United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina,

Charlotte Division.

Lucy Bigham PIGG, Plaintiff,

v.

PROGRESSIVE CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY and Canal Insurance Company, Defendants.

June 27, 2006.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CARL HORN, III, Magistrate Judge.

THIS MATTER is before the Court upon the Plaintiff’s “Motion to Remand Action to State Court” (document # 7) filed April 17, 2006, and the “Plaintiff’s Brief in Support …” (document # 9) filed May 11, 2006. [] Defendant Canal Insurance Company filed its “… Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand” (document # 10) on May 24, 2006, and Defendant Progressive Casualty Insurance Company filed its “… Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand” (document # 16) on June 6, 2006.

Counsel for the Plaintiff contacted the undersigned’s chambers and was given an informal twenty (20) day extension in which to file her supporting memorandum. In addition, counsel for each Defendant was contacted and informed that the time to respond to the Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand would not begin to run until each was served with her supporting memorandum due to the Court’s grant of an informal extension.

Having carefully considered the parties’ arguments, the record, and the applicable authority, the undersigned will deny the Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand, as discussed below.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Plaintiff filed this action on December 22, 2005, in the General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division of Union County, North Carolina, seeking a Declaratory Judgment that separate commercial automobile liability insurance policies issued by the Defendants provided coverage for injuries sustained by the Plaintiff in an April 26, 2001 collision.

Jeffrey Smith caused a multiple vehicle collision while operating a tractor-trailer on April 26, 2001, which resulted in personal injury and property damage to the Plaintiff. This collision caused significant bodily injury, including a number of broken bones. To date the Plaintiff has accumulated over $300,000 in accident-related medical bills, may never fully recover, and anticipates almost $45,000 in home renovations to make her home handicap accessible.

At the time of the accident, Mr. Smith carried a liability insurance policy with National Casualty Insurance Company (“National”), which has offered to settle its claims with the Plaintiff for $687,554.53. The Plaintiff has made the strategic decision not to accept this offer until she can determine what other coverage is available under two other insurance policies. Specifically, at the time of the collision, Mr. Smith was hauling a trailer owned by Mickey Plyler Trucking, Inc., which carried a fleet insurance policy issued by Canal Insurance Company (“Canal”), with a liability limit of $1,000,000. In addition, Mr. Smith did not have his own Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”) number, but had entered a verbal agreement with Teresa Clyburn of C.J. Trucking Company to operate his tractor under Ms. Clyburn’s ICC number. At the time of the collision, Ms. Clyburn carried an insurance policy issued by Progressive Casualty Insurance Company (“Progressive”) with a liability limit of $750,000. In her Complaint, the Plaintiff alleged that the Progressive and Canal policies apply to the April 26, 2001 collision and are “liable to Plaintiff up to the full liability limits of said polic[ies].” Both Canal and Progressive deny that their policies are applicable to the Plaintiff’s injuries.

Relevant to the subject Motion to Remand, the Plaintiff is a citizen of North Carolina, Progressive is a corporation organized under Ohio law with its principal place of business in Ohio, and Canal is a corporation organized under South Carolina law with its principal place of business in South Carolina.

On March 17, 2006, the Defendants filed a “Notice of Removal” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §  1332, alleging federal diversity subject matter jurisdiction. On April 17, 2006, the Plaintiff filed her Motion to Remand, essentially conceding that the parties’ citizenship is diverse, [] but arguing that “the jurisdictional amount in controversy has not been established or proved” and that even if it had, Canal waived the Defendants’ right to remove this case by availing itself of the jurisdiction of the state court. The Defendants argue that the language of the Plaintiff’s Complaint actually seeks the full amount of the policies, that her prior attorney made them aware of additional facts which prove the value of her claims as to each Defendant exceeds $75,000, and that their removal right was not waived by virtue of Canal filing a motion for extension of time in state court.

The citizenship of the parties is clearly diverse, that is, the Plaintiff is a citizen of North Carolina, Progressive is a citizen of Ohio, and Canal is a citizen of South Carolina. See 28 U.S.C. §  1332(c)(1) (2000) (“a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business”); Athena Automotive, Inc. v. DiGregorio, 166 F.3d 288, 290 (4th Cir.1999) (a corporation has its principal place of business at the “nerve center” and/or “place of” its operations); and Peterson v. Cooley, 142 F.3d 181, 184 (4th Cir.1998).

The Plaintiff’s motion has been fully briefed and is therefore ripe for disposition.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Amount in Controversy

At the outset, the undersigned notes that the Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand is timely. See 28 U.S.C. §  1447(c) (motion to remand must be filed within 30 days of filing of notice of removal and the court shall order remand if removal was improper).

28 U.S.C. §  1441(a) provides:

Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.

The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue, and absent a proper basis for subject matter jurisdiction, a removed case must be remanded to state court. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 96 (1998). Accord Jones v. American Postal Workers Union, 192 F.3d 417, 422 (4th Cir .1999); and Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir . 1999). Moreover, it is well established that “[t]he subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts is limited and the federal courts may exercise only that jurisdiction which Congress has prescribed.” Chris v. Tenet, 221 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir.2000), citing Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Accord Darcangelo v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 292 F .3d 181, 186 (4th Cir.2002) (“In general, an action filed in state court may be removed to federal court only if it might have been brought in federal court originally”). There is no dispute that the Plaintiff’s claims arise entirely under state law and, therefore, that the basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction, if any, must arise under what is commonly called diversity jurisdiction.

A case falls within a federal district court’s diversity jurisdiction only if diversity of citizenship among the parties is complete–that is, only if no plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the same State–and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §  1332 (2000); Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998); Carden v. Arkoma Associates, 494 U.S. 185, 187 (1990); and Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267 (1806). The requirements are so absolute that “[n]o party need assert [a lack of complete diversity or the requisite amount in controversy]. No party can waive the defect, or consent to jurisdiction. No court can ignore the defect; rather a court, noticing the defect, must raise the matter on its own.” Schacht, 524 U.S. at 389 (internal citations omitted). Accord Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).

The party seeking federal jurisdiction has the burden generally of proving that subject matter jurisdiction exists. See Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir.1999); Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir.1991); and Norfolk Southern Ry. Co. v. Energy Development Corp., 312 F.Supp.2d 833, 835 (S.D.W.Va.2004). In cases where jurisdiction is predicated on diversity of citizenship and where a complaint does not allege a specific amount of damages but instead seeks damages “in excess” of a certain dollar figure, the party asserting that jurisdiction exists must prove by the preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy requirement has been met. Accord Momin v. Maggiemoo’s International L.L.C., 205 F.Supp.2d 506, 509 (D.Md.2002) (applying preponderance of evidence standard to amount in controversy); and Gynn v. Wal-mart Stores, 955 F.Supp. 44, 46 (M.D.N.C.1996) (same).

When a claim is being made on an insurance policy, “the amount in controversy is the value of the underlying claim, not the face amount of the policy.” Darbet, Inc. v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 792 F.Supp. 487, 489 (S.D.W.Va.1992). See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Brown, 736 F.Supp. 705, 707 (W.D.Va.1990) (“[w]here the insured does not seek to recover the maximum under the policy, the court cannot rely exclusively on the policy limit as the measure of the amount in controversy”). []

Recognizing that unpublished authority is of limited precedential value, the undersigned nonetheless notes that the Fourth Circuit has also found that the value of a plaintiff’s claims should not be assumed to “automatically equate” to the policy limits of the coverage. Toler v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 25 Fed. Appx. 141, 143 (4th Cir.2001).

It is also well settled that the existence of subject matter jurisdiction and, specifically, whether more than $75,000 is in controversy is evaluated as of the time the Complaint is filed. Griffin v. Red Run Lodge, Inc., 610 F.2d 1198, 1204-05 (4th Cir.1979), citing St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 290-93 (1938) (holding that plaintiff could not avoid federal jurisdiction by decreasing amount in controversy in amended complaint filed post-removal). Accord Keith v. Clarke American Checks, Inc., 261 F.Supp.2d 419, 422 (W.D.N.C.2003) (where complaint, including claim for back pay, was filed more than two years after plaintiff’s termination and his annual salary had been $41,000, the amount in controversy was met). And, finally, “[w]hen a complaint is ambiguous at to the value of the action, ‘until jurisdiction becomes determinate, the court may consider any evidence of the amount in controversy.’ ” Talantis v. Paugh Surgical, Inc., 273 F.Supp.2d 710, 713 (M.D.N.C.2003) (citations omitted).

Applying these legal principles to the record in this case, because there is no issue over the diversity of the parties, the Defendants must prove by the preponderance of the evidence that more than $75,000 was in controversy at the time the Complaint was filed. The Plaintiff argues that the jurisdictional amount has not been met because she has never “stated or otherwise indicated that she seeks this amount.” Further, she states that National has offered as settlement the full amount of her medical expenses and property damage, plus an amount for the “unspecified amount in pain and suffering” she seeks. However, to find that the jurisdictional amount was not present in this case would go squarely against the evidence presented, all of which was available at the time the Complaint was filed.

First, although the undersigned is not relying exclusively on the policy limit, it is notable that in her Complaint the Plaintiff actually seeks a declaration that Canal and Progressive are “liable to Plaintiff up to the full liability limits of said polic[ies].” As noted above, the Canal policy has a $1,000,000 limit and the Progressive policy has a $750,000 limit. This fact alone would not satisfy the jurisdictional amount, but when considered in light of the Plaintiff’s extensive injuries as described in the May 10, 2005 letter from her former attorney to Progressive, it is clear that the Plaintiff seeks more than $75,000 from each of the Defendants, and to find otherwise would be to ignore the plain facts of this case in favor of a generic statement by the Plaintiff that she simply has not yet stated the amount in controversy.

First, the Plaintiff has held off accepting a settlement offer of $687,554.53 for the purpose of finding out whether additional recovery from Canal and Progressive was possible. While it is true that her medical bills, approximately $305,352.22, are covered by the proposed National settlement, and most likely the damage to her vehicle, the pain and suffering element of the Plaintiff’s claim appears to be extremely significant. Sixteen specific injuries are listed in the letter-all of which are summarized by the words of one of her doctors that she “broke nearly every bone in her body.” According to the letter, the Plaintiff, 66-years-old at the time of the collision, endured months of recovery at a hospital and nursing home. Following this, she moved in with her paraplegic son because his house is handicap accessible. However, she continued with regular medical treatment. “She suffers from chronic and debilitating pain on a daily basis.” Further,

[The Plaintiff] now has great difficulty just getting dressed each day and pursuing her daily activities. She cannot be on her feet, to stand or walk, for any length of time and has to use a walker and her wheelchair extensively. When she stands or tries to walk, she is in constant danger of falling, because of weakness in both legs and balance problems related to her injuries. She has been advised by her family doctor [ ] that she will likely have to take blood thinners (she is presently taking Coumadin) for the rest of her life. This puts her at even greater risk than the population generally, each time she suffers a fall, which happens frequently.

In addition, the Plaintiff anticipates almost $45,000 of home renovations in order to make her own home handicap accessible so that she may live there. “Prior to this wreck and her injuries, [the Plaintiff] was an independent, healthy, robust, energetic and active woman, who worked an average of 45 hours per week.” Now, she has extensive scars and disfigurement, and considers her injuries permanent.

Considering these extensive and life-changing injuries, the nature of this action, the Plaintiff’s own choice of words in her Complaint, the policy limits on the Canal and Progressive policies, and the existing potential resolution of claims with National, the undersigned finds that the jurisdictional amount has been satisfied. In short, the Defendants have shown by the preponderance of the evidence that the Plaintiff’s potential recovery from each Defendant, if successful in establishing application of the two policies, would exceed $75,000, the statutory minimum for federal diversity jurisdiction.

B. Waiver of Right of Removal

Plaintiff also argues that this action should be remanded to state court because Canal waived its right to remove the action to federal court by the filing of a single motion for an extension of time. On this issue, the Fourth Circuit has held that while “a defendant may [ ] waive its 30-day right to removal by demonstrating a ‘clear and unequivocal’ intent to remain in state court, such a waiver should only be found in ‘extreme circumstances.’ ” Grubb v. Donegal Mutual Ins. Co., 935 F.2d 57, 59 (4th Cir.1991) (citations omitted). A motion for extension of time does not demonstrate a clear and unequivocal intent to remain in state court and certainly does not present an extreme circumstance in which waiver could be found. Accordingly, the Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand will be denied on this ground as well.

III. ORDER

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED:

1. The Plaintiff’s “Motion to Remand Action to State Court” (document # 7), is DENIED.

2. The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Memorandum and Order to counsel for the parties.

SO ORDERED.

United States District Court,

E.D. Wisconsin.

Ashish UDANI and Rupa Udani, Plaintiffs,

v.

BENNY’S MOVING & STORAGE, INC. and Hanover Insurance Company, Defendants.

June 28, 2006.

DECISION AND ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND FOR ENTRY OF

JUDGMENT

WILLIAM E. CALLAHAN, JR., Magistrate Judge.

On February 25, 2005, the plaintiffs, Asish and Rupa Udani (“the Udanis”), filed a complaint in the Waukesha County Circuit Court against three defendants, to wit, Benny’s Moving & Storage, Inc. (“Benny’s”), Arbella Protection Insurance Company (“Arbella”), and Hanover Insurance Company (“Hanover”). At its factual core, the Udanis’ complaint is that in July of 2004 Benny’s transported the Udanis’ family’s household possessions from Acton, Massachusetts to Brookfield, Wisconsin. Unfortunately, the condition of the possessions at the time they were ultimately delivered to the Udanis in Wisconsin was not the same as it was when they were turned over to Benny’s in Massachusetts.

Upon delivery, the Udanis discovered that many of their family household furnishings had been damaged in transit. Wooden furniture was variously chipped, broken, scratched, wet, and moldy. The finishes of lacquer furniture were peeled or broken away, and were wet and moldy. The Udanis also discovered that: boxes containing personal items and garments were damaged, wet, moist, and moldy; several mattresses were wet, moldy, and stained with rust; and, garments specially designed and made in India for Rupa Udani had been stained, soiled, and otherwise damaged. The Udanis also discovered a dead rodent at the bottom of one of the garment boxes.

(Compl.¶  15.) On March 29, 2005, the complaint was removed to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § §  1331, 1337(a) and 1441, because “the Carmack Amendment to the ICC Termination Act of 1995 (“ICCTA”), 49 U.S.C. §  14706, governs Plaintiffs’ claims for loss of or damage to the subject shipment.” (Notice of Removal ¶  4.) Defendants Benny’s and Hanover answered the complaint, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their complaint against defendant Arbella, and soon thereafter the parties commenced together their journey down the long and winding litigation road in this action, leading ultimately to the plaintiffs’ instant motion for summary judgment as to reasonable attorneys’ fees.

No formal discovery was ever taken in this case. More particularly, no interrogatories, requests for production of documents or requests for admissions were served by any of the parties, and no depositions were taken. Ultimately, the parties stipulated that “the amount of actual damages to which Plaintiffs are entitled from Benny’s on the claims alleged in their First Amended Complaint are $6,500.00, exclusive of any reasonable attorneys’ fees to which Plaintiffs may be entitled from Benny’s under 49 U.S.C. §  1478(d), to be determined by the Court.” (Parties’ Stip. as to Damages) The plaintiffs now claim that from August 19, 2004 (which was well prior to the filing of the complaint) to March 3, 2006 (which was shortly before the instant motion was filed), the Udanis incurred attorneys fees totaling $24,307.00 and costs totaling $829.41. [] The defendants assert that such amount is unreasonable. Indeed, the defendants maintain that the most they should be ordered to pay in attorneys’ fees is $10, 301.00.

Indeed, in the June 13, 2006 affidavit of Ashish Udani, which affidavit was filed with the plaintiffs’ reply brief, Mr. Udani avers that “[a] s of today’s date, I have paid a total of $30,267.50 in attorneys’ fees, including all of the fees submitted in connection with Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees.” (Aff, at ¶  4.)

In support of their motion the plaintiffs filed a fourteen page brief, a set of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and affidavits signed by Asish Udani, by Attorney Benjamin C. Grawe (with attached billing invoices, letters, faxes and a complaint filed with the Better Business Bureau), by Attorney Douglas P. Dehler, and by Attorney David V. Meany. The defendants responded by filing their own twenty-one page memorandum, a set of proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and affidavits (to which various documents were attached) signed by David Abotbool, by Attorney Wesley S. Chused, and by Attorney Tomislav Z. Kuzmanovic. Finally, the plaintiffs filed a nine page reply brief, and affidavits signed by Ashish Udani and Attorney Benjamin Grawe.

According to the plaintiffs,

[C]ounsel for Plaintiffs have spent 151.85 hours on this case. Of these hours, 104.60 were spent by an associates [sic] at the hourly rate of $185; 16 hours were spent by a partner at the hourly rate of $237.50; and 27.5 hours were spent by law clerks or other support staff at hourly rates ranging from $57.51 to $100.00. This amount also takes into consideration counsel’s reduction of fees by $2,094 for time spent by a law clerk and junior associate.

(Pls.’ Br. at 8.)

The defendants do not dispute that the plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §  14708(d). They likewise do not contend that the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ hourly billing rates are unreasonable. (Defs.’ Br. at 13 n.6, 17.) Their only dispute is over the amount of time that was reasonably expended by the plaintiffs’ attorneys in prosecuting the Udanis’ claim.

The starting point in the court’s analysis of reasonable attorneys’ fees in a case such as this involving the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. §  14708(d) is the lodestar amount–a calculation that multiplies the number of hours reasonably expended on the case by the appropriate hourly rate for counsel. This figure then becomes the presumptive fee to be awarded. Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc., 903 F.Supp. 234, 237 (D.Mass.1995). After determining the lodestar, the court may discount the total fee based on various factors, including (1) the time and labor required, (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions, (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly, (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case, (5) the customary fee for similar work, (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent, (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances, (8) the amount in controversy and the results obtained, (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys, (10) the undesireability of the case, (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client, and (12) attorneys’ fees awards in similar cases. See Bankston v. State of Illinois, 60 F.3d 1249, 1255 (7th Cir.1995); Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.1974).

To reiterate, the lodestar amount is arrived at by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the case by the appropriate hourly rate. Thus, before applying any of the afore-listed factors the court must come up with the number of hours reasonably expended by the plaintiffs’ counsel in prosecuting the plaintiffs’ claim. That can be a challenging task. After all, hindsight is 20-20, and actions taken that appear in the rearview mirror to be unreasonable might have seemed quite reasonable at the time they were actually taken.

I note that the steps required to arrive at the lodestar amount seem to overlap somewhat with the above factors. More specifically, arriving at the lodestar amount requires a court to multiply the number of hours reasonably expended on the case by the appropriate hourly rate for counsel. Yet, the first of the above factors allows the court to take into account the time and labor required in considering whether to reduce the amount sought. “The trial judge should weigh the hours claimed against his own knowledge, experience, and expertise of the time required to complete similar activities.” Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717. That having been said, I have reviewed the time sheets submitted by the plaintiffs. From that mere review I cannot say state definitively how much, if any, of the time expended on this case by the plaintiffs’ legal representatives was per se unreasonably expended. Thus, I will find the lodestar amount to be that which the plaintiffs’ are seeking, to wit, $24,307.00. That does not mean, however, that the plaintiffs are entitled to that amount of attorneys’ fees. To the contrary, and as noted, the court may consider the factors set forth above in deciding whether to reduce those fees.

The time sheets reveal that three attorneys worked on this file, and that some of their time was spent meeting with one another to discuss the file and reviewing one another’s written work product. To be sure, there is nothing necessarily wrong with lawyers consulting with one another and reviewing one another’s written work product. At the same time, however, lawyers need to be continually sensitive to the nature of the case, the amount of money that may be involved, as well as the case’s novelty and complexity, so that an inordinate amount of time is not spent on the case. After all, not every case is a $100,000.00 case. And indeed, the Udanis’ damages were known at the outset to be, at most, approximately $30,000.00. (See Pls.’ Br., Ex. 2, attachment 2 (letter from Pls. to Benny’s dated Jan. 3, 2005).)

Ultimately, the plaintiffs agreed to accept the sum of $6,500.00 in damages. This is considerably less than the $30,000.00 they sought from Benny’s in the January 3, 2005, letter. Indeed, while the plaintiffs prevailed on their claim, they ultimately received only 20% (approximately) of what they claimed their actual damages were. On the other hand (and to be fair to the plaintiffs’ attorneys), the Udanis and their lawyers were dealing with a rather tricky area of the law, which (as they have learned) can fairly be described as not necessarily consumer-friendly.

Another matter bears some comment. The defendants argue that the plaintiffs’ claim for attorneys’ fees should be reduced by any fees incurred after October 18, 2005. This is the date on which the defendants agreed to stipulate that Benny’s was liable to the plaintiffs for $6,500.00 in actual damages.

Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ time records show that after October 18, 2005 [plaintiffs’ attorneys] spent a total of 26.85 hours working on this case for which they now seek payment of $6,169.75. Since the issue of Benny’s liability and actual damages had already been agreed upon as of October 18, 2005, this means that Plaintiffs and their counsel spent almost as much time and money for additional legal fees as Benny’s had agreed to pay in actual damages.

(Defs.’ Br. at 14 (citation omitted).) In reply, the plaintiffs argue that they are nevertheless entitled to the attorneys’ fees incurred after October 18, 2005 because during that period of time they were trying to obtain Benny’s tariff (if one existed) from the defendants’ attorney. According to the plaintiffs, if Benny’s did not have a tariff on file for public review, “the difference in potential liability for the Defendants is huge.” (Pls’ Reply at 5.)

Under federal law, failure to have a valid tariff on file for public review would mean that Defendants’ liability would not be limited by the terms of their bill of lading. Instead, the Udanis would be in a position to recover their full amount of damages.

This issue, therefore required thorough research and additional legal analysis by Plaintiffs’ counsel. Although the Udanis ultimately chose not to pursue the tariff matter at trial, framing the legal issue and evaluating the extent of the Defendants’ exposure was a necessary exercise and allowed the Udanis to make an informed decision regarding the settlement of the litigation.

(Pls.’ Reply at 5 (citation omitted).) In my opinion, the plaintiffs should not be awarded all of their attorneys’ fees for engaging in such “exercise.” After all, it was the plaintiffs themselves who offered to settle for the amount of $6,500.00 in their counsel’s October 12, 2005 letter to defendants’ counsel. And, although their offer to do so was conditioned on their being provided with a copy of Benny’s tariff, the bottom line is that they ultimately agreed to accept the $6,500.00, apparently without ever having their tariff-related questions fully answered by the defendants. Given the foregoing, I believe that the amount of attorneys’ fees attributable to the “thorough research and additional legal analysis” performed after October 18, 2005, should be reduced by $5,000.00. Reducing the $24,307.00 lodestar amount by $5,000.00 brings it to $19,307.00.

Furthermore, bearing in mind that the plaintiffs recovered only 20% of their claimed total damages, I believe that a further reduction in their attorneys’ fees claim would be fair and appropriate. Thus, an additional $3,000.00 will be deducted from the $19,307.00, resulting in $16,307.00.

In conclusion, the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to reasonable attorneys’ fees will be granted in part and denied in part. The plaintiffs will be awarded $16,307.00 in attorneys’ fees and $829.41 in costs, for a total award of $17,136.41. In addition, and based on the parties’ stipulation, the plaintiffs will be awarded $6,500.00 in damages.

NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED that the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to reasonable attorneys’ fees be and hereby is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiffs be and hereby awarded $6,500.00 in damages from the defendants;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiffs be awarded $16,307.00 in attorneys’ fees and $829.41 in costs;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that judgment shall be entered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants in the total amount of $23,636.41;

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the clerk of court enter judgment accordingly.

SO ORDERED this 28th day of June 2006, at Milwaukee, Wisconsin.