United States District Court,

D. Massachusetts.

UNITED VAN LINES, LLC

v.

Evelyn T. ANTHONY.

Civil Action No. 08-CV-11243-RGS.

 

Feb. 3, 2010.

 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

 

STEARNS, District Judge.

 

On July 22, 2008, plaintiff United Van Lines, LLC (United), brought this Complaint seeking payment from defendant Evelyn Anthony for an October 2007 shipment of household goods from Illinois to Massachusetts. United amended the Complaint on September 6, 2008. On October 20, 2008, Anthony answered, contending that her former husband, Christopher Anthony, was solely liable for the debt. She also filed a counterclaim, alleging violations of Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 93A (the Consumer Protection Act), and asserting common-law claims of negligence, “excess billing,” and negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress. United further amended its Complaint on October 22, 2008, and answered the counterclaim. On October 27, 2009, United moved for summary judgment on its claims and for dismissal of Anthony’s counterclaim, arguing that all of Anthony’s claims and defenses were preempted by the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995 (ICCTA). Anthony did not file an opposition.

 

49 U.S.C. § 14706.

 

BACKGROUND

 

The undisputed facts are as follows. On October 9, 2007, United accepted a shipment of household goods from Evelyn Anthony. The goods were shipped from United’s terminal in Willowbrook, Illinois. United issued Anthony a Uniform Household Goods Bill of Lading and Freight Bill No. 211-01112-7. Two days later, United issued a second Bill of Lading No. 211-01112-7A representing the excess weight portion of Anthony’s shipment. Anthony signed, but did not read, the Bills of Lading. Anthony charged the shipment to Christopher Anthony’s American Express card. Christopher is Evelyn Anthony’s former husband.

 

United delivered the bulk of Anthony’s shipment to the designated address in Weston, Massachusetts, on October 13, 2007. The remainder of the shipment was delivered on October 20, 2007. The goods arrived intact except for a broken glass shelf.

 

United submitted the credit slip signed by Anthony to American Express for payment. On November 8, 2007, American Express notified United that the charge to Christopher Anthony’s credit card had been disallowed. Christopher Anthony had informed American Express that the charge was unauthorized (“fraudulent”). United unsuccessfully protested the disallowance to American Express.

 

On March 4, 2008, United mailed a letter to Evelyn Anthony demanding payment of the outstanding balance of $18,336.87. United, represented by Corrigan Moving Services, contacted Anthony numerous times regarding the unpaid bill. Anthony responded that she was attempting to persuade Christopher Anthony to make payment.

 

United’s total charges for the shipments amounted to $19,800.69. Anthony made a payment of $1,256.56, leaving a balance of $18,544.13 charged to American Express.

 

It is undisputed that Christopher Anthony had no involvement in contracting for United’s services. Evelyn Anthony signed the Bills of Lading as both “shipper” and “consignee” without Christopher’s endorsement.

 

The first page of the Bills of Lading contained the following terms and conditions.

 

1. All terms written and printed, stamped or typed on the front or back of this form are agreed to by both parties.

 

2. If credit is extended by the carrier by agreeing to bill an employer or other party, and in the event that any or all of the charges are not paid, the owner of the goods and/or beneficiary of the services acknowledges he remains primarily liable for payment.

 

3. The above named shipper agrees that this carrier shall transport the goods and effects tendered by the shipper subject to the preceding.

 

Section 3(a) of the Bills of Lading, printed on page two, contained the following provision.

 

The shipper, upon tender of the shipment to carrier, and the consignee, upon acceptance of delivery of shipment from carrier, shall be liable, jointly and severally, for all unpaid charges payable on account of a shipment in accordance with applicable tariffs including, but not limited to, sums advanced or disbursed by a carrier on account of such shipment. The extension of credit to either shipper or consignee for such unpaid charges shall not thereby discharge the obligation of the other party to pay such charges in the event the party to whom credit has been extended shall fail to pay such charges.

 

United’s governing Tariff Item 43 contains the same requirement, that is, that the shipper, (Anthony), remains liable to the carrier (United), in the event of the disallowance of any extension of credit.

 

In response to the Complaint, Anthony counterclaimed against United, alleging “[b]reach of contract/excess billing.” Anthony does not dispute that the “overcharge” claims are governed by Item 51 of United’s governing tariff. Anthony never filed an overcharge claim with United. Anthony also counterclaimed for negligence in the handling of her goods. Cargo loss or damage claims are governed by the Bills of Lading and Tariff Item 43. Section 6 of the Bills of Lading provides as follows.

 

Section 6 of Tariff Item 43 is virtually copied from this section of the Bills of Lading.

 

As a condition precedent to recovery, a claim for any loss or damage, injury or delay, must be filed in writing with carrier within nine (9) months after delivery to consignee as shown on face hereof, or in case of failure to make delivery, then within nine (9) months after a reasonable time for delivery has elapsed; and suit must be instituted against carrier within two (2) years and one (1) day from the date when notice in writing is given by carrier to the claimant that carrier has disallowed the claim or any part or parts thereof specified in the notice. Where a claim is not filed or suit is not instituted thereon in accordance with the foregoing provisions, carrier shall not be liable and such a claim will not be paid.

Under this provision, Anthony had nine months after receipt of the shipment, that is, until July 20, 2008, to file a written claim. Although United mailed Anthony the proper form, she did not file a claim. Anthony filed her counterclaim in this suit on October 20, 2008, three months after the July 20, 2008 deadline.

 

In her claim of infliction of emotional distress, Anthony blames United for the toll exacted by the necessity of defending herself in this lawsuit. Moreover, she was “required to seek medical assistance … for depression-related symptoms” resulting from the breakdown of her marriage.

 

DISCUSSION

 

Summary judgment is appropriate when, based upon the pleadings, affidavits, and depositions, “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Gaskell v. Harvard Co-op. Soc., 3 F.3d 495, 497 (1st Cir.1993).

 

When a non-moving party fails to file a timely opposition to an adversary’s motion for summary judgment, the court may consider the summary judgment motion unopposed, and take as uncontested all evidence presented with that motion…. While an unopposed summary judgment motion still must be scrutinized in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, id., a district court’s decision to treat a summary judgment motion as unopposed is serious business. In most cases, a party’s failure to oppose summary judgment is fatal to its case.

 

Perez-Cordero v. Wal-Mart Puerto Rico, 440 F.3d 531, 533-534 (1st Cir.2006). Where the record is circumscribed because summary judgment is unopposed, a district court may grant summary judgment against the nonresponding party “if appropriate.” SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Mullen v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 972 F.2d 446, 452 (1st Cir.1992). Although the court is required to scrutinize an uncontested record with care, it has no obligation to ferret out facts that might defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Diaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13, 42 (1st Cir.2006) (“[I]t is plaintiffs’ responsibility to direct the court’s attention to [evidence in the record supporting their allegations].”). Rather, the failure of a nonmoving party to submit a statement of disputed facts has the legal effect of admitting the moving party’s factual assertions.United States v. Parcel of Land, 958 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.1992).

 

Local Rule 56.1 provides that:

 

[o]pposition to motions for summary judgment shall include a concise statement of the material facts of record as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried, with page references to affidavits, depositions and other documentation. Copies of all referenced documentation shall be filed as exhibits to the motion or opposition. Material facts of record set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party will be deemed for purposes of the motion to be admitted by opposing parties unless controverted by the statement required to be served by opposing parties.

 

United’s Claims

 

United asserts three claims, each seeking the same relief.

 

1. Interstate Tariff Charges

 

The ICCTA applies the “filed rate doctrine” to interstate motor carriers of household goods. 49 U.S.C. § 13702(a). The filed rate doctrine imposes on carriers “not only the right but also the duty to recover its proper charges for services performed.” S. Pac. Transp. v. Commercial Metals Co., 456 U.S. 336, 343, 102 S.Ct. 1815, 72 L.Ed.2d 114 (1982). The purpose of the filed rate doctrine is to prevent price discrimination and unlawful preferences among a carrier’s customers. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co., 250 U.S. 577, 581, 40 S.Ct. 27, 63 L.Ed. 1151 (1919). Thus, the “time-honored rule that [when a carrier is not paid for lawful charges], no ‘act or omission of the carrier (except the running of the statute of limitations) [will] estop or preclude it from enforcing payment of the full amount by a person liable therefor.’ ” S. Pac. Transp., 456 U.S. at 352, citing Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Cent. Iron & Coal Co., 265 U.S. 59, 65, 44 S.Ct. 441, 68 L.Ed. 900 (1924).

 

Anthony does not dispute that: (1) United presented her with the Bills of Lading upon accepting her household goods for shipment; (2) United transported the goods from Illinois to Massachusetts; (3) the cost of the shipment, as computed under the governing tariff, was $19,800.69; (4) United has received only $1,256.56 of that amount; and (5) the unpaid balance is $18,544.13. As Anthony has offered no countervailing facts, United is entitled by the governing tariff to recover from Anthony the amount owing.

 

2. Breach of Contract

 

Anthony does not dispute that: (1) she hired United to ship her household goods; (2) she promised to pay the shipping charges; (3) she signed the Bills of Lading;  (4) United transported her household goods from Illinois to Massachusetts; (5) United has made a demand for payment; and (6) United has been paid only $1,256.56 of the total bill of $19,800.69. The Bills of Lading clearly contemplated the possibility that charges billed to a third party (Christopher Anthony) might not be paid, and in that eventuality the responsibility for payment was to fall on the shipper and consignee (Evelyn Anthony). Thus, under the express terms of Anthony’s contract with United, she is liable for the unpaid balance of $18,544.13.

 

That Anthony did not read the Bills of Lading before signing them has no legal significance. See Spritz v. Lishner, 355 Mass. 162, 164, 243 N.E.2d 163 (1969).

 

3. Quantum Meruit

 

United’s final claim is under the equitable doctrine of quantum meruit. Quantum meruit “is a claim independent of an assertion for damages under the contract.” J.A. Sullivan Corp. v. Commonwealth, 397 Mass. 789, 793, 494 N.E.2d 374 (1986). “The underlying basis for awarding quantum meruit damages in a quasi-contract case is unjust enrichment of one party and unjust detriment to the other party.” Salamon v. Terra, 394 Mass. 857, 859, 477 N.E.2d 1029 (1985). Like unjust enrichment, quantum meruit is a theory of recovery and not an independent cause of action. Where as here, a party’s loss is made whole at law by contract damages, there is no occasion for an award of equitable relief. See Liss v. Studeny, 450 Mass. 473, 479-480, 879 N.E.2d 676 (2008).

 

Anthony’s Counterclaims

 

Anthony makes four counterclaims against United. The claims are bare allegations, for which Anthony has offered no evidentiary support. Because Anthony has failed to respond to United’s motion to dismiss the claims, there is no record on which the court could find that any of the four counterclaims has a plausible heft. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1967, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). On their face, almost all of Anthony’s counterclaims are barred by the Carmack Amendment, which preempts state laws imposing liability on carriers based on the loss or damage of shipped goods, liability stemming from the claims process, and all liability related to the payment of claims for damage to goods. See Rini v. United Van Lines, Inc., 104 F.3d 502, 505-506 (1st Cir.1997). Of Anthony’s claims, only the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress is not preempted by Carmack. Id. This claim stems from United’s attempts to collect the debt owed by Anthony. The intentional tort requires acts which, either individually or as part of a pattern of harassment, are “extreme and outrageous … reasonably viewed as an attempt to … shock and harm a person’s peace of mind by invading that person’s mental or emotional tranquility.” Ratner v. Noble, 35 Mass.App.Ct. 137, 139, 617 N.E.2d 649 (1993). See also Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 400 Mass. 82, 99, 508 N.E.2d 72 (1987) (“appalling” conduct is required to trigger the tort); Conway v. Smerling, 37 Mass.App.Ct. 1, 8, 635 N.E.2d 268 (1994) (“profoundly shocking” conduct); Sena v. Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 250, 264, 629 N.E.2d 986 (1994) (conduct “beyond all bounds of decency … utterly intolerable in a civilized community”). Whether on the facts pled, a plaintiff has met this high standard is an issue of law for the trial court. Id. The court readily concludes that a party’s resort to a lawsuit as a means of collecting a debt that is legitimately owed (or is believed in good faith to be owed) cannot as a matter of law constitute the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

 

As a general rule, mental suffering caused by a breach of contract is not compensable at law. McLean v. Univ. Club, 327 Mass. 68, 76, 97 N.E.2d 174 (1951).

 

ORDER

 

For the foregoing reasons United’s motion for summary judgment is ALLOWED. Anthony’s counterclaims are DISMISSED. The Clerk will enter judgment for United and close the case. United will have fourteen (14) days to file a bill of costs. Prejudgment interest is awarded to United as of March 4, 2008. See Saint-Gobain Indus. Ceramics, Inc. v. Wellons, Inc., 246 F.3d 64, 72 (1st Cir.2001).

 

SO ORDERED.

United States District Court,

S.D. Illinois.

Teresa CARETTA, individually and as special administratrix of the estate of Alfred Carretta III, deceased; Ashley Carretta; Alfred Carretta, IV; and Justin Carretta, Plaintiffs

v.

MAY TRUCKINGCOMPANY, Defendant.

No. 09-CV-0158-MJR.

 

Feb. 3, 2010.

 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

 

REAGAN, District Judge.

 

In this diversity case brought by the surviving family members of Alfred Carretta III, as a result of a vehicular collision, Defendant May TruckingCompany has moved that the Court dismiss the suit for improper venue. In the event that venue is proper, May Trucking alternatively seeks transfer of venue to the District of Oregon or the Northern District of California. Because venue is proper in the Southern District of Illinois and because May Trucking has not satisfied the standards for a transfer of venue, the Court will deny its motion.

 

I. Facts

 

Motions regarding venue (either to transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1404 or to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3)) are governed by the same standard as a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2). Gulf Ins. Co. v. Glasbrenner, 417 F.3d 353, 355 (2d Cir.2005). If the motion is made solely on the pleadings and affidavits (i.e. no evidentiary hearing), the plaintiff need only make out a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. Id. (citing Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir.2003)). Additionally, the Court assumes that the facts pleaded in the complaint are true and makes all favorable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 1020 n. 1 (citing Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Phencorp Reinsurance Co., 440 F.3d 870, 878 (7th Cir.2006); Purdue, 338 F.3d at 782). There is one difference among the venue motions. In the case of a motion to dismiss, the plaintiff has the burden of proof that venue is proper. See GCIU-Employer Ret. Fund v. Goldfarb Corp., 565 F.3d 1018, 1023 (7th Cir.2009) (citing RAR, Inc. v. Turner Diesel, Ltd., 107 F.3d 1272, 1276 (7th Cir.1997)). In the case of a motion to transfer venue, the movant has the burden to show that transfer is appropriate. Coady v. Ashcraft & Gerel, 223 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir.2000). For reasons stated herein, the Court concludes the plaintiffs have met their burden while the defendant has failed in its.

 

Based on the above standard, the Court will assume the following facts while deciding this motion. Around 1:45 PM on May 31, 2008, Alfred Carretta III and Edwin Soper were in a vehicular collision. Soper was driving a tractor-trailer that struck Carretta’s pick-up truck on California State Route 12. Carretta had stopped, along with others in front of him, waiting for the Mokelumme River Bridge to reopen for vehicle traffic. As a result of this collision, Carretta sustained critical injuries that led to his death. At the time of the collision, Soper was May Trucking’s employee and was driving the trailer for May Trucking. The part of California State Route 12 at which the collision occurred was in San Joaquin County, which is within the territory of the Northern District of California.

 

The surviving Carrettas are domiciled in Collinsville, Illinois, which is within the territory covered by the Southern District of Illinois. Decedent Carretta’s particular domicile is in dispute between the parties; his immediate family lives in Illinois and he has an Illinois license and Illinois vehicle registration plates, but when arrested earlier that month before death he claimed that his address was his brother’s in Northern California. As will be demonstrated later, his actual domicile does not matter for the purposes of this motion. May Trucking is an Idaho corporation with a principal place of business in Oregon. May Trucking employs no officers and has no offices within the Southern District (or in Illinois for that matter). May Trucking does do significant business in Illinois, though. Its agents have traveled more than 2.2 million miles each year since 2005 in Illinois. Out of all of May Trucking’s travel, the Illinois traffic amounted to less than 2% annually. These miles were not simply miles accumulated while passing from one state to the next; May Trucking drove those miles while executing pickups from clients ranging from 1399 to 1709 pickups from 2006-2008.

 

II. Analysis

 

A. Venue

 

Even though incorporated and headquartered outside this district, the May Trucking Co. nevertheless resides in this district because it is subject to personal jurisdiction here. Venue is proper in the Southern District of Illinois.

 

Jurisdiction for the Carrettas’ suit “is founded only on diversity of citizenship,” meaning that the Southern District is a proper venue if it is a district in which “any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same State,” “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated,” or “any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (2006). Neither party disputes that no substantial part of the events or omissions occurred within this district. Given that there is only one defendant, May Trucking, if the defendant resides in this district then venue here is proper.

 

Another important factor is that May Trucking is a corporation, which means that its residence is “in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). Because Illinois is a state with several judicial districts, May Trucking’s residence would be in the Southern District if its contacts with the Southern District were sufficient to subject May Trucking to personal jurisdiction if the Southern District were its own state. Id.

 

Illinois employs a long-arm statute to get personal jurisdiction over appropriate out-of-state defendants. The long-arm statute permits personal jurisdiction over “a natural person or corporation doing business within this State.” 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-209(b)(4) (2008). “Doing business” refers to an Illinois common-law doctrine in which a corporation “engages in a continuous and systematic course of business in the State” so that it is “considered a resident of Illinois and may be sued for any cause of action, regardless of whether that cause of action arose out of the corporation’s actions within Illinois.” Old Orchard Urban Limited P’ship v. Harry Rosen, Inc., 389 Ill.App.3d 58, 328 Ill.Dec. 540, 904 N.E.2d 1050, 1057 (Ill.App. 1st Dist.2009) (quoting Kostal v. Pinkus Dermatopathology Lab., P.C., 357 Ill.App.3d 381, 293 Ill.Dec. 150, 827 N.E.2d 1031, 1035 (Ill.App.2005)). This is a high standard to meet, though. Id. (citing Kostal, 293 Ill.Dec. 150, 827 N.E.2d at 1035). Additionally, the Court must consider whether subjecting the corporation to personal jurisdiction does not violate the corporation’s due process rights, i.e., whether the conduct and connection with the forum is such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being subject to the jurisdiction of the forum. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980).

 

May Trucking argues that it is not subject to personal jurisdiction in the State of Illinois at all, let alone the Southern District, and therefore that venue is improper. The Carretta’s counter and point to the evidence of May Trucking’s business dealings within the Southern District, arguing that personal jurisdiction works with Illinois’s long arm statute and that there is no due process violation. The Court agrees with the Carrettas. The amount of traffic in which May Trucking engaged in Illinois in 2008 was quite large: 2.2 million miles to be exact. Granted, it is but a fraction of May Trucking’s overall yearly travel, but it is still a lot of travel within the state. Illinois courts have found that out-of-state truckingcompanies engaging in much smaller amounts of travel and business within Illinois than May Trucking fall under the “doing business” doctrine. See, e.g., Colletti v. Crudele, 169 Ill.App.3d 1068, 120 Ill.Dec. 311, 523 N.E.2d 1222, 1229 (Ill.App.1988) (finding that the defendant truckingcompany was doing business within Illinois to subject it to general jurisdiction, noting that although the defendant’s Illinois operations were small “even $5,000 or $10,000 is a substantial amount from a number of perspectives, despite being a small percentage of a thriving company’s revenues” and also that a mere dozen trips per year was “not intrinsically an insubstantial number so as to foreclose immediately consideration as to whether the trips, viewed in the light of all the case’s circumstances, constitute doing business here”). As such, May Trucking is properly subject to personal jurisdiction in Illinois. Additionally, the Court cannot say that being subject in this circumstance violates due process. Persons travelling as much as May Trucking within a single state (over 2 million miles per year) should be prepared to be sued in that state, even if they travel more elsewhere. May Trucking, then, is subject to the Southern District’s personal jurisdiction, so venue is proper there.

 

B. Transfer

 

Just in case the Court found venue proper within the Southern District, which it does, May Trucking asks the Court to transfer the case to the United States District Court for either the District of Oregon or the Northern District of California. The Court declines to do so.

 

A transfer of venue is within the Court’s discretion. N. Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon, 642, 649 n. 3 (7th Cir.1999) (citing Cote v. Wadel, 796 F.2d 981, 985 (7th Cir.1986)). “[F]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); see Coffey v. Van Dorn Iron Works, 796 F.2d 217, 219 (7th Cir.1986). In evaluating a motion to transfer venue, factors to be considered are (1) the plaintiff’s choice of forum, (2) the situs of material events, property and evidence, (3) the convenience of witnesses and (4) the convenience of the parties. See, e.g., Von Holt v. Injection Molding Sys., Ltd., 887 F.Supp. 185, 188 (N.D.Ill.1995). In addition to these “private” factors, a court should consider the public interest or the “interests of justice.” Id.

 

The plaintiffs’ choice of forum is important, but when the plaintiff does not live in the chosen forum, the plaintiffs’ choice is not more important than the other factors. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Citizen’s Bank & Trust Co., 592 F.2d 364, 368 (7th Cir.1979). When the choice of forum is where the plaintiff lives, then the choice is significant and entitled to deference. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255, 102 S.Ct. 252, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981) (“[A] plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to greater deference when the plaintiff has chosen the home forum.” (citing Koster v.(Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524, 67 S.Ct. 828, 91 L.Ed. 1067 (1947))); id. at 255 n. 23 (“[I]n any balancing of conveniences, a real showing of convenience by a plaintiff who has sued in his home forum will normally outweigh the inconvenience the defendant may have shown.” (quoting Koster, 330 U.S. at 524)). In this case, the Carrettas do reside within the Southern District of Illinois, so their choice of forum is entitled to some deference. The choice-of-forum factor weighs in favor of non-transfer.

 

It is undisputed that the situs of the events and evidence in this case is at the place of the accident, Northern California. This factor weighs in favor of transferring venue. Additionally, most of the material events and evidence are located in Northern California, so it is likely that the witnesses are also concentrated in that District. Defendants claim that the vast majority of relevant witnesses at this point in the litigation are all from California, with the exception of the plaintiffs. The fact that the witnesses are almost all in California favors transfer. But a trial in California would require the Illinois relatives of the deceased to present damage evidence either by deposition or live testimony. Whether the case is managed in Oregon, California or Illinois, there will be inconvenience to someone.

 

Looking at the parties’ positions, the Court finds that it would be substantially more burdensome for the Carrettas to litigate far away on the Pacific Coast. This difficulty of the plaintiffs is in stark contrast to the difficulty of a national truckingcompany litigating in a forum in which it should have anticipated being amenable to jurisdiction. The difficulty imposed on May Trucking is significant, but not as significant as the difficulty of the plaintiffs were there to be a transfer of forum. This factor weighs in favor of retaining the case in the Southern District of Illinois.

 

Finally, with respect to the interests of justice factor, May Trucking correctly states that courts should consider their familiarity with the applicable law and whether the forum has an interest in hearing the particular case or controversy. See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Mobil Oil Co., 90 F.Supp.2d 958, 961-62 (N.D.Ill.2000). May Trucking argues that, because of the location of the accident and the Illinois choice of law rules that the Court will apply, see Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Co., 174 F.3d 842, 844 (7th Cir.1999) (“In the absence of unusual circumstances, the highest scorer on the ‘most significant relationship’ test is-the place where the tort occurred.”), California tort law will apply. California courts are better suited to hear California law cases, and as the Carrettas’ do not argue this point the Court will assume it true and note that it weighs in favor of transfer. The inquiry does not end there, though. Because May Trucking is “doing business” within this District, this Court and the citizens of this District have some interest in adjudicating the case from the defendant’s perspective, which weighs in favor of not transferring. Additionally, the Carrettas reside in this district, meaning that the Court and the citizens of the District have a significant interest in hearing the case from the plaintiffs’ perspective. Damages, if awarded and proven will be localized since plaintiff’s decedent and those she represents are within the Southern District of Illinois. This factor weighs strongly in favor of a southern Illinois venue.

 

The Court also notes another public interest factor-federal court workload-weighs heavily in favor of non-transfer. The pending caseloads  in the Northern District of California and the District of Oregon are significantly greater than the Southern District of Illinois.

 

According to the most recent available statistics, the pending cases per judge for California Northern, Oregon and Illinois Southern, respectively, were: 634, 514 and 299. See http://jnet.ao.dcn/cgi-bin/cmsd2008.pl.

 

The interests of justice, the deference that the Court will grant the plaintiffs with respect to their choice of forum, and the convenience of the parties all point to the Court retaining this case in the Southern District of Illinois.

 

III. Conclusion

 

Accordingly, the Court DENIES May Trucking’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 6) or in the alternative to transfer.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.