United States District Court,

N.D. Iowa,

Cedar Rapids Division.

PENFORD CORPORATION and Penford Products Co., Plaintiffs,

v.

NATIONAL UNION FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PITTSBURGH, PA, and Ace American Insurance Company, Defendants.

No. 09-CV-0013-LRR.

July 13, 2009.

RULING ON MOTION TO BIFURCATE AND STAY

JON STUART SCOLES, United States Magistrate Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the Motion to Bifurcate and Stay (Docket No. 23) filed by the Defendants on May 21, 2009; the Memorandum in Opposition (Docket No. 28) filed by the Plaintiffs; and the Reply Memorandum (Docket No. 29) filed by the Defendants. The Defendants’ request for oral argument is denied. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.c, the motion will be decided without oral argument.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 23, 2009, Plaintiffs Penford Corporation and Penford Products Co., (collectively, “Penford”) filed a Complaint (Docket No. 1) seeking declaratory judgment and damages from Defendants National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA, and Ace American Insurance Company. Penford claims that Defendants have failed to fully reimburse Penford for covered losses following a flood in June 2008. Penford seeks a declaratory judgment regarding the benefits covered by the policies (Count One) and compensatory damages for breach of contract (Count Two). In addition, Penford seeks damages for Defendants’ alleged “bad faith denial or delay of insurance benefits” (Count Three). Defendants deny Penford’s material allegations and assert various affirmative defenses.

On June 1, 2009, the Court filed a Scheduling Order and Discovery Plan (Docket No. 26), setting various pretrial deadlines. The deadline for completion of discovery is January 1, 2010, with a dispositive motions deadline of February 1, 2010. A jury trial has been scheduled before Chief Judge Linda R. Reade on June 14, 2010.

II. ISSUE PRESENTED

On May 21, 2009, Defendants filed the instant Motion To Bifurcate and Stay. Defendants ask (1) that the Court bifurcate the trial of the declaratory judgment and breach of contract claims from the trial of the bad faith claim, and (2) that the Court stay discovery on the bad faith claim “pending resolution of the declaratory judgment and breach of contract claims.”

III. RELEVANT FACTS

Penford conducts manufacturing operations at its facility in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. In June 2008, Penford’s Cedar Rapids plant was flooded and suffered substantial property damage. Defendants provided insurance coverage for Penford’s facility at that time. Among other things, the policy provided a $10 million “sublimit” for flood damages to “Zone A,” as defined in the policy, and a $10 million sublimit for flood damages to “Zone B.” Defendants have paid Penford $20 million for flood damages sustained in Zones A and B.

In addition, the policy contained certain “time element coverages,” providing coverage for losses caused by business interruption. The policy also provided additional coverages for debris removal, decontamination costs, contaminant or pollutant clean up, and professional fees. Penford claims that it is entitled to additional benefits for losses falling under the time element coverages and additional policy coverages. According to Penford, its covered losses will exceed $50 million. Penford requests that the Court “declare Penford’s rights and Defendant Insurance Companies’ obligations under the Policy,” and that it award compensatory damages for breach of contract. In addition, and of particular significance to the instant motion, Penford asks that the Court award it additional damages for Defendants’ alleged bad faith in denying Penford benefits which are due under the policy, and “unreasonably delaying undisputed payments under the Policy.”

IV. DISCUSSION

Penford’s declaratory judgment and breach of contract claims address its flood losses, the extent to which those losses are covered by the insurance policy issued by Defendants, and how the “sublimits” contained in the policy apply to the circumstances presented here. Penford’s bad faith claim rests on the adjustment of the loss, and whether Defendants knowingly acted unreasonably in denying or delaying Penford’s benefits.

To recover on a first-party bad faith claim, the insured is required to prove (1) the insurer had no reasonable basis for denying the insured’s claim, and (2) the insurer knew or had reason to know that its denial was without reasonable basis. Bellville v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 702 N.W.2d 468, 473 (Iowa 2005).

The FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE authorize the Court to order a separate trial of the claims “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize.”Rule 42(b) states:

For convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues, claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims. When ordering a separate trial, the court must preserve any federal right to a jury trial.

FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b). Here, Defendants argue that staying discovery “with respect to the bad faith claim pending resolution of the declaratory judgment and breach of contract claims” will “promote judicial economy, [ ] conserve the parties’ resources and [ ] achieve an expeditious resolution of Plaintiffs’ threshold claims .”As the moving parties, Defendants have the burden of demonstrating that bifurcation is warranted. Cedarapids, Inc. v. CMI Corp., 1999 WL 33656876 (N.D.Iowa) at *1.

In their Memorandum of Law, Defendants set forth the version of Rule 42(b) which existed prior to the stylistic amendment made on December 1, 2007. See Defendant’s Memorandum of Law at 4 (Docket No. 23-2 at 4).

Defendants’ Motion to Bifurcate and Stay at 2 (Docket No. 23 at 2).

In exercising its “broad discretion” whether to bifurcate issues for trial, the district court should consider “the preservation of constitutional rights, clarity, judicial economy, the likelihood of inconsistent results and possibilities for confusion.” O’Dell v. Hercules Incorp., 904 F.2d 1194, 1201-02 (8th Cir.1990) (citing Koch Fuels, Inc. v. Cargo of 13,000 Barrels of No. 2 Oil, 704 F.2d 1038, 1042 (8th Cir.1993)). When serving on the district court, Chief Judge Michael J. Melloy identified various factors to be considered by the trial court in exercising its “sound discretion” whether or not to bifurcate a trial:

Courts traditionally consider the following factors when deciding whether to order separate trials: (1) the complexity of the damages issue; (2) potential for juror confusion; (3) overlap of the issues to be tried; and (4) prejudice to either party. (citation omitted) In addition, courts may consider (1) whether the issues are triable by the court or by jury; (2) whether discovery has been directed to one trial on all issues; (3) whether the evidence for each issue is substantially different; and (4) the effect bifurcation would have on settlement negotiations.

Cedarapids, Inc. v. CMI Corp., 1999 WL 33656876 at *1.

Turning to the instant action, Defendants focus on their argument that recovery by Penford on its declaratory judgment and breach of contract claims is a “condition precedent” to its recovery on the bad faith claim. Defendants argue that the discovery required on the bad faith claim is “not relevant” to the discovery associated with the declaratory judgment and breach of contract claims. Therefore, according to Defendants’ argument, bifurcating the trial and staying discovery on the bad faith claim will promote judicial economy.

Not surprisingly, Penford disagrees. Penford argues that much of the discovery “intermingles” between the contract and bad faith claims. According to Penford, a number of witnesses have knowledge regarding both the flood loss and the subsequent adjustment of the insurance claim, and staying discovery on the bad faith claim would necessitate deposing those witnesses twice. In addition, Penford argues that even if it does not prevail on the breach of contract claim, it nonetheless has a viable bad faith claim for Defendants’ alleged failure to timely pay the benefits due under the policy. Finally, Penford argues that even if bifurcation of the trial is otherwise appropriate, the parties should be permitted to proceed with discovery on all claims.

The Court concludes that Penford has the better argument in this regard. In Counts One and Two, Penford claims that it is entitled to additional benefits for covered losses sustained as a consequence of the June 2008 flood. Discovery regarding the extent of Penford’s damages may be related to discovery regarding information provided to Defendants in the adjustment of the loss. As Penford notes, some witnesses may have knowledge regarding the underwriting of the policy, the damages sustained by Penford, and the adjustment of the loss. It does not promote judicial economy, nor does it conserve the parties’ resources, to require multiple depositions of certain witnesses. Moreover, because discovery regarding the various issues overlaps, bifurcation of discovery would inevitably result in disputes regarding whether certain information could be pursued at this time or must await some later stage in the proceeding.

Defendants rely heavily on the argument that Penford’s recovery on the bad faith claim is contingent on “a finding in favor of Penford on the claims for declaratory judgment and breach of contract.”That is, Defendants argue that it is unnecessary to address discovery and trial on the bad faith claim unless Penford first prevails on its contract claims. This argument fails, however, to address Penford’s claim that Defendants acted in bad faith in delaying the payment of insurance benefits. Even if it is determined that Penford has been paid all of the benefits it is entitled to receive under the policy, a claim for bad faith may lie if Defendants knowingly acted unreasonably in delaying payments. Galbraith v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 698 N.W.2d 325, 328 (Iowa 2005) (a bad faith claim may lie if “the insurer lacked a reasonable basis for denying or for delaying payment of the claim”) (citing Thompson v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 559 N.W.2d 288, 291 (Iowa 1997)) (emphasis added).See also Schuller v. Great-West Life & Ann. Ins. Co., 2005 WL 2259993 (N.D.Iowa) at *14. Accordingly, Penford is entitled to discovery regarding the adjustment of its loss, even if Defendants ultimately prevail on the contract claims.

While the claimed loss in this case is substantial, there are a limited number of parties and the issues are fairly straightforward. Bifurcating the trial and staying discovery on the bad faith claim until after the contract claims have been resolved would unnecessarily delay this action and, therefore, prejudice Penford. Tustin v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WL 5377835 (N.D.W.Va.2008) at *2-3 (identifying the factors to be considered when determining whether to stay discovery on a first-party bad faith claim). In Agrawal v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 182 F.Supp.2d 788 (N.D.Iowa 2001), the court ordered bifurcation of trial on the coverage and bad faith claims. Id. at 791 (“I prefer to keep the jury focused on one issue at a time.”). The court did not, however, stay discovery. The court envisioned that the bad faith claim would be tried immediately following coverage claim, if necessary. Id. (“If possible (i.e., if the parties are not inconvenienced and the jurors remain available to do so), the same jury will try the bad faith claim in the event that it resolves the coverage issue in the plaintiff’s favor.”). Discovery on both claims proceeded, notwithstanding the court’s decision to bifurcate the trial.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court concludes that discovery on the bad faith claim should not be stayed. For similar reasons, the Court concludes that the trial should not be bifurcated. Defendants have failed to meet their burden of proving that bifurcation will promote judicial economy or conserve the parties’ resources. As set forth above, Penford may pursue a bad faith claim for defendants’ alleged delay in the payment of benefits, even if it is not entitled to any additional recovery under the contract. If the claims are bifurcated, then it will result in two trials with a substantial amount of overlapping evidence. A combined trial will not be unduly complex, nor, in the Court’s view, will the jury likely be confused by the issues presented. Cedarapids, Inc. v. CMI Corp., 1999 WL 33656876 (N.D.Iowa) at *1. The Court is not convinced that Defendants will be prejudiced by trying the contract claims with the bad faith claim. Athey v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 234 F.3d 357, 362 (8th Cir.2000) (finding the district court did not abuse its discretion when it did not bifurcate the breach of contract and bad faith claims).

ORDERED

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion to Bifurcate and Stay (Docket No. 23) filed by the Defendants on May 21, 2009, is hereby DENIED.

United States District Court,

N.D. Ohio,

Western Division.

Phillip MILLER, Plaintiff,

v.

TMT LOGISTICS, INC., Defendant.

No. 3:07CV3180.

June 25, 2009.

ORDER

JAMES G. CARR, Chief Judge.

This is an employment discrimination case by a terminated employee against his former employer. Plaintiff, Phillip Miller, asserts that Defendant, TMT Logistics, Inc., fired him in violation of O.R.C. § 4123.90 in retaliation for his having filing a workers’ compensation claim. Defendant denies the allegations and claims Plaintiff cannot set forth a prima facie case or meet his burden of proof as to the pretext component.

Plaintiff’s complaint originally included several claims, in which jurisdiction was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claim is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Pending is Defendant’s motion for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56 [Doc. 19]. For the following reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment shall be granted.

Background

TMT Logistics, Inc., a transportation company located in Napoleon, Ohio, hired Plaintiff Phillip Miller on June 21, 2006, as a shuttle driver to transport local freight to and from TMT’s facility in Napoleon. Plaintiff filed a workers’ compensation claim on January 30, 2007, and missed three weeks of work. He returned to work at TMT on February 21, 2007, in a transitional work program and continued to receive physical therapy treatments conducted on TMT’s premises.

On April 25, 2007, approximately three months after Plaintiff filed his workers’ compensation claim, TMT dispatched Plaintiff from Napoleon to Graham Packaging in Findlay, Ohio, to deliver a loaded TMT trailer. Plaintiff arrived at Graham Packaging and proceeded to back the trailer into one of the truck docks. After securing the trailer, Graham Packaging employees told Plaintiff that it would take them roughly one hour to unload and reload the trailer. Despite TMT’s instructions to Plaintiff to stay with the trailer until it was unloaded, Plaintiff unhooked the TMT tractor from the trailer and drove it away from Graham Packaging’s premises, leaving the TMT trailer.

When he left the premises, Plaintiff drove TMT’s tractor approximately five miles to the Easter Tire building in Findlay, the location of a TMT competitor, Fleetmaster. The parties dispute why Plaintiff stopped. Plaintiff contends that he went to the facility to use the restroom and ended up learning about a potential employment opportunity when he ran into one of his colleagues. According to TMT, Plaintiff stopped at Fleetmaster to inquire about the job. Regardless, it is undisputed that Plaintiff left the TMT trailer to attend to personal business. After he left Fleetmaster, Plaintiff stopped at a convenience store, and then drove the TMT tractor back to Graham Packaging. According to Plaintiff, the entire trip took him approximately 40 to 50 minutes.

On April 25, 2007, Mike Beavers, one of Plaintiff’s co-workers, informed Ken Major, TMT’s then Vice President of Transportation, that he saw Plaintiff’s TMT tractor parked outside Fleetmaster’s location. The following day, April 26, 2007, Major questioned Plaintiff about his activities the day before. Carrie Sprenger, TMT’s Vice President of Marketing and Human Resources, was also present when Major questioned Plaintiff. Major asked Plaintiff whether he indeed left Graham Packaging while TMT’s trailer was being unloaded and drove TMT’s tractor to another trucking company in Findlay. In response, Plaintiff admitted that after he arrived at Graham Packaging on the day in question, unhooked the TMT tractor from the trailer, and drove it to Fleetmaster.

TMT concluded that by unhooking the TMT trailer and driving the tractor to another location, regardless of the purpose, Plaintiff violated company expectations and misused company equipment. After meeting with Plaintiff on April 26, 2007, Major discussed the matter with Sprenger and Tony Marks, TMT’s president. Major recommended terminating Plaintiff’s employment because of his actions on April 25, 2007; Sprenger and Marks agreed. Major thereafter informed Plaintiff that his employment was terminated because of his actions on April 25, 2007.

On October 16, 2007, Miller brought this suit alleging: 1) violation of COBRA rights; 2) retaliation under O.R.C. § 4123.90; 3) wrongful discharge in violation of public policy under O.R.C. § 4123.90; 4) wrongful discharge in violation of public policy under O.R.C. § 4113.52, et seq.; 5) age discrimination in promotion; and 6) intentional infliction of emotional distress. On January 30, 2009, Defendant moved for summary judgment, and in response Plaintiff withdrew all claims, except the retaliation claim presently at issue.

Standard of Review

I must enter summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying the record’s portions demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323.The nonmoving party then “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). The nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings or merely reassert its previous allegations; rather, the nonmovant must show that there is more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).Rule 56(e)“requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the [unverified] pleadings” and present some type of concrete evidentiary material in support of his position. Celotex, supra, 477 U.S. at 324.

In deciding the motion for summary judgment, I will accept the evidence of the nonmoving party as true, resolve all doubts against the nonmoving party, construe all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and draw all inference in the nonmoving party’s favor. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451, 456, 112 S.Ct. 2072, 119 L.Ed.2d 265 (1992). I shall rule in favor of summary judgment only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show no genuine issue of material fact exists and the law entitles the movant to summary judgment.

Discussion

Generally, Courts analyze employment discrimination claims unsupported by direct evidence under the three-step, burden shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 350 (6th Cir.1998). Under this test, Miller must first establish a prima facie case. See id.If he does so, the burden shifts to TMT to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action. See Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 574 (6th Cir.2003). If the employer does so, the burden shifts back to the employee to show that the employer’s articulated reason is merely a pretext to conceal an unlawful motivation. See id.

1. Prima Facie Case

In this case, Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case. To establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge under O.R.C. § 4123.90, Plaintiff must show that “1) [ ]he was injured on the job, 2)[ ]he filed a worker’s compensation claim, and 3) there was a causal connection between [his] filing of the workers’compensation claim and his termination.” Cunningham v. Kroger Co., 2006 WL 3230323, at(Ohio Ct.App.). Although Miller engaged in protected activity when he filed his workers’ compensation claim and suffered an adverse employment action (i.e.termination), he has not sufficiently shown a causal connection between the two events.

A. Causation and Temporal Proximity

Plaintiff may show causation with “any persuasive evidence of a retaliatory intent and by a direct or an indirect method of proof.” Buehler v. Ampam Commercial Midwest, 2007 WL 2683520, at(Ohio Ct.App.). When relying on indirect evidence, Plaintiff may rely on a combination of a “variety of factors,” including timing, to infer causation. See id.

In this case, Plaintiff maintains that he satisfied the causation element based solely on the temporal relationship between the filing of the workers’ compensation claim on January 30, 2007, and his termination from TMT about three months later on April 26, 2007. Although many factors may contribute to an inference of causation, Ohio courts have consistently interpreted O.R.C. § 4123.90 to require more than just temporal proximity. McDermott v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 2008 WL 1766892, at(S.D.Ohio) (“temporal proximity alone is insufficient to support a causal connection.”); Buehler, supra, 2007 WL 2683520, at(“While the timing of the termination can contribute to an inference of retaliation, temporal proximity alone is insufficient to support a finding of a causal connection.”); Cunningham, supra, 2006 WL 323032, at(holding “temporal proximity alone does not show the required causal connection.”).

Plaintiff references several other retaliatory discharge cases that have indicated temporal proximity may sometimes be sufficient to support an inference of causation in employment discrimination cases. These cases, however, are all distinguishable from the present case because they do not involve interpretation of Ohio law. In Singfield v. Akron Metropolitan Housing Authority, 389 F.3d 555, 563 (6th Cir.2004), for example, the Sixth Circuit stated that temporal proximity alone sufficed to infer causation in a Title VII retaliation claim. But in this cases decisions interpreting O.R.C. § 4123.90 control: as stated, Ohio have consistently held that temporal proximity, without more, cannot establish causation.

Plaintiff cannot, therefore, establish the causation element of his prima facie case.

2. Legitimate, Non-Discriminatory Reason

Even if Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case under O.R.C. § 4123.90, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for its action. See Wexler, supra, 317 F.3d at 574.Cunningham, supra, 2006 WL 323032, at *3. Ohio courts have also emphasized that, “[w]hen considering whether an employer has a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for discharging an employee, the court must keep in mind the fact that an employee who files a workers’ compensation claim is not insulated from discharge.”Markham v. Earle M. Jorgensen Co., 13 8 Ohio App.3d 484, 492 (2000).“The scope of the cause of action created by [O.R.C. § 4123.90] is very limited, and the burden of proof is upon the employee to specifically show that the termination was in direct response to the filing of a claim.” Metheney v. Sajar Plastics, Inc., 69 Ohio App.3d 428, 432, 590 N.E.2d 1311 (1990).

In this case, the employer has stated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason: Plaintiff’s failure leaving the trailer and driving away on what the employer perceived as a personal and unauthorized errand. Do so, plaintiff failed to comply with company policy regarding supervision and use of company property.

The defendant can meet its burden of producing a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its actions.

3. Pretext

Once Defendant articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action, the burden shifts back to Plaintiff to show that there is a legitimate dispute of material fact which, if found in his favor, would satisfy a rational jury that the company’s that the employer’s articulated reasons are not its true reasons were not its true reasons, but are offered simply as a pretext to mask unlawful intent. See, e. g., Wexler, supra, 317 F.3d at 574;Cunningham, supra, 2006 WL 323032, at *3. Even if Plaintiff had established his prima facie case, which he did not, he cannot meet his burden of proving that pretext underlies TMT’s stated reason for terminating Plaintiff’s employment.

First, Plaintiff contends that TMT’s stated reason is “unworthy of credence” because of a putative inconsistency in an interrogatory answer. Plaintiff contends that because Defendant failed to provide materials requested in an interrogatory, but later testified to their existence and admitted the mistake, shows inconsistency in TMT’s actions.

This mistake, however, is neither dispositive, nor even relevant to the issue at hand. It was related to an misinterpretation of the scope of the interrogatory; and, other discovery responses provided the information that the interrogatory sought. Moreover, this mistake alone does not remotely lead to an inference that TMT’s stated reason for terminating Plaintiff’s employment is not credible.

Second, Plaintiff points to the increase in workers’ compensation premiums in the years leading up to Plaintiff’s termination as evidence of retaliation. TMT asserts that business growth caused the increase, but Plaintiff claims TMT belied its explanation in a document referring to a layoff based on slow business during the same time period. Plaintiff, therefore, attempts to assert that TMT’s position on the increase in premiums is inconsistent. This contention, however, does not trigger a reasonable inference that TMT’s stated reason for terminating Plaintiff’s employment is a pretext for workers’ compensation retaliation.

Additionally, Plaintiff ignores the evidence presented by TMT of the fact that several other employees filed workers’ compensation claims without losing their jobs. Ohio courts have ruled that evidence of other employees who filed workers’ compensation claims without resulting adverse employment action presents appropriate grounds for granting summary judgment in favor of the employer. See Rollison v. Ball, 2006 WL 2795597, at(Ohio Ct.App.).

Finally, Plaintiff contends that an interpretation of company rules by a fellow TMT employee may suggest that Miller’s conduct did not technically violate written company rules. This fact is also irrelevant to whether the stated reason for the firing was a pretext to conceal retaliatory motive. Plaintiff claims that this statement by a fellow employee regarding the rules demonstrates a “credibility problem” with Defendant, yet Plaintiff does not actually contest the validity of the work rule or present any evidence suggesting his action on April 25, 2007, was acceptable work behavior, and thus inappropriate grounds for termination. On the contrary, this statement cannot overcome the undisputed evidence regarding the events on April 25, 2007, as well as Defendant’s evidence regarding workers’ compensation claims filed by TMT employees.

Plaintiff, therefore, cannot establish pretext.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby:

ORDERED THAT Defendant’s motion for summary judgment be, and the same hereby is granted.

So ordered.

N.D.Ohio,2009.

Miller v. TMT Logistics, Inc.

Slip Copy, 2009 WL 1850313 (N.D.Ohio)

END OF DOCUMENT