Superior Court of Connecticut,Judicial District of New Haven.

A & P TRUCKING, INC.

v.

MKM TRANSPORTATION SERVICES, INC.

 

Feb. 26, 2008.

 

COSGROVE, J.

The plaintiff, A & P Trucking, Inc., (“A & P”) alleges it entered into a “transportation broker contract” with the defendant MKM Transportation Services, Inc., (“MKM”) on October 22, 2003. The plaintiff asserts that the defendant agreed to have machinery “consigned to the plaintiff transported for the plaintiff to Florida for an agreed price.”The plaintiff alleges that an agent of the defendant, J.F. Lomma, Inc., (“Lomma”) caused the machinery to be damaged and that the plaintiff became liable to third persons because of the damage. In the first count of the complaint the plaintiff claims that the plaintiff breached the transportation broker contract when its agent, J.F. Lomma, Inc., damaged the machinery. In the second count the plaintiff seeks recovery from the defendant on a theory of common law indemnification.

 

The burden of proof by the preponderance of the evidence is upon the plaintiff.

 

The court finds the following facts from the testimony and exhibits introduced during the trial of this case on November 21, 2007. The plaintiff is a licensed and insured interstate trucking company with a place of business in Wallingford, Connecticut. It is in the business of transporting freight. One of the plaintiff’s regular customers was Plastics One, Inc., of Wallingford, Connecticut (“Plastics One”). On or about October 20, 2003, Plastics One called the plaintiff and asked the plaintiff if it could arrange to transport an injection molding machine from its Wallingford plant to its customer, Security Plastics of Miami Lakes, Florida. Plastics One had reconditioned the machine and had sold it to Security Plastics for $35,000.

 

The plaintiff advised Plastics One that he would be able to arrange for transportation. In fact the plaintiff did not have equipment available to provide these services. The plaintiff called the defendant MKM and asked the defendant to identify an interstate trucker who would be able to provide the required transportation services. The defendant would be paid for these brokerage services by the trucking entity that actually transported the injection molding machine. As a transportation broker, the defendant does not own any trucks and does not hold any licenses to transport goods on an interstate basis.

 

Upon receiving the plaintiff’s query, the defendant’s employee, Chuck Kulak, called several trucking companies and ultimately determined that Lomma was willing to accept the load for a price of $750.00. The plaintiff would be the billing agent and the broker’s fee to MKM would be $75.00.

 

On October 22, 2003, Lomma’s agent arrived at the Plastics One plant in Wallingford and the injection molding machine was loaded onto the truck. A Straight Bill of Lading was issued by Plastics One identifying Security Plastics as the Consignee and Plastics One as the Shipper. The bill of lading had been prepared by Plastics One, and A & P Trucking was named the carrier in a space at the top of the form. A & P never signed the bill of lading. Lomma picked up the machinery at the plant of Plastics One on October 22, 2003, and signed the bill of lading as the carrier. Lomma became bound by the terms of the bill of lading. The bill of lading acknowledges receipt of the machine by Lomma and describes the machine as “in apparently good order.” Plastics One did not object to Lomma transporting the machinery.

 

Sometime between October 22, 2003, and October 24, 2003, the machinery was damaged and rendered a total loss while it was in the control of Lomma. On October 24, 2003, the injection molding machine was returned to the shipper, Plastics One.

 

Subsequently, the president of Plastics One called Alan Platt, president of A & P. Mr. Platt was informed that the issue of the damage to the machine had to be “taken care of” because Security Plastics had already paid $35,000 for the machine and Plastics One would have to refund the purchase price. Mr. Platt submitted an insurance claim but it was rejected because the plaintiff’s insurance only covered its trucks, not those of Lomma. Under pressure from Plastics One, the plaintiff agreed on November 14, 2003, to pay the $35,000 to Plastics One. In essence, it agreed to buy the injection molding machine. In this transaction the plaintiff was unrepresented by an attorney and did not obtain an assignment of any rights that Plastics One might have had against Lomma as the carrier.

 

With regard to the First Count, the success of the plaintiff’s claim depends upon the terms and conditions of the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff claims that when it sought the defendant’s assistance in locating a willing trucker that it specifically told the plaintiff that it would not work with Lomma because of prior bad experiences. There is nothing in writing to reflect and corroborate the testimony of Alan Plan, president of the plaintiff. The contemporaneous notes of MKM do not document any such limitation. As such, there is insufficient credible evidence to support the plaintiff’s contention that Lomma had been excluded as a potential carrier. The credible components of the oral contract between the plaintiff and the defendant was that the defendant would find a ready, willing, and able trucker for the Plastics One job. This they did. The defendant found such a carrier and its duties under the agreement were fully performed. The defendant had nothing to do with the loading or transporting of the machinery. There was no evidence that the defendant had any control over Lomma or any of its employees or agents, and therefore the plaintiff failed to prove that there was a principal-agent relationship between the defendant and Lomma. See, e.g., Wesley v.. Schaller Subaru, Inc., 277 Conn. 526, 543-44, 893 A.2d 389 (2006). There was no evidence as to what caused the damage to the machinery. There was only evidence that the machinery was damaged while it was in the control of Lomma, an independent contractor. There is no evidence that at the time the machinery was damaged that the plaintiff had any ownership interest in the machinery. The plaintiff has not met its burden of proof with regard to the first count.

 

In order to establish liability on the second count alleging indemnification, the plaintiff must prove either an express agreement or a common-law indemnification claim. As there was no written contract between the parties, the only possible avenue of recovery for the plaintiff is under a common law tortious indemnification theory. “[T]ortious indemnification is an action that arises between two tortfeasors, one, whose passive negligence resulted in a monetary recovery by the plaintiff, and a second, whose active negligence renders him liable to the first by way of reimbursement … [I]n order to recover under a theory of tortious indemnification, the first tortfeasor, seeking indemnification, must demonstrate that the second tortfeasor’s active negligence, rather than the [first tortfeasor’s] own passive negligence, was the direct, immediate cause of the harm in question.”(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) ATC Partnership v. Coats North America Consolidated, 284 Conn. 537, 551-52, 935 A.2d 115 (2007); see Kaplan v. Merberg Wrecking Corp., 152 Conn. 405, 415-16, 207 A.2d 732 (1965) (“The plaintiff in an action claiming an implied obligation of indemnity against an independent contractor cannot recover unless he proves that the active negligence and wrong which caused the injury … were the negligence and wrong of the defendant … or, in other words, that the defendant was the party primarily liable for the wrongful act which occasioned the injury in respect of which the plaintiff has been compelled to pay damages.”) A prerequisite for a viable tortious indemnification claim is that the plaintiff and the defendant are joint tortfeasors. ATC Partnership v. Coats North America Consolidated, supra, 284 Conn. at 552.

 

Thus, in order to succeed in its common law tortious indemnification claim, A & P must prove that it was passively negligent and that MKM, or its agent, was actively negligent and therefore responsible for the damage to the machine. A & P has failed to produce the evidence necessary to support this claim. First, although A & P paid Plastics One for the damage to the machine and thus may appear to be in a position to seek indemnification from a party that played a more active role in causing the damage, there is no evidence that A & P was actually a tortfeasor. Second, the only party that the record indicates could be liable for the damage to the machine was Lomma, and Lomma is not a party to this action.As noted earlier, there is no evidence that MKM and Lomma were in a principal-agent relationship, nor that the defendant had any control over the actions of Lomma, and therefore MKM cannot be liable for Lomma’s negligence. Finally, there is no agency or contractual relationship between A & P and Lomma on which to base a claim of indemnification. The plaintiff has not met its burden of proof with regard to the second count.

 

It may also be noted that Lomma is an interstate motor carrier subject to federal law, and in particular the Carmack Amendment, a federal statute that absolutely preempts state common law with regards to claims for loss or injury to property transported in interstate commerce. 49 U.S.C. § 14706 (1996); see Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 505-06, 33 S.Ct. 148, 57 L.Ed. 314 (1913). Any claims made directly against Lomma would be governed by the applicable federal laws. The plaintiff’s claims against MKM, however, are not preempted by federal law because the Carmack Amendment does not apply to brokers. Chubb Group of Ins. Cos. v. H.A. Transportation Systems, Inc., 243 F.Sup. 1064, 1068-69 (C.D.Cal.2002).

 

Judgment may enter in favor of the defendant. Costs shall be taxed by the clerk.

(Court of Appeals Rule 4(b) and Rule 37(b), February 21, 2008)

March 24, 2008

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

COLEMAN

v.

B-H TRANSFER COMPANY et al.

DIXON TRUCKING COMPANY et al.

v.

COLEMAN.

Johnson, Presiding Judge.

These cases arise from a tractor trailer collision that occurred on January 6, 2003 in South Carolina. The facts of the collision are not in dispute. The collision involved three tractor trailers, driven by Jerry Lee Coleman, Harry Mitchell Dixon and Scotty Schafer. All three drivers were purportedly independent contractors, and all three tractor trailers were under contract with B-H Transfer Company to deliver loads of kaolin. Dixon Trucking Company, Inc.  owned the vehicle driven by Dixon and allegedly leased the vehicle to Dixon.

1. Harry Mitchell Dixon is not related to the owners of defendant Dixon Trucking Company, Inc. It is a mere coincidence that both defendants have the name “Dixon.”

After delivering the kaolin, the tractor trailers began the return trip from South Carolina. Coleman drove the lead vehicle, followed by Schafer then Dixon. At some point on Interstate 95, Coleman slowed to almost a stop and allegedly pulled his vehicle onto the left shoulder of the road to avoid congestion due to a traffic wreck on the right shoulder of the road. Schafer and Dixon also attempted to stop, but Dixon struck the rear of Schafer’s vehicle, forcing Schafer into the rear of Coleman’s vehicle. The force of the collision caused Coleman to strike a tree in the median and sustain serious injuries. As a result of the collision, Dixon received a traffic citation for traveling too fast for conditions.

Coleman sued Dixon Trucking Company, Harry Dixon, B-H Transfer Company, and Discover Property and Casualty Insurance Company. The defendants moved for summary judgment on various grounds. The trial court granted summary judgment to B-H Transfer Company based on a release and indemnity agreement which precluded liability for Coleman’s injuries, denied summary judgment to Dixon Trucking Company, Harry Dixon and Discover Property and Casualty Insurance Company based on this same release and indemnity agreement, and granted summary judgment to all defendants on Coleman’s punitive damages claim. In Case Number A08A0013, Coleman appeals, contending the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to B-H Transfer Company based on the release and indemnity agreement. In Case Number A08A0014, Dixon Trucking Company, Harry Dixon, and Discover Property and Casualty Insurance Company appeal, alleging the trial court erred by failing to enter summary judgment in their favor based upon the release and indemnity provision in Coleman’s independent contractor agreement. Dixon Trucking Company further contends that the trial court erred in denying summary judgment to it because Harry Dixon was working for B-H Transfer Company at the time of the collision and Dixon Trucking Company had relinquished full control of its vehicle at the time of the collision.

For reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s order granting B-H Transfer Company’s motion for summary judgment in Case Number A08A0113. In Case Number A08A0114, we affirm the trial court’s order denying summary judgment to Harry Dixon and Dixon Trucking Company, but reverse the trial court’s denial of summary judgment to Discover Property and Casualty Insurance Company.

1. Coleman argues that the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment to B-H Transfer Company on the basis of an indemnity contract that was ambiguous. We find no error.

The independent contract agreement between Coleman and B-H Transfer Company specifically provides, in part:

7. (a) BHTC acknowledges its obligation to maintain insurance coverage for the protection of the public pursuant to 49 CFR, Part 387. BHTC agrees to provide Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability Insurance on the vehicle when being used in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. This insurance shall not cover any operation of the contracted vehicle when not being used on BHTC business in providing the transportation services contemplated by this Agreement, nor will such insurance cover damage to persons or property resulting from the collision of two vehicles, both of which are under contract to BHTC. Independent Contractor hereby specifically releases and agrees to indemnify BHTC from any liability resulting from any such occurrences….”

Contrary to Coleman’s contention, the release and indemnity provision is not ambiguous because it refers to a collision between two vehicles and the collision in the present case was between three vehicles. The intent of the provision is clear and must be implemented. Moreover, technically, Coleman’s vehicle only collided with one other vehicle, the tractor trailer driven by Schafer.

Coleman also contends the provision is ambiguous because it does not specifically state whether Coleman would be held liable due to his own or someone else’s negligence. Again, we must disagree based on the clear language of the provision: B-H Transfer Company would not provide coverage for a collision between vehicles under contract to B-H Transfer Company, and the independent contractor would indemnify B-H Transfer Company for any liability. It is irrelevant whose negligence caused the collision.

In a final effort to save his liability claim against B-H Transfer Company, Coleman contends the release and indemnity provision fails for a lack of consideration. According to Coleman, the release and indemnity provision required consideration above and beyond consideration in the general independent contractor agreement. However, the cases cited by Coleman, National Bank of Tifton v. Smith and The National Bank of Monroe v. Wright, have nothing to do with an employment or independent contractor contract and do not support Coleman’s position in the present case. The trial court did not err in holding that Coleman could not claim liability against B-H Transfer Company and in granting B-H Transfer Company’s motion for summary judgment.

2. 142 Ga. 663 (83 SE 526) (1914).

3. 77 Ga.App. 272 (48 S.E.2d 306 ) (1948).

2. Coleman contends the trial court erred in holding that he was not a member of the public to be protected under federal and state laws applicable to motor carriers. Under the circumstances of this case, we disagree.

A contractual provision which releases or indemnifies a party from liability for injuries arising out of the contract is enforceable unless it contravenes public policy:

It is the paramount public policy of this state that courts will not lightly interfere with the freedom of parties to contract. A contracting party may waive or renounce that which the law has established in his or her favor, when it does not thereby injure others or affect the public interest. Exculpatory clauses in Georgia are valid and binding, and are not void as against public policy when a business relieves itself from its own negligence.

4. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Neighborhood Assistance Corp. v. Dixon, 265 Ga.App. 255, 256(1) (593 S.E.2d 717) (2004).

Here, the independent contractor agreement pursuant to which Coleman was operating his tractor trailer at the time of the collision specifically provided that Coleman agreed to release and indemnify B-H Transfer Company from any liability resulting from a collision between vehicles under contract to B-H Transfer Company. Since the collision at issue involved tractor trailers under contract to B-H Transfer Company, the release and indemnity provision clearly applies.

Coleman contends the release violates public policy because the law requires motor carriers to maintain coverage for the protection of the public. However, we agree with the trial court’s finding that Coleman was not a member of the public entitled to protection under the law. 49 C.F.R. § 387.15, which provides the federal minimum insurance coverage for motor common carriers, states that the required insurance does not apply to the insured’s employees while in the course of employment. And when defining “employee,” the statute specifically includes an independent contractor.  The trial court correctly granted B-H Transfer Company’s motion for summary judgment.

5. 49 C.F.R. § 390.5.

Case Number A08A0114

3. Dixon Trucking Company, Harry Dixon and Discover Property and Casualty Insurance Company (the “appellants”) contend the trial court erred in denying their summary judgment motion based on the release and indemnity provision in Coleman’s independent contractor agreement. According to the appellants, “[s]ince [Coleman] has contractually released his claims against B-H Transfer Company, it follows that the remaining defendants also are entitled to summary judgment.” We disagree with respect to Harry Dixon and Dixon Trucking Company, but agree with respect to Discover Property and Casualty Insurance Company.

a. Harry Dixon. The appellants contend Harry Dixon is immune from liability simply because B-H Transfer Company is immune from liability. However, they have not cited any authority supporting this position. Clearly, there is no bar to Coleman’s ability to recover from a fellow independent contractor for that independent contractor’s negligence.  Contrary to the appellants’ argument, Coleman has a valid claim against Harry Dixon, the driver of one of the other tractor trailers involved in the collision, even if vicarious liability does not attach to B-H Transfer Company because of the release and indemnity provision. The trial court did not err in denying Harry Dixon’s motion for summary judgment.

6. See Rothrock v. Jeter, 212 Ga.App. 85, 86(1) (441 S.E.2d 88) (1994).

b. Dixon Trucking Company. The trial court did not err in denying Dixon Trucking Company’s motion for summary judgment because the record before us on appeal shows the existence of a question of material fact concerning whether an agency relationship existed between Harry Dixon and Dixon Trucking Company. If such a relationship existed, Dixon Trucking Company could be vicariously liable for any negligence on the part of Harry Dixon.

7. See generally The Pep Boys & c. v. Yahyapour, 279 Ga.App. 674, 675-677(4) (632 S.E.2d 385) (2006).

According to the record, Harry Dixon and Dixon Trucking Company did not have a written lease to commemorate any oral agreement regarding Harry Dixon’s use of the tractor trailer at issue. And, the evidence establishes that Dixon Trucking Company retained at least partial control over the tractor trailer driven by Harry Dixon, including maintaining, servicing and inspecting the tractor trailer. The record further shows that Harry Dixon paid Dixon Trucking Company one-half of all monies received by Harry Dixon for jobs performed for B-H Transfer Company. And, Dixon Trucking Company paid for the tractor trailer repairs resulting from the collision at issue.

Because there was no written lease agreement between Harry Dixon and Dixon Trucking Company, and because the record contains evidence that Dixon Trucking Company failed to relinquish total control of the tractor trailer to Harry Dixon, the record on appeal creates a material issue of fact regarding whether Harry Dixon was Dixon Trucking Company’s agent. Therefore, Dixon Trucking Company remains a proper party in this action, and the trial court correctly denied Dixon Trucking Company’s motion for summary judgment.

c. Discover Property and Casualty Insurance Company. The record shows that B-H Transfer Company insured the subject vehicles with Discover Property and Casualty Insurance Company pursuant to federal and state statutes. The appellants argue that Discover Property and Casualty Insurance Company is entitled to summary judgment because Coleman’s indemnity agreement makes it impossible for Coleman to obtain a judgment against B-H Transfer Company and, therefore, there is no “actionable injury” pursuant to OCGA § 46-7-12. We agree.

This Court has previously held that “an indispensable prerequisite to an action against the insurer is an ‘actionable injury.’ ”  And “actionable injury” means an injury to a person who could sue the motor carrier and obtain a judgment for his injuries.  Here, as we held in Division 1, Coleman can not successfully sue B-H Transfer Company, the motor carrier insured by Discover Property and Casualty Insurance Company. Because the liability of the insurance carrier on its policy is merely ancillary to that of the motor carrier it is insuring, there is no way for Coleman to recover against the surety since he cannot recover a judgment against the principal. 0 The trial court erred in denying Discover Property and Casualty Insurance Company’s motion for summary judgment.

8. Tuck v. Cummins Trucking Co., 171 Ga.App. 485, 487(2) (320 S.E.2d 265) (1984).

9. Id.

10. Id.

Judgment affirmed in Case No. A08A0113. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part in Case No. A08A0114. Barnes, C. J., and Phipps, J., concur.