United States District Court, E.D. Virginia,

Norfolk Division.

CMA CGM S.A., Plaintiff,

v.

DECKWELL SKY (USA) INC., d/b/a Monarch Container Line, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 2:14cv135. | Signed March 16, 2015.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Brett M. Saunders, Dustin M. Paul, Edward J. Powers, Vandeventer Black LLP, Norfolk, VA, for Plaintiff, CMA CGM S.A.

John T. Husk, Jeffrey E. Cox, Law Offices of Seaton & Husk LP, Vienna, VA, Robert G. Rothstein, Franklin & Prokopik PC, Herndon, VA, for Defendants, Deckwell Sky (USA) Inc.

 

 

OPINION & ORDER

HENRY COKE MORGAN, JR., Senior District Judge.

*1 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff CMA CGM S.A.’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 19, Defendant Deckwell Sky (USA) Inc.’s (“Defendant”) Motion to Strike and Motion in Limine, Docs. 21, 25, and the subsequent bench trial held before this Court on February 24, 2015. For the reasons explained herein, the Court GRANTED the Motion for Summary Judgment as to liability on all counts, DENIED Defendant’s pretrial Motions, and, having received sufficient evidence at trial, FINDS Defendant LIABLE to Plaintiff in the total amount of $438,910.66.

 

 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed its Complaint against Defendant on April 4, 2014, alleging five counts. Doc. 1. Counts Four and Five were dismissed voluntarily on June 4, 2014. Doc. 12. Count One alleges Breach of Contract “for all demurrage and storage charges;” Count Two alleges Breach of Contract to recover “freight and associated charges;” and Count Three alleges violation of the “Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.” Doc. 1 at 5–6.

 

Plaintiff filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on January 22, 2015. See Doc. 19. On January 30, 2015, Defendant filed its Response. Doc. 23. Plaintiff’s Reply was filed on February 5, 2015. Doc. 28. Argument on that Motion was heard at the Final Pretrial Conference on February 10, 2015 and the Court ruled from the bench in Plaintiff’s favor as to liability.

 

A bench trial for the purpose of determining the appropriate amount of damages took place on February 24, 2015. Doc. 38. Based on the Court’s prior summary judgment ruling, the parties filed a trial stipulation stating Plaintiff “is entitled to demurrage charges from July to December of 2013.” Doc. 39. The Court heard evidence and argument from both sides but withheld a ruling on the exact amount of damages pending the issuance of this Order. Doc. 38.

 

 

B. Undisputed Facts Established for Summary Judgment1

Plaintiff is a foreign company operating as a “common carrier providing ocean transportation services for containerized cargo worldwide.” Doc. 20 at 1–2. Defendant, doing business as “Monarch Container Line,” is considered a Non–Vessel Operating Common Carrier (“NVOCC”). Id. at 2.

 

Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a service contract ensuring that Plaintiff would reserve sufficient space for Defendant’s cargo on its vessels in exchange for Defendant’s guarantee to ship at least a certain amount of cargo over the life of the contract. Id . This contract was formed sometime in April 2013. Id.

 

In a related transaction, which took place in May or June 2013, Defendant contracted with Kumquat Tree, Inc. (“Kumquat”), represented by an individual identified as “John Chen,” to ship thirteen containers from Oakland, California to the Port of Tianjin, China. Id. at 3. To effectuate its deal with Kumquat, Defendant booked passage for these thirteen containers under the terms of its contract with Plaintiff in three separate shipments. Id. The documentation provided by Kumquat indicated that the thirteen containers held “auto parts,” and Defendant passed this description along to Plaintiff. Id.

 

*2 The final shipment left Oakland on or about June 28, 2013. Id. at 5. On July 5, 2013, after two of the shipments had arrived safely in China, Defendant notified Plaintiff that it was having difficulty reaching its consignee and that the cargo “may be abandoned.”2 Plaintiff responded on July 9, 2013, informing Defendant that it would be liable for any costs associated with the cargo being abandoned. Id. Defendant responded by requesting a quote for a change of destination. Id. at 5–6. Plaintiff immediately informed Defendant that a change of destination was impossible because the containers had already been discharged from the vessel in China and were “under Customs’ custody.” Id. at 6, Ex. 18.

 

Unable to change destinations, Defendant requested that Plaintiff provide a quote for the costs of abandonment or re-exportation. Id. at 6. Plaintiff provided an estimated cost to destroy the cargo, id. at Ex. 21, but Defendant refused to pay this amount, id. at Ex. 22. Two weeks passed without Defendant instructing Plaintiff on how to proceed with the cargo. Id. at 7.

 

On July 29, 2013, Defendant informed Plaintiff that it had learned that the cargo may not be “auto parts” but, instead, “used tires.” Id. at 7, Ex. 23. The parties continued to exchange e-mail communication over the next two weeks, and Defendant again requested re-exportation of the containers, which Plaintiff refused pending confirmation of the true contents of the containers. Id. at 8. On August 12, 2013, Defendant confirmed that the containers were loaded with “used tires” and not “auto parts.” Id. at 8, Ex. 29. Importing used tires into China is illegal, a fact known to both parties, and Defendant maintains that it did not know the cargo was misidentified until after arrival in China. Id. at 8. Furthermore, Defendant concedes that Plaintiff had no knowledge of the problem. Id. at 12.

 

Given that the cargo was an illegal import, Plaintiff asked Defendant if it was prepared to proceed with destruction of the cargo. Id. Defendant refused, claiming the costs estimated by Plaintiff were “way too high,” and yet again requested re-exportation. Id. at Ex. 30. Plaintiff denied this request on the grounds that destruction “was the only viable option” and advised Defendant of the costs that would likely be incurred. Id. at 8–9. Defendant responded that same day, August 14, 2013, that it would “try to find shipper[, Kumquat,] and relay the charges.” Id. at 9, Ex. 33.

 

On October 8, 2013, after nearly two months of silence, Plaintiff sent follow-up notice providing a cost estimate for destruction and alleging Defendant’s liability for those costs if the cargo was to be officially abandoned. Id. at 9, Ex. 34. Defendant responded, again rejecting the cost estimations as unnecessarily high and instead requesting a quote for returning the cargo to the United States. Id. at 9, Ex. 35. Plaintiff denied this request, stating that if Defendant wished to take action aside from destruction, it should do so at its “own costs, risks and responsibilities.” Id. at 9, Ex. 36.

 

*3 Finally, in an effort to retain Defendant as a long-term customer, Plaintiff offered to effectuate re-exportation of the cargo on the condition that Defendant paid the costs incurred in storage and customs. Id. at 10. Defendant refused this offer, citing the alleged delay in offering re-exportation on Plaintiff’s part as the cause of the majority of the storage costs. Id. at 10, Ex. 38. Negotiations broke down further, and Defendant informed Plaintiff of its intent to file a report with the Federal Maritime Commission if Plaintiff did not agree “to assume reasonable responsibility for its serious mishandling of this shipment.” Id . at 10, Ex. 39.

 

The parties agreed that Plaintiff’s contractual obligations over the cargo terminated upon safely reaching the Port of Tianjin. Id . at 10. Defendant admitted that it is responsible for unpaid “ocean freight and associated charges.” Id. at 11, 14. Although the proper amount remained in dispute, Defendant also admitted that it is responsible under the parties’ service contract for some amount of demurrage charges.3 Id. at 11.

 

 

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is appropriate only when the court, viewing the record as a whole and in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, determines that there exists no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; see, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–24 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248–50 (1986); Terry’s Floor Fashions v. Burlington Indus., 763 F.2d 604, 610 (4th Cir.1985). Once a party has properly filed evidence supporting the motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations in the pleadings, but must instead set forth specific facts illustrating genuine issues for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–24. Such facts must be presented in the form of exhibits and sworn affidavits. Failure to rebut the motion with such evidence will result in summary judgment when appropriate. “[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment … against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id. at 322.

 

A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. Rather, the evidence must be such that the fact-finder reasonably could find for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). Although the court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, in order to successfully defeat a motion for summary judgment, a nonmoving party cannot rely on “mere belief or conjecture, or the allegations and denials contained in his pleadings.” Doyle v. Sentry Ins., 877 F.Supp. 1002, 1005 (E.D .Va.1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324).

 

 

B. Bench Trial

*4 At trial, a plaintiff must prove, by the preponderance of evidence, that it has suffered damages due to the defendant’s breach of contract and violation of maritime law. This burden is to prove “with reasonable certainty the amount of damages and the cause from which they resulted; speculation and conjecture cannot form the basis of the recovery.” Shepherd v. Davis, 574 S.E.2d 514, 524 (Va.2003). Accordingly, a plaintiff must show two elements for each type of damages claimed: (1) “a causal connection between the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the damages asserted;” and (2) “the amount of those damages by using a proper method and factual foundation for calculating damages.” Saks Fifth Avenue, Inc. v. James, Ltd., 630 S.E.2d 304, 311 (Va.2006).

 

 

III. ANALYSIS

As a general proposition, nobody wants to own 325 metric tons of used tires;4 the parties in this case are no exception. Plaintiff does not accuse Defendant of knowingly misrepresenting its cargo, and it appears clear to the Court that both parties in this case are the victims of a fraud perpetrated by “John Chen” and Kumquat, the original shipper of the used tires.5 That being said, the Court must still determine, as between the parties now before it, where the legal responsibility should lie for the misrepresentation of the cargo and the significant expenses which followed.

 

 

A. Liability

Defendant did not dispute any of the asserted facts supporting its general liability pursuant to each of the three Counts of the Complaint: Breach of Contract (Counts 1 & 2) and Violation of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (Count 3). Accordingly, there exists no genuine issue of material fact in dispute on the topic of liability. First, Defendant admitted responsibility for misrepresenting the cargo as “auto parts.” (Counts 1 & 3). See Doc. 28 at 2. Second, Defendant admitted responsibility for the “unpaid freight” (Count 2). See id. at 3. Finally, it is clear from the face of the service contract that Defendant is liable for at least some detention, demurrage, and destruction charges based upon its admitted abandonment of the cargo (Count 1). The only issue truly debated by the parties on summary judgment was the proper scope of Defendant’s liability and the mitigation of damages.

 

Although Defendant objected generally to a significant number of Plaintiff’s factual allegations, bare objections are not sufficient to create a dispute. A non-moving party must put forth evidence and “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Furthermore, the Court did not sustain any of Defendant’s evidentiary objections. Plaintiff clearly established a prima facie case for liability, and Defendant provided no new or distinguishing facts, relying instead solely upon meritless evidentiary objections. Therefore, the Court GRANTED Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to liability, Doc. 19, but proceeded to trial for the proper determination of damages.

 

 

B. Damages

*5 At trial, Plaintiff sought three specific types of damages. First, Plaintiff sought the freight cost of shipping the cargo, equal to 8,820 United States Dollars (“USD”), an amount Defendant does not contest. Doc. 37 at 2. Second, it sought the daily demurrage costs for depriving Plaintiff of the use of its thirteen containers from July 2013 until April 4, 2014, 2,519,780 Chinese Yuan (“CNY”). Id. Third, Plaintiff sought the actual costs associated with destruction of the cargo once abandoned, 1,513,074 CNY. Id.

 

 

1. Freight Charges

Plaintiff claims it is owed freight, the contract price for shipment of the cargo, in the amount of 8,820 USD. Id. Plaintiff asserted this claim in its Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 20 at ¶ 61, and Defendant did not object or respond to this claim, see Doc. 28 at 3. Defendant also admitted to this charge through deposition, and the evidence presented by both parties at trial clearly supports the accuracy of the amount. See, e.g., Trial Ex. 5 at CMA000106–09. Defense counsel did not contest these damages at trial. See Doc. 33 at 2, 6. Accordingly, the Court FINDS that Plaintiff has proven “with reasonable certainty the amount of damages” relating to the freight charges for shipment of the cargo initially identified as “auto parts” and successfully delivered to the Port of Tianjin. See Shepherd, 574 S.E.2d at 524. Therefore, the Court ORDERS that Defendant is LIABLE for damages relating to freight charges in the amount of 8,820 USD.

 

 

2. Demurrage Charges

Plaintiff seeks damages relating to demurrage charges from the expiration of the “free time” on each container6 until April 4, 2014, the date Defendant was invoiced to facilitate the filing of this lawsuit. Using that date, Plaintiff claims to be owed damages in the amount of 2,519,780 CNY. Although Plaintiff claimed at trial that demurrage continued to accrue after April 4, 2014, Plaintiff asked the Court to award damages based upon this invoice.

 

Defendant disputes Plaintiff’s ability to recover “any demurrage” on the basis that Plaintiff failed to properly mitigate damages. Doc. 33 at 6. Defendant asserts that because Plaintiff had physical possession of the cargo, it was the only one in the position to mitigate damages. Defendant alleges that Plaintiff’s failure to do so should completely undermine its ability to recover demurrage. Id.

 

The Court FINDS, however, that the evidence does not entirely support either party’s position. Defendant’s consignee did not pick up the cargo as anticipated in July 2013, see Trial Ex. 13, thereby continuing to occupy Plaintiff’s containers and initiating demurrage charges under the service contract. The parties then engaged in a series of e-mail communications seeking to find a resolution. See Trial Exs. 13, 21–22, 24, 34, 39. Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff delayed too long before destroying the cargo is severely undermined by these e-mails.

 

*6 Over the course of their communications, Plaintiff continually instructed Defendant that the only feasible way to proceed was by destroying the tires. See, e.g., Trial Ex. 22. In response, Defendant repeatedly informed Plaintiff that the quoted pricing for destruction was too high, and requested that Plaintiff not proceed with destruction. As a result, Plaintiff cannot reasonably have been expected to destroy the cargo while it still belonged to Defendant.

 

At trial, Defendant also argued that Plaintiff could have mitigated damages by acting on its right to empty the unclaimed containers for more productive use elsewhere and arranging another means of storage for the cargo. “[M]itigation of damages is an affirmative defense and the party that breached the contract bears the burden of proving that failure by a preponderance of the evidence.” Johnson v. Washington, No. 2:07cv204, 2008 WL 850690, at *5 (E.D.Va. Mar. 12, 2008) (citing Fox–Sadler v. Norris Roofing Co., 229 Va. 106, 112 (1985)). Although it does appear Plaintiff had the right to empty the containers, Defendant failed to meet its burden to prove how or if Plaintiff’s failure to act on that right unnecessarily enhanced the overall costs. Accordingly, the Court FINDS that Plaintiff is owed some amount of demurrage charges.

 

In Yang Ming Marine Transp. Corp. v. Okamoto Freighters Ltd., the Ninth Circuit faced a very similar set of facts regarding the issue of demurrage. 259 F.3d 1086, 1088–90 (9th Cir.2001) [hereinafter Yang Ming ]. There, the court held that although the plaintiff-carrier was initially entitled to demurrage upon the expiration of “free time,” its ability to recover demurrage ceased when the cargo was officially abandoned. The court reasoned that post-abandonment, plaintiff-carrier could no longer claim to be retaining the containers as a service to defendant-NVOCC. Id. at 1093. The court did, however, permit the plaintiff-carrier to recover the “actual costs it incurred as a result of [defendant-NVOCC]’s misdescription of the cargo.” Id. at 1094.

 

The Court is persuaded to adopt the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit as to the proper scope of demurrage-related damages. Therefore, Plaintiff may recover damages for all demurrage charges incurred between the expiration of “free time” for each container and the date on which the cargo was officially abandoned by Defendant.

 

As the date of abandonment is necessary for establishing the scope of damages, the Plaintiff bears the burden of proving the actual date. No evidence was offered at trial to establish an exact date; however, the parties agree that Defendant abandoned the cargo in December 2013 or early January 2014. See also Doc. 39 at 1 (trial stipulation stating Plaintiff “is entitled to demurrage charges from July to December of 2013.”). Compare Doc. 33 at 3, 6, with Doc. 37 at 4. Since Plaintiff bears the burden of proving damages, it also bears the related risk of nonpersuasion. See Fed.R.Evid. 301. Therefore, as no evidence was offered to establish an exact date of abandonment,7 the Court must select an appropriate date that is least prejudicial to Defendant. Accordingly, the Court FINDS, based upon the evidence now before it, that the cargo was officially abandoned on December 1, 2013, and Plaintiff can only recover the demurrage damages it seeks for charges incurred prior to that date.

 

*7 The service contract between the parties incorporated by reference Plaintiffs publically filed Tariff. See Trial Ex. 1 at CMA000114. Accordingly, the demurrage rates maintained in the Tariff are considered to be a part of the contract. See also Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94, 98 (1915) (“knowledge of the lawful [tariff] rate is conclusively presumed”).

 

For shipments of forty-foot “HC” containers from the United States to China, the Tariff lists the following schedule for demurrage charges:

 

 

 

 

Days Since Delivery of Cargo

 

 

Cost to Customer

 

 

Day One through Day Seven

 

 

Free Time

 

 

Day Eight through Day Fifteen

 

 

190 CNY/Day/Container

 

 

Day Sixteen through Day Forty

 

 

380 CNY/Day/Container

 

 

Day Forty–One and Forward

 

 

760 CNY/Day/Container

 

 

 

 

 

Trial Ex. 60 at CMA000241.

The first shipment of cargo arrived on June 23, 2013 with five containers. Trial Ex. 5 at CMA000103–04. This shipment’s seven days of “free time” expired on June 29. The first tier of demurrage charges ran from June 30 until July 7. The second tier ran from July 8 until August 1. The third tier ran from August 2 until November 30. The charge for each period, multiplied over five containers, is displayed in the following table:

 

 

 

 

Demurrage Tier

 

 

Days

 

 

Number of Containers

 

 

Daily Cost

 

 

Cost Incurred

 

 

Tier One

 

 

8

 

 

5

 

 

190 CNY

 

 

7,600 CNY

 

 

Tier Two

 

 

25

 

 

5

 

 

380 CNY

 

 

47,500 CNY

 

 

Tier Three

 

 

121

 

 

5

 

 

760 CNY

 

 

459,800 CNY

 

 

TOTAL DEMURRAGE FOR FIRST SHIPMENT

 

 

514,900 CNY

 

 

 

 

 

The second shipment of cargo arrived on June 30, 2013 with seven containers. Id. at CMA000100–02. This shipment’s seven days of “free time” expired on July 6. The first tier of demurrage charges ran from July 7 until July 14. The second tier ran from July 15 until August 8. The third tier ran from August 9 until November 30. The charge for each period, multiplied over seven containers, is displayed in the following table:

 

 

 

 

Demurrage Tier

 

 

Days

 

 

Number of Containers

 

 

Daily Cost

 

 

Cost Incurred

 

 

Tier One

 

 

8

 

 

7

 

 

190 CNY

 

 

10,640 CNY

 

 

Tier Two

 

 

25

 

 

7

 

 

380 CNY

 

 

66,500 CNY

 

 

Tier Three

 

 

114

 

 

7

 

 

760 CNY

 

 

606,480 CNY

 

 

TOTAL DEMURRAGE FOR SECOND SHIPMENT

 

 

683,620 CNY

 

 

 

 

 

The third shipment of cargo arrived on July 15, 2013 with one container. Id. at CMA000105. This shipment’s seven days of “free time” expired on July 21. The first tier of demurrage charges ran from July 22 until July 29. The second tier ran from July 30 until August 23. The third tier ran from August 24 until November 30. The charge for each period, multiplied by one container, is displayed in the following table:

 

 

 

 

Demurrage Tier

 

 

Days

 

 

Number of Containers

 

 

Daily Cost

 

 

Cost Incurred

 

 

Tier One

 

 

8

 

 

1

 

 

190 CNY

 

 

1,520 CNY

 

 

Tier Two

 

 

25

 

 

1

 

 

380 CNY

 

 

9,500 CNY

 

 

Tier Three

 

 

99

 

 

1

 

 

760 CNY

 

 

75,240 CNY

 

 

TOTAL DEMURRAGE FOR THIRD SHIPMENT

 

 

86,260 CNY

 

 

 

 

 

*8 As represented in the preceding tables, the Court FINDS that Plaintiff has proven “with reasonable certainty” that the recoverable demurrage for all thirteen containers from delivery until abandonment is 1,284,780 CNY. See Shepherd, 574 S.E.2d at 524. Ordinarily, however, the Court should “enter judgments in U.S. dollars.” ReliaStar Life Ins. Co. v. IOA Re, Inc., 303 F.3d 874, 882 (8th Cir.2002). Accordingly, the appropriate exchange rate of CNY to USD must be determined.

 

The proper date to select an exchange rate is the date of the breach. Elite Entm’t, Inc. v. Khela Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 396 F.Supp.2d 680, 694 (E.D.Va.2005). Here, the Court FINDS that the date of abandonment, December 1, 2013, is also the date the contract was breached. The Court therefore takes judicial notice that at the close of business on Friday, November 29, 2013, the applicable exchange rate was 0.16416 CNY to 1 USD.8 Applying this rate of exchange to the aforementioned total, the Court hereby ORDERS that Defendant is LIABLE for damages relating to demurrage charges in the amount of 210,909.48 USD.

 

 

3. Destruction Costs

Despite being unable to collect demurrage charges after abandonment, Plaintiff may still recover any actual costs incurred as a result of Defendant’s breach. See Yang Ming, 259 F.3d at 1093. Plaintiff requests these damages in the form of destruction costs, inspection fees, and storage charges. At trial, Plaintiff offered into evidence an e-mail from Plaintiff’s employee, Maria Soto, to Defendant’s employee, Eric Ngo, which provided cost estimates for destruction of the cargo. Trial Ex. 39. Uncontroverted witness testimony confirmed that these estimates accurately reflected the actual costs later incurred by Plaintiff. See Trial Test. of Ms. Hawkins.

 

The cost to physically destroy the used tires was quoted to Defendant as “CNY4,000/TON.” Trial Ex. 39. The Bills of Lading confirm that the cargo weighed a total of 325,000 kilograms or 325 metric tons. Trial Ex. 3 at CMA000199, 201, 203. Accordingly, destruction of the used tires cost Plaintiff a total of 1,300,000 CNY. Applying the exchange rate previously determined by the Court, this equals 213,408.00 USD.

 

The cost of inspection fees was quoted to Defendant as “CNY2000/CNTR.”9 Trial Ex. 39. The Bills of Lading confirm that the cargo was shipped in a total of thirteen containers. Trial Ex. 3 at CMA000199, 201, 203. Accordingly, the inspection of these thirteen containers cost Plaintiff a total of 26,000 CNY. Applying the exchange rate previously determined by the Court, this equals 4,268.16 USD.

 

The storage fees quoted to Defendant were “CNY8/[CNTR]/day … increased to CNY24/[CNTR]/day if idle over [three] months.” Trial Ex. 39. Since Plaintiff is receiving demurrage as compensation for storing the containers until abandonment, damages for storage costs will be calculated from December 1, 2013 until the tires were destroyed. Deposition testimony used at trial indicates that the actual destruction of tires began on December 17, 2014, see Trial Test. of Emma Sun, a period of 382 days after abandonment. As the cargo was idle for well over three months prior to abandonment, the Court will use the 24 CNY per container per day charge, amounting to a total storage cost of 9,168 CNY. Applying the exchange rate previously determined by the Court, this equals 1,505.02 USD.

 

*9 Based upon the foregoing evidence, the Court FINDS that Plaintiff has proven “with reasonable certainty” its actual costs post-abandonment. See Shepherd, 574 S.E.2d at 524. The Court hereby ORDERS that Defendant is LIABLE for damages relating to destruction, inspection, and storage costs in the amount of 219,181.18 USD

 

 

C. Defendant’s Pretrial Motions

Defendant filed both a Motion to Strike the Declaration of Ms. Hawkins from Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Motion and a Motion in Limine to prevent her from testifying at trial. See Docs. 21, 25. Both motions rest on the same principal argument, namely that Ms. Hawkins’ testimony does not come from her direct or personal knowledge and is, therefore, inadmissible.

 

Plaintiff asserted that the motions should be denied because Ms. Hawkins testified as a 30(b)(6) corporate designee. The Federal Rules are clear that such a witness “must testify about information known or reasonably available to the organization.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 30(b)(6). This acts as an exception to the general principle that a witness must have personal knowledge, and the deposition transcript cited by Plaintiff clearly indicated that this was Ms. Hawkins role and that she was aware of that distinction. Doc. 31 at 2. Furthermore, the Court took the matter under advisement after the Final Pretrial Conference, and although Ms. Hawkins did testify at trial, the objection was not renewed.

 

The Motion to Strike is also deficient on procedural grounds. Such a motion is only proper in reference to “material included in a pleading.” Gregory v. Belfor USA Grp., No. 2:12cv11, 2012 WL 2309054, at *2 (E.D. Va. June 15, 2012). The material that Defendant sought to strike is not attached to a pleading, but to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion to Strike, Doc. 21, and Motion in Limine, Doc. 25, both procedurally and on their merits.

 

 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Court GRANTED the Motion for Summary Judgment, Doc. 19, as to liability but not as to damages, DENIED Defendant’s pre-trial Motions, Docs. 21, 25, and FINDS Defendant LIABLE for damages in the total amount of $438,910.66.

 

The Clerk is REQUESTED to send a copy of this Order to all counsel of record.

 

It is so ORDERED.

 

 

 

Footnotes

 

1

 

The facts laid out in this section are those that were available to the Court, and uncontested by Defendant, when it considered Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. At that time, the Court FOUND that these facts were sufficient to establish Defendant’s liability for all three types of damages discussed below; however, the Court also noted that the evidence was insufficient to determine the proper amount of damages. See infra Part III.A. Further factual findings, based solely on the evidence and testimony offered at trial, are integrated below as necessary to explain the Court’s holding as to damages. See infra Part III.B.1–3.

 

2

 

Although Plaintiff cautiously indicates that Defendant thought abandonment was merely a possibility, the evidence cited appears more certain. The Exhibit in question purports to be an e-mail message informing Plaintiff “that these shipments have been abandoned by shipper.” Doc. 20 at Ex. 15. Furthermore, Defendant’s employee, Eric Ngo, stated that “[w]e have been trying to contact shipper for past 3 weeks, but they never get back to us.” Id.

 

3

 

“Detention” is defined by the service contract as “the charge [Defendant] pays for detaining [Plainitff’s] equipment outside the port, terminal or depot, beyond the free time.” Doc. 20 at Ex. 1. “Demurrage” is similarly defined as “the charge, related to the use of the equipment only, [Defendant] pays for [Plaintiff’s] equipment kept beyond the free time allowed by [Plaintiff] for taking delivery of goods in the port, terminal or depot … include[ing] storage and equipment costs.” “Free time” is “the period of time allowed to the merchant free of charge.” Doc. 20 at Ex. 4.

 

4

 

By 1982, used tires were already recognized as “a problem that won’t go away.” Stewart Levin, Recycling Used Tires: A Boon or a Balloon, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Sept. 21, 1982), available at http:// www.csmonitor.com/1982/0921/092139.html. By 1990, the federal courts were already presented with individuals charged with implementing complex fraudulent schemes to abandon large shipments of used tires in the hands of trucking companies. See, Lisa Ellis, Man Pleads Guilty To 23 Counts In Tire-disposal Scheme, PHILLY.COM (Oct. 30, 1990), http:// articles.philly.com/1990–10–30/news/ 25894511_1_tire-disposal-wire-fraud-western-union. No later than 1997, would-be fraudsters were targeting unsuspecting NVOCCs as a method for relieving themselves of used tires at a fraction of the cost of doing so legally. See Yang Ming Marine Transp. Corp. v. Okamoto Freighters Ltd., 259 F.3d 1086, 1089 (9th Cir.2001) (ten containers shipped to Tokyo, Japan “held used tires instead of cigars and cigarettes”). The instant case and recent situations like it are living proof that this illegal practice continues to plague companies and nations alike. See, e.g., Joe McDonald, China Recycling Cleanup Jolts Global Industry, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 3, 2013), available at http:// news.yahoo.com/chinarecycling–cleanup–jolts–global–industry–062315875 _ finance.html (“Despite a ban on imports of used tires, [Chinese] inspectors intercepted a 115—ton shipment of them in March [of 2013] … labeled ‘recycled rubber bands’ ”).

 

5

 

During his seemingly brief negotiations with Defendant to arrange the booking of the fateful shipment, “John Chen” specifically identified one shipping line that Defendant was not to use, allegedly due to “very high demurrage and detention.” Trial Ex. 9 at 1. Since “Mr. Chen” obviously had no intention of paying any such costs, however, inferentially this request must have been based on his knowledge that the carrier he identified would have been more likely to discover the fraud prior to shipment. Presumably this would be accomplished through a corporate policy leading to inspection of the original trucking company’s bill of lading, which when eventually consulted correctly identified the cargo as “used tires.” See Trial Test. of Ms. Yang; Trial Ex. 24. In this case, the burden was on Defendant to check the trucker’s bill of lading, but by the time they did so it was too late. Under the terms of the contract, Defendant certified Kumquat’s description of the cargo, accordingly, as between Plaintiff, the carrier, and Defendant, a NVOCC, the risk of misidentified cargo falls upon Defendant. However, Plaintiffs rights are no better than a NVOCCs ability to bear the burden of damages caused by a shipper’s fraud. Therefore, whenever possible, both carrier and NVOCC should check the trucker’s bill of lading to minimize the risk of such fraud. In Yang Ming Marine Transp. Corp. v. Okamoto Freighters Ltd., 259 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir.2001), a similar improper shipment of used tires resulted in destruction costs of approximately $25,000 for ten containers. Id. at 1089. Here, the destruction costs for thirteen containers of tires were over $200,000. This raises the question of whether the cost of dealing with used tires has multiplied several times over in the last decade and a half or whether the fraudulent scheme has reached across the ocean to artificially inflate the cost of destroying the tires. Based upon the Court’s research into similar cases, see supra note 4, and the representations of counsel, it appears the scheme of shipping garbage unbeknownst to either carrier or NVOCC is not a rare occurrence. Therefore, until a profitable method for recycling used tires is developed, it behooves both carriers and NVOCCs to check behind the original shipper’s certification of the cargo.

 

6

 

“Free time” expired on three different dates due to the fact that the cargo arrived at the Port of Tianjin in three separate shipments. The first shipment arrived on June 23, 2013 with five containers. The second arrived on June 30, 2013 with seven containers. The third arrived on July 15, 2013 with one container. See Trial Ex. 5 at CMA000100–05.

 

7

 

In fact, Plaintiff’s counsel specifically avoided any attempt to establish an exact date. See Trial Test. of Ms. Hawkins (“Q. Now, I understand eventually, based on the prior testimony, that sometime in December 2013 the parties parted ways, they couldn’t come to a resolution, and the cargo was … up to CMA to deal with it? A. Yes.”).

 

8

 

Data gathered from CHINA RENMINBI–US DOLLAR Exchange Rate, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS, http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/CNYUSD:CUR/chart (last visited Mar. 6, 2015).

 

9

 

Testimony at trial clouded this issue, as Ms. Hawkins identified a relevant typographical error in Exhibit 2. This Exhibit states that the inspection fees were estimated at “8,40.00,” but Ms. Hawkins did not clarify if the correct amount was 840 USD or 8,400 USD. She did, however, indicate that the Exhibit’s cost estimates were drawn from the figures contained in Exhibit 39, and that Exhibit 39 accurately reflects the costs incurred. Therefore, the Court relies on Exhibit 39, rather than Exhibit 2, in determining the appropriate amount of damages.

 

 

 

 

 

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Edward LUCERO, Jr., and Elaine Lucero, Plaintiffs–Respondents,

v.

NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant–Petitioner.

No. 34,607. | March 26, 2015.

 

Original Proceeding on Certiorari, Louis E. Depauli, Jr., District Judge.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Montgomery & Andrews, P.A., Kevin M. Sexton, Andrew S. Montgomery, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.

O’Connell Law, L.L.C., Erin B. O’Connell, Law Offices of Geoffrey R. Romero, Geoffrey R. Romero, The Vargas Law Firm, L.L.C., Ray M. Vargas, II, Albuquerque, NM, for Respondents.

Butt, Thornton & Baehr, P.C., Paul Trafton Yarbrough, Jane A. Laflin, Rodey, Dickason, Sloan, Akin & Robb, P.A., Thomas A. Outler, Seth L. Sparks, Civerolo, Gralow, Hill & Curtis, P.A., Lance Dean Richards, Albuquerque, NM, for Amici Curiae American Trucking Associations, Inc., Trucking Industry Defense Association and New Mexico Trucking Association.

 

 

OPINION

BOSSON, Justice.

*1 { 1}  trucking company purchased a liability insurance policy covering each of its several tractors and trailers. The policy stipulated that liability coverage would be limited to “$1,000,000 each ‘accident.’ “ A tractor-trailer rig insured under the policy was involved in a single accident. The question before us is whether $1,000,000 is the limit per accident for both vehicles (the tractor and the trailer) or whether each vehicle has liability coverage in the amount of $1,000,000. The district court interpreted the policy to limit its coverage to $1,000,000; our Court of Appeals disagreed and reversed. Because this dispute affects not only the parties to this lawsuit but arguably New Mexico’s place among the many jurisdictions that have grappled with similar policy language, we granted certiorari and now reverse the Court of Appeals.

 

 

BACKGROUND

{ 2}  The facts in this case are undisputed. The Luceros were severely injured when their vehicle was hit by a tractor-trailer negligently driven by an employee of H & J Hamilton Trucking Company, insured by Defendant Northland Insurance Company. Northland defended Hamilton in the ensuing lawsuit. Eventually, Northland stipulated to liability, and the Luceros agreed to dismiss all claims against Northland and its insured in exchange for a settlement in the amount of policy limits.

 

{ 3}  The parties disagreed, however, as to the policy limits. Before the district court, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment seeking to answer this question. Northland maintained that its insurance policy limits liability to $1,000,000 for each accident, an amount it tendered to the Luceros. The Luceros, on the other hand, interpreted the policy as providing $1,000,000 for each covered auto. Hamilton’s tractor and trailer are both covered autos under the policy, so the Luceros sought $1,000,000 for each, or $2,000,000 for both. The district court agreed with Northland’s reading of the insurance policy and granted summary judgment for $1,000,000. The Court of Appeals reversed, agreeing with the Luceros. See Lucero v. Northland Ins. Co., 2014–NMCA–055, ¶¶ 1, 27, 326 P.3d 42.

 

 

DISCUSSION

[1] [2] [3] [4] { 4}  Because the insurance policy before us involves liability coverage, we interpret the policy “in accordance with the same principles which govern the interpretation of all contracts.” Ponder v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2000–NMSC–033, ¶ 11, 129 N.M. 698, 12 P.3d 960 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Our primary goal is to determine “the intentions of the contracting parties … at the time they executed the [policy].” Id. “When discerning the purpose, meaning, and intent of the parties to a contract, the court’s duty is confined to interpreting the contract that the parties made for themselves, and absent any ambiguity, the court may not alter or fabricate a new agreement for the parties.” CC Hous. Corp. v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 1987–NMSC–117, ¶ 6, 106 N.M. 577, 746 P.2d 1109. “Thus, when the policy language is clear and unambiguous, we must give effect to the contract and enforce it as written.” Ponder, 2000–NMSC–033, ¶ 11, 129 N.M. 698, 12 P.3d 960.

 

 

The Insurance Policy

*2 [5] { 5}  Three sections of the policy before us are particularly relevant in resolving this case: Declarations Item Two, “Schedule of Coverages and Covered Autos,” Section 11(A), “Liability Coverage,” and Section II(C), “Limit of Insurance.” We look first to the Declarations page, Item Two, entitled “Schedule of Coverages and Covered Autos,” which we insert from the original.

 

 

 

 

?

 

 

{ 6}  We note particularly the language stating: “This policy provides only those coverages where a charge is shown in the premium column below. Each of these coverages will apply only to those ‘autos’ shown as Covered ‘Autos.’ “ As noted above, the Declarations page then provides, and sets forth separate premiums for, various kinds of coverages including the liability coverage for bodily injury and property damage at issue in this lawsuit. “Covered Auto” is a defined term in the policy that refers in a separate page to Hamilton’s five tractors and six trailers, including both the tractor and the trailer involved in this accident. Accordingly, Northland is clearly liable for the negligence of its insured up to any limits of liability the policy declares. As is evident from the quoted portion of the Declarations page, the policy limits liability coverage to a maximum of “$1,000,000 each ‘accident.’ “

 

{ 7}  Moving beyond the Declarations page to the main body of the policy, the next significant provision, Section II(A) “Liability Coverage,” reads as follows:

We will pay all sums an “insured” legally must pay as damages because of “bodily injury” or “property damage” to which this insurance applies, caused by an “accident” and resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of a covered “auto”.

We will also pay all sums an “insured” legally must pay as a “covered pollution cost or expense” to which this insurance applies, caused by an’ “accident” and resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of covered “autos”. However, we will only pay for the “covered pollution cost or expense” if there is either “bodily injury” or “property damage” to which this insurance applies that is caused by the same “accident”.

We have the right and duty to defend any “insured” against a “suit” asking for such damages or a “covered pollution cost or expense”. However, we have no duty to defend any “insured” against a “suit” seeking damages for “bodily injury” or “property damage” or a “covered pollution cost or expense” to which thus insurance does not apply. We may investigate and settle any claim or “suit” as we consider appropriate. Our duty to defend or settle ends when the Liability Coverage Limit of Insurance has been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements.

 

{ 8}  The third relevant policy provision, Section II(C) entitled “Limit of Insurance,” then proceeds to define the limit on liability coverage:

Regardless of the number of covered “autos”, “insureds”, premiums paid, claims made or vehicles involved in the “accident”, the most we will pay for the total of all damages and “covered pollution cost or expense” combined, resulting from any one “accident” is the Limit of Insurance for Liability Coverage shown in the Declarations.

 

*3 { 9}  Reading the three provisions together, we see that Northland’s promise in Section II(A) to “pay all sums an ‘insured’ legally must pay as damages … caused by an ‘accident’ and resulting from the … use of a covered ‘auto’,” is limited by Section II(C), “the most we will pay for … all damages … resulting from any one ‘accident.’ “ That limit is “$1,000,000 each ‘accident’ “ as stated on the Declarations page.

 

{ 10}  The Luceros read the policy as promising something different. They argue that the policy provides $1,000,000 in liability coverage for each “covered auto” involved in any one accident. Because two “covered autos” were involved in this accident (the tractor and the trailer) and because each “covered auto” carries $1,000,000 in liability coverage, the Luceros contend that the policy limits in this case are $2,000,000, not $1,000,000. The Court of Appeals agreed with the Luceros’ position. See Lucero, 2014–NMCA–055, ¶ 13, 326 P.3d 42 (“Defendant is obligated to provide $1 million in coverage for the tractor involved in the accident and $1 million in coverage for the trailer involved in the same accident, for a total of $2 million in coverage.”).

 

{ 11}  As authority for their conclusion, the Luceros look first to the Declarations page Schedule of Coverages, previously quoted, which states in part that “[e]ach of these coverages will apply only to those ‘autos’ shown as Covered ‘Autos.’ “ The Luceros read this as a grant of coverage up to the policy limits of $1,000,000 for each covered auto involved in any accident, including this situation involving two covered autos in one accident. We question whether the policy really grants such expansive coverage.

 

{ 12}  First, the policy simply does not say that it grants coverage in the amount of policy limits for each covered auto, each accident. The language does not read, “each of these coverages will apply to [each of] those autos shown….” The language states instead that “[e]ach of these coverages will apply only to those ‘autos’ shown….” It is as if the Luceros would read the word “only” out of the sentence. Textually, the provision is phrased not as a grant but as a limitation: “only” those autos shown on the list of covered autos are eligible for $1,000,000 of liability coverage. There is a critical distinction between a grant of coverage and “the amount of such coverage.” See Vigil v. California Cas. Ins. Co., 1991–NMSC–050, ¶¶ 7–8, 112 N.M. 67, 811 P.2d 565 (emphasis added). Plainly, the Declarations page makes liability coverage available for each of the covered autos, but it does not grant policy limits for each covered auto.

 

{ 13}  The Declarations page then stipulates that its limit of liability is “$1,000,000 each ‘accident.’ “ Clearly then, liability coverage is not boundless; the policy does not say “$1,000,000 each covered auto each accident.” The limitation on the Declarations page apparently applies as an outside limit per “accident” without regard to the number of covered autos involved.

 

*4 { 14}  Even, however, if there were reasonable grounds for disagreement over the terms of the Declarations page, language in the body of the policy settles the matter. Section 11(A) of the policy, previously quoted, states: “Our duty to defend or settle ends when the Liability Coverage Limit of Insurance has been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements.” As previously discussed, the Declarations page provides that this limit is $1,000,000 each accident. Section II(C) of the policy then says the same thing in terms of a “per accident” outside limit on what Northland will pay. It states: “Regardless of the number of covered ‘autos’… or vehicles involved in the ‘accident’,” the most Northland will pay “for the total of all damages … resulting from any one ‘accident’ is the Limit of Insurance for Liability Coverage shown in the Declarations [$1,000,000 each accident].” Therefore, the argument advanced by the Luceros that the policy provides $1,000,000 in coverage for “each covered auto in each accident” simply does not find support in the language of the policy. The policy limits Northland’s exposure to $1,000,000 per accident regardless of the number of covered autos involved in any one accident.

 

{ 15}  Importantly, we observe that other jurisdictions interpreting similar insurance clauses have reached a similar conclusion. See Grinnell Select Ins. Co. v. Baker, 362 F.3d 1005, 1006 (7th Cir.2004) (“This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of: 1. ‘Insureds’; 2. Claims made; 3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or 4. Vehicles involved in the auto accident.”); Auto–Owners Ins. Co. v. Munroe, 614 F.3d 322, 324–25 (7th Cir.2010) (“The ‘Combined Limit of Liability’ provision … provides that the per-occurrence limit—$1,000,000—is the most that Auto–Owners will pay, ‘regardless of the number of automobiles shown in the Declarations … or automobiles involved in the occurrence.’ “ (second omission in original)); Suh v. Dennis, 260 N.J.Super. 26, 614 A.2d 1367, 1370 (N.J.Super. Ct. Law Div.1992) (“Regardless of the number of covered ‘autos’, ‘insureds’, premiums paid, claims made, or vehicles involved in the ‘accident’, the most we will pay for all damages resulting in any one ‘accident’ is the Limit of Insurance for Liability Coverage shown in the Declarations.”); United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Baggett, 209 Cal.App.3d 1387, 258 Cal.Rptr. 52, 54 (Ct.App.1989) (“This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of: 1. Covered persons; 2. Claims made; 3. Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or 4. Vehicles involved in the auto accident.” (internal alterations omitted)); United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Wilkinson, 132 N.H. 439, 569 A.2d 749, 751–52 (N.H.1989) (“Regardless of the number of covered autos, insureds, claims made or vehicles involved in the accident, our limit of liability is as follows: … The most we will pay for all damages resulting from bodily injury to any one person caused by any one accident is the limit shown in this endorsement for ‘each person’.”); Banner v. Raisin Valley, Inc., 31 F.Supp.2d 591, 592 (N.D.Ohio 1998) (“The limitation of liability section clearly states that the limit applies regardless of the number of vehicles involved in the accident.”). The Luceros offer little contrary authority.

 

*5 { 16}  The Luceros, focusing on the precise language and phrasing of Section II(C), put forward a different theory of that section’s intent, essentially arguing that the limits of that section simply do not apply when two covered autos are involved in one accident. For ease of reference, we state the Limitation of Insurance clause once more.

Regardless of the number of covered “autos”, “insureds”, premiums paid, claims made or vehicles involved in the “accident”, the most we will pay for … any one “accident” is the Limit of Insurance for Liability Coverage shown in the Declarations [$1,000,000 each accident].

 

{ 17}  The Luceros point out that “[r]egardless of the number of covered ‘autos’ “ as stated in Section II(C) does not say “regardless of the number of covered autos involved in the accident.” The Luceros argue that since the phrase is not tied to covered autos involved in the accident, then the phrase should be read as, “regardless of the number of covered autos not involved in the accident.”

 

[6] { 18}  This interpretation, according to the Luceros, makes the phrase an anti-stacking clause and not a limit on per-accident liability. Anti-stacking clauses are typically designed to prevent the insured from aggregating (stacking) policy limits that apply to covered vehicles that are not involved in the particular accident. See Lucero, 2014–NMCA–055, ¶ 19, 326 P.3d 42. Here, the Luceros are not trying to aggregate (or stack) policy limits for covered autos not involved in the accident; they seek to aggregate the limits provided for each of the covered autos that is involved in the accident. Therefore, the Luceros argue that the limits referred to in Section II(C) do not apply to this particular circumstance where more than one covered auto is involved in a single accident.1

 

{ 19}  Of course, the Limitation of Insurance clause does use the term “involved in the accident” after the word “vehicles” (“[r]egardless of the number of … vehicles involved in the ‘accident’ ”). The Luceros argue that the term “involved in the ‘accident’ “ only modifies “vehicles” and not any of the antecedent terms before it—like covered autos (“[r]egardless of the number of covered ‘autos’ ”). The Luceros note the absence of a comma between “claims made” and “or vehicles involved in the accident.”2 The Luceros point out that “covered autos” is specifically defined in the policy whereas the term “vehicles” is not, and therefore, “vehicles” is intended to refer to something other than “covered autos.” Instead, the Luceros argue that “vehicles” is a generic term that refers to all autos and not “covered autos,” a debatable assertion given that all “covered autos” must as well be “vehicles.”

 

{ 20}  Thus, argue the Luceros, by putting the term “vehicles” instead of “covered autos” right before the phrase “involved in the accident,” Northland must have intended the clause “involved in the ‘accident’ “ to mean that the limits in the Declarations page apply regardless of the number of other vehicles involved or claims made against the insured. For example, the limit of liability would be the same if the insured was in an accident with one other vehicle or one hundred other vehicles. Similarly, the limit of liability would be the same whether there were one hundred claims against the insured or one.

 

*6 { 21}  But, according to the Luceros, this clause was not intended to modify or limit liability for multiple “covered autos” involved in the accident. In that case, there would be no limit. Northland would have to pay $2,000,000 for two covered autos in one accident, $6,000,000 for six covered autos, even $11,000,000 if all eleven covered autos were somehow involved in a single accident. At the very least, the Luceros’ interpretation suggests ambiguity, and ambiguity in contracts should be interpreted in favor of the insured.

 

{ 22}  We note that “a contract is ambiguous if a genuine doubt appears as to its meaning, that is, if after applying established rules of interpretation, the written instrument remains reasonably susceptible to at least two reasonable but conflicting meanings….” 11 Williston on Contracts: Ambiguity as a prerequisite to interpretation and construction § 30:4 (4th ed.2014) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). This does not mean that every possible interpretation will lead to an ambiguity. While the Luceros’ reading is not entirely implausible, it relies in part on a very technical rule of English known as the Doctrine of the Last Antecedent. See LeClercq, supra, at 201–02. Such rules may inform our analysis, but they are merely a guide to discerning legislative intent. Hale v. Basin Motor Co., 1990–NMSC–068, 110 N.M. 314, 795 P.2d 1006. We believe our duty is not to impose hyper-technical rules of grammar when interpreting the true intentions of parties to a contract. If that were our duty, then most contracts would be ambiguous.

 

{ 23}  From the text of Section II(C), considered as a whole and not parsed too finely, we believe it is clear that Northland intended its “$1,000,000 each ‘accident’ “ limitation to apply “[r]egardless of the number of covered ‘autos’… or vehicles” that are “involved in the ‘accident’.” Regardless of that number, not the number of covered autos not involved in the accident, the policy proclaims its limit: “[T]he most we will pay for the total of all damages … resulting from any one ‘accident’ “ is $1,000,000.

 

{ 24}  Reading Section II(C) as a per-accident limit of liability regardless of the number of covered autos involved in the accident, appears to be consistent with the majority of jurisdictions that have addressed this issue. It is also consistent with similar cases in which the tractor and the trailer are both involved in a single accident. See Munroe, 614 F.3d at 325 (following the accident of a tractor trailer, the policy unambiguously limits coverage to $1,000,000); Canal Ins. Co. v. Blankenship, 129 F.Supp.2d 950, 953 (S.D.W.Va.2001) (the policy liability for the truck and trailer was properly limited to $1,000,000 and did not provide for $2,000,000 policy limits); Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Estate of Karpov, 559 F.3d 621, 625 (7th Cir.2009) (although the accident involved a covered tractor and trailer, “[t]he insurance policy clearly and expressly limited [the insurer’s] liability to a maximum of $1,000,000 per accident”).

 

*7 { 25}  We note three cases that are particularly helpful in deciding this issue. First, in Auto–Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 756 So.2d 29 (Fla.2000), the Florida Supreme Court construed a limit of liability clause after a tractor-trailer rig caused an accident with a single car. Id. at 31–32. Although the Court found that the language of the limitation-of-liability clause in that particular policy was ambiguous, it turned to several cases from other jurisdictions as an example of what the insurer should have done to make its liability limit unambiguous. Id. at 33–36. The Florida Court stated:

In contrast to the clause drafted by Auto–Owners in this case, the limiting provisions of the insurance policies set forth in the recent reported decisions include an introductory qualifying clause that clearly and unambiguously explains that liability coverage is limited to a certain amount “regardless” of the number of vehicles involved in the accident.

Id. at 36. See also State Auto Ins. Co. v. Stinson, 142 F.3d 436 (6th Cir.1998) (unpublished table decision); Weimer v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 216 Wis.2d 705, 575 N.W.2d 466, 469 n. 6 (Wis.1998); Dennis, 614 A.2d at 1370. The limiting phrase “regardless of the number of vehicles involved in the accident” is of course strikingly similar to Northland’s language in this very case.

 

{ 26}  Referring to these other cases, the Florida Court then observed,

The presence of these qualifying clauses evidences an established custom in the insurance industry as to the language used by insurers in drafting clauses where the intent is to limit liability coverage to a single amount, even though multiple insured vehicles are involved in an accident. As these out-of-state cases demonstrate, when multiple insured vehicles are involved in a single accident, a limitation of liability can be achieved by the simple use of a qualifying clause.

Anderson, 756 So.2d at 36 (citation omitted).

 

{ 27}  We regard this reference to a “custom in the insurance industry” as significant. Because Northland can justifiably rely on limiting phraseology accepted elsewhere to achieve its desired objective, we should proceed cautiously before creating different expectations solely for our state.

 

{ 28}  Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit interpreted a limit-of-liability clause after three sets of tractor-trailers, all owned by the insured, were involved in one accident. Munroe, 614 F.3d at 323. The policy contained a combined limit of liability of $1,000,000 per occurrence “ ‘regardless of the number of automobiles shown in the Declarations … or automobiles involved in the occurrence.’ “ Id. at 325 (omission in original). The Court found no ambiguity: “While the Munroes attempt to find ambiguity, including in the terms ‘automobiles’ and ‘combined,’ these contortions merit little discussion here: applied to the facts of this case, the unambiguous terms of the policy limit the coverage to $1,000,000 for each occurrence, notwithstanding the involvement of three … tractor-trailers.” Id.

 

*8 { 29}  Finally, the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia interpreted a limit of liability clause after a tractor and trailer were involved in a deadly accident. Blankenship, 129 F.Supp.2d at 952. The sole question was whether the policy limit provided $1,000,000 total liability coverage or $1,000,000 for each vehicle. Id. The policy contained a clause that read “[r]egardless of the number of … automobiles to which this policy applies, … [t]he limit of liability stated in the schedule of the policy as applicable to ‘each occurrence’ is the total limit of the company’s liability….” Id. The injured parties claimed that this language was ambiguous “because it does not limit liability to one million dollars per occurrence when more than one covered vehicle is involved in the accident.” Id. at 953. They suggested that the insurance company should have added the language “ ‘regardless of the number of vehicles involved in the accident.’ “ Id. (emphasis added). The Court held that the insurance policy was not ambiguous and provided coverage up to $1,000,000 per occurrence. Id. at 956. The Court noted that “[a] court should read policy provisions to avoid ambiguities and not torture the language to create them.” Id. at 953 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

 

{ 30}  Thus, we are satisfied that Northland’s position appears to be more in line with the “custom” within the industry and the jurisprudence construing it. While that observation is not necessarily dispositive, it does inform our deliberations. The Luceros’ position, on the other hand, appears to be almost without supporting authority, at least in terms of cases interpreting similar policy language. In its briefing to this Court, Northland asserted that the Luceros’ interpretation of the policy, as adopted by our Court of Appeals, “stands alone among the 50 state judicial systems.” See Grinnell, 362 F.3d at 1007. Though perhaps somewhat hyperbolic, that statement remains largely unchallenged, and the Luceros have not done much to discredit it.3

 

 

CONCLUSION

{ 31}  We hold that Northland limited its liability to $1,000,000 for each accident regardless of the number of insured vehicles involved. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Northland.

 

{ 32}  IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

WE CONCUR: BARBARA J. VIGIL, Chief Justice, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, EDWARD L. CHAVEZ, Justices, and JERRY H. RITTER, Judge, Sitting by Designation.

 

 

Footnotes

 

1

 

We note that while stacking generally involves aggregating the policies of the vehicles not involved in the accident, merely saying a clause is an anti-stacking clause is not alone dispositive. A court should look to the facts of the case and the language as a whole to determine if a clause is actually an anti-stacking clause. See Progressive Premier Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Kocher ex rel. Fleming, 402 Ill.App.3d 756, 342 Ill.Dec. 633, 932 N.E.2d 1094, 1098 (Ill.App.Ct.2010).

 

2

 

According to the Doctrine of the Last Antecedent, “[e]vidence that a qualifying phrase is supposed to apply to all antecedents instead of only to the immediately preceding one may be found in the fact that it is separated from the antecedent by a comma.” Terri LeClercq, Doctrine of the Last Antecedent: The Mystifying Morass of Ambiguous Modifiers, 40 Tex. J. Bus. L. 199, 210 (2004) (footnote, internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

 

3

 

The Fifth District Court of Appeals for Illinois has found policies ambiguous despite a similar limit of liability clause. See Kocher, 342 Ill.Dec. 633, 932 N.E.2d at 1096 (“ ‘The limit of liability shown on the Declarations Page is the most we will pay regardless of the number of: 1. claims made; 2. covered vehicles; 3. trailers shown on the Declarations Page; 4. insured persons; 5. lawsuits brought; 6. vehicles involved in an accident; or 7. premiums paid.’ ”). However, the court found the policy ambiguous because the amount in the limit liability in the declarations page was listed more than once. The court specifically distinguished its case with those cases where the amount in the declarations page was listed only once. Id. at 1102. In our case, Northland’s policy only states the limit of liability once.