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February 2021

Moreaux v. Clear Blue Insurance Co.

2021 WL 627717

United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana,
Lake Charles Division.
ASHLEY MOREAUX
v.
CLEAR BLUE INSURANCE CO. ET AL.
CASE NO. 2:18-CV-01255
|
Filed 02/17/2021

MEMORANDUM RULING
JAMES D. CAIN, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
*1 Before the court is a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [doc. 103] filed by defendant James River Insurance Company (“JRIC”). No opposition to the motion has been filed and the time for doing so has passed. Accordingly, the motion is regarded as unopposed.

I. BACKGROUND
This suit arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred at about 4:05 am on March 1, 2018, on Interstate 10 in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana. The accident involved a vehicle driven by plaintiff Ashley Moreaux and a tractor-trailer allegedly “owned, managed, possessed, operated and/or controlled” by defendants Tim Ables Trucking Company LLC (“Tim Ables Trucking”), Shannon Wayne Watson, and Kevin Posey.1 Doc. 16, ¶¶ 8–9.

Ms. Moreaux alleges that she was seriously injured when her vehicle was struck by the tractor-trailer driven by Mr. Watson, as he attempted to merge from the shoulder onto the interstate. Id. at ¶¶ 10–16. She further alleges that Mr. Watson only stopped for a brief time after the crash, then continued down the interstate for another forty miles before eventually reporting the accident. Id. at ¶¶ 17–25. Finally, she asserts that tractor-trailer had an inoperable turn signal and that a prescription bottle containing a Schedule V drug, Soma (carisoprodol), was found in the cab but that authorities were unable to test Watson for his level of impairment at the crash due to the delay caused when he fled the scene. Id. at ¶¶ 26–27.

Ms. Moreaux filed suit against the above-named defendants and their insurer, Clear Blue Insurance Company, in this court on September 24, 2018.2 Doc. 1. She seeks compensatory damages as well as punitive and exemplary damages under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.4. Doc. 16. In the Second Amended and Restated Complaint she added excess insurers JRIC and Hallmark Insurance Company as defendants. Doc. 57. Since that time Ms. Moreaux has also executed a Gasquet settlement and dismissed her claims against any named defendant, except to the extent that insurance coverage is found applicable to the claims proven at trial. Docs. 88, 90.

JRIC admits that it issued an excess liability insurance policy to Tim Ables Trucking, and that the policy was in effect at the time of the accident. Doc. 74, ¶ 33; see doc. 103, att. 2. It maintains, however, that the policy’s express exclusion for punitive damages means that all claims for such damages against JRIC are barred as a matter of law. Accordingly, it seeks summary judgment on these claims. Doc. 103. No party has responded to the motion and their time for doing so has passed, meaning that the motion is regarded as unopposed.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Under Rule 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The moving party is initially responsible for identifying portions of pleadings and discovery that show the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995). He may meet his burden by pointing out “the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party’s case.” Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 404 (5th Cir. 2003). The non-moving party is then required to go beyond the pleadings and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To this end he must submit “significant probative evidence” in support of his claim. State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1990). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (citations omitted).

*2 A court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). The court is also required to view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Clift v. Clift, 210 F.3d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 2000). Under this standard, a genuine issue of material fact exists if a reasonable trier of fact could render a verdict for the nonmoving party. Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2008).

III. LAW & APPLICATION
Under Louisiana law, an insurance policy is a contract and should be interpreted using the general rules set forth in the Louisiana Civil Code. Williams v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 2014 WL 2197067, at *2 (M.D. La. May 27, 2014). The court’s role, therefore, is to determine the parties’ common intent. In this determination words and phrases must be construed “using their plain, ordinary and generally prevailing meaning, unless the words have acquired a technical meaning.” Starr Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Banner Prop. Mgmt. Co., 2018 WL 6448840, at *5 (E.D. La. Dec. 10, 2018) (citing La. Civ. Code art. 2047). Where the terms of the policy are clear and do not lead to absurd consequences, no further interpretation is required. La. Civ. Code art. 2046. An ambiguous term, however, is generally construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage. Cadwallader v. Allstate Ins. Co., 848 So.2d 577, 580 (La. 2003).

Under the terms of JRIC’s policy, JRIC agrees to pay
those sums in excess of the scheduled “underlying insurance” that [Tim Ables Trucking becomes] legally obligated to pay as damages because of injury or property damage to which this insurance applies, provided that the damages would be covered by the scheduled “underlying insurance(s)” or would apply but for the exhaustion of the applicable Limits of Insurance.
Doc. 103, att. 2, p. 6. Under a section entitled “Exclusion – Punitive Damages,” however, the policy also excludes coverage for “[c]ivil or criminal fines, sanctions or penalties, whether imposed pursuant to statute or otherwise,” as well as “[p]unitive or exemplary damages and the multiplied portion of multiplied damages.” Id. at 22.

Here there is no ambiguity as to the exclusion and its impact on coverage. “Absent a conflict with statutory provisions or public policy, insurers … are entitled to limit their liability and to impose and to enforce reasonable conditions upon the policy obligations they contractually assume.” La. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Interstate Fire and Cas. Co., 630 So.2d 759, 763 (La. 1994). Louisiana courts have routinely upheld punitive damages exclusions as valid and enforceable. See, e.g., Pike v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 796 So.2d 696 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2001); McDaniel v. DeJean, 556 So.2d 1336 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1990); Yonter v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 802 So.3d 950 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2001). The court finds no basis to depart in this matter, and agrees that punitive damages are not recoverable under JRIC’s policy.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [doc. 103] will be GRANTED and all claims for exemplary and/or punitive damages brought against defendant James River Insurance Company will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

*3 THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers on this 17th day of February, 2021.

All Citations
Slip Copy, 2021 WL 627717

Footnotes

1
Mr. Posey is only specifically named under the negligent entrustment claim and appears to pay some sort of supervisory role at the company.

2
Plaintiff’s father, Chris Moreaux, originally joined the suit as a plaintiff based on his emotional distress at witnessing the crash scene. See docs. 1, 16. He later voluntarily dismissed these claims. Doc. 44.

Goosby v. Briggs

2021 WL 298817

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.
Barbara Causey GOOSBY, Plaintiff,
v.
Gary Lee BRIGGS, et al., Defendants.
CIVIL ACT. NO. 2:20-cv-766-ECM
|
Signed 01/28/2021
Attorneys and Law Firms
Charles James, II, QuiAndria Jacquelynne James, Serious Injury Law Group PC, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.
Lindsay Hembree Barnes, Steve Ray Burford, Simpson, McMahan, Glick & Burford, PLLC, Birmingham, AL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
EMILY C. MARKS, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION
*1 This cause is before the Court on motions to remand filed by Plaintiff Barbara Causey Goosby (“Goosby”) (Docs. 7 & 10) and upon a request by the Defendants to engage in jurisdictional discovery. (Doc. 12 at 4).

The case was originally filed in the Circuit Court of Lowndes County, Alabama, and was removed by Defendant Gary Lee Briggs (“Briggs”) to federal district court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Defendant Southeastern Freight Lines, Inc. has not been served, but consents to the removal. (Doc. 1-3).

For reasons that follow, the Court concludes that the request for jurisdictional discovery is due to be GRANTED to the extent that the Court will allow for limited written discovery on the jurisdictional issue.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and therefore possess only the power authorized by the Constitution or statute. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Courts should presume that a case lies outside of this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary should be upon the party asserting jurisdiction. Id. Although a defendant has the statutory right to remove in certain situations, the plaintiff is still the master of his claim. Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994). For that reason, the defendant’s right to remove and the plaintiff’s right to choose his forum are “not on equal footing.” Id. Accordingly, the defendant’s removal burden is a heavy one. Id. If a plaintiff fails to make a specific demand for damages in the complaint, “a removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy more likely than not exceeds the … jurisdictional requirement.” Roe v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 613 F.3d 1058, 1061 (11th Cir. 2010).

When a defendant removes a case within the first thirty days after receipt of the initial complaint, the court considers both the initial complaint and other evidence introduced by the defendant. See Sullins v. Moreland, 2021 WL 54206, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 6, 2021)(citing Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, Inc., 608 F.3d 744, 754 (11th Cir. 2010)). The court may use “ ‘deduction, inference, or other extrapolation’ to determine whether the relevant evidence submitted by the removing party supports the existence of the required amount in controversy.” Id. (quoting Pretka, 608 F.3d at 753). When the court is presented with a notice of removal without facts or specific allegations, “it may not speculate or divine ‘by looking at the stars’ the amount in controversy.” Id. (quoting Pretka, 608 F.3d at 753).

III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The facts of this case stem from an automobile crash during which a tractor-trailer driven by Briggs, allegedly within the scope of his employment with Southeastern Freight Lines (SEFL), crashed with a vehicle driven by Goosby. Goosby brings claims for negligence; wantonness; negligent, hiring, training and supervision; and vicarious lability.

*2 In her complaint, Goosby does not seek a specified amount of damages for the entirety of her claims. She specifies that she does not seek more than $ 75,000 for one claim, but that limitation is only contained within the count alleging vicarious liability. Goosby seeks compensatory damages for “serious bodily injuries,” physical pain, mental anguish, medical expenses, loss of enjoyment of life, and lost wages, and also seeks punitive damages. (Doc. 1-1 at 4).

IV. DISCUSSION
It is undisputed that complete diversity of parties exists in this case. (Doc. 7 at 2). The Plaintiff argues, however, that the case is due to be remanded because she does not assert a specific monetary amount in her complaint, and the Defendants not proven the $75,000 amount in controversy required by 28 U.S.C § 1332 for the Court to exercise federal diversity jurisdiction.

In opposing remand, the Defendants argue that the complaint meets the amount in controversy requirement because the complaint alleges “serious bodily injuries,” and seeks damages for mental anguish, medical expenses, and punitive damages. Because the complaint does not describe the nature of Goosby’s injuries or medical treatment, determining a “value would be an exercise in impermissible speculation.” Piard v. VRP Transportation, Inc., 2019 WL 210402, at *5 (M.D. Ala. 2019). Upon review of the record, however, the Court concludes that the Defendants have shown enough through the allegations of the complaint, particularly the allegation of “serious bodily injuries,” to justify post-removal discovery. Id.; cf. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 554 (2014) (holding in a Class Action Fairness Act case removal that the district court may permit post-removal discovery and make jurisdictional findings under the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard the amount in controversy is in dispute when after removal) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 112-10, p. 16 (2011)). The Court will allow discovery limited to evidence which is relevant to the amount in controversy at the time the case was removed.

V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons as stated, it is ORDERED as follows:
1. Defendants may serve written jurisdictional discovery (interrogatories, requests for production of documents, and requests for admissions) on the Plaintiff within ten days of the entry of this Order. The discovery must be narrowly tailored to the amount in controversy, and the parties should work together in good faith in the coordination and completion of discovery.
2. The Plaintiff is DIRECTED to respond to the Defendants’ requests within 21 days of service or by March 1, 2021, whichever is later.
3. The Defendants have until March 8, 2021, to file a supplemental memorandum with evidence in opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to remand.
4. The Plaintiff has until March 15, 2021 to file a reply.
5. Ruling on the motions to remand is RESERVED.

DONE this 28th day of January, 2021.

All Citations
Slip Copy, 2021 WL 298817

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