United States District Court,

E.D. California.

ALL STAR DAIRY ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff,

v.

AMBER TRUCKING, INC., a California corporation; and Does 1 through 25, inclusive, Defendants.

 

No. 1:13–cv–00947–SKO.

Signed June 23, 2014.

 

Charles Fredrick Meine, III, Coleman & Horowitt, LLP, Fresno, CA, for Plaintiff.

 

Michael S. Helsley, Wanger Jones Helsley PC, Fresno, CA, for Defendants.

 

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SHEILA K. OBERTO, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

*1 On May 7, 2014, Plaintiff All Star Dairy Association, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) filed a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 17.) Amber Trucking, Inc. (“Defendant”) failed to file any opposition to the motion. On June 10, 2014, the Court determined the matter was suitable for decision without oral argument, the matter was taken under submission, and the hearing was vacated. (Doc. 18.)

 

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

 

II. BACKGROUND

This is a diversity suit that arises out of a written agreement involving the purchase of tires and other services. Plaintiff is engaged in the business of providing discount pricing for products and services used by its members. (Cmplt. ¶ 5; Doc. 17–1, Declaration of Jeff Hoogerheide (“Hoogerheide Decl.”), ¶ 9.) Plaintiff uses the combined buying power of its members to negotiate agreements with various suppliers to obtain volume price discounts for its members. (Cmplt. ¶ 5; Doc. 17–1, Hoogerheide Decl., ¶ 9.) Plaintiff’s members order from suppliers, the suppliers invoice Plaintiff, and Plaintiff forwards the supplier’s invoice to the members with a cover invoice from Plaintiff. (Doc. 17–1, Hoogerheide Decl., ¶ 9.) Defendant is a freight shipping and trucking company that hauls general freight. (Cmplt., ¶ 6; Doc. 8, Answer, ¶ 6.)

 

On April 14, 2010, Defendant, through its agent Jatinder S. Kaleka, executed a Credit Application and Membership Agreement with Plaintiff (the “Agreement”). (Cmplt., ¶ 7; Doc. 8, Answer, ¶ 7; Doc. 17–1, Hoogerheide Decl., ¶¶ 10–11.) Pursuant to the Agreement, Plaintiff furnished Defendant with a line of credit for the purchase of goods and services to be used in connection with Defendant’s business. (Cmplt, ¶ 8; Doc. 8, Answer, ¶ 8; Doc. 17–1, Hoogerheide Decl., ¶ 12.) Defendant paid a membership fee and agreed to the terms of the Agreement. (Doc. 17–1, Hoogerheide Decl., ¶ 12.)

 

The Agreement provides that Defendant would pay all invoices billed by Plaintiff for all goods and services Defendant purchased. (Cmplt., ¶ 8; Doc. 8, Answer ¶ 8; Doc. 17–1, Hoogerheide Decl., ¶ 12.) According to Plaintiff, from the time the Agreement was entered in April 2010 until January 2013, Defendant used the line of credit to purchase tires and related services for its fleet of trucks, Plaintiff issued invoices, and Defendant paid the invoices. (Doc. 17–1, Hoogerheide Decl., ¶ 14.)

 

Beginning with the invoice issued to Defendant in February 15, 2013, however, Defendant allegedly breached the agreement by failing to pay the invoices as they were delivered. (Doc. 17–1, Hoogerheide Decl., ¶ 15.) While Defendant continued to make purchases for two more months, it refused to make any payments for those purchases. (Cmplt, ¶ 11; Doc. 17–1, Hoogerheide Decl., ¶ 16.) Plaintiff maintains it has never received payment from Defendant on 25 outstanding invoices, and seeks to recover $96,136.56 that Plaintiff claims is due and owing under the Agreement.

 

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

*2 Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits show that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that] the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Material facts are those which may affect the outcome of the case. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id. The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits or declarations which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. On an issue for which the opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, however, the moving party need only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325.

 

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. The court is only concerned with disputes over material facts and “factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U .S. at 248. It is not the task of the district court to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact. Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir.1996). The nonmoving party has the burden of identifying with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

 

B. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment

A district court may not grant a motion for summary judgment solely because the opposing party has failed to file an opposition. See Cristobal v. Siegel, 26 F.3d 1488, 1494–95 & n. 4 (9th Cir.1994) (unopposed motion may be granted only after the court determines that there are not material issues of fact). This is so even if the failure to file an opposition violates a local rule of the court. See Martinez v. Stanford, 323 F.3d 1178, 1182–83 (9th Cir.2003). Here, Defendant has failed to file any opposition to Plaintiff’s motion. Therefore, the Court considers whether Plaintiff has met its burden to show that there is an absence of genuine issues of material facts.

 

1. The Parties’ Joint Statement of Undisputed FactsFN1

 

FN1. Filed concurrently with its motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff submits a Joint Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“Joint Statement”). Prior to filing the statement, Plaintiff asserts its counsel met and conferred with counsel for Defendant and confirmed that the facts in the Joint Statement are undisputed. (Doc. 17–11.)

 

On April 14, 2010, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a written contract. Pursuant to the terms of the contract, Plaintiff agreed to furnish Defendant with a line of credit. Defendant agreed to pay all amounts borrowed under the line of credit within a specified number of days after receipt of an invoice from Plaintiff for Defendant’s purchases. Defendant used the line of credit to purchase goods and services, including tires for its fleet of trucks. Plaintiff performed all covenants and conditions required of it under the terms of the contract, and issued invoices to Defendant for purchases made pursuant to the contract. Between February 15, 2013, and April 26, 2013, Plaintiff sent numerous invoices to Defendant relating to outstanding amounts owed for Defendant’s purchases under the line of credit. Defendant breached the contract by failing to repay the amounts borrowed under the line of credit. The principal amount due and owing under the contract from Defendant to Plaintiff is $96,136.56. The interest balance due under the contract is $9,903.84 as of June 11, 2014.

 

2. Plaintiff’s Request for Judicial Notice

*3 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201, Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of Plaintiff’s complaint filed on June 20, 2013, and Defendant’s Answer filed on August 1.2013. The Court does not need to judicially notice the pleadings in the current proceeding to consider them.   Estate of Cartledge v. Columbia Cas. Co., No. 2:11–cv–2623–WBS–GGH, 2011 WL 5884255, * 2 (E.D.Cal. Nov.23, 2011). Thus, Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice of these pleadings is denied as moot.

 

3. Plaintiff is Entitled to Summary Judgment for Breach of Contract

In California, “[a] cause of action for breach of contract requires proof of the following elements: (1) existence of the contract; (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance; and (3) defendant’s breach; and (4) damages to plaintiff as a result of the breach.” CDF Firefighters v. Maldonado, 158 Cal.App.4th 1226, 1239, 70 Cal.Rptr.3d 667 (2008).

 

Plaintiff contends that a valid contract was formed between the parties on April 14, 2010, which Defendant materially breached by failing to pay the amounts owed. Plaintiff seeks contract damages in the amount of $96,136.56.

 

After Plaintiff filed suit, Defendant filed an Answer (Doc. 8) and subsequently served responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for Admission. (Doc. 17–5, Declaration of C. Fredrick Meine III (“Meine Decl.”), ¶¶ 6–7; Doc. 17–6, Exhibits D; Doc. 17–7, Exhibit E.) The material facts of this case, taken from declarations submitted by Plaintiff,FN2 Defendant’s responses to Requests for Admission (Doc. 17–5, Meine Decl., Exhibit E) and Defendant’s Answer (Doc. 8), are not in dispute because Defendant has not filed opposing affidavits, declarations, or deposition transcripts. Moreover, Defendant has admitted all material elements of the breach of contract action in its responses to Plaintiff’s Request for Admissions and in its Answer.

 

FN2. (Doc. 17–1, Hoogerheide Decl.; Doc. 17–5, Meine Decl.”)

 

a. No Material Dispute Regarding the Existence of the April 14, 2010, Agreement

Plaintiff alleges in its complaint that Defendant, by and through its agent Jatinder S. Kaleka, executed the Agreement with Plaintiff so that Plaintiff would extend credit to Defendant for the purpose of purchasing tires on credit. (Cmplt., ¶ 7.) Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, Plaintiff agreed to and did furnish tires to Defendant for which Defendant agreed to pay Plaintiff pursuant to the terms of the invoice. (Cmplt., ¶ 11.) In its answer, Defendant admitted that it entered into the Agreement with Plaintiff through its agent Jatinder S. Kaleka, and that it made subsequent purchases from Plaintiff pursuant to the Agreement. (Doc. 8, Answer, ¶¶ 7, 11.) Defendant further admitted in its answer that, under the terms of the Agreement, Plaintiff extended credit to Defendant for the purpose of purchasing tires, and Defendant would pay Plaintiff pursuant to the terms of the invoices issued by Plaintiff to Defendant. (Doc. 8, Answer, ¶¶ 7–8.)

 

Because Defendant admitted it entered into this Agreement with Plaintiff, there is no material dispute regarding the existence of the Agreement or its terms. Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Lacelaw Corp., 861 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir.1988) (Factual assertions in the operative pleadings are “considered judicial admissions conclusively binding on the party who made them”).

 

b. No Material Dispute Regarding Plaintiff’s Performance

*4 Plaintiff submitted the declaration of Jeff Hoogerheide in support of its motion. Mr. Hoogerheide is the Controller and buyer for Plaintiff, has access to all records relating to accounts for the purchase of tires, and is the custodian of records for Plaintiff. (Doc. 17–1, Hoogerheide Decl., ¶ 5.) Mr. Hoogerheide attests that he is trained to work with account debtors who have defaulted on the terms of their respective Agreements with Plaintiff, and he is familiar with Defendant’s entire account history. (Doc. 17–1, Hoogerheide Decl., ¶¶ 7–8.)

 

Mr. Hoogerheide states Plaintiff has performed all its obligations under the terms of the Agreement by providing Defendant with credit to purchase tires, issuing invoices, keeping accurate records of payments made, interest accrued, and fees incurred. (Doc. 17–1, Hoogerheide Decl., ¶ 15.) Defendant has not submitted any declaration or evidence to dispute this fact. As such, there is no material dispute regarding Plaintiff’s performance under the terms of the Agreement.

 

c. No Material Dispute Regarding Defendant’s Breach

The parties’ Agreement provides that Defendant will “pay all invoices billed by [Plaintiff] for goods and services purchased by [Defendant] and billed through [Plaintiff].” (Hoogerheide Decl., Exhibit A, Doc. 17–2.) Plaintiff maintains that Defendant made purchases through the line of credit extended by Plaintiff, for which Plaintiff invoiced Defendant. Depending on the invoice, full payment was due and owing within 30 to 45 days, but Defendant failed to make any payment on 25 outstanding invoices. In its responses to Requests for Admission, Defendant admitted that each of the 25 outstanding invoices is genuine, that Defendant received each of the 25 outstanding invoices, and that Defendant has not made any payment to Plaintiff on any of the 25 outstanding invoices. (Doc. 17–5, Meine Decl., ¶ 7; Doc. 17–6, Def. Resp. to Req. for Admission, Nos. 1–111.) Finally, Defendant admitted it owes Plaintiff $96,136.56 pursuant to the 25 outstanding invoices. (Doc. 17–5, Meine Decl., ¶ 7; Doc. 17–7, Def. Resp. to Req. for Admission, No. 112.) There is no factual dispute that Defendant’s failure to pay the outstanding invoices is a material breach of the parties’ Agreement.

 

d. No Material Dispute as to Damages

The final element of breach of contract is the damage to the non-breaching party as a result of the breach. CDF Firefighters, 158 Cal.App. at 1239. There is no material issue of disputed fact with respect to the damages caused by Defendant’s breach. In response to Plaintiff’s Requests for Admission, Defendant admitted that it had not made any payments to Plaintiff on the 25 outstanding invoices, and that it owes Plaintiff $96,136.56 pursuant to those outstanding invoices. (Doc. 17–5, Meine Decl., ¶ 7; Doc. 17–6, Def. Resp. to Req. for Admission, No. 111–12.) Mr. Hoogerheide reviewed the outstanding invoices and confirmed that the amount due and owing is $96,136.56. (Doc. 17–1, Hoogerheide Decl., ¶ 21; Doc. 17–3, Exhibit B.)

 

4. Conclusion

*5 Based on the record before the Court, the undisputed facts show that there was an Agreement entered between the parties which was breached by Defendant when it failed to pay Plaintiff the amounts due under 25 outstanding invoices. Plaintiff’s papers are sufficient to support its Motion for Summary Judgment and do not on their face reveal a genuine issue of material fact. Pursuant to the foregoing, summary judgment is granted in favor of Plaintiff, and Plaintiff is awarded damages in the amount of $96,136.56.

 

C. Plaintiff’s Request for $9,903.84 in Prejudgment Interest

Plaintiff seeks an award of $9,903.84 in prejudgment interest. “Prejudgment interest is a substantive aspect of a plaintiff’s claims, rather than a merely procedural mechanism.” Oak Harbor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Sears Roebuck, & Co., 513 F.3d 949, 961 (9th Cir.2008). In diversity actions, state law governs all awards of prejudgment interest. Lund v. Albrecht, 936 F.2d 459, 464–65 (9th Cir.1991).

 

“California Civil Code section 3287[ (a) ] provides that a party is entitled to recover prejudgment interest on an amount awarded as damages from the date that the amount was both (1) due and owing and (2) certain or capable of being made certain by calculation.” Uzyel v. Kadisha, 188 Cal.App.4th 866, 919, 116 Cal.Rptr.3d 244 (2010). “Damages are certain or capable of being made certain by calculation, or ascertainable, for purposes of Civil Code section 3287[ (a) ] if the defendant actually knows the amount of damages or could compute that amount from information reasonably available to the defendant.” Id.

 

The 25th and final invoice was sent to Defendant on April 26, 2013, which was due to be paid within 30 days. Thus, Defendant’s payment on this final invoice was due on or before May 27, 2013. (Doc. 17–1, Hoogerheide Decl., ¶ 22; Doc. 17–3, Exhibit B; Doc. 17–4, Exhibit C.) The information regarding the total amount due pursuant to all 25 invoices ($96,136.56) was reasonably available to Defendant, and Defendant could have computed the figure on its own using the invoices sent by Plaintiff.

 

Under Civil Code section 3289(b), “[i]f a contract entered into after January 1, 1986, does not stipulate a legal rate of interest, the obligation shall bear interest at a rate of 10 percent per annum after a breach.” Cal. Civ.Code 3289(b). Because Plaintiff’s damages derive from the Agreement and the invoices sent by Plaintiff to Defendant, and because neither the Agreement nor the invoices stipulate a legal rate of interest, the $96,136.56 bears ten percent per annum interest from May 27, 2013. Cal. Civ.Code § 3289(a).

 

Plaintiff’s interest calculations begin on June 1, 2013, through the date this motion was set for hearing, June 11, 2014. The daily interest is $26.34 on the total amount due. The total interest due on June 11, 2014, was $9,903.84 (376 days x $26.34).

 

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

 

*6 1. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED;

 

2. Judgment shall be entered in Plaintiff’s favor in the amount of $106,040.40 ($96,136.56 + $9,903.84);

 

3. Any motion for attorney’s fees should be filed pursuant to this Court’s Local Rules; and

 

3. This case shall be administratively closed.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

United States District Court,

M.D. Alabama,

Northern Division.

Richard I. LOHR, II, as Administrator of the Estate of Charles David Fancher, Deceased, Plaintiff,

v.

Joseph Earl ZEHNER, III, et al., Defendants.

 

Civil Action No. 2:12cv533–MHT.

Signed June 23, 2014.

 

Richard Duane Morrison, Beasley Allen Law Firm, Montgomery, AL, Jere Locke Beasley, Beasley Allen Crow Methvin Portis & Miles PC, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.

 

Thomas M. Gutting, King & Spalding, Houston, TX, Albry Joe Peddy, Smith Spires & Peddy, PC, Birmingham, AL, John Burruss Riis, Katie Hammett Hassell, Hand Arendall, L.L.C., Mobile, AL, for Defendants.

 

OPINION AND ORDER

MYRON H. THOMPSON, District Judge.

*1 Plaintiff Richard I. Lohr, II, as administrator of the estate of Charles David Fancher, filed this wrongful-death lawsuit against defendants Joseph Earl Zehner, III and United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), among others. The lawsuit arises out of a series of highway collisions that resulted in Fancher’s death. The cause is before the court on Zehner and UPS’s motion to exclude the testimony of administrator Lohr’s proffered expert Michael Napier from consideration during summary judgment and at trial by the jury.

 

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Fed.R.Evid. 702 allows experts to offer opinion testimony if:

 

“(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

 

“(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

 

“(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

 

“(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.”

 

Fed.R.Evid. 702. If an expert’s testimony is otherwise admissible, he may testify to the ultimate issue in a civil case. Fed.R.Evid. 704(a).

 

Before an expert may testify, the court must play a gatekeeping role to ensure that the testimony is reliable. See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). Even if part of an expert’s testimony is based on unreliable methodology, the court should allow those parts that are reliable and admissible. United Fire and Cas. Co. v. Whirlpool Corp., 704 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir.2013).

 

II. BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are complex and disputed. For the purpose of this opinion, however, it is helpful to include some basic and undisputed facts. Early in the morning, before sunrise, Zehner was driving a UPS tractor-trailer on an interstate highway, when he collided with the rear of another tractor-trailer, and his truck turned on its side, blocking the highway. Approximately 20 minutes later, Fancher, approached Zehner’s upturned truck, collided with it, and died.

 

Administrator Lohr now argues that Zehner was negligent and wanton in the events leading to and following the initial collision. He also points to several accidents and violations on Zehner’s record before the accident and alleges that UPS was negligent and wanton in its response to those previous infractions.

 

III. DISCUSSION

Administrator Lohr proffers Napier as an expert in trucking safety and management, and no party challenges his qualifications. However, Zehner and UPS challenge Napier’s testimony on several grounds, none of which would exclude the entirety of his testimony.

 

A. Napier’s Affidavit of April 28, 2014

In response to Zehner and UPS’s motion to exclude his testimony, Napier submitted an affidavit, dated April 28, 2014, that describes in further detail the nature of his expertise and the opinions he would present at trial. Zehner and UPS seek to exclude any information or opinions in this new affidavit as undisclosed opinions.

 

*2 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a party disclose the identity of any expert witnesses and, for witnesses such as Napier who were retained as experts, a written report that contains “a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(B). If an opinion is undisclosed, it should be excluded unless the non-disclosure “was substantially justified or is harmless.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1).

 

Administrator Lohr seems to confuse this argument with the ‘sham affidavit’ concept in summary-judgment proceedings. See Tippens v. Celotex Corp., 805 F.2d 949, 953 (11th Cir.1986)(“any issue raised by affidavit which was flatly contradicted by an earlier deposition was so suspect of untruthfulness as to be disregarded as a matter of law”). Zehner and UPS argue, not that Napier’s affidavit contradicts his earlier testimony, but that it presents altogether new opinions. That said, it is difficult to see what new opinions the affidavit puts forward or, to the extent the opinions in the affidavit differ or strengthen the basis for Napier’s earlier opinions, how the new opinions prejudice Zehner and UPS in any way. In other words, to the extent that there are new opinions in this affidavit, the non-disclosure is harmless. The court will consider the affidavit.

 

B. Standard of Care

Zehner and UPS challenge Napier’s testimony with regard to the events leading to the collisions and Zehner’s alleged negligence. They argue that his “opinions are not beyond the ken of lay persons” and that the opinions “seek to impose a higher standard … than is allowed by Alabama law.” Mot. to Exclude (Doc. No. 113–1) at 6–7. Both of these arguments lack merit.

 

In order to prove negligence on the part of Zehner, administrator Lohr must show that Zehner failed to exercise reasonable care, “that is, such care as [a] reasonably prudent person would have exercised under the same or similar circumstances.” Klein v. Mr. Transmission, Inc., 318 So.2d 676, 679 (Ala.1975) (quoting jury instructions approvingly). Zehner and UPS argue that most jurors will have driven an automobile and that, as a result, most jurors will have a common-sense understanding of the attendant responsibilities in a crash situation. They argue that any testimony about the differences between safely driving a truck and safely driving an ordinary automobile would impose a higher standard of care on Zehner. In support of this proposition, they point to Gunnells v. Dethrage, 366 So.2d 1104, 1106 (Ala.1979), which rejected an argument that minor drivers should be allowed a lower standard of care than the standard to which adults are held.

 

Gunnells does not support Zehner and UPS’s argument because the difference between negligence in driving a tractor-trailer, as opposed to a sedan, is not a difference in the standard of care but instead a difference in the circumstances. The reasonably-prudent-person standard applies, but the law recognizes that a reasonably prudent person acts differently in different situations. A tractor-trailer is a significantly larger and more dangerous vehicle than an automobile and it is a significantly different kind of vehicle from that driven by an ordinary juror. As a result, the circumstances within which a tractor-trailer driver must exercise care are quite different from the circumstances with which most jurors will be familiar. The testimony of an expert on how to drive a truck safely will be helpful to the jury.

 

*3 Furthermore, it is well-established under Alabama law that the customs and practices within an industry may be considered by a jury, but are not determinative, when deciding whether the standard of care has been breached in a given situation. “The common usage of a business or occupation is a test of care or negligence, and is a proper matter for consideration in determining whether or not sufficient care has been exercised.” Klein, 31 So.2d at 441–42 (quoting 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 16, now found at 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 912); see also King v. Nat’l Spa & Pool Inst., Inc., 570 So.2d 612, 616 (Ala.1990) (“In Alabama, evidence that a defendant manufacturer complied with or failed to comply with industry standards, such as the standards promulgated by the trade association in this case, is admissible as evidence of due care or the lack of due care.”).

 

Napier is qualified to offer insights to the jury as to the nature of driving a tractor-trailer and the industry practices for driving such a truck safely. Furthermore, under Fed.R.Evid. 704, he may offer his opinion as to whether, on his review of the various accident reports, Zehner failed to exercise the appropriate degree of care consistent with industry customs and practices.

 

C. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations

Zehner and UPS seek to bar Napier from offering interpretations of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations and opinions as to whether Zehner and UPS violated those regulations. They argue that any testimony about the regulations would be offering conclusions of law and intruding on the role of the court. In support, they point this court to an unpublished opinion from the Northern District of Georgia, which cited Seventh and Eighth Circuit opinions that excluded testimony about the meaning of regulations. Ricker v. Southwind Trucking, Inc., 2006 WL 5157692 at *8 (N.D.Ga. July 13, 2006) (Murphy, J.) (citing Bammerin v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp ., 30 F.3d 898, 900 (7th Cir.1994), and Police Ret. Sys. of St. Louis v. Midwest Inv. Advisory Serv., Inc., 940 F.2d 351, 357 (8th Cir.1991)). However, there is no per se bar on expert testimony about regulations in the Eleventh Circuit. See United State v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 817 & n. 10 (11th Cir.1984) (allowing use of expert testimony to explain complex regulations and describing such testimony in other cases); see also United States v. Sinclair, 74 F.3d 753, 757 n. 1 (7th Cir.1996) (noting that, despite Bammerin, the Seventh Circuit does sometimes permit expert testimony as to the meaning of regulations).

 

Alabama law does not recognize a negligence-per-se cause of action based on the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, but such regulations may be considered by a jury to determine whether a defendant exercised appropriate care for the situation. Osborne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Langston, 454 So.2d 1317, 1326 (Ala.1984). Furthermore, common sense suggests that trucking industry practices around safety are heavily influenced by the regulations on the industry. There is no need to demand that Napier eliminate all references to the regulations in his testimony.

 

*4 Although Napier has the experience to describe how the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations are understood within the industry, there is nothing to show that he has the expertise to engage in abstract interpretation of the regulations. To the extent that Zehner and UPS complain that Napier will be called to explain the regulations in the abstract, such testimony would be ungrounded and would not be useful to the jury since there is no negligence-per-se theory available. However, there is no indication of such abstract interpretations in Napier’s expert report, deposition, or affidavit, and as a result, there are no such opinions to be excluded.

 

D. NATMI Materials

Zehner and UPS argue that Napier should be barred from offering opinions that rely on materials of the North American Transportation Management Institute (NATMI). In arguing against the NATMI references, Zehner and UPS introduce an affidavit from the executive director of that organization. The affidavit states that, “NATMI does not set industry standards in the trucking institute.” Arnold Aff. (Doc. No. 113–2) at 128. However, Napier relied on NATMI’s book, Motor Fleet Safety Supervision, Principals and Practices, which states that NATMI certification is designed to “designate competence with regard to the transportation industry’s standards of performance, excellence and achievement.” Napier Aff. (Doc. No. 130–2) at ¶ 5. Therefore, even if such materials do not set industry standards, they could be reasonably understood to describe industry practices and would therefore be legitimate bases for Napier’s opinions. The court sees no reason that citation to NATMI materials diminishes the reliability of Napier’s opinions to the extent that those opinions should not go before a jury.

 

E. “High Risk Commercial Driver”

Zehner and UPS seek to exclude any opinion that Zehner was a “High Risk Commercial Driver” or that his previous violations and preventable accidents should have led UPS to terminate him prior to the collisions at issue in this case. Napier relies on two bases for this set of opinions: his own experience in the trucking industry, as well as a document called the “Synthesis of Safety Practice,” which was commissioned by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration and issued by the Transportation Research Board of the National Academies.

 

UPS and Zehner argue that Napier’s opinion regarding Zehner’s record and UPS policies do not have sufficient basis to be reliable. However, in his deposition Napier makes clear that he is offering his opinion based in part on his experience in the trucking industry and his review of numerous trucking company policies. See, e.g. Napier Dep. (Doc. No. 130–3) at 91:22–25 (“There’s not a single standard that I’ve ever read or any company policy that would accept a driver that had three moving violations in three months that they would retain.”). He says that his reference to the Synthesis was intended “as a support to what I’m saying I understand the industry standards to be with regards to issues of the high risk driver.” Id. at 94:2–5.

 

*5 Experience may provide sufficient foundation for an expert opinion. “If the witness is relying solely or primarily on experience, then the witness must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.” Fed.R.Evid. 702 advisory committee note (2000 amends.); see also United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1265–66 (11th Cir.2004). In this case, the specific experience is Napier’s prior review of other company’s disciplinary and retention policies, which he characterizes as showing that no other policies are as lenient as UPS’s.

 

Zehner and UPS’s concerns about the reliability of the Synthesis, on the other hand, stands on stronger footing. Specifically, they challenge the reliability of the Synthesis as an indication of industry standards. The Synthesis was a survey of various trucking industry professionals on their response to safety issues. The survey was not intended as a prescriptive, standard-setting document, and it did not have a sufficiently large response rate to be scientifically representative of industry opinion on safety issues. Napier admitted as much in his deposition.

 

Napier’s basis in experience is sufficiently reliable for the court to admit opinions about industry practices of retention of drivers who have exhibited various forms of risky behavior and how Zehner’s driving history would be evaluated in the industry. However, the court cannot conclude that the Synthesis report is also sufficiently reliable to serve as a basis for expert opinion.

 

Since, as of now, the phrase “High Risk Commercial Driver” appears to come from the Synthesis, Napier will be barred from using that phrase in testimony unless there is an indication at trial that the phrase is a general term of art within the industry. However, the court cannot determine from the record which of Napier’s opinions on this subject would still stand absent the Synthesis report. The court believes that discerning which opinions should be heard by the jury and which should be excluded is a process better left for trial, where the court can examine the witness to understand better the basis or each opinion.

 

Napier’s opinions on this issue do not affect the court’s summary-judgment analysis.

 

F. Fatigue

UPS and Zehner challenge Napier’s opinion that Zehner’s actions are “indicative of the actions of a distracted, ill/fatigued, and/or otherwise impaired driver.” Napier Rep. (Doc. No. 130–1) ¶ 5. Napier expounds further in his expert report and in his deposition testimony about the dangers of driver fatigue, but his only basis for stating that Zehner was likely fatigued or otherwise impaired is that he failed to abide by Napier’s articulated standard of care and that he stated that he had “fallen asleep” and “nodded off” on several occasions. Id. These summaries add no helpful analysis for the jury, which will be as well equipped to determine whether Zehner fell asleep as Napier is. Napier offers no detail on how his experience might inform the summary opinions, although he does offer conclusory statements that his experience would be useful. These statements are not sufficient for Napier’s opinion to be admissible on this matter. See Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1265–66 (affirming exclusion of expert’s opinions regarding a matter outside his expertise, where his experience did not provide a basis for the opinion).

 

*6 Therefore, with regard to the fatigue, UPS and Zehner’s motion to exclude will be granted.

 

G. “Contributing Factors”

Finally, Zehner and UPS object to Napier’s use of the phrase “contributing factor” to describe his conclusions. From the written record alone, it is difficult to determine exactly what Napier is trying to communicate with this phrase: Are they factors which contribute to his accident, to his opinion, to something else? To some extent, Zehner and UPS’s objection seems to sound more strongly in Fed.R.Evid. 403 than Rule 702: Is the probative value of Napier’s use of ‘contributing factor’ “substantially outweighed by a danger of … unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury”? For the time being, the court will allow Napier to use this phrase in his testimony depending on the context. However, Zehner and UPS may object at trial if context shows that the usage is prejudicial. The use of this language will not affect the court’s summary-judgment analysis.

 

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that defendants Joseph Earl Zehner, III and United Parcel Service, Inc.’s motion to exclude the testimony of Michael Napier (doc. no. 113) is granted in part and denied in part as set forth in the above opinion.