Court of Appeals of Tennessee.

PREMIER GRAPHICS, INC.,

v.

WESTERN EXPRESS, INC.

No. M2007-02761-COA-R3-CV.

July 15, 2008 Session.

Sept. 26, 2008.

OPINION

HERSCHEL PICKENS FRANKS, P.J.

Plaintiff’s action charged defendant with failure to deliver time-sensitive material, and sought damages. The Trial Court granted summary judgment on the issue of liability and submitted the issue of damages to a jury. The jury awarded damages and defendant has appealed raising issues as to liability, timely filing a claim, the measure of damages under the “  Carmack Amendment”, special damages, and insufficiency of evidence of damages. We affirm the Trial Court.

Plaintiff, Premier Graphics, Inc., brought this action against Intercon Systems, Inc., and Western Express, Inc., alleging that McQuiddy Printing, an unincorporated division of Premier, sustained damages when defendants failed to deliver time-sensitive printed materials that McQuiddy had printed for a third party. It was alleged that McQuiddy had printed 32,000 directories and 16,000 addenda to be used at a convention in New York on June 3-5, 2005. McQuiddy contracted with Intercon for shipment of the materials from Nashville to New York, and Intercon contracted with Western for transportation. The materials were to be delivered on June 1, 2005, and it was alleged that McQuiddy contacted Intercon on June 2, 2005, to confirm that the delivery had been made, and was assured that it had.

Plaintiff averred that McQuiddy received a call later that day stating that one truckload of the materials had been delivered, but the second truckload had not arrived. McQuiddy contacted Intercon again later that day and early the next morning, and was assured both times that the entire shipment had been delivered.

Plaintiff asserted that late in the morning on June 3, 2005, Intercon informed McQuiddy that the second truckload had not been delivered, but in fact had just left Nashville and would not make it to New York until the following morning, which was the second day of the convention. Plaintiff asserted that Western later informed McQuiddy that the truck had broken down near Baileytown, Tennessee, and McQuiddy had to arrange to have part of the shipment offloaded and transported via air by Federal Express Custom Critical, at a cost of $29,500.00. Further, that Western was to delivered the rest of the shipment by 5:00 a.m. on June 5, 2005, the last day of the convention, but the shipment did not arrive on time, and plaintiff suffered substantial financial losses, including the cost of the directories, cost of emergency airfreight services, lost profit, and damage to its reputation/goodwill.

Plaintiff concluded that since the shipment originated in one state and traveled through other states, it was subject to jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. § 13501 of the Interstate Commerce Act, and attached the bill of lading as an exhibit, and asserted that since the delivery was not made as set forth on the bill of lading, defendants were liable to plaintiff for its damages under 49 U.S.C. § 14706. Plaintiff also charged claims of breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent misrepresentation.

Western filed an Answer, denying liability. Intercon filed an Answer and Cross-Claim, and alleged that it was not a “  motor carrier” as defined by 49 U.S.C. § 13102, and thus was not subject to Carmack Amendment liability pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 14706. Intercon stated that it made no guarantees to plaintiff regarding delivery times, and that it did not make any misrepresentations. Intercon filed a cross-claim against Western, asserting that it contracted with Western to deliver the materials, and that Western had falsely represented to Intercon that the deliveries had been made, and then later recanted and said the deliveries were not made. Intercon sued for breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation, and attached its contract with Western as an exhibit to the Cross-Claim. Western filed a Response to the Cross-Claim, and denied any negligence or liability, and then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, asserting that plaintiff had failed to properly file a claim pursuant to federal law, and also plaintiff’s damages would be limited to the actual value of the cargo. Western attached various documents in support of its motion, and plaintiff responded that it had submitted a proper claim on October 10, 2005, and that special and consequential damages were recoverable under Carmack. Intercon responded that it was not required to file a claim, as the Carmack Amendment did not apply to brokers, and thus its damages were also not limited under Carmack. The Court entered an Order denying summary judgment, finding that there were material issues of fact in dispute, including papers comprising the bill of lading.

Plaintiff then filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and Western responded that since the Court had already found that issues of fact existed, the motion should be denied. Western filed a Motion for Separate Trial, asking the Court to separate the claims filed by plaintiff against Western from the claims filed by Intercon against Western. Intercon then filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal as to its Cross-Claim against Western. Plaintiff also filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal regarding its claims of breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation against Western, and the Trial Court then entered an Order in response to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and found that there was no dispute that Western was liable to plaintiff for its failure to timely deliver the materials in accordance with the bill of lading attached as an exhibit to plaintiff’s memorandum in support of partial summary judgment. Thus, the Court granted summary judgment to plaintiff as to Western’s liability on the Carmack claim, and reserved the issue of damages. Plaintiff then filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal regarding the claim of intentional misrepresentation against Western.

The trial was held on September 17 and 18, 2007, and following the trial, the jury returned a verdict, finding damages of $61,578.00 against the defendant, with which the Trial Court agreed and entered Judgment.

Western has appealed and these issues are raised:

1. Whether the Trial Court was correct in determining as a matter of law that Western was liable to the plaintiff because of a late delivery?

2. Whether plaintiff filed a timely claim as required by federal law?

3. What is the proper measure of damages under the Carmack Amendment?

4. Whether the Court erred in failing to charge the jury that in order to recover special damages, the plaintiff had to specifically advise Western that it would be liable for such special damages?

5. Whether gratuitous payments are recoverable?

6. Whether it was possible for the jury to return the damages awarded based upon the evidence presented at trial?

Western argues the Trial Court erred in granting summary judgment on the issue of Western’s liability for late delivery, when one of the bills of lading stated that the delivery date was 6/12 instead of 6/1, and argues that this creates a genuine issue of material fact which should have precluded summary judgment.

The evidence at trial was that the bills of lading were prepared by McQuiddy and accepted by Western’s drivers, and that one of the bills contained a typographical error which stated that the delivery date was 6/12 rather than 6/1. There was no question, however, that Western knew the target delivery date was actually 6/1, because this is the date which was listed on the rate quote confirmations, which the Western representative testified was what Western actually relied upon. At trial, there was no testimony whatsoever that anyone was confused by the typographical error on this bill of lading, or that there was any misunderstanding about the delivery date being 6/1. Moreover, the load with the bill of lading containing the incorrect delivery date was actually the load that made it to its destination. The load with the bill of lading containing the delivery date of 6/1 was the load that did not get delivered. Accordingly, there was no genuine issue of material fact, as the Trial Court properly found.

As the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained:

The 1906 Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C.s 20(11), makes common carriers liable “for any loss, damage or injury” caused by such carriers to property received by them for transportation. The Supreme Court has construed the Carmack Amendment as follows:

(T)he statute codifies the common-law rule that a carrier, though not an absolute insurer, is liable for damage to goods transported by it unless it can show that the damage was caused by “(a) the act of God; (b) the public enemy; (c) the act of the shipper himself; (d) public authority; (e) or the inherent vice or nature of the goods.”

Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. 134, 137, 84 S.Ct. 1142, 1144, 12 L.Ed.2d 194 (1964) (citations omitted).

The Court dealt with the burden of proof in such cases as follows:

Accordingly, under federal law, in an action to recover from a carrier for damage to a shipment, the shipper establishes his prima facie case when he shows delivery in good condition, arrival in damaged condition, and the amount of damages. Thereupon, the burden of proof is upon the carrier to show both that it was free from negligence and that the damage to the cargo was due to one of the excepted causes relieving the carrier of liability. Id. at 138, 84 S.Ct. at 1145 (citations omitted).

Plough, Inc., v. Mason & Dixon Lines, 630 F.2d 468, 470 (6th Cir.1980).

Consequently, liability will attach for an unreasonable delay in the delivery of goods. As stated by the District Court of Maryland:

… although the Carmack Amendment refers to compensation for “loss or damage” to goods, it also allows for recovery for unreasonable delay in the delivery of goods, even if not lost or damaged. As stated in Turner’s Farms Incorporated v. Maine Central Railroad Company, 486 F.Supp. 694, 697-98 (D.Me.1980):

The duty to transport goods with reasonable dispatch is “an integral part of the normal undertaking of the carrier.”A party injured by the carrier’s breach of that duty is entitled to recover damages under the Carmack Amendment.

Richter v. North American Van Lines, 110 F.Supp.2d 406, 412 (D.Md.2000).

In this case, there was no real dispute that the goods in question were not timely delivered, and the Trial Court correctly granted summary judgment on the issue of liability.

Next, Western argues that Carmack liability does not attach unless the shipper files a claim consistent with 49 C.F.R. § 1005.2, within the time limit specified in the bill of lading, if any such time limit was specified, and asserts that no such claim was filed in this case.

49 C.F.R. § 1005.2 explains that a claim is sufficient if it is 1) in writing, 2) within the time specified in the bill of lading, if any, 3) the writing contains facts sufficient to identify the shipment of property, 4) the writing asserts liability for loss, damage, injury, or delay, and 5) the writing makes a claim for payment of a determinable amount of money. The federal courts have recognized that strict compliance with the requirements of the regulations is not essential, and that the purpose of the regulation is not to permit the carrier to avoid liability, but to insure that the carrier has enough information to begin processing the claim. Trepel v. Roadway Exp. Inc., 194 F.3d 708 (6th Cir.1999). The federal courts have also recognized that the claim requirements are very informal, and that the claim need only contain sufficient facts to identify the goods, assert liability, and ask for damages. Ford Motor Co. v. Transport Indem. Co., 795 F.2d 538 (6th Cir.1986).

In this case, plaintiff sent a letter on October 10, 2005, which complied with the requirements in the stated regulation. There was no time limit for such a claim stated in the bills of lading, so the claim was clearly timely. The written letter of October 10 from plaintiff’s attorney to Western contains sufficient facts to identify the shipment, assert liability for late delivery/nondelivery, and demands compensation for same in a definite amount. The Trial Court held this letter to be sufficient, and this is correct, based on the above regulation and case law. This issue is without merit.

Western argues that Carmack liability is limited to the loss of the value of the goods, but a review of the authorities demonstrates otherwise. As stated, the courts have recognized that Carmack liability will attach not only for loss/damage to the goods, but also for an unreasonable delay in the delivery of goods, even if they are not ultimately lost/damaged. See Richter.The normal measure of damages when a carrier fails to timely deliver a shipment is the difference between the market value of the goods at the time of delivery, and the value of the goods at the time when they should have been delivered. Starmakers Publishing Corp. v. Acme Fast Freight, Inc., 615 F.Supp. 787 (D.N.Y.1985).

Special damages are those damages which are not necessarily the ordinary and natural consequence of the untimely delivery, and are only recoverable when the carrier has reason to foresee at the time the contract was made that the particular loss was a probable result of untimely delivery. Id; see also  Burlington Air Express, Inc., v. Truck Air of the Carolinas, Inc., 8 F.Supp.2d 508 (D.S. C.1998). In this case, Western was on notice by McQuiddy that the materials being shipped were time-sensitive, and that they had to be delivered by the beginning of the show, which was stated on the bills of lading. Moreover, this information was also communicated orally to the drivers. The cases relied upon by the defendant involved situations where inadequate notice was given that the materials being shipped were time-sensitive, but such is not the case before us.

The evidence establishes that the value of the delayed shipment was zero, and that this cost was recoverable. The jury found, that it was foreseeable to Western that extraordinary measures might have to be taken to get the materials delivered on time if Western failed to do so. As we have stated, “[t]his Court on appeal is required to take the strongest legitimate view of the evidence favoring the prevailing party, discard all contrary evidence, allow all reasonable inferences to uphold the jury’s verdict and set aside the jury verdict only when there is no material evidence to support it.”T.R.A.P. 13(d); Estate of Glasgow v. Whittum, 106 S.W.3d 25 (Tenn.Ct.App.2002)(quoting Witter v. Nesbit, 878 S.W.2d 116, 121 (Tenn.Ct.App.1993). In this case, material evidence supports the jury’s verdict regarding damages suffered by the plaintiff.

Western argues the Trial Court failed to properly instruct the jury regarding special damages, but apparently the court reporter did not transcribe the Trial Court’s verbal charge to the jury. The technical record contains what purports to be pattern jury instructions given by the Court to the jury, and we assume the parties’ representation about what was contained in the charges is true. It is represented that the Trial Court did instruct the jury that special damages could only be awarded if defendant had reason to foresee that such damages might result from a breach at the time the contract was made. As this Court has previously explained:

We begin our review of the challenged jury instructions with the understanding that we do not measure a trial court’s jury instruction against the standard of perfection. “Instead, we review the entire charge just as the jury would, and we will not invalidate it as long as it fairly defines the legal issues involved in the case and does not mislead the jury.”“Under Tennessee law the jury charge will be viewed in its entirety and considered as a whole in order to determine whether the trial judge committed prejudicial error.”

* * *

There is no reversible error if the instruction fairly submitted the applicable legal principles to the jury.

Brandy Hills Estates, LLC v. Reeves, 237 S.W.3d 307, 319-21 (Tenn.Ct.App.2006) (citations omitted).

The charge contained in the record properly explained the nature of special damages to the jury, and we find no error in this charge.

Similarly, the Trial Court did not err in failing to instruct the jury regarding gratuitous payments, as defendant asserted, because there was no proof of any such gratuitous payment in this case. Western argues that plaintiff gratuitously did not charge its customer for the directories, and that Western should thus not be held liable for such damages, but the proof was that McQuiddy’s client refused to pay for the directories, not that McQuiddy simply decided not to bill for them. David McQuiddy testified that it was his understanding from talking with a representative of his client that the directories would not be paid for, and thus McQuiddy ultimately reversed the charges for same.

Finally, Western argues the jury must have engaged in some type of improper averaging or speculation in order to arrive at the damages figure. As plaintiff points out, however, there was somewhat confusing testimony regarding how many directories were ultimately printed and shipped, what arrived and what did not arrive, etc., such that the jury could have simply based its numbers on a figure other than what was presented in the damages exhibit, which could have come from testimony at trial. As stated, the jury’s verdict is supported by material evidence, and we affirm the decision of the Trial Court.

The cost of the appeal is assessed to Western Express, Inc.

United States District Court,S.D. New York.

ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, as subrogee of Movers, Inc., Plaintiff,

v.

DELTA AIR LINES, INC., Defendant.

No. 07 Civ.1912(GWG).

Oct. 10, 2008.

OPINION AND ORDER

GABRIEL W. GORENSTEIN, United States Magistrate Judge.

St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company (“St.Paul”), as subrogee of Movers, Inc., has sued Delta Air Lines, Inc. for damages arising out of 21 contracts for the interstate shipment of fresh seafood. Delta now moves for summary judgment on the ground that Movers’ letters to Delta claiming loss did not provide Delta with adequate information. The parties have consented to disposition of this matter by a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). For the reasons stated below, Delta’s motion is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Movers is a freight forwarder that arranges for the interstate air shipment of seafood. See Deposition of David Beach 6:10-21, annexed as Ex. 3 to Affirmation in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed June 6, 2008 (Docket # 21) (“D.Aff”). For each of the 21 shipments of seafood at issue in this case, Delta issued an air waybill stating that the shipments “are subject to governing rates, rules and classifications stated in [Delta’s] most recent ATPCO Tariff.”See Ex. 1 to D. Aff. The rules in that tariff in effect at the time of the 21 shipments provided as follows:

G60 CLAIM PROCEDURE

(A) (Not applicable to/from Canada) All claims, including claims for overcharges, must be made to Delta in writing within sixty (60) days after the date of acceptance of the shipment by Delta.

G63 LIMITATION OF ACTION

Delta shall not be liable in any action brought to enforce a claim, except for overcharges, unless the provisions of Rule No. G60 have been complied with by the claimant, and unless such action is brought within two years from the date Delta accepted the shipment for transportation.

Ex. 2 to D. Aff. The tariff contains no further requirements for the contents of a claim.

Within 60 days of each of the 21 shipments, Movers sent a letter to Delta stating: “A problem has been experienced with the shipment .”See Ex. 8 to D. Aff. Each letter provided the date and number of the air waybill, the destination, and the total dollar value of the shipment. Id. Each letter concluded with the following sentence: “This is to serve as notice of formal claim against you.”Id.

II. DISCUSSION

Delta has moved for summary judgment asserting that St. Paul’s claims are barred by the tariff’s notice-of-claim provision.

See Notice of Motion, filed June 6, 2008 (Docket # 20); Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Delta Air Lines, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed June 6, 2008 (Docket # 22) (“D.Mem.”); Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant Delta Airlines, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed June 20, 2008 (Docket # 25); Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant Delta Air Lines, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed June 27, 2008 (Docket # 27) (“D. Reply Mem.”).

A. Law Governing Motions for Summary Judgment

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact “may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party” and thus should be left to the finder of fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). There are no issues of fact in dispute with respect to the instant motion.

B. Law Governing Interstate Air Freight Contracts

Actions for loss or damage to interstate air shipments are governed by federal common law. See, e.g.,  Nippon Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Skyway Freight Sys., Inc., 235 F.3d 53, 59 (2d Cir.2000); N.  Am. Phillips Corp. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 579 F.2d 229, 233-34 (2d Cir.1978); accord  Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Great W. Airlines, Inc., 767 F.2d 425, 427 (8th Cir.1985); First Pa. Bank, N.A. v. E. Airlines, Inc., 731 F.2d 1113, 1115-19 (3d Cir.1984). Thus, federal jurisdiction is properly based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which “support[s] claims founded upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory origin.”  Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972); Nippon, 235 F.3d at 59 n. 2.

Under federal common law, a notice-of-claim clause, such as the one contained in Delta’s tariff, is enforceable as long as the time limit is not unreasonable. The  West Arrow, 80 F.2d 853, 856 (2d Cir.1936); The  J.L. Luckenbach, 65 F.2d 570, 573 (2d Cir.1933). The Supreme Court in Georgia, Florida & Alabama Railway v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U.S. 190 (1916), explained:

Ordinarily the managing officers, and those responsible for the settlement and contest of claims, would be without actual knowledge of the facts of a particular transaction. The purpose of the stipulation [in the bill of lading providing for the filing of claims for loss or damage] is not to escape liability, but to facilitate prompt investigation. And, to this end, it is a precaution of obvious wisdom, and in no respect repugnant to public policy, that the carrier by its contracts should require reasonable notice of all claims against it even with respect to its own operations.

Id. at 196.

At issue in the present case is whether the 21 letters complied with the notice-of-claim provision of the contract of carriage. The governing provisions, quoted above, do not require a particular format for a claim; nor do they require the inclusion of specific information. See Exs. 1-2 to D. Aff. Delta, however, asserts that a notice of claim must include the nature of the loss and the amount of damages. See D. Mem. at 8.

C. Notice of Claim Requirements Under Federal Common Law

Before addressing the merit s of the dispute, we examine what sources of federal law should guide our decision. Prior to 1972, courts looked to the federal common law to determine whether common carriers had been given adequate notice of claims, including when courts were deciding cases governed by the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act (“I.C.A.”), now codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 11707, 14706. See, e.g.,  Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Newtowne Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 675, 680-81 (1st Cir.1951); Del, Lackawanna  & W. R.R. v. United States, 123 F.Supp. 579, 582 (S.D.N.Y.1954); Bond Stores v. Overland Package Freight Serv., 171 Misc. 135, 137-38 (Mun.Ct.1939). In 1972, however, the Interstate Commerce Commission issued regulations addressing the standards for a notice of claim under the I.C.A. SeeProcessing of Loss and Damage Claims, 37 Fed.Reg. 4257 (Mar. 1, 1972) (codified at 49 C.F.R. § 1005.2). After the promulgation of these regulations, courts no longer used federal common law to determine the adequacy of notice of claim in cases governed by the I.C.A. inasmuch as “the very fact that the regulations identify a properly constituted claim as one that contains certain minimum filing requirements distinguishes the standard established by the I.C.C. regulations from the standard established by the case law.”  Pathway Bellows, Inc. v. Blanchette, 630 F.2d 900, 903 n. 5 (2d Cir.1980) (citing Wis. Packing Co. v. Ind. Refrigerator Lines, Inc., 618 F.2d 441, 446 (7th Cir.1980)).

Despite the inapplicability of these regulations, Delta cites a number of cases governed by the I.C.A. for the purpose of establishing the legal requirements for the notice of claim here. See D. Mem. at 5 (citing Pathway Bellows, 630 F.2d at 903 n. 4; Molloy v. Allied Air Lines, Inc., 267 F.Supp.2d 1246, 1255 (M.D.Fla.2003); Gen. Elec. v. Brown Transp. Corp., 597 F.Supp. 1258, 1260, 1264 (E.D.Va.1984); D. Mem. at 7 (citing Adelman v. Hub City Los Angeles Terminal, 856 F.Supp. 1544, 1550 n. 9 (N.D.Ala.1994)). These cases have no relevance, however, because they rely on the I.C.C. regulations to determine the adequacy of notice rather than federal common law. See  Arkwright-Boston Mfrs., 767 F.2d at 427-28 (concluding that cases decided under the Carmack Amendment standards are not a source of federal common law in non-I.C.A. cases).

Unlike the I.C.C. regulations, federal common law does not specifically define the standard for adequacy of a notice of claim under contracts of carriage. The Supreme Court has held that a notice of claim “does not require documents in a particular form. It is addressed to a practical exigency and it is to be construed in a practical way.”  Blish Milling, 241 U.S. at 198. Generally, courts look to the purpose of notice-of-claim clauses in determining whether a claim is adequate under the common law. See, e.g.,  Am. Synthetic Rubber Corp. v. Louisville & Nashville R .R., 422 F.2d 462, 468 (6th Cir.1970); Thompson v. James G. McCarrick Co., 205 F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir.1953); Minot Beverage Co. v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry., 65 F.Supp. 293, 295 (D.Minn.1946); Louisville & Nashville Ry. v. Patton, 156 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Ky.1941); Adler Upholstery Fabrics v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc., 54 Misc.2d 360, 361 (Civ.Ct.1967). That purpose is to “insure that the carrier may make a prompt and thorough investigation of the claim.”  Pathway Bellows, 630 F.2d at 903 n. 5;accord  Blish Milling, 241 U.S. at 196 (“The purpose of the stipulation [in the bill of lading providing for the filing of claims for loss or damage] is not to escape liability, but to facilitate prompt investigation.”). The court in Minot Beverage Co. explained:

That the provision must be interpreted in the light of its purpose seems both reasonable and necessary, for nothing in the context of the provision aids in explaining the meaning of the word ‘claim.’ To confine the term to narrower limits than the situation against which the parties intended to guard would seem unreasonable. For theory, not intent and practicality, would then determine its meaning.

65 F.Supp. at 295.

Here, Delta asserts that the notice of claim must specify the amount of the damages claimed. See D. Mem. at 5; D. Reply Mem. at 5-6. While the 1972 I.C.C. regulations require the specification of damages, see 49 C.F.R. § 1005.2(b)(3), cases decided under federal common law uniformly reject any requirement that damages be specified, see  Thompson v. McCarrick, 205 F.2d at 901 (“There is no requirement that … [the] exact amount of damage be stated….”); Minot Beverage Co., 65 F.Supp. at 296 (“Because plaintiff may have believed it necessary to file subsequently a more detailed form concerning the amount due does not mean that the objective of the provision was not satisfied by the first letter,” which contained no specification of damages); Bond Stores, 171 Misc. at 138 (“While nowhere in the correspondence does the plaintiff set forth … the value which they attribute to the contents of this carton, there seems to be no requirement in law that they do so within the nine month limitation in order to establish a claim.”); see also  Gen. Elec., 597 F.Supp. at 1266 (noting that under federal common law there was no requirement that “a claim must state a specified or determinable amount of damages”).

As previously noted. Delta cites a number of cases decided under the 1972 I.C.C. regulations, which have no applicability here. Two of the cases cited by Delta, Dawlen Corp. v. New York Central R.R., 43 N.W.2d 887 (Mich.1950) and Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 733 F.2d 1509 (11th Cir.1984), see D. Mem. at 5, do not state whether they are decided under the regulations or the common law. Dawlen, however, merely contains a statement that a claim “must include a demand for payment of damages.”  43 N.W.2d at 888. The context of this statement makes clear that the court held only that the claimant must assert that the shipper is liable for damages suffered, not that the claimant must specify the amount of those damages. As for Farmland, it cites prominently to Wisconsin Packing Co. v. Indiana Refrigerator Lines, 618 F.2d 441, 452 & n. 1 (7th Cir.1980), see 733 F.2d at 1510, a case decided under the I.C.C. regulations, suggesting that it was not applying federal common law. In any event, the statement in Farmland is of no relevance. While Farmland noted that “[o]ne of the principal functions of the notice requirement in the bill of lading is to allow the carrier to exactly compute its losses,”  733 F.2d at 1510, there is nothing in the opinion to indicate that the claimant in Farmland provided timely notice of any kind. Thus the statement in Farmland did not constitute a holding as to what must be contained in a timely notice.

Delta also argues that Movers’ notice of claim was defective because it failed to include a description of the nature of the loss. See D. Mem. at 4-5; D. Reply Mem. at 3-4. The cases cited by Delta, however, contain no holdings regarding disclosure of the “nature” of the loss. For example, while the court in Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Yarbrough, 535 S.W.2d 734 (Tex.Civ.App.1976), mentioned in passing that a claim should include either the “amount of the claim or nature of the loss,”see  id. at 736, the dispositive issue was only whether the shipper had filed a notice that expressed an intention to hold the carrier liable for the loss suffered, see  id. at 737.In Louisville & Nashville Railroad, notice was held to be insufficient because it did not satisfy any element of a claim: only one letter was sent during the claim period, which asserted no liability for the loss, and which was not even sent to the carrier, but to a third party. 156 S .W.2d at 475-76. The court mentioned the nature of loss element only in the context of a list of possible elements that could have constituted a proper claim against the carrier had the letter been addressed to it. See id. at 1476.Bond Stores provided a list of five elements in a claim, including “nature of the loss”; but its holding turned on whether two separate letters may be combined to establish a claim and whether the claimant must submit all supporting documentation prior to the expiration of the claim period. 171 Misc. at 137-38. Notably, dictum may be found that equally supports the notion that there is no requirement that the claim specify the “nature of the loss.” Thus, in Thompson, the court stated that “[t]here is no requirement that a written instrument be submitted in detail or that the cause and exact amount of damage be stated thereon in order to constitute a valid claim.”  205 F.2d at 901;see also  Adler Upholstery, 54 Misc.2d at 360-61 (finding a sufficient notice of claim where plaintiff had identified the nature of the shipment, its date, and its origin and destination).

In the end, Delta has not identified, and the court has been unable to locate, any case decided under federal common law in which a notice of claim has been deemed insufficient due to failure to identify the nature of the loss involved.

The Second Circuit has noted that

courts applying the case law standard have been extremely reluctant to conclude that the written claim requirement has not been satisfied in any situation where a carrier has seen a written document noting damage to a particular shipment and implying the carrier’s responsibility therefor.

Pathway Bellows, 630 F.2d at 903 n. 5. That minimum standard-“a written document noting damage to a particular shipment and implying the carrier’s responsibility therefor”-has indisputably been met here. Moreover, the purpose behind the notice-of-claim requirement-specifically, the need for the carrier to “make a prompt and thorough investigation of the claim,”id.-similarly dictates the result in this case. Delta argues that it needs to know the amount of the claim and the nature of the loss “in order that it may conduct an investigation.”D. Mem. at 6. But it never explains why this information is needed in order to conduct an investigation. Keeping foremost in mind the Supreme Court’s admonition that the obligation to submit a claim must “be construed in a practical way,” and merely to “facilitate prompt investigation,” Blish Milling, 241 U.S. at 196, 198, Movers’ letters gave Delta all the information it needed to initiate an investigation into the nature of the claim and the total losses suffered. Delta could have contacted its own agents or Movers to request further information. While Delta complains that Movers was in possession of additional information that it failed to include in its claim letter, D. Mem. at 8-9, the purpose of the claim requirement is not to ensure that the claimant includes in the claim all the information it has. Rather the purpose is to allow the carrier to begin an investigation into the claim. Because, as a “practical” matter, the claim letters enabled Delta to commence a prompt investigation to obtain any information it needed about the claim, Movers’ notices of claim were sufficient.

III. CONCLUSION

Delta’s motion for summary judgment is denied.