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GARNETT CIVIL ACTION VERSUS PUGH ET AL.

GARNETT CIVIL ACTION VERSUS PUGH ET AL.

 

CIVIL ACTION NO: 14-479 SECTION: “J” (4)

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

 

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33593

 

 

March 18, 2015, Decided

March 18, 2015, Filed

 

 

COUNSEL:  [*1] For Paulette Garnett, Plaintiff: Allen Helwick Borne, Jr., LEAD ATTORNEY, Borne Law Firm, New Orleans, LA; Ryan Patrick Reece, The Reece Law Firm, New Orleans, LA.

 

For Protective Insurance Company, Christopher K. Pugh, Waggoners Trucking, incorrectly named as Waggoners Trucking, Inc., Defendants: John Emerson Galloway, LEAD ATTORNEY, Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr & Smith (New Orleans), New Orleans, LA; Andrea Leigh Albert, Campbell B Fetzer, Jr, Galloway, Johnson, Tompkins, Burr & Smith (Mandeville), Mandeville, LA.

 

JUDGES: CARL J. BARBIER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

 

OPINION BY: CARL J. BARBIER

 

OPINION

 

ORDER & REASONS

Before the Court is Plaintiff Paulette Garnett’s Motion for Spoliation of Evidence (Rec. Doc. 27) and Defendants Christopher Pugh, Protective Insurance Company, and Waggoners Trucking Company’s opposition thereto. (Rec. Doc. 35) Having considered the motion and memoranda of the parties, the record, and the applicable law, the Court finds that the motion should be DENIED for the reasons set forth more fully below.

 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This action arises out of a rear-end collision involving Plaintiff Paulette Garnett (Garnett) and a tractor-trailer combination owned by Defendant Waggoners [*2]  Trucking, Inc. (Waggoners) on February 5, 2013. (Rec. Doc. 27-30, p. 1-2) The facts surrounding the rear-end collision are in dispute. At or around the time of the collision, Garnett was allegedly traveling in the left lane of U.S. 90B, also known as the “Westbank Expressway,” near its intersection with Westwood Drive in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana. (Rec. Doc. 27-30, p. 2) At or around that same time, Garnett alleges that a Waggoners 2012 Kenworth tractor with flatbed trailer was traveling behind Garnett’s vehicle. She further alleges that Christopher Pugh, a Waggoners employee, was operating the tractor-trailer and that his son, Jeremy Davis (Davis), who is also a Waggoners employee, rode with Pugh as his co-driver on the trip. Id. Garnett asserts that as she approached the intersection of Westwood Drive, observing a traffic signal change from green to yellow, she slowed her vehicle to stop, and the tractor-trailer operated by Pugh collided with the rear of her vehicle. Id. Although Garnett’s deposition testimony reveals that she did admittedly change lanes prior to the collision, the parties dispute the specific time in which she changed lanes prior to slowing her vehicle. (Rec. [*3]  Doc. 35, p. 2) While Garnett asserts that she did not believe her lane change to be of consequence in the rear end collision, Waggoners alleges that Garnett changed lanes and stopped abruptly in a way that left Pugh without enough time and distance to stop the tractor-trailer. (Rec. Doc. 27-30, p. 2-4)

On January 9, 2014, Garnett filed suit in the 24th Judicial District of Louisiana against Pugh, Waggoners, and Protective Insurance Company (Protective). (Rec. Doc. 1, p. 1) Thereafter, Protective removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and 28 U.S.C. § 1441 on February 28, 2014. (Rec. Doc. 1) Garnett filed a Motion to Compel (Rec. Doc. 20), which was heard for oral argument on January 28, 2015, seeking production of various documents. The motion was opposed, and this Court ultimately granted the motion in part and denied the motion in part. (Rec. Doc. 26, p. 7) Garnett then filed the instant motion on February 21, 2015, seeking to have this Court (1) issue a judgment declaring that Defendants destroyed, mishandled, and altered critically important evidence relevant to the liability for the rear-end collision; (2) strike Defendants’ responsive pleadings regarding liability as a penalty; (3) barring [*4]  Defendants from disputing liability for the collision at trial; or (4) alternatively, allow adverse presumption jury charges for each piece of evidence Waggoners destroyed and altered. Defendants opposed the motion on March 3, 2015. (Rec. Doc. 35) On March 10, 2015, Garnett filed a reply. (Rec. Doc. 45)

 

PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

Garnett argues that Waggoners altered, mishandled, and destroyed critically important evidence by: (1) “losing” Davis’s recorded statement, which was taken at the time of the accident by Victor Villanova (Villanova), a Custard Insurance Adjusters (CIA) employee investigating the accident; (2) failing to preserve, or destroying, the engine control module data by allowing the data to be overwritten when the tractor experienced “subsequent deceleration events” between the time of the accident and the time the data was extracted; (3) failing to preserve electronic data and hours of service documents that could help determine whether Pugh was fatigued at the time of the accident, including Pugh and Davis’s subjective daily logs, fuel receipts, toll receipts, bills of lading, and other similar documents; and (4) failing to preserve identifiable Qualcomm systems data (tracking [*5]  data) from the tractor(s) Pugh drove during the weeks and days prior to the accident.

As to the audio recording of Davis’s statement taken immediately after the accident, Garnett alleges that this Court should reject any claims that Waggoners lost the recorded statement. Garnett asserts that Waggoners likely knew that the recorded statement was unfavorable to Pugh, so Waggoners demanded that Davis author a “biased/favorable” handwritten statement as a substitute for the recorded statement. Furthermore, Garnett questions why Villanova utilized “regular mail,” rather than a mail service that would have allowed for tracking of the delivery in transporting the recorded statement. Alternatively, Garnett asserts that even if the statement was lost, Waggoners’ failure to copy the recorded statement or hire an independent third party to transcribe the recording “demonstrates Waggoners’ willful disregard for competent evidence preservation and retention protocol(s).” In addition, the summary of the statement, prepared by Villanova the day after the accident, does not mitigate any prejudice suffered from not having the recorded statement.

Secondly, Garnett alleges that the Defendants failed to [*6]  preserve, or destroyed, the relevant engine control module data (ECM). Because Defendants failed to download the ECM data in a reasonable amount of time, the data was overwritten when the tractor experienced “subsequent deceleration events” between the date of the accident and the date of the data extraction. In addition, Garnett is severely prejudiced by this missing data because it could have provided detailed and objective insight into the mechanics of the collision. Further, Garnett asserts that Defendants could have discharged their duty to preserve the data by notifying Garnett that they did not intend to download or otherwise preserve the data; therefore, Garnett could have then made arrangements to obtain the data.

Next, Garnett alleges that Defendants failed to preserve data and documents from the last week of January 2013 to the first week of February 2013 that could have been used to determine whether Pugh was fatigued at the time of the accident, including Pugh and Davis’s subjective daily logs, fuel receipts, toll receipts, bills of lading, other similar documents, as well as identifiable QUALCOMM systems messaging and tracking data. Specifically, Garnett alleges that the [*7]  tracking data was non-descript as to who drove the tractors during the weeks and days prior to the accident and that the tracking data was altered. Garnett contends that Davis’s daily log originally indicated that he was in the tractor’s sleeper berth at the time of the collision, but that information was later “lined through” and corrected to state that Davis was “off-duty.”

Finally, Garnett asserts that for all these reasons, Defendants bear a high degree of fault for destroying, mishandling, and altering evidence. Based on the severe prejudice caused to Garnett by Defendants’ failure to preserve critical evidence, Garnett asserts that “stripping Defendants of their liability defenses” is the most appropriate penalty. Alternatively, Garnett seeks adverse presumption jury charges as to every piece of evidence that Defendants destroyed, mishandled, and altered.

Defendants deny all of the allegations regarding spoliation and pray that this Court deny Garnett’s Motion for Spoliation of Evidence. Further, Defendants assert that Garnett has mischaracterized or exaggerated facts relating to: (1) the State Trooper’s finding of fault related to the accident, (2) Villanova’s testimony relating [*8]  to the accident and Garnett being “extracted” from the vehicle, (3) referral to a settlement of property damage claims, (4) Protective Insurance Company allegedly pressuring Waggoners to terminate Pugh’s employment, (5) Waggoners’ failure to preserve drivers’ logs and trip envelope, (6) alleged false claims regarding documents produced after the hearing on the motion to compel, and (7) Defendants allegedly altering Davis’s logs.

Defendants contend that they did not alter Davis’s Driver log for February 5, 2013, but rather, Davis had edited the log prior to submitting it to Waggoners. Secondly, Defendants assert that they did not alter or destroy any Qualcomm data and have provided the relevant hours of service documents to Garnett. Defendants state that both Pugh and Davis’s driver logs were submitted to Garnett, and that Garnett has all of the documents supporting Pugh’s hours of service. Further, Defendants argue that the Qualcomm system could not have been used to enter the driver log hours, because the Waggoners units lacked this capability. Therefore, Defendants assert that since something that does not exist cannot be intentionally destroyed or altered, spoliation could not have [*9]  occurred.

Additionally, Defendants deny that they altered or destroyed the audio tape of Jeremy Davis’s statement. Neither Protective nor Waggoners’ claim administrator nor Waggoners’ safety department received the tape. Furthermore, Garnett is not prejudiced by this missing tape, because Villanova’s typed summary of Davis’s statement is in her possession.

Finally, Defendants deny that they intentionally destroyed ECM data or acted in bad faith. Waggoners does not dispute that the ECM data was not downloaded until June 25, 2014, which was approximately eight days after receiving the written request by Garnett. Further, Waggoners contends that Garnett could have requested the ECM data download earlier, and Waggoners would have complied with such a request. Defendants explain that the ECM data could provide no information regarding Garnett’s movements, speed, or distance in front of the unit that Pugh was operating. In addition, Garnett has failed to show that Defendants have acted intentionally or in bad faith, so sanctions are not warranted.

In her reply, Garnett disputes many of Defendants’ statements. Garnett alleges that Defendants incorrectly stated that: (1) Villanova’s testimony [*10]  that emergency personnel removed Garnett from her car is “hearsay,” (2) Garnett previously stated the Qualcomm system should have been used to enter driver log hours, (3) because Waggoners located Pugh and Davis’s logs on a back-up server, “all is well” with respect to how Waggoners responded to Garnett’s multiple requests for the driving logs, (4) the engine control module data is irrelevant and Garnett could have obtained the data before Waggoners destroyed it, (5) the recorded statement of Pugh’s son was, without explanation, “simply lost,” and (6) Davis’s log for February 5, 2013, was not materially altered, and hence not spoiled. Garnett goes on to argue why each of these statements is incorrect and the importance of each issue.

 

LEGAL STANDARD

When evaluating allegations regarding spoliation of evidence, federal courts sitting in diversity are to apply federal evidentiary rules rather than state spoliation laws. Condrey v. SunTrust Bank of Georgia, 431 F.3d 191, 203 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing King v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 337 F.3d 550, 556 (5th Cir. 2003)); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. CMA Dishmachines, No. 03–1098, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8026, 2005 WL 1038495, at *3 (E.D. La. Apr. 26, 2005)(Vance, J.). A plaintiff alleging spoliation must establish that the defendant intentionally destroyed the evidence for the purpose of depriving opposing parties of its use. Catoire v. Caprock Telecommunications Corp., No. 01-3577, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23389, 2002 WL 31729484, at *1 (E.D. La. Dec. 2, 2002). It is insufficient to show that [*11]  a party acted negligently, rather than intentionally, in spoiling the evidence. Id.

The spoliation of evidence doctrine provides courts with the authority to impose sanctions on responsible parties when there has been intentional destruction of relevant evidence. This Court has previously held that in order for a court to impose an adverse inference or other sanctions, it must first determine whether the doctrine of spoliation applies. Collongues v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., No. 09–3202, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4841, 2010 WL 103878, at *2 (E.D. La. Jan. 7, 2010). In order for the doctrine to apply, the movant must prove two elements: (1) that the party having control over the evidence had a duty to preserve the evidence at the time it was destroyed; and (2) that the destruction of the evidence was intentional. Id. (citing Menges v. Cliffs Drilling Co., No. 99–2159, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8478, 2000 WL 765082, at *2 (E.D. La. June 12, 2000)). In order for a party to have a duty to preserve evidence, the party must have notice that the evidence is relevant to litigation. Menges, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8478, 2000 WL 765082, at *2. In addition, negligence is not sufficient to support the imposition of sanctions for spoliation. See In re Bertucci Contracting Co., L.L.C., No. CIV.A. 12-0697, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153790, 2014 WL 5483707, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 29, 2014); Lafayette Ins. Co., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8026, 2005 WL 1038495, at *3. Furthermore, it is settled that a sanction predicated upon spoliation of evidence requires a showing [*12]  that the party acted in bad faith. See King, 337 F.3d at 556; United States v. Wise, 221 F.3d 140, 156 (5th Cir. 2000).

 

DISCUSSION

As a threshold matter, it does appear to this Court that Waggoners was put on notice that litigation was likely to arise from the accident when they dispatched CIA to the scene. Additionally, litigation was reasonably foreseeable when Garnett was transported to the hospital following the accident. Thus, the Court finds that Defendants had a duty to preserve relevant data within their control. Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Alcoa, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 335, 339 (M.D. La. July 19, 2006)(noting that the duty to preserve arises “when a party should have known that the evidence may be relevant to future litigation” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). The question therefore becomes whether Plaintiff has shown that Defendant intentionally destroyed the evidence. Menges, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8478, 2000 WL 765082, at *2 (“Once a court concludes that a party was obliged to preserve the evidence, it must then consider whether the evidence was intentionally destroyed and the likely contents of that evidence.”)

 

1. DAVIS’S RECORDED STATEMENT

In regards to the recorded statement of Davis that Villanova took immediately following the accident, Garnett has made several allegations regarding Defendants’ actions that include: (1) Defendants destroyed the tape, (2) Defendants should have [*13]  ensured it was transcribed by an independent third party, and (3) Defendants had questionable intentions when taking down Davis’s handwritten statement. (Rec. Doc. 27-30, p. 13-14) Although courts within the Fifth Circuit have recognized that a “strong chain” of circumstantial evidence could be sufficient to establish the intent to destroy evidence, Garnett has failed to provide any evidence indicating that the Defendants destroyed the tape. See In re Bertucci Contracting Co., L.L.C., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153790, 2014 WL 5483707, at *3. Garnett only offers a string of conclusory statements indicating that the Defendants wanted the tape to be destroyed because it likely contained an unfavorable statement. (Rec. Doc. 27-30, p. 13) These conclusory statements are insufficient to support any sanction for spoliation of evidence.

Alternatively, Garnett argues that Villanova mailing the tape via regular mail, the fact that no copy was made, and Waggoners’ failure to “hire an independent third party to transcribe the recording demonstrates Waggoners’ willful disregard for competent evidence preservation and retention protocol(s).” (Rec. Doc. 27-10, p. 14) However, these allegations again do not amount to the intentional destruction of evidence for purposes of spoliation. First, Villanova [*14]  is not a party to this action, so the method of mail he chose to use to send the tape to Defendants is not determinative here. And Defendants have submitted affidavits indicating that neither PIC nor Waggoners received the tape. (Rec. Doc. 35-5 & Rec. Doc. 35-8) Thus, Garnett simply has not established any evidence indicating that Defendants destroyed Davis’s recorded statement. Furthermore, Villanova completed a typed summary of the statement the day following the accident, which Garnett has in her possession. (Rec. Doc. 35, pp. 10-11) The Court finds that Garnett has failed to show that Defendants intentionally destroyed the recorded statement, as necessary to support any sanction against Defendants for spoliation of evidence. The Court similarly finds that the lack of a copy and the mere fact that Waggoners could have hired an independent third party to transcribe the recording cannot support the imposition of sanctions here.

 

2. ECM DATA

Garnett also alleges that Defendants intentionally destroyed the ECM data by failing to download that data within a reasonable amount of time. (Rec. Doc. 27-30, p. 14) Defendants downloaded the ECM data within eight days of a written request for such [*15]  data from Garnett, which request was not made until approximately sixteen months after the accident. (Rec. Doc. 35, p. 12) However, as a result of the tractor’s subsequent deceleration events, the data from the date of the accident had been overwritten and destroyed when Defendants downloaded it. (Rec. Doc. 27-30, p. 14) Again, Garnett has not shown that Defendants intentionally destroyed the data. Her conclusory allegation stating as much is insufficient. Therefore, the imposition of the requested sanctions is improper as to the ECM data.

 

3. QUALCOMM TRACKING AND MESSAGING DATA

Next, Garnett asserts that Defendants failed to preserve the Qualcomm messaging data from the latter part of January 2013 until February 5, 2013. (Rec. Doc. 27-30, p. 15) Garnett does not provide any support for her allegations regarding Defendants’ destruction of or failure to preserve the Qualcomm messaging data. Although Defendants do not directly address this argument in their opposition, Pugh’s deposition testimony suggests that the Qualcomm messaging system was down at the time of the accident and some time prior to the accident. (Rec. Doc. 35-2, p. 3) Garnett’s spoliation claim regarding the Qualcomm data [*16]  fails.

In addition, Garnett states, “With respect to the electronic tracking data, Waggoners produced non-identifiable tracking data for only one relevant date, the date of the accident, but did not preserve identifiable data from the tractor(s) Pugh drove during the weeks and days leading up to and including the date of the accident.” (Rec. Doc. 27-30, p. 15) Defendants addressed this argument by explaining that none of the Waggoners units had the capability of allowing a person to enter his driver log hours. (Rec. Doc. 35, p. 9) Although Garnett denies any reference to driver logs in her reply, her original motion does make several references to the tracking data being non-identifiable or not indicating who was driving. (Rec. Doc. 27-30, p. 8, 9, 15, 21) In any case, Defendants have in fact produced the tracking data for the day of the accident. As to any other days that Garnett may have requested tracking data for, she has not presented any evidence supporting the contention that Defendants in fact destroyed that evidence. Garnett’s claim of spoliation as to the Qualcomm tracking data is unsupported and without merit.

 

4. HOURS OF SERVICE DOCUMENTS

Finally, Garnett alleges, “Waggoners [*17]  breached its obligation to preserve critically important documents and electronic data . . . . The missing documents not only included all of Pugh and his son’s subjective daily logs, but critically important objective documents such as fuel receipts, toll receipts, bills of lading and other similar documents.” (Rec. Doc. 27-30, pp. 14-15)(emphasis omitted). In addition, Garnett further contends that someone altered Davis’s driver logs for the date of the accident. Id. at 20. Defendants explain that both Davis and Pugh’s driver logs were turned over to Garnett, and the Order on Garnett’s Motion to Compel indicated that Garnett was not entitled to Davis’s “trip envelope” documents. (Rec. Doc. 26, p. 7) Therefore, the record suggests that at least some of the requested documents, including payroll data, were turned over to Garnett (Rec. Doc. 27-30, p. 7), while others were found to be irrelevant. (Rec. Doc. 26, p. 7) Moreover, Garnett has not put forth any evidence indicating that Defendants destroyed any of the documents requested.

Finally, there is no indication of when Davis’s driver log was corrected. While Garnett contends that Waggoners corrected the statement, Defendants explain that the [*18]  log was turned in with that alteration. (Rec. Doc. 35, p. 9) Here, Garnett has failed to put forth any evidence indicating that Defendants altered the logs. Therefore, the unsubstantiated claims regarding the hours of service documents do not support a finding of spoliation, and sanctions for spoliation are improper.

Garnett has failed to show that Defendants acted in bad faith or intentionally destroyed any evidence discussed herein. Therefore, the Court finds that it would be improper to strike Defendants’ liability defenses or allow any adverse jury charge.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Spoliation of Evidence (Rec. Doc. 27) is DENIED.

New Orleans, Louisiana this 18th day of March, 2015.

/s/ Carl J. Barbier

CARL J. BARBIER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

NORTHRICH COMPANY, Plaintiff, vs. GROUP TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, INC., et al., Defendants.

NORTHRICH COMPANY, Plaintiff, vs. GROUP TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, INC., et al., Defendants.

 

CASE NO. 1:13CV1161

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO, EASTERN DIVISION

 

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35826

 

 

March 23, 2015, Decided

March 23, 2015, Filed

 

 

COUNSEL:  [*1] For Northrich Company, Plaintiff: Frank R. Brancatelli, LEAD ATTORNEY, Painesville, OH.

 

For Group Transportation Services, Inc., Defendant, Cross-Claimant: David M. Krueger, LEAD ATTORNEY, Clare R. Taft, Eric Larson Zalud, Benesch, Friedlander, Coplan & Aronoff – Cleveland, Cleveland, OH.

 

For FedEx Freight, Inc., Defendant, Cross Defendant: David A. Valent, Reminger & Reminger – Cleveland, Cleveland, OH.

 

JUDGES: CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO, United States District Judge.

 

OPINION BY: CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO

 

OPINION

 

OPINION AND ORDER

CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO, J.:

This matter comes before the Court upon the Motion (ECF DKT #42) of Defendant, FedEx Freight, Inc. (“FedEx”), for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Complaint; Motion (ECF DKT #43) of Defendant, Group Transportation Services, Inc. (“GTS”), for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Complaint and on GTS’s Cross-Claim against FedEx; Motion (ECF DKT #44) for Summary Judgment of FedEx on GTS’s Cross-Claim; and Motion (ECF DKT #45) of Plaintiff, Northrich Company, for Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, FedEx’s Motion (ECF DKT #42) for Summary Judgment and GTS’s Motion (ECF DKT #43) for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Complaint are granted. Plaintiff Northrich’s Motion (#45) for Summary [*2]  Judgment is denied; and the Motions of FedEx (ECF DKT #44) and GTS for Summary Judgment on their mutual Cross-Claims are denied as moot.

 

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On October 18, 2013, Plaintiff filed its First Amended Complaint (ECF DKT #20) against FedEx and GTS for violation of the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, which imposes liability on carriers for “actual loss or injury” to goods damaged in interstate transport. See 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1) (2008). Plaintiff is a manufacturers’ representative of high-quality commercial HVAC products. (ECF DKT #45-1, Affidavit of Robert Evans, President of Northrich Company).

On December 4, 2012, Plaintiff obtained a quote from GTS to arrange for the shipment of three heat exchangers (“coils”) from one of its vendors, Mestek, Inc., located in Dallas, Texas, to Oberlin College in Lorain County, Ohio. GTS contracted with FedEx to transport the goods from Texas to Ohio. Crane Ohio (a non-party) was hired to lift the “coils” in place at the job site. Robert Evans viewed the “coils” and the crates at the Crane Ohio premises and “determined that 2 of the 3 skids/pallets were damaged as well as the “coils” placed on the skids/pallets and were not fit for the purpose intended by the ultimate customer.” (ECF [*3]  DKT #45-1, ¶ 11). Plaintiff was required to replace the two damaged “coils;” and Plaintiff paid Mestek $20,616.67 for the replacement “coils” and paid GTS $2,195.00 for dock-to-dock shipment. (Id. at ¶¶ 13-15). Plaintiff alleges that FedEx and GTS are liable, as motor carriers, for Plaintiff’s actual damages, together with interest on such amounts from the date that the damaged goods were to be delivered. (ECF DKT #20, ¶ 13).

Plaintiff asserts that it has demonstrated a prima facie claim pursuant to the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, and is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law against FedEx and GTS. FedEx moves for judgment in its favor, arguing that Plaintiff lacks standing to sue under the Carmack Amendment; that Plaintiff has not met its prima facie burden for liability under the Carmack Amendment, and that FedEx’s liability is contractually limited. GTS moves for judgment in its favor on the basis that, as a broker and not a carrier, it cannot be liable under the Carmack Amendment. GTS also moves for judgment on its Cross-Claim against FedEx for indemnification.

 

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

 

Civil Rule 56 Standard

A summary judgment should be granted if the pleadings, depositions, documents, electronically stored information, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, [*4]  transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a) and (c). The burden is on the moving party to conclusively show no genuine issue of material fact exists, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); Lansing Dairy, Inc. v. Espy, 39 F.3d 1339, 1347 (6th Cir.1994); and the court must view the facts and all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). Once the movant presents evidence to meet its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest on its pleadings, but must come forward with some significant probative evidence to support its claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Lansing Dairy, 39 F.3d at 1347. This Court does not have the responsibility to search the record sua sponte for genuine issues of material fact. Betkerur v. Aultman Hospital Ass’n., 78 F.3d 1079, 1087 (6th Cir.1996); Guarino v. Brookfield Township Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 404-06 (6th Cir.1992). The burden falls upon the nonmoving party to “designate specific facts or evidence in dispute,” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); and if the nonmoving party fails to make the necessary showing on an element upon which it has the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Whether summary judgment is appropriate depends upon “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one [*5]  party must prevail as a matter of law.” Amway Distributors Benefits Ass’n v. Northfield Ins. Co., 323 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52).

 

The Carmack Amendment

49 U.S.C. § 14706 recites in pertinent part:

 

(a) General liability —

(1) Motor carriers and freight forwarders. –A carrier providing transportation or service subject to jurisdiction under subchapter I or III of chapter 135 shall issue a receipt or bill of lading for property it receives for transportation under this part. That carrier and any other carrier that delivers the property and is providing transportation or service subject to jurisdiction under subchapter I or III of chapter 135 or chapter 105 are liable to the person entitled to recover under the receipt or bill of lading. The liability imposed under this paragraph is for the actual loss or injury to the property caused by (A) the receiving carrier, (B) the delivering carrier, or (C) another carrier over whose line or route the property is transported in the United States or from a place in the United States to a place in an adjacent foreign country when transported under a through bill of lading and, except in the case of a freight forwarder, applies to property reconsigned or diverted under a tariff under section 13702. Failure to issue a receipt or bill of lading does not affect the liability of a [*6]  carrier. …

 

 

In other words, the Carmack Amendment makes common carriers liable “for any loss, damage or injury” caused by such carriers to property received by them for transportation. Plough, Inc. v. Mason and Dixon Lines, 630 F.2d 468, 470 (6th Cir.1980). “(T)he statute codifies the common-law rule that a carrier, though not an absolute insurer, is liable for damage to goods transported by it unless it can show that the damage was caused by ‘(a) the act of God; (b) the public enemy; (c) the act of the shipper himself; (d) public authority; or (e) the inherent vice or nature of the goods.'” Id., quoting Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. 134, 137, 84 S. Ct. 1142, 12 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1964).

For purposes of the statute, a “motor carrier” is defined as “a person providing motor vehicle transportation for compensation.” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(14). A “broker” is “a person, other than a motor carrier or an employee or agent of a motor carrier, that as a principal or agent sells, offers for sale, negotiates for, or holds itself out by solicitation, advertisement, or otherwise as selling, providing, or arranging for, transportation by motor carrier for compensation.” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(2). (Emphasis added).

To establish a prima facie case for carrier liability for loss under the Carmack Amendment, a plaintiff must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) the goods were received by the carrier in good condition, (2) [*7]  the goods arrived at their destination in a damaged condition, and (3) a specified amount of damages resulted. Plough, 630 F.2d at 470; Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. at 138. “Once the plaintiff has established its prima facie case, the burden shifts to the carrier defendant to prove that (1) it was free from negligence and (2) that the damaged cargo was not (sic) a result of one of the five exceptions listed in Elmore & Stahl.” Plough, 630 F.2d at 470-71; Travelers Indemnity Company of Connecticut v. Central Transport, Inc., No. 2:07-CV-14096, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89852, 2008 WL 4793403 at *5 (E.D.Mich. Nov.3, 2008).

 

Group Transportation Services, Inc.

In its Motion for Summary Judgment, GTS asserts that, as a broker, it cannot be liable under the Carmack Amendment; and that, in Plaintiff’s contract with GTS, Plaintiff expressly waived any claim against GTS for damages in the delivery of the property. The Court finds, for those reasons, that GTS is entitled to judgment in its favor.

The Carmack Amendment imposes liability upon common carriers for damages to goods due to their unexcused negligence. Brokers are defined as persons other than motor carriers. 49 U.S.C. § 13102(2).

The Affidavit (ECF DKT #43-1) of Paul Kithcart, President of GTS, recites in part:

 

2. GTS is a transportation broker, duly licensed with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration under FMCSA Number MC286225, …

3. As a broker, [*8]  GTS serves as an intermediary between shippers and motor carriers in arranging for third-party transportation of property by motor carrier.

4. GTS is not a motor carrier, does not have operating authority to act as a motor carrier, and does not hold itself out (sic) the public as a motor carrier.

 

 

Plaintiff argues that GTS is an agent of the carrier in this case, FedEx. Plaintiff “contends that as a result of the [Transportation Agreement] between GTS and FedEx which provides for a volume discount to GTS for customers GTS referred to FedEx, GTS is in effect an agent of FedEx and by reason thereof falls with in (sic) the purview of the Carmack Amendment.” (Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition, ECF DKT #49 at 6). Plaintiff does not offer that Transportation Agreement into evidence and says, in passing, that Defendants did not provide it in discovery. Discovery is closed and Plaintiff did not seek a court order compelling the document’s production. Not only has Plaintiff failed to meet its burden of showing, with probative evidence, a genuine issue of disputed fact; but Plaintiff is prohibited, at the dispositive motion stage, from alleging a cause of action for agency or vicarious liability which is absent [*9]  from its original Complaint and Amended Complaint. See Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 873 (6th Cir.1997); Marzuola v. Continental Tire North America, No. 5:05CV2339, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56150, 2006 WL 2345529 at *3 (N.D.Ohio Aug. 11, 2006).

In addition, on April 12, 2012, Plaintiff’s authorized representative signed a GTS Credit Application (ECF DKT #43-3). By executing the Application, Plaintiff designated GTS “as a provider of third-party freight transportation services.” Id. Further, a provision, typed in bold and in all caps, recites in part:

 

THE COMPANY [NORTHRICH] FURTHER AGREES THAT GTS WILL NOT BE LIABLE TO THE COMPANY FOR ANY DAMAGES OF WHATEVER NATURE, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO, CONSEQUENTIAL, SPECIAL OR PUNITIVE, WITH RESPECT TO GTS CARRYING OUT ITS OBLIGATIONS AND DUTIES AS SPECIFIED HEREIN AND/OR ANY OTHER MATTER RELATING THERETO. THE COMPANY AGREES TO LOOK TO THE FREIGHT CARRIER FOR DAMAGES IF THE COMPANY OR ITS VENDORS WERE TO SUFFER ANY DAMAGES IN THE DELIVERY OF ANY OF ITS PROPERTY.

 

 

Thus, Plaintiff expressly waived any claim against GTS for damages to the heat exchangers (“coils”) transported by FedEx from Texas to Oberlin College in Ohio.

Therefore, the Motion (ECF DKT #43) of Defendant, Group Transportation Services, Inc. (“GTS”), for Summary Judgment is granted.

 

FedEx Freight, Inc.

In [*10]  its Motion for Summary Judgment, FedEx contends that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring an action under the Carmack Amendment; that Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden of proof to establish its prima facie case; and that, in any event, FedEx’s liability is contractually limited.

Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1), a carrier’s liability extends to “the person entitled to recover under the receipt or bill of lading.” Plaintiff repeatedly states that it never saw the Shippers Domestic Bill of Lading, which, in itself, militates against Plaintiff’s right to recover under the Carmack Amendment. (See, e.g., ECF DKT #47 at 4). Nonetheless, Plaintiff attaches the Shippers Domestic Bill of Lading to its Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF DKT #45-7). Upon review of that document, the Court notes that the name “Northrich Company” does not appear anywhere.

Plaintiff refers to itself at various times as “the buyer,” “the purchaser,” “one with an insurable interest,” and “the title holder.” After consideration of the relevant authority, the Court is unable to find any decision which explains how a party that is not the shipper; that is not listed on, or a party to, the bill of lading; that did not possess the bill of lading; that did not negotiate with [*11]  the carrier; and that was not the receiving party of the shipment, has standing to sue for damage to the cargo under the Carmack Amendment. (See similar analysis in OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. Haas Industries, Inc., 567 F.Supp.2d 1138 (N.D.California 2008)). Therefore, the Court determines that Plaintiff lacks standing to sue the carrier, FedEx, under the Carmack Amendment.

Even assuming Plaintiff has standing, the Court agrees with FedEx, and holds that Plaintiff cannot prevail because it has not satisfied its prima facie burden for carrier liability for loss under the Carmack Amendment. Specifically, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate the first element — delivery of the goods to the carrier in good condition — by a preponderance of the evidence.

Plaintiff directs the Court’s attention to the Shippers Domestic Bill of Lading (ECF DKT #45-7) and the Shipper Certification, at the bottom of the document, attested to by an agent of Mestek, Inc., Aubrey Barlow: “This is to certify that the above named materials are properly classified, described, packaged, marked and labeled, and in proper condition for transportation according to the applicable regulations of the DOT.” Clearly, this is not a certification by Plaintiff. Moreover, the statement, in the Court’s view, merely verifies the packaging condition of the goods for transporting, [*12]  per Department of Transportation regulations.

Also, the form language of the Shippers Domestic Bill of Lading recites as follows:

 

RECEIVED, subject to the “Transportation Agreement” between GTS and the carrier in effect on the date of the shipment, the property described below, in apparent good order, except as noted (contents and condition of contents of packages unknown) marked, consigned, and defined as shown below. This bill of lading is not subject to any tariffs or class factors whether individually determined or filed with any Federal or State regulatory agent, except as specifically appears in writing by GTS and the carrier. (Emphasis added).

 

 

The carrier, FedEx, did not sign the Carrier Certification, acknowledging “receipt of packages order and condition;” and there is no special description or instruction regarding the three skids and heat exchangers, which would override the clear exclusion (indicated above) of any representation as to the condition of the shipment.

“While a bill of lading, on its own, may constitute some evidence that a shipment was received in good order, it is not necessarily prima facie evidence of that condition.” Travelers Indemnity, No. 2:07-CV-14096, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89852, 2008 WL 4793403 at *5 [*13] ; see American Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 325 F.3d 924, 929 (7th Cir.2003). “A ‘statement in the bill of lading as to ‘apparent good order’ [, however,] is prima facie evidence … that, as to parts which were open to inspection and visible, the goods were in good order at the point of origin.'” Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, 262 F.2d 832, 834 (6th Cir.1959).

Plaintiff presents photographs of the damaged crates at delivery, which appear to show that there were open slats through which the heat exchangers could be observed. (Exhibits N & O to ECF DKT #45). Plaintiff also submits the Shippers Domestic Bill of Lading (ECF DKT #45-7) and the Affidavit of Northrich’s President that, upon unloading, he observed “that 2 of the 3 skids/pallets were damaged as well as the “coils” placed on the skids/pallets and were not fit for the purpose intended by the ultimate customer Oberlin College.” (ECF DKT #45-1 at ¶ 11).

“Under the Carmack Amendment jurisprudence, a carrier does not have an affirmative duty to inspect goods in a sealed container.” Travelers Indemnity, No. 2:07-CV-14096, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89852, 2008 WL 4793403 at *6. However, Plaintiff does bear the burden of proving all three elements of the prima facie case. 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89852, [WL] at *7. Plaintiff asserts that “the ‘coils’ were clearly visible and any damage that existed, should have been noted by the FedEx driver at the time of acceptance of the [*14]  ‘coils’ for transportation.” This bald assertion/assumption, though, is not supported by any sworn testimony, i.e., affidavit or deposition testimony, of the FedEx driver, and discovery in this case is closed.

Plaintiff proffers the Shippers Domestic Bill of Lading, which is, at best, ambiguous evidence. The Carrier Certification is not executed; and considered along with the clear proviso that the condition of the contents is unknown, the Court finds that this document is not a clean bill of lading, showing that the shipment was received by the carrier in good order. Plaintiff also submits that one of the “coils” (heat exchangers) arrived at the destination undamaged. However, this “does not provide evidence of the condition of the goods at issue at the time of deposit to Defendant; rather, the statement speaks to the condition of other goods post-delivery. Plaintiff presents no other evidence of the [heat exchangers’] condition at the time of tender to Defendant.” See Ohio Star Transportation LLC v. Roadway Express, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-00261, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95764, 2010 WL 3666982 at *3 (S.D.Ohio Sept. 14, 2010).

Plaintiff is required to provide evidence of the good condition of the heat exchangers which, when taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, [*15]  could support a verdict by a reasonable jury in its favor. Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden of proof.

Since the Court holds that Plaintiff lacks standing to recover against FedEx under the Carmack Amendment, and alternatively, that Plaintiff’s failure to satisfy the first element of its prima facie burden is dispositive, the Court need not address FedEx’s other arguments. The Motion (ECF DKT #42) of Defendant FedEx for Summary Judgment is granted.

 

Remaining motions

In light of the Court’s ruling, the Motion (ECF DKT #45) of Plaintiff, Northrich Company, for Summary Judgment against Defendants Group Transportation Services, Inc. and FedEx is denied. Furthermore, the Motions of FedEx (ECF DKT #44) and GTS for Summary Judgment on their mutual Cross-Claims are denied as moot.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Christopher A. Boyko

CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO

United States District Judge

Dated: March 23, 2015

 

JUDGMENT

The Court has filed its opinion and order in the above-captioned matter. Accordingly, this action is terminated pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Christopher A. Boyko

CHRISTOPHER A. BOYKO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED: March 23, 2015

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