United States District Court,D. New Jersey.

UNITED STATES FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY and the North River Insurance Company, Plaintiffs,

v.

WORLD TRUCKING, INC., World Trucking Express, Inc., Xtra Corporation, Defendants.

Feb. 13, 2008.

.

OPINION

DENNIS M. CAVANAUGH, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court upon motion by Valerie Carlson in support of a Motion to Intervene pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 24. Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 78, no oral argument was heard. On January 24, 2008, the Court instructed all parties by letter to address the possibility of a sua sponte transfer of venue in this matter. After carefully considering the submissions of the parties and based upon the following, it is the finding of this Court that venue is transferred sua sponte from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (“D.N.J.”) to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee (“E.D.Tenn.”).

I. BACKGROUND

Valerie Carlson, individually and as administratrix to the estate of Melissa Carlson Armstrong, has contingent tort claims against World Trucking, Inc. and World Trucking Express, Inc. (collectively, “Defendants”). Carlson now seeks to intervene in a declaratory judgment action involving policies issued by Plaintiffs United States Fire Insurance Company and The North River Insurance Company (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) to Xtra Corporation (“Xtra”).

On March 7, 2004, a tractor trailer, allegedly being operated by World Trucking, was involved in an accident (the “Accident”). Three lawsuits were filed against World Trucking and other parties in connection with the Accident (the “Underlying Cases”), including one instituted by Carlson. The tractor involved in the Accident was allegedly hauling a trailer leased to World Trucking by Xtra Lease, a subsidiary of Xtra. Xtra, however, is not a defendant in any of the Underlying Cases. The Underlying Cases are ongoing and neither Carlson nor the other Plaintiffs in the Underlying Cases have obtained a judgment against World Trucking.

During the course of litigation in the Underlying Cases, World Trucking made a demand on U.S. Fire for coverage pursuant to the policy issued to Xtra, asserting additional insured status. U.S. Fire denied the claim on the grounds that the Xtra policy stated specifically that lessees of trailers are not insured entities under the Xtra policy. Plaintiffs then instituted the instant declaratory judgment suit against Defendants seeking a declaration that they have no obligation to reimburse any expense or liability incurred by World Trucking as a result of the Underlying Cases.

Following the institution of this declaratory judgment action, a second declaratory judgment action was instituted by Plaintiffs in the Underlying Cases in the E.D. Tenn. seeking a declaration that Plaintiffs “have a duty to indemnify the defendants, World Trucking, Inc.; World Trucking Express, Inc.; Nasko Nazov; and Marjan Milev, for the use and benefit of the plaintiffs for liability arising out of litigation pending in” the E.D. Tenn. Plaintiffs describe the action as one “present[ed] for declaratory judgment [as] an insurance coverage dispute.”Plaintiffs have moved to dismiss this second declaratory judgment action, alleging that Plaintiffs do not have liquidated claims and, therefore, do not have standing to bring a direct action against Xtra’s insurers. Carlson filed the instant motion to intervene in this declaratory judgment action.

II. DISCUSSION

A court may transfer venue sua sponte. See Concession Consultants, Inc., v. Mirisch, 355 F.2d 369, 371 n. 3 (2d Cir.1966); see also 2-12 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE-CIVIL § 12.32. “For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.”28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that “[t]o permit a situation in which two cases involving precisely the same issues are simultaneously pending in different District Courts leads to the wastefulness of time, energy, and money that § 1404(a) was designed to prevent.”Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 26, 80 S.Ct. 1470, 4 L.Ed.2d 1540 (1960). The purpose of § 1404(a) strongly favors transferring a case to a jurisdiction in which related matters are pending. See Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line Ltd., 708 F.Supp. 1440, 1447 (D.N.J.1989). Furthermore, the pendency in another jurisdiction of a prior related action involving the same set of circumstances is another factor of great importance in exercising jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act. See Koresko v. Nationwide Lief, 403 F.Supp.2d 394, 404 (E.D.Pa.2005).

The Court has broad discretion in deciding whether transfer is warranted and must consider both the public and private interests of the parties. See Plum Tree, Inc. v. Stockment, 488 F.2d 754, 756 (3d Cir.1973). Although 28 U.S.C. § 1404 expressly includes three factors, the Court may also consider other factors. See SEC v. Page Airways, Inc., 464 F.Supp. 461 (D.D.C.1978). The public factors to be considered include: (1) the enforceability of the judgment; (2) practical considerations that could make the trial easy, expeditious or inexpensive; (3) the relative administrative difficulty in the two fora from court congestion; (4) the local interest in deciding controversies; (5) the public policies of the fora; and (6) in diversity cases, the familiarity of the trial judge with the applicable state law. See id. at 879-80.The private factors are: (1) plaintiff’s original choice of forum; (2) the defendant’s preference; (3) where the claim arose; (4) the convenience of the parties as indicated by their relative physical and financial condition; (5) the convenience of the witnesses to the extent that the witnesses may be unavailable for trial in one of the fora; and (6) the location of books and records to the extent that the files cannot be produced in the alternative forum. See Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir.1995) (citations omitted). Generally, a plaintiff’s choice of forum is accorded great weight. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255, 102 S.Ct. 252, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981). Deference to the plaintiff’s selected forum may be overcome, however, “if the private and public interest factors clearly point toward trial in an alternative forum.”Id.

The presumption favoring a plaintiff’s choice of forum is not dispositive of the motion. See Tischio v. Bontex, Inc., 16 F.Supp.2d 511, 521 (D.N.J.1998). Plaintiffs’ choice of forum is given less weight when transferring venue would result in only negligible inconvenience to the plaintiff. See Oudes v. Block, 516 F.Supp. 13, 14 (D.D.C.1981). Additionally, a plaintiff’s choice is afforded less deference when their choice of forum “has little connection with the operative facts of the lawsuit.”Tischio, 16 F.Supp.2d at 521;see also Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 736 F.Supp. 1294, 1306 (D.N.J.1990).

*328 U.S.C. § 1404 does more than codify the doctrine of forum non conveniens;§ 1404 permits transfer upon a lesser showing of inconvenience than is required under common law doctrine and it allows the District Court to exercise broader discretion in transferring the case under the statute than would be permitted under forum non conveniens. See Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 371 F.Supp. 247 (S.D.N.Y.1974).28 U.S.C. § 1404 is similar to the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens, but it authorizes transfers within the federal court system with a lesser burden, both substantially and procedurally, than a motion to dismiss. See Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149 (3d Cir.1980), rev’d on other grounds,454 U.S. 235, 102 S.Ct. 252, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981).28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is intended to enlarge common law power under the doctrine of forum non conveniens; this section allows courts to grant transfers upon a lesser showing of inconvenience than is required at common law. See De Lay & Daniels, Inc. v. Allen M. Campbell Co., General Contractors, Inc., 71 F.R.D. 368 (D.S.C.1976).

Questions concerning whether transfer of venue should be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) depend upon the particular circumstances of each case. See Mills v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 232 F.Supp. 577 (S.D.N.Y.1964); Sell v. Greyhound Corp., 228 F.Supp. 134 (E.D.Pa.1964). Variables render every motion to transfer unique. See Secs. & Exch. Com. v. Golconda Mining Co., 246 F.Supp. 54 (S.D.N.Y.1965). Although 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) mentions only three factors to consider in determining whether to grant or deny a motion to transfer, the Court is not limited to those rather broad generalities, but may consider other factors which are subsumed by purpose of statute. See SEC v. Page Airways, Inc., 464 F.Supp. 461 (D.D.C.1978).

In the current case, transfer of venue promotes the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act. When deciding whether to maintain jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action, courts consider, inter alia, whether a declaratory judgment would settle the controversy, whether declaratory relief would serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations at issue, whether the declaratory relief has been initiated to provide an arena for a race for res judicata and whether an alternative remedy exists that is more effective. See Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Pellecchia, No. 91-2323, 1991 WL 101457 (E.D.Pa. June 7, 1991) (citing Am. HomeAssurance Co. v. Evans, 791 F.2d 61, 63 (6th Cir.1986).

The action pending in the E.D. Tenn. is a declaratory judgment action involving the same parties and others and addressing the same issues pending in this action. The E.D. Tenn. action was filed by Edward Dean Armstrong, Jr. and Susan K. Armstrong Gray as next of kin of the other members of Melissa Carlson’s family who were killed in the accident. The Defendants in the E.D. Tenn. Action are U.S. Fire, North River, the driver of the tractor owned by World Trucking, other employees of World Trucking, Xtra, Valerie Carlson and others injured in the Accident. The Plaintiffs in the E.D. Tenn. Action allege that those non-insurance company defendants are “interested and necessary parties to this complaint seeking declaratory judgment against” Defendants. That lawsuit was filed on or about May 9, 2007. The E.D. Tenn. Action, like the New Jersey Action, seeks a declaratory judgment regarding whether the insurance policies issued by Defendants provide coverage to World Trucking and its employees.

The companion declaratory judgment actions brought in the E.D. Tenn. were consolidated with the underlying suit, bringing together all interested parties. The E.D. Tenn. has already determined that consolidation of all parties is appropriate. Transfer to the E.D. Tenn. will not prejudice any parties because all parties are named defendants in the E.D. Tenn. suit. Furthermore, the matter before the Court is a purely legal issue. Considerations regarding convenience to witnesses and access to evidence are irrelevant. Furthermore, this case has no meaningful connection to New Jersey. Therefore, the current case is transferred sua sponte to the E.D. Tenn.

This Court, therefore, lacks the requisite jurisdiction to address Carlson’s Motion to Intervene pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 24.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, it is the finding of this Court that venue is transferred to the E.D. Tenn. An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

TITAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

REPUBLIC WESTERN INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee,

andAuto Club Insurance Association, Defendant-Appellant,

andPacific Employers Insurance Company, Defendant.

Feb. 14, 2008.

Wayne Circuit Court; LC No. 05-527347-NF.

Before: FITZGERALD, P.J., and MURPHY and BORRELLO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant Auto Club Insurance Association (ACIA) appeals as of right that part of an order granting summary disposition under MCR 2 .116(C)(10) in favor of plaintiff, Titan Insurance Company, in this action brought pursuant to MCL 500.3172(3) for reimbursement of no-fault automobile benefits paid out on behalf of Jamal Al-Shimmary .We reverse.

The trial court also granted summary disposition in favor of defendants Republic Western Insurance Company and Pacific Employers Insurance Company.

On February 1, 2002, Jamal Al-Shimmary was injured in a motor vehicle accident in Dearborn while he was hauling automobile parts as an independent contractor for Horizon Freight System (Horizon). Though plaintiff was a Michigan resident, had a Michigan driver’s license, and was driving a semi-truck that he purchased in Michigan, he registered the semi-truck in Oklahoma. Republic Western Insurance Company (Republic) insured the truck under a policy that provided only for non-trucking liability (for the truck when it was not hauling a trailer, known as “bobtail” coverage) and Michigan no-fault coverage, but excluded liability  coverage if the vehicle was “under carrier direction, control or dispatch,” or “used to carry property in any business or in route for such purposes.”There is no dispute that Al-Shimmary was operating the truck under dispatch at the time of the accident. Pacific Employers Insurance Company (Pacific) insured the trailer that Al-Shimmary was carrying at the time of the accident under a corporate policy issued to Horizon that included an endorsement for Michigan no-fault coverage. In addition, Al-Shimmary’s estranged wife, Etah El-Selman, owned a personal vehicle that was insured by Auto Club Insurance Association (ACIA) under a Michigan no-fault policy.

The certificate of insurance included personal injury protection coverage under the category “Liability.”

In an underlying suit, Al-Shimmary filed suit on September 18, 2002, against Republic and Pacific seeking personal protection benefits. Because of a dispute between the two insurers concerning their obligation to provide coverage, the Michigan Assigned Claims Facility assigned the claim to Titan Insurance Company. See MCL 500.3172(1). The trial court thereafter entered an order adding ACIA and Titan as defendants. On November 21, 2003, Al-Shimmary agreed to the dismissal of Republic, Pacific and ACIA, leaving Titan as the sole defendant. Titan arbitrated Al-Shimmary’s claim for no-fault benefits and filed the present action seeking reimbursement of its no-fault payments pursuant to MCL 500.3172(3)(c).

ACIA was not involved in the case at that time.

Titan filed a motion for summary disposition seeking a ruling that ACIA was the insurer responsible for the payment of no-fault benefits under MCL 500.3114. Titan acknowledged that ACIA had taken the position that Al-Shimmary’s vehicle was uninsured at the time of the accident. Titan maintained that both the Pacific policy and the Republic policy provided no-fault coverage that was in effect at the time of the accident. Republic filed a motion for summary disposition on the ground that coverage under its non-trucking policy was excluded because at the time of the accident that truck was “under carrier direction, control or dispatch” and was “used to carry property in any business.”Pacific filed a motion for summary disposition on the ground that Al-Shimmary was an independent contractor operating his own semi-truck at the time of the accident and was not operating a motor vehicle owned or registered by Pacific’s insured, Horizon. ACIA filed a response to Titan’s motion for summary disposition asserting that under MCL 500.3101(1), Al-Shimmary, as the owner and operator of the truck, was required to “maintain security for payment of benefits under personal protection insurance.”ACIA asserted that neither the Republic policy nor the Pacific policy provided such security. ACIA maintained that under MCL 500.3113(b), Al-Shimmary was not entitled to be paid personal protection insurance benefits and, therefore, under MCL 500.3172 Al-Shimmary was not a “person entitled to claim” personal protection insurance benefits. ACIA requested summary disposition in its favor.

A hearing was held on the motions on December 13, 2006. Titan conceded that Republic’s policy excluded no-fault coverage in this case, but argued that no-fault coverage was provided under both Pacific’s and ACIA’s policies. Pacific argued that coverage was not afforded under its policy for a number of reasons, including that Al-Shimmary, as the owner and registrant of the truck, was required, but failed, to maintain no-fault insurance coverage on the truck. ACIA argued that, pursuant to MCL 500.3113(b), Al-Shimmary was not entitled to personal protection benefits because he was the owner of the motor vehicle involved in the accident with respect to which the security required by MCL 500.3101 was not in effect. The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of plaintiff against ACIA on the ground that Al-Shimmary was an insured under his estranged wife’s policy and, therefore, ACIA had responsibility for the payment of no-fault benefits under MCL 500.3114(1). The trial court also granted summary disposition in favor of Republic and Pacific, finding that personal protection insurance coverage was precluded by exclusions in each insurance policy.

Republic relied on its non-trucking exclusion.

Whether plaintiff’s semi-truck was insured within the meaning of MCL 500.3113 is a question of law. Issues of law are reviewed de novo. Walters v. Snyder, 239 Mich.App 453, 456;608 NW2d 97 (2000). Questions of statutory construction are also reviewed de novo. People v. Stone Transport, Inc, 241 Mich.App 49, 50;613 NW2d 737 (2000).

MCL 500.3172(1) provides for payment of personal protection insurance benefits through an assigned claims plan to a person entitled to claim such benefits if the personal protection insurance applicable to the injury cannot be ascertained because of a dispute between 2 or more automobile insurers concerning their obligation to provide coverage. Under MCL 500.3173 a person who, pursuant to any limitation or exclusion set forth in the no-fault act, would be disqualified from receiving personal protection benefits under an applicable insurance policy is also disqualified under the assigned claims plan.

Subject to certain exceptions not applicable here, every motor vehicle driven on Michigan roadways must be registered with the state. MCL 257.216; Parks v. DAIE, 426 Mich. 191, 200 n 2;393 NW2d 833 (1986). Under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., the owner of a motor vehicle that is required to be registered in Michigan must carry personal protection insurance, property protection insurance, and residual liability insurance. MCL 500.3101(1); Ardt v. Titan Ins Co, 233 Mich.App 685, 689;593 NW2d 215 (1999). If the vehicle is not insured as provided in MCL 500.3101, the owner is not entitled to personal protection insurance benefits for an accident involving that vehicle. MCL 500.3113(b); Ardt, supra at 689;Wilson v. League Gen Ins Co, 195 Mich.App 705, 707-708;491 NW2d 642 (1992).

MCL 500.3113(b) provides in pertinent part:

A person is not entitled to be paid personal injury protection insurance benefits for accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident any of the following circumstances existed:

* * *

(b) The person was the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle or motorcycle involved in the accident with respect to which the security required by section 3101 or 3103 was not in effect.

ACIA maintains that the security required by section 3101  was not in effect at the time of the accident and therefore Al-Shimmary is not entitled to personal protection benefits at all.

Section 3103 pertains to motorcycles and is not relevant to this case.

Titan conceded at the hearing on the motion for summary disposition that Republic’s policy did not provide no-fault coverage to Al-Shimmary because Al-Shimmary was engaged in trucking at the time of the accident. Further, Pacific’s policy was issued to Horizon, which had no interest in Al-Shimmary’s semi-truck. Horizon apparently owned the trailer that plaintiff was hauling, but it is the insurance coverage of Al-Shimmary’s truck that is at issue here. And MCL 500.3101(1), when read in conjunction with MCL 500.3113(b), does not exclude the owner of a vehicle from maintaining insurance on an otherwise uninsured vehicle.

There is no evidence that Al-Shimmary had no-fault coverage on the semi-truck that was in effect at the time of the trucking accident. As stated above, MCL 500.3113(b) expressly precludes an uninsured owner from obtaining personal protection benefits under the facts of this case. Thus, Al-Shimmary was disqualified from receiving personal protection benefits. MCL 500.3113(b); MCL 500.3173. Therefore, the trial court erred in concluding that ACIA was required to reimburse Titan for the personal protection benefits paid to Al-Shimmary.

Reversed.

Mich.App.,2008.

Titan Ins. Co. v. Republic Western Ins. Co.