Gonzalez v. Caballero

S.D.N.Y.,2008.

United States District Court,S.D. New York.

Luis GONZALEZ, Plaintiff,

v.

“John” CABALLERO (first name being unknown) and New England Motor Freight Inc., Defendants.

No. 07 Civ. 4801(DC).

Aug. 27, 2008.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

CHIN, District Judge.

On September 12, 2005, defendant “John” Caballero, a driver for defendant New England Motor Freight Inc. (“NEMF”), delivered a number of display racks to the Tribeca Soho Animal Hospital (the “Hospital”). Instead of taking the display racks into the Hospital, however, Caballero left them outside on the street. Plaintiff Luis Gonzalez, an employee of the Hospital, attempted to move the display racks into the Hospital by himself because he was the only Hospital employee on duty and Caballero refused to help him. The display racks were extremely heavy, and Gonzalez injured himself in the process.

In this diversity case, Gonzalez sues Caballero and NEMF for damages, claiming that defendants were negligent in their delivery of the display racks. He contends that defendants failed to exercise reasonable care when Caballero left the racks in the street and refused to help him move them into the Hospital. NEMF moves for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) dismissing the complaint, contending that defendants owed Gonzalez no duty of care. For the reasons that follow, the motion is granted and the complaint is dismissed.

BACKGROUND

A. The Facts

The facts alleged in the complaint are assumed to be true for purposes of this motion. They may be summarized as follows:

1. The Parties

At all relevant times, Gonzalez was employed at the Hospital, which is located at 5 Lispenard Street, New York, New York. (Compl.¶ 6). Gonzalez is a citizen of New York. (Not. of Remov. ¶ 5; Summons at 1).

At all relevant times, Caballero was a driver and deliveryman employed by NEMF. (Comp.¶¶ 2-4). Caballero is a citizen of New Jersey.NEMF, a federally licensed interstate motor carrier, is a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey. (Answ.¶ 4).

2. The Delivery

On September 12, 2005, Gonzalez was waiting at the Hospital for NEMF to deliver the display racks. (Compl.¶ 21). Gonzalez was the only employee on duty at the Hospital at the time. (Id.  ¶ 20).

Caballero arrived at the Hospital with the display racks, each of which weighed more than 100 pounds. (Id.  ¶¶ 7-10). Instead of delivering the racks onto the premises of the Hospital as he was supposed to, however, Caballero left them on the “public roadway located on Lispenard Street.”(Id.  ¶¶ 12-14). Gonzalez asked Caballero to help him take the racks inside, but Caballero refused. (Id.  ¶¶ 15-17, 23-26). Caballero then left, without helping Gonzalez. (Id.  ¶ 26).

As a consequence, after Caballero left, Gonzalez was forced to move the display racks by himself from the street into the Hospital. (Id.  ¶¶ 26-27). As he attempted to do so, he hurt himself, suffering substantial injuries.(Id.  ¶¶ 27-28).

B. Prior Proceedings

Gonzalez commenced this action in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Bronx County, on February 27, 2007. (Not. of Remov. ¶ 1). The complaint asserts a negligence claim against defendants, contending that, as a result of defendants’ “negligence, carelessness and reckless conduct,” Gonzalez was forced to move the display racks himself, without the aid of proper equipment, hurting himself in the process. (Compl.¶ 27). NEMF served its answer on April 10, 2007. (Not. of Remov. ¶ 2).

The complaint did not seek a specified amount of damages, but on May 25, 2007, Gonzalez served a Supplemental Demand pursuant to C.P.L.R. 3107(c) requesting judgment in the amount of $8 million. (Not. of Remov. ¶ 3 & Ex. C). On June 5, 2007, NEMF removed the case to this Court, based on diversity of citizenship of the parties. (Id.  ¶ 4).

The parties conducted limited discovery, and at a pretrial conference on December 14, 2007, NEMF requested permission to move for judgment on the pleadings rather than for summary judgment. I permitted it to do so and set a briefing schedule.

This motion followed.

DISCUSSION

First, I discuss the legal standards applicable to a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings. Second, I address the merits of Gonzalez’s negligence claim.

A. Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings

Motions pursuant to Rule 12(c) for judgment on the pleadings are governed by the same standards applicable to Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.Cleveland v. Caplaw Enter., 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir.2006). On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a complaint, the court must accept a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 321 (2d Cir.1996); see Erickson v. Pardus, — U.S. —-, —-, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, — U.S. —-, —-, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

In its recent decision in Bell Atlantic Corp., the Supreme Court announced the “retirement” of the oft-quoted “no set of facts” language from Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957), adopting in its place a “plausibility” standard. Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S.Ct. at 1968-69. As interpreted by the Second Circuit, Bell Atlantic Corp. did not announce a “universal standard of heightened fact pleading, but … instead requir[es] a flexible ‘plausibility standard,’ which obligates a pleader to amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts where such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible.”  Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d Cir.2007). The question is whether the pleading alleges “ ‘enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’ “  Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir.2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 127 S.Ct. at 1974).

B. The Merits

1. Applicable Law

A plaintiff bringing a negligence claim under New York law to recover for personal injuries must show that (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of reasonable care; (2) the defendant breached that duty; and (3) the breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Williams v. Utica College of Syracuse Univ., 453 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir.2006) (internal citations omitted); Labajo v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 478 F.Supp.2d 523, 531 (S.D.N.Y.2007).

Here, the first element is the key. “ ‘[A] duty of reasonable care owed by the tort-feasor to the plaintiff is elemental to any recovery in negligence.’ “  Lippman v. Island Copter Corp., 248 A.D.2d 596, 597, 670 N.Y.S.2d 529 (2d Dep’t 1998) (quoting Eiseman v. State of New York, 70 N.Y.2d 175, 187, 518 N.Y.S.2d 608, 511 N.E.2d 1128 (1987)). A defendant is not liable in negligence unless it has assumed a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm to the plaintiff. Lippman, 248 A.D.2d at 597, 670 N.Y.S.2d 529;see also Espinal v. Melville Snow Contractors, Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 136, 138, 746 N.Y.S.2d 120, 773 N.E.2d 485 (2002).

The existence of a duty of care is usually a question of law for the court. Palka v. Servicemaster Mgmt. Serv. Corp., 83 N.Y.2d 579, 585, 611 N.Y.S.2d 817, 634 N.E.2d 189 (1994); Kazenoff v. United States, 945 F.2d 32, 36 (2d Cir.1991). Once the court has determined the existence of a duty of care, it is then the factfinder’s job to determine whether the duty was breached and, if so, whether the breach was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury. Palka, 83 N.Y.2d at 585, 611 N.Y.S.2d 817, 634 N.E.2d 189;Lombard v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, 280 F.3d 209, 215-16 (2d Cir.2002).

To prevail, Gonzales must show that NEMF owed a duty of care specifically to him because “without a duty running directly to the injured person there can be no liability in damages, however careless the conduct or foreseeable the harm.”Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 96 N.Y.2d 222, 232, 727 N.Y.S.2d 7, 750 N.E.2d 1055 (2001). Hence, the question is whether NEMF, while under contract to deliver display racks to the Hospital, owed Gonzales-an employee of the Hospital who chose to move the storage racks himself-a duty of reasonable care.

2. Application

I conclude that NEMF did not owe a duty of care to Gonzalez. Even assuming NEMF had a contractual obligation to the Hospital to deliver the racks inside, NEMF did not have a duty to Gonzalez to try to save him from injuring himself. Caballero undertook no duty to protect Gonzalez; his refusal to help Gonzalez created no such duty and therefore he did not breach any duty. See Lippman, 248 A.D.2d at 597, 670 N.Y.S.2d 529;Conte v. Abolian Corp., 80 A.D.2d 990, 991, 437 N.Y.S.2d 473 (4th Dep’t 1981). Instead, after Caballero left, Gonzalez injured himself because he made the unwise decision to try to move several heavy display racks himself, without any help or equipment.

Both Conte and Lippman are instructive. In Conte, the plaintiff and his co-employee arrived at the defendant’s loading dock to pick up a piano. They were told that everyone was out to lunch, and that if they wanted help with the piano, they would have to wait until after lunch. Rather than wait, they decided to load the piano onto their truck themselves. The piano fell, injuring the plaintiff. He sued the defendant for negligence. 80 A.D.2d at 991.

The trial court denied defendant’s summary judgment motion. The Fourth Department reversed, dismissing the complaint and holding:

Plaintiff’s claim that a duty existed, under common law principles, for defendant to assist in loading the piano is without merit. Defendant merely failed to provide assistance during its workers’ lunch hour. Such behavior is not the type of inaction that creates a duty….

Plaintiff’s claim that defendant’s shipping contract with his employer imposed an affirmative duty upon defendant to assist in loading the truck is also without merit. Even if the contract created a duty chargeable to defendant to load the piano, liability does not follow, because the record does not show that the parties clearly intended the assumption of that duty and that its breach should result in favor of a nonparty plaintiff personally injured…. If defendant breached any duty, it was a contractual duty owed to plaintiff’s employer, the party with which it contracted, and not one owed to the injured plaintiff.

80 A.D.2d at 990-91 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Similarly, here, if NEMF breached any duty, it was its contractual duty to the Hospital, not any duty to Gonzalez. The allegations of the complaint, even if true, do not establish that NEMF and the Hospital, in entering their contract, intended that NEMF would assume a duty to ensure that the Hospital’s employees would remain injury-free.

In Lippmann, the defendant entered into a contract with a hospital to provide helicopter transportation for emergency medical service personnel and patients. Pursuant to the contract, the defendant transported a 250-pound incubator, which contained an infant, via helicopter to the hospital. When the helicopter landed, the plaintiff-the hospital’s assistant security director-motioned for the pilot to turn off the engine and rotors. The pilot refused. With the pilot seated at the control panel watching, the plaintiff attempted to unload the incubator himself. The incubator started to roll out the helicopter door, and the plaintiff injured himself. He sued the defendant for negligence, claiming that the pilot owed him a duty to help him unload the incubator. 248 A.D.2d at 596-97.

The trial court granted defendant’s summary judgment motion and dismissed the complaint. The Second Department affirmed, holding:

[B]efore the defendant may be held liable for negligence it must be shown that the defendant has assumed a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm to the plaintiff…. Here, the pilot’s inaction in merely failing to provide assistance to the [assistant security director] in his unilateral attempt to unload the [incubator] did not create such a duty.

Id. at 597 (citation omitted). Similarly, here, Caballero’s inaction in refusing to help Gonzalez move the racks into the Hospital did not create a duty on the part of defendants to exercise reasonable care to prevent Gonzalez from hurting himself. See also Swade v. Nassau Valve & Supply Co., 288 A.D.2d 370, 371, 734 N.Y.S.2d 85 (2d Dep’t 2001) (“[B]efore a defendant may be held liable for its alleged negligence, it must be demonstrated that it ‘has assumed a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent reasonable harm to the plaintiff.’…Here, the inaction of the defendant’s employees in merely failing to assist the plaintiff in his attempt to load his truck did not create such a duty.”) (citations omitted).

Gonzalez argues that defendants had both a common law and contractual duty of care to him. (Pl. Mem. at 7-23). The argument is rejected, in light of the holdings in Lippman, Conte, and Swade, discussed above.

[10] Gonzalez relies on a series of cases involving deliveries where the courts held that a delivery or trucking company was liable to a plaintiff who was injured while participating in the delivery. (Pl. Mem. at 8-10). In Hong v. Roadway Express Co., for example, the plaintiff was standing at the back of the defendant’s truck waiting to receive a delivery of supplies when a “load bar”-a metal bar on the truck that locked into brackets to secure loads during transit-fell and hit him. 21 A.D.3d 483, 484 (2d Dep’t 2005). These cases are distinguishable because they involved actual deliveries in which the defendants participated-the defendants undertook a delivery and were negligent in the course of carrying it out. When a party undertakes an act, whether gratuitously or for consideration, the law imposes an obligation on the party to use reasonable care to protect others from an unreasonable risk of harm.Espinal, 98 N.Y.2d at 141-42, 746 N.Y.S.2d 120, 773 N.E.2d 485;Church ex rel. Smith v. Callanan Indus., Inc., 99 N.Y.2d 104, 111, 752 N.Y.S.2d 254, 782 N.E.2d 50 (2002); William L. Prosser & Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts  § 92, at 655 (5th ed.1984). Here, however, Caballero did not undertake the act; to the contrary, he refused.

[11] Gonzalez also argues that NEMF was contractually obligated to provide “inside delivery.” (Pl. Mem. at 2). Even assuming that to be true, then NEMF breached its contract with the Hospital. But that breach did not create a duty on the part of defendants to protect Gonzalez from hurting himself.

[12] Gonzalez also argues, in essence, that he and other Hospital employees were third-party beneficiaries of the contract between NEMF and the Hospital, and that therefore defendants owed him a duty as well. (Pl. Mem. at 17). Generally, however, New York law does not recognize employees of a business to be third-party beneficiaries of the business’s service contracts. See, e.g., Johnson v. Robert Bruce McLane Assoc., Inc., 201 A.D.2d 436, 437, 608 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1st Dep’t 1994). Here, the facts alleged in the complaint do not plausibly give rise to the inference that NEMF and the Hospital intended the latter’s employees to be third-party beneficiaries. See, e.g., Maldonado v. Olympia Mechanical Piping & Heating Corp., 8 A.D.2d 348, 350, 188 N.Y.S.2d 45 (2d Dep’t 2004); Kurtz v. Sanford Fire Apparatus, Corp., 147 A.D.2d 952, 952, 537 N.Y.S.2d 407 (4th Dep’t 1989). But even assuming the Hospital’s employees were third-party beneficiaries of the delivery contract to the extent that NEMF and the Hospital contemplated that the employee would not be burdened with the task of bringing the racks inside, the breach of the contract did not create a duty on the part of defendants to protect the employees from hurting themselves. Again, the remedy is a breach of contract action, not a claim for negligence.

[13][14][15][16] Finally, Gonzalez argues that defendants had a duty to him because they “ ‘launched a force or instrument of harm.’ “ (Pl. Mem. at 14) (quoting H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 168, 159 N.E. 896 (1928)). The assertion is not plausible. The display racks were not a “force or instrument of harm.” They were not dangerous, nor did they create a condition of peril. See Espinal, 98 N.Y.2d at 141-42, 746 N.Y.S.2d 120, 773 N.E.2d 485. Rather, they were simply heavy. Gonzalez should not have undertaken to move them alone. Had he done nothing-or had he called his supervisor to ask for assistance-he would not have been injured. Again, defendants did not have a duty to save Gonzalez from himself.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted. The complaint is dismissed, with prejudice but without attorneys’ fees or costs.

Caballero has not appeared in the action. The pleadings do not set forth his citizenship, nor does the notice of removal. At the first pretrial conference in the case, however, defense counsel represented that Caballero was a citizen of New Jersey. Hence, complete diversity exists.

Both sides have submitted materials outside the pleadings. I do not rely on them, but instead consider only the allegations of the complaint.

A breach of contract does not give rise to a tort cause of action unless a duty independent of the contract has been violated.Clark-Fitzpatrick, Inc. v. Long Is. R.R. Co., 70 N.Y.2d 382, 389, 521 N.Y.S.2d 653, 516 N.E.2d 190 (1987). Moreover, a breach of a contractual obligation is insufficient to permit noncontracting third parties to recover against the promisor in tort, except in certain limited circumstances where a duty of care exists. Espinal, 98 N.Y.2d at 139, 746 N.Y.S.2d 120, 773 N.E.2d 485. Here, however, none of these circumstances exist.

Even assuming defendants owed Gonzalez a duty, the complaint must be dismissed because Gonzalez’s injuries were not foreseeable. Foreseeability of harm determines the scope of a duty once it is determined to exist. Maheshwari v. City of New York, 2 N.Y.3d 288, 294, 778 N.Y.S.2d 442, 810 N.E.2d 894 (2004); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314 (1965). The scope of duty is generally based on the reasonable expectations of plaintiff and of society, in addition to other factors.Alfaro v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 210 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir.2000) (citing Palka, 83 N.Y. at 586);532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 96 N.Y.2d 280, 288-89, 727 N.Y.S.2d 49, 750 N.E.2d 1097 (2001). Generally, foreseeability is for a factfinder to resolve, but if “no person can be expected to guard against harm from events which are … so unlikely that the risk … would commonly be disregarded,” then courts may dismiss the case as a matter of law.Lafontant v. U-Haul Co. of Florida, 48 A.D.3d 757, 859, 854 N.Y.S.2d 405 (2d Dep’t 2008); see Sanchez v. State of New York, 99 N.Y.2d 247, 254, 754 N.Y.S.2d 621, 784 N.E.2d 675 (2002). It was not reasonably foreseeable here that Gonzalez would try to move the heavy display racks himself, without assistance or equipment, and that he would hurt himself trying to do so.

Smurfit-Stone Container Enterprises, Inc. v. National Interstate Ins. Co.

E.D.Va.,2008.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia,

Richmond Division.

SMURFIT-STONE CONTAINER ENTERPRISES, INC., Plaintiff,

v.

NATIONAL INTERSTATE INSURANCE CO. and Terminal Consolidated Company, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:08CV093-HEH.

Sept. 5, 2008.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

HENRY E. HUDSON, District Judge.

(Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment)

This case involves a dispute over the scope of insurance coverage provided to Plaintiff Smurfit-Stone Container Enterprises, Inc. (“Smurfit-Stone”) as an “additional insured” under an insurance policy issued by Defendant National Interstate Insurance Co. (“National”). It is currently before the Court on Plaintiff’s Rule 12(c) Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings and Defendant National’s Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant Terminal Consolidation Company (“Terminal”) is not a party to either motion. All involved parties have filed memoranda of law in support of their respective positions. The Court will dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials presently before the Court and argument would not aid in the decisional process. For the reasons detailed herein, Plaintiff’s Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is hereby DENIED and Defendant’s Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED.

I. Factual Background

Plaintiff Smurfit-Stone is a paper and packaging producer that owns and operates a manufacturing facility in Hopewell, Virginia. Amend. Compl. ¶ 6. In October of 1992, Smurfit-Stone’s corporate predecessor entered into a transportation contract (the “Agreement”) with Terminal. Amend. Compl. ¶ 9-10. Pursuant to the Agreement, Terminal contracted to transport products manufactured by Smurfit-Stone. The Agreement required Terminal to obtain liability insurance and to name Smurfit-Stone as an additional insured under the policy. Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 11-13. Terminal thereafter obtained a comprehensive liability policy (the “Policy”) from National and, consistent with its obligations under the Agreement, named Smurfit-Stone as an additional insured. Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 14-15, Ex. C. The motions presently before the Court turn on the boundaries of that coverage.

In November of 2004, a truck driver, Jeffrey Urquhart, was injured at the Smurfit-Stone manufacturing facility in Hopewell when the truck he was driving collided with a Terminal truck and a train operated by the Norfolk Southern Railway Corporation. Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 20-23, Ex. E. Urquhart subsequently filed suit in the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond, naming Terminal and Smurfit-Stone, among others, as defendants. Amend. Compl. ¶ 19. Urquhart’s complaint charged Smurfit-Stone with negligence, alleging, among other things, that the company breached its duty to keep its facility “in a reasonably safe condition” by failing to adopt numerous safety measures, including failure to “manage, monitor, conduct, and supervise the use, operation, and maintenance” of the Smurfit-Stone facility. Amend. Compl. Ex. E at 10-14. Urquhart further alleged that “the wrongdoing of each Defendant”-including Terminal and Smurfit-Stone-“joined and concurred with the wrongdoing of one or more other Defendants … to proximately cause” his injuries. Amend. Compl. Ex. E at 19. Importantly, however, Urquhart’s complaint did not allege that Smurfit-Stone was in any way vicariously liable for the actions of either Terminal or its agent. Amend. Compl. Ex. E.

Ultimately, Urquhart’s case settled short of trial. Though it continues to deny any negligence, Smurfit-Stone contributed $200,000 towards the Urquhart settlement and has alleged that it also incurred “substantial legal fees and related expenses” defending Urquhart’s claim. Amend. Compl. ¶ 27-28. Claiming coverage as an “additional insured” under the Policy, Smurfit-Stone subsequently demanded that National reimburse all costs incurred to “investigate, defend, and settle” Urquhart’s claim.Amend. Compl. ¶ 31. National, however, denied Smurfit-Stone’s demand, contending that the Policy did not cover costs incurred by Smurfit-Stone in defense of the Urquhart complaint. Amend. Compl. ¶ 32; Answer ¶ 32. This action followed.

The exact timing of Smurfit-Stone’s demand to National remains unclear. Smurfit-Stone contends that it made a proper demand on National on September 27, 2006 via letter sent to counsel for Defendant National. See Plaintiff’s Mem. In Opp. Ex. A. National asserts, however, that this demand was insufficient. National claims that proper demand was not made until February 21, 2007, when counsel for Smurfit-Stone sent a letter to National’s Assistant Vice President asking National to “Please accept this letter as … demand for National Interstate to defend, indemnify and hold harmless” Smurfit-Stone from the Urquhart suit. Def. Reply Mem. In Supp. Ex 1. Because the Court concludes that Smurfit-Stone is not entitled to coverage under the Terminal policy as a matter of law, it need not resolve this dispute.

Although the Policy issued by National extended liability coverage to additional insureds such as Smurfit-Stone, this grant of coverage had specifically-defined limitations. The Policy contains an “Additional Insureds endorsement”, which reads:

The entity[ies] designated on Certificates of Insurance on file with [National] are Additional Insureds under this policy as respects the operations of [Terminal], but only with respect to [Terminal]’s liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a “covered auto” and coverage shall not be broader than the coverage afforded to [Terminal].

Amend. Compl. Ex. B. Plaintiff Smurfit-Stone has moved for partial judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c)of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, asking the Court to find that Smurfit-Stone, as an additional insured under the Policy, is covered for the Urquhart claim and entitled to reimbursement. Pl. Mem. at 7. In addition to opposing Smurfit-Stone’s Rule 12(c) Motion, Defendant National has moved for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. In support of its motion, National contends that the “plain language of the Additional Insureds indorsement at issue unambiguously confines the scope of coverage afforded to Smurfit[-Stone] to liability that is derivative of Terminal’s liability.”Def. Mem. at 1.

II. Analysis

A. Interpretation of the Plain Language of the Additional Insureds Endorsement

As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s Rule 12(c) Motion and Defendant Terminal’s Rule 56 Motion both require this Court to construe the language of the Additional Insureds endorsement in the Policy to determine whether, as a matter of law, the endorsement extends coverage to costs incurred by Smurfit-Stone in connection with its defense of the Urquhart claim. The Court finds nothing in the text of the endorsement to support such an expansive interpretation. The plain language of the Additional Insureds endorsement extends coverage to Smurfit-Stone only to the extent that Smurfit-Stone is alleged to be vicariously liable for the actions of Terminal. Because the Urquhart complaint does not allege that Smurfit-Stone is in any way vicariously liable for the actions of Terminal, see Amend. Compl. Ex. E at 10-14, the Policy cannot be construed to extend insurance coverage to the Urquhart allegations.

Under Missouri law, which governs in this case, interpretation of an insurance policy is dictated by the general rules of contract construction. Kertz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., — S.W.3d 39, 41 (Mo.Ct.App.2007). The Court is compelled to enforce an insurance policy as it is written, unless the policy is ambiguous. Hempen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 687 S.W .2d 894 (Mo.1985) (en banc). Terms of a policy are considered ambiguous under Missouri law only when uncertainty exists as to a term’s meaning or when a term is susceptible to multiple interpretations. Nixon v. Life Investors Ins. Co. Of Am., 675 S .W.2d 676, 679 (Mo.Ct.App.1984).

Both Smurfit-Stone and National agree that Missouri law governs the Court’s construction of the terms of the Policy and the Additional Insureds endorsement. See Def. Opp. at 3 and Pl. Rep. at 1. Thus the Court, sitting in diversity, will apply Missouri law consistent with the agreement of the parties and the rule of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

A close examination of the plain language of the Additional Insured endorsement at issue demonstrates that the policy language is far from ambiguous. To the contrary, the plain language of the Additional Insureds endorsement makes clear that Smurfit-Stone is insured under the policy “only with respect to [Terminal’s] liability arising out of the … use of a ‘covered auto.’ “ Amend. Compl. Ex. B at 20. The terms of the endorsement further state that Smurfit-Stone’s insurance coverage extends no farther than “as respects the operations of [Terminal].”  Id.Moreover, the concluding phrase of the Additional Insureds endorsement states that Smurfit-Stone’s coverage “shall not be broader than the coverage afforded to Terminal.”  Id. Despite Plaintiff’s contentions, such language is susceptible to only one interpretation: the Additional Insureds endorsement extends insurance coverage to Smurfit-Stone “only with respect to [Terminal’s] liability.”  Id. Thus, the Policy extends coverage to Smurfit-Stone only to the extent that Smurfit-Stone is alleged to be vicariously liable for the actions of Terminal.

The Court’s interpretation of the Additional Insureds endorsement is supported by the nature of the Agreement and the purpose of the insurance policy in this case. When construing an insurance policy, Missouri law instructs the Court to “consider the purpose and nature of [the] contract.”Wildflower Comm. Ass’n Inc. v. Rinderknecht, 25 S.W.3d 530, 534 (Mo.Ct.App.2000). Courts in Missouri and elsewhere have recognized that a common purpose of an additional insured provision is to “provide … protection from vicarious liability” and to provide “specialized protection rather than all-encompassing coverage.”U.S. Fidelity & Guar. v. Drazic, 877 S.W.2d 140, 143 (Mo.Ct.App.1994); accord Northbrook Ins. v. American States Ins., 495 N.W.2d 450, 453 (Minn.Ct.App.1993) (recognizing that “One of the primary functions of the additional insured endorsement is to protect the additional insured from vicarious liability for acts of the named insured”); Harbor Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 562 F.Supp. 800, 803 (E.D.Pa.1983) (concluding that “In the insurance industry, additional insured provisions have a well established meaning. They are intended to protect parties who are not named insureds from exposure to vicarious liability for acts of the named insured”).

Considering the nature of the business relationship between Smurfit-Stone and Terminal, the Court doubts whether the parties intended that Terminal would provide Smurfit-Stone with general, all-encompassing liability insurance. See Amend. Comp. ¶ 11 (stating that Terminal contracted “to provide motor carrier services” and “transportation of Smurfit-Stone’s goods and products”). Instead, the plain language of the Additional Insureds endorsement is consistent with the purpose for which additional insured provisions are routinely obtained: to provide protection against vicarious liability.

Accordingly, the Court is compelled to enforce the plain language of the policy as it is written. Hempen, 687 S.W.2d 894. The Court therefore holds, as a matter of law, that the plain language of the Additional Insureds endorsement extends insurance coverage to Smurfit-Stone only to the extent that Smurfit-Stone is alleged to be vicariously liable for the actions of Terminal. The Court will now turn to Plaintiff Smurfit-Stone’s Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Defendant National’s Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment in light of this interpretation.

B. Plaintiff’s Rule 12(c) Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings

When deciding a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court must apply the same standard that is applied when ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).Burbach Broad. Co. v. Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.3d 401, 405-06 (4th Cir.2002); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir.1999). In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(c), the Court must assume that the allegations in the non-moving party’s pleadings are true and construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.1992).“Judgment should be entered when the pleadings, construing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,” indicate that the dispute “can … be decided as a matter of law.”O’Ryan v. Dehler Mfg. Co ., 99 F.Supp.2d 714, 718 (E.D.Va.2000); see also A.S. Abell Co. v. Baltimore Typographical Union No. 12, 338 F.2d 190, 192 (4th Cir.1964) (discussing whether “it was proper to enter judgment as a matter of law” under Rule 12(c)).

The immediate motions before the Court are purely questions of contract interpretation. No issues of fact appear to be in dispute. Both parties agree that the Policy is a valid and enforceable insurance contract. Compare Amend. Compl. ¶¶ 14-15 with Answer ¶¶ 14-15. Moreover, both Smurfit-Stone and National agree that the terms of the Additional Insured endorsement govern the extent of Smurfit-Stone’s insurance coverage under the Policy.

Count II of the Amended Complaint alleges only that National was obligated to reimburse Smurfit-Stone for costs associated with defense of a claim stemming from Smurfit-Stone’s own independent acts of negligence. As discussed previously, such a claim is beyond the scope of the narrow coverage provided by the endorsement. See Section II-A, supra.The Policy at issue extends insurance coverage to Smurfit-Stone only to the extent that Smurfit-Stone is alleged to be vicariously and/or derivatively liable for the actions of Terminal. Urquhart’s suit, however, makes no such claim.Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings is denied.

“Count 5” of the Urquhart complaint alleges that “the wrongdoing of each Defendant”-including both Terminal and Smurfit-Stone-“joined and concurred with the wrongdoing of one or more other Defendants” to cause Urquhart’s injuries. Plaintiff contends that Count 5 could be construed as an allegation that Smurfit-Stone is vicariously liable for the actions of Terminal. The Court disagrees. Count 5 is more properly viewed as an allegation that the separate negligent acts of the named defendants joined as concurrent (yet independent) causes of Urquhart’s injuries. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Count 5, like Count 3, fails to invoke coverage under the Policy.

C. Defendant National’s Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment

Finally, Defendant National seeks summary judgment under Rule 56. Summary judgment “shall be rendered … if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits … show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists under Rule 56“if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When evaluating a motion under Rule 56, the Court must construe all “facts and inferences to be drawn from the facts … in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”Miller v. Leathers, 913 F.2d 1085, 1087 (4th Cir.1990) (internal quotations omitted).

No genuine issue exists as to any material fact in the dispute between National and Smurfit-Stone-both parties appear to concede that their dispute turns on the terms of the Additional Insureds endorsement contained in the Policy issued by National to Terminal. See Section II-B, supra.Under this Court’s construction of the Additional Insureds endorsement, National is only obligated to defend and to indemnify Smurfit-Stone against claims alleging that Smurfit-Stone is vicariously liable for the actions of Terminal. See Section II-A, supra.The Urquhart complaint-which forms the basis of the Plaintiff’s claim-alleged only that Smurfit-Stone was liable to Urquhart for Smurfit-Stone’s independent acts and omissions. See Amend. Compl. Ex. E at 10-14. Accordingly, under the terms of the Policy and its Additional Insured endorsement, National is not obligated to reimburse Smurfit-Stone for costs incurred in defending against the Urquhart suit.

Because the Court concludes that Defendant National owed Plaintiff no legal obligation to reimburse Smurfit-Stone for the “costs of investigating, defending and settling the Urquhart claim,”id., the Court holds that Defendant National is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim.

III. Conclusion

For the reasons detailed herein, Plaintiff Smurfit-Stone’s Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings under Rule 12(c) is hereby DENIED, and Defendant National’s Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED.

An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.