United States District Judge. Magistrate Judge Deavers.

 

OPINION BY: JAMES L. GRAHAM

 

OPINION

 

Opinion and Order

Plaintiff James Streets brings this action pro se against defendants Hankook Tire America Corporation, Putnam, Inc., and Putnam’s principals (Daniel Hennessey, Patrick Hennessey, Ralph Hennessey and Ronald Kunkel). The original complaint was a rambling, 105-page document that mentioned numerous possible causes of action, including: a claim under the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706, et seq.; claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 for due process and equal protection violations; and common law claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, promissory estoppel, fraud,  [*2] negligence, unjust enrichment, slander and libel.

The magistrate judge, in granting two motions for more definite statements, found the complaint to be so ambiguous that defendants could not be required to frame responsive pleadings. See Docs. 6 and 25. In response to the magistrate’s order, Streets has filed a document that he requests be treated as an amended complaint, and the court will treat it as such. See Doc. 28.

The amended complaint lists three counts against both Hankook and the Putnam defendants. The first is for breach of contract. The second is for “breach of contract/breach of duty.” And the third is for “discrimination.”

This matter is before the court on separate motions to dismiss filed by Hankook and the Putnam defendants. For the reasons set forth below, the motions to dismiss are GRANTED.

 

I. Factual Allegations

Streets alleges that he operated a business called Howard Logistics and that his business contracted with Hankook to ship tires in interstate commerce. He alleges that Hankook issued 76 bills of lading to Howard Logistics from July 2001 to March 2003. During the same time period, Streets alleges, he entered into a broker agreement with Putnam under which Putnam  [*3] would carry freight that Howard Logistics had contracted to carry for Hankook.

The amended complaint alleges that Hankook breached its duty under the bills of lading by falsely accusing Streets of stealing shipments and accepting payment from Hankook for those shipments. He alleges that Putnam breached the broker agreement by claiming ownership of the bills of lading, by asserting a right to payment thereunder, and by accusing Streets of stealing its business.

Streets admits that he was indicted in this court in 2007 for mail fraud and making false statements in connection with his dealings with Hankook and Putnam. See U.S. v. Streets, No. 2:07-cr-82 (S.D. Ohio). A jury found him guilty on both counts.

Though the allegations are difficult to decipher, the gist of them is that Hankook and the Putnam defendants somehow breached their duties and committed discrimination by cooperating with law enforcement officials in the investigation that culminated in the 2007 indictment of Streets.

 

II. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a pleading contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).  [*4] When considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss a pleading for failure to state a claim, a court must determine whether the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). A court should construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all well-pleaded material allegations in the complaint as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (2007); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56. Because Streets is proceeding pro se, his complaint is construed liberally. See Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011).

The “tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557 (“labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,” nor will “naked assertion[s]”  [*5] devoid of “further factual enhancements”); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986) (a court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”). The plaintiff must provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief “rather than a blanket assertion of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 n.3. Thus, “a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

When the complaint does contain well-pleaded factual allegations, “a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Though “[s]pecific facts are not necessary,” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and though Rule 8 “does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, the factual allegations must be enough to raise the claimed  [*6] right to relief above the speculative level and to create a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support the claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56. This inquiry as to plausibility is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. . . . [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged — but it has not ‘show[n]’– ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

 

III. Discussion

 

A. Breach of Contract

Streets asserts claims for breach of contract against Hankook based on the bills of lading and against the Putnam defendants based on the broker agreement. But Streets has failed to identify any contractual provision that defendants allegedly breached. There is no allegation, for instance, that Hankook failed to make payments required under the bills of lading. Nor has Streets alleged that Putnam failed to provide the promised services under the broker agreement. Rather, he alleges that defendants breached the agreements by making false claims  [*7] against him and by failing to “set straight the record” with investigators and law enforcement authorities. Streets makes vague references to “hold harmless” clauses allegedly contained in the contracts — seemingly arguing that these clauses should be interpreted to mean that defendants would not “hold” anything against Streets by way of making harmful statements about him to the authorities. The court finds this interpretation of a hold harmless clause in the commercial carriage context to be implausible. Thus, Streets has failed to state a claim for breach of contract against either Hankook or the Putnam defendants.

 

B. Breach of Duty

When Streets alleges a “breach of duty,” it is unclear whether he is referring to a contractual duty, fiduciary duty, or some other duty. The amended complaint alleges that defendants had a “moral, legal duty to tell the truth.” If the duty is contractual in nature, then the claim fails for reasons already stated. If the duty is fiduciary in nature, then the claim is time-barred. Ohio has a four-year statute of limitations for claims of breach of fiduciary duty. See O.R.C. § 2305.09(D); Antioch Litig. Trust v. McDermott Will & Emery LLP, 738 F.Supp.2d 758, 773 (S.D. Ohio 2010).  [*8] Streets filed this action in August 2013. The amended complaint does not allege when defendants gave false statements to authorities, but the only plausible inference to be made is that the statements were given prior to the completion of the criminal trial in May 2008. Finally, if the duty is moral or ethical in nature, then the court would liberally construe the claim as one for defamation. A claim for defamation likewise would be time-barred. See O.R.C. § 2305.11(A) (one-year statute of limitation).

Thus, Streets has failed to state a claim for breach of duty.

 

C. Discrimination

Streets alleges that defendants committed “unconstitutional discrimination” against him by preventing him from exercising his rights under the bills of lading. As defendants correctly argue, there is no such thing as a generic claim for discrimination. Liberally construing the complaint, the court observes that the original complaint cited the Equal Protection Clause and § 1983. See Doc. 2 at p. 7. Even so, defendants are not state actors, see Hidden Village, LLC v. City of Lakewood, Ohio, 734 F.3d 519, 527 (6th Cir. 2013) (state actor requirement in § 1983 actions), and the Equal Protection Clause (as well  [*9] as any other applicable federal or state statute) prohibits only certain types of invidious discrimination, such as discrimination based on race, gender, age, or disability. See Dixon v. Univ. of Toledo, 702 F.3d 269, 278 (6th Cir. 2012). Streets has made no allegation of invidious discrimination, and the court therefore finds that he has failed to state a claim.

 

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the motion to dismiss of the Putnam defendants (doc. 21) is GRANTED; the motion to dismiss of Hankook (doc. 34) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motion to treat his December 17, 2013 filing as an amended complaint (doc. 28) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motion to require defendants to answer his amended complaint (doc. 35 ) is DENIED.

This matter is hereby dismissed in its entirety.

/s/ James L. Graham

JAMES L. GRAHAM

United States District Judge

DATE: May 14, 2014