2021 WL 321663

NOTE: UNPUBLISHED OPINION, SEE WA R GEN GR 14.1
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1.
BRIAN SUDBECK, Appellant,
v.
EAGLE TRANSPORT, Inc., Respondent.
No. 81154-1-I
|
2/1/2021
Opinion

ANDRUS, A.C.J.

*1 Brian Sudbeck sued Eagle Transport, Inc. (“Eagle”) for negligence after he fell through the roof of a damaged semitrailer belonging to Eagle. The trial court granted summary judgment for Eagle, concluding it had discharged any duty it owed to Sudbeck, who was on site to repair the trailer. We affirm.

FACTS
Brian Sudbeck is a tractor trailer mechanic with twelve years of experience, six years of which he spent working for Mobile One Trailer Repair, LLC (“Mobile One”). Defendant Eagle Transport, Inc. exclusively retains Mobile One to perform all repairs and maintenance on its semitrailers. The two companies have a business relationship extending twenty-five years.

On June 15, 2017, a forklift mast hit the roof of one of Eagle’s trailers, poking a hole in the top and damaging a “spar.”1 Eagle employee Tom Robertson inspected the damage and alerted his managers, Jeff Pepper and Jake Smith, via email and attached two .jpeg image files to his message.2 Neither Pepper nor Smith visually inspected the damage. Instead, Smith called Bruce Frewaldt, owner of Mobile One, and requested he come to look at “cracks in the roof” of the trailer. According to Eagle President Tyler Beach, Eagle’s standard procedure was to communicate to Mobile One the exact faulty condition to be remedied when requesting repairs. Frewaldt testified, however, that Smith did not tell him a spar had been damaged.

Frewaldt instructed Sudbeck to go to Eagle’s place of business first thing in the morning of June 16, 2017 to make the repairs. There is an issue of fact as to what exactly Frewaldt communicated about the nature of the required repairs. Frewaldt testified he gave Sudbeck a hand-written list, which stated “cracks in roof.” Sudbeck testified he was instructed to fix a “small hole” in the roof.

Sudbeck arrived at Eagle’s facility at approximately 6:45 a.m. Sudbeck had performed work at Eagle’s facility on many occasions and had been instructed by Eagle employees to knock on a specific door if he wanted to contact them while performing any repair work. Sudbeck knocked on the door and waited approximately 5-10 minutes. When no one came to the door, Sudbeck decided to start working on the trailer. It was not unusual for Mobile One employees to begin repairs without checking in with employees from Eagle.

Sudbeck located the trailer parked up against Eagle’s loading dock. Although Sudbeck conceded he normally assesses damage from the inside of a trailer, Eagle’s trailer was parked in such a way that he could not access the interior without first entering Eagle’s facility. Using his ladder, Sudbeck climbed on top of the trailer without fall protection and walked from the front to the back of the trailer to find the damage. He testified he stepped only in locations he believed were supported by interior roof bows. Sudbeck testified walking on the bows is common practice when repairing a trailer roof, but the fiberglass roof was too weathered and dirty for Sudbeck to see the exact location of the bows. Sudbeck found a small hole in the roof near the back of the trailer. He turned to walk back to the front of the trailer, took a few steps and then fell through the roof, landing on the inside of the trailer and suffering serious injuries. Sudbeck yelled for help and called 911 on his cell phone before Eagle employees came to his aid.

*2 Sudbeck filed this suit against Eagle claiming Eagle was negligent in failing to protect him from the damaged roof bow. Eagle sought summary judgment, arguing that it discharged its duty to Sudbeck as a matter of law when it informed Mobile One that the trailer had cracks in the roof and requested repairs. The trial court granted Eagle’s motion and Sudbeck appealed.

ANALYSIS
Sudbeck argues the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Eagle discharged the duty it owed to Sudbeck as a business invitee. We disagree.

We review summary judgment orders de novo and perform the same inquiry as the trial court. McDevitt v. Harbor View Med. Ctr., 179 Wn.2d 59, 64, 316 P.3d 469 (2013). Summary judgment is only appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact based on the record before the trial court. CR 56(c). All reasonable inferences are considered in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Robb v. City of Seattle, 176 Wn.2d 427, 432-33, 295 P.3d 212 (2013).

A plaintiff in a negligence action must show: (1) the existence of a duty owed to the plaintiff (2) breach of that duty (3) a resulting injury and (4) a proximate cause between the breach and the duty. Iwai v. State, 129 Wn.2d 84, 96, 915 P.2d 1089 (1996).

At issue here is the extent of Eagle’s duty to Sudbeck when Eagle invited him to its facility to repair a damaged trailer roof. Whether a duty exists is a question of law. Tincani v. Inland Empire Zoological Soc’y, 124 Wn.2d 121, 128, 875 P.2d 621 (1994). “The legal duty owed by a landowner to a person entering the premises depends on whether the entrant falls under the common law category of a trespasser, licensee, or invitee.” Iwai, 129 Wn.2d at 90-91. “An invitee is either a public invitee or a business visitor.” Thompson v. Katzer, 86 Wn. App. 280, 284, 936 P.2d 421 (1997) (quotations omitted). It is undisputed that Sudbeck was a business invitee.

Washington has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts sections 343 and 343A as the law regarding a landowner’s duty to a business invitee. Iwai, 129 Wn.2d at 96. Section 343 states:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he
(a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and
(b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).

The trial court concluded Sudbeck failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to prong (b) of section 343 because he presented no evidence to suggest that Eagle should have expected Sudbeck, a veteran trailer repairman specifically invited to fix a damaged roof, would fail to discover the damaged bow or fail to protect himself from falling through the roof. Sudbeck argues the trial court erred in reaching this conclusion because, based on the information Eagle communicated to Mobile One, he had no reason to believe that a roof bow was damaged. But the focus of prong (b) is not what Sudbeck actually knew about the extent of the damage before he climbed to the top of Eagle’s trailer, but what Eagle should have expected a repairman such as Sudbeck to discover when that repairman was hired to inspect and repair roof damage.

*3 Addressing an analogous issue, this court held that “landowners who invite individuals with superior knowledge onto their property to make repairs on the property should not be required to know of defects the repairs were intended to discover and remedy or to anticipate defects within the expertise of the experts.” Stimus v. Hagstrom, 88 Wn. App. 286, 296, 944 P.2d 1076 (1997). In Stimus, a roofer sued property owners when she fell through their dry-rotted roof, alleging they had failed to warn her of the dangerous condition caused by the dry rot. Id. at 289-92. The homeowners had asked Stimus to conduct repairs after the roof sustained extensive water damage and specifically requested that one of Stimus’s employees check for dry-rot damage. Id. at 289-90. The trial court granted summary judgment to the homeowners and Stimus appealed, arguing the Hagstroms had a duty to warn her of the dangerous condition and an issue of fact existed as to whether the Hagstroms knew of but failed to disclose the defect to her. Id. at 292.

The court rejected Stimus’s argument, reasoning that, under section 343, “[t]he duty owed by the Hagstroms to the roofers … must be examined in light of the expectations and knowledge of the parties.” Id. at 296. The court concluded that, because the roofers “were in the position of having superior knowledge concerning the roof and the implications of the Hagstroms’ statements about dry rot,” the Hagstroms’ duty to warn of the danger extended only to dangers of which the owners were aware and which the roofers “could not reasonably have discovered.” Id. With the expertise of the roofers in mind, the court held that the Hagstroms fulfilled their duty when they warned the roofers about the potential dry rot. Id.

In this case, Eagle similarly discharged its duty to warn Sudbeck of potential dangers when it informed Mobile One that there was a crack or hole in the roof of the trailer and asked a contractor with whom it had worked for decades to come to the facility to inspect and repair the damage. There is no evidence to support Sudbeck’s contention that Eagle should have expected he would not discover or realize the danger from the roof damage, or would fail to protect himself against it.

Sudbeck argues on appeal there is no evidence in the record that he could have reasonably discovered the dangerous condition through a visual inspection of the trailer’s interior.3 But if the damage was not observable to Sudbeck, an expert in trailer repairs, it is hard to imagine how it could have been observable to Eagle. In fact, the email from Robertson to Pepper and Smith indicated he had gone inside the trailer, identified a damaged spar and hole in the top of the roof, and attached image files for Pepper and Smith to review. This undisputed evidence shows that the extent of the damage was apparent by visual inspection of the trailer’s interior.

Moreover, even if Sudbeck could not have seen the damaged bow, he was in a position of superior knowledge regarding the potential risks to physical safety he might encounter when climbing onto and walking across a semitrailer fiberglass roof. Sudbeck was an experienced trailer repairman, was trained in fall protection, and was aware that Mobile One provided employees with fall protection equipment when working on trailer roofs. Sudbeck admitted he was aware the roof was damaged, knew there was the possibility that a roof bow had been compromised and a missing or damaged bow would reduce the roof’s ability to support his weight, and understood the danger of falling through the roof. He further testified it was common practice to check the inside of damaged trailers before climbing onto possibly structurally-compromised trailers. Sudbeck’s supervisor testified that no one expected Sudbeck to climb onto the roof of the trailer. This undisputed evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that Eagle had no reason to expect that a Mobile One repairman would be unable to discover damage that might present a risk to that person’s physical safety or to protect himself from that risk.

*4 We affirm.

WE CONCUR:
All Citations
Not Reported in Pac. Rptr., 2021 WL 321663

Footnotes

1
Spars run horizontally across the inside of the top of the trailer to support the trailer’s roof. They are also referred to as “roof bows.”

2
Neither Eagle nor Sudbeck submitted copies of these images to the trial court and they are not in the record before this court.

3
Eagle argues that this is a new issue raised for the first time on appeal in contravention of RAP 9.12. Because we affirm summary judgment for Eagle, we decline to reach this argument here.

2021 WL 433976

United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana,
LAKE CHARLES DIVISION.
LAUREN BERTRAM, ET AL
v.
PROGRESSIVE SOUTHEASTERN INSURANCE CO., ET. AL.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 19-01478
|
Filed 02/08/2021

MEMORANDUM RULING AND ORDER
KATHLEEN KAY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
*1 Before the court is a Motion for Attorney Fees [doc. 25] and a Motion for Contempt and Discovery Sanctions [doc. 28] filed by plaintiff, Lauren Bertram, individually and on behalf of her minor children.1 The motions are opposed by defendants Progressive Southeastern Insurance Company and Empire National, Inc. (hereinafter collectively referred to as “defendants”). Docs. 32, 42, 52. The motions have been referred to the undersigned in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636.

For the following reasons the motions are GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND
On October 7, 2019, plaintiff, individually and on behalf of her three minor children, filed suit in the 14th Judicial District Court, Parish of Calcasieu, State of Louisiana. alleging that, on July 16, 2019, her husband was killed in an automobile accident which occurred on Interstate 10. Doc. 1, att. 2, pp. 1-6. Her petition alleges that a tractor trailer driven by defendant Justin Anthony Chong, owned by defendant Empire National, Inc. (“Empire”) and insured by defendant Progressive Southeastern Insurance Company (“Progressive”), crossed from the eastbound lane of Interstate 10 into the westbound lane of Interstate 10 and struck her husband’s vehicle head on resulting in him being ejected from the vehicle and dying at the scene.2 Id.

Plaintiff served her first set of discovery including interrogatories and requests for production of documents on defendants with the petition. Doc. 1, att. 2, pp. 7-19. Defendants Progressive and Empire filed answers to the lawsuit on October 18, 2019, and November 6, 2019, respectively. Doc 1, att. 2 pp. 34-36, 42-44. The lawsuit was removed to this court on November 14, 2019, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Doc. 1.

On March 18, 2020, the undersigned held a status conference with counsel for plaintiff and counsel for defendants. At the conference the parties selected a trial date and the court noted that the parties were free to engage in discovery. Doc. 18.

On May 18, 2020, plaintiff filed a motion to compel and motion for attorney fees. Doc. 25. In her motion and supporting memorandum she alleged that defendants failed to respond to discovery, failed to provide dates for a 30(b)(6) deposition, and failed to provide initial disclosures as provided by Rule 26(a). Doc. 25, att. 1. p. 2. Prior to filing the motion counsel for plaintiff either conferred or attempted to confer with opposing counsel on at least three occasions. Id. On one occasion plaintiff granted defendants a two-week extension to comply with the outstanding requests but, following the two-week period, defendants still failed to provide or produce any information whatsoever to the plaintiff. Id.

*2 The court issued a Notice of Motion Setting on the motion to compel and motion for attorney fees which set a deadline of twenty-one days for defendants to file a response in opposition to the motion. Doc. 26. Defendants did not file any response and on July 6, 2020 the court issued an Order stating:

No opposition to the motion having been submitted, it is
ORDERED that on or before 7/24/2020, defendant Empire National, Inc., is to respond to the First Set of Discovery served with the original petition on 10/22/2019. By that same date Empire is to designate a corporate representative and date for a rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Empire.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants Progressive and Empire provide[ ] their initial disclosures mandated by FRCP 26 (a) to plaintiffs no later than 7/24/2020.
Plaintiff has requested attorney fees be awarded. It appears that inaction of these defendants would support such an award but we defer ruling on that request until we are informed by plaintiff of the extent to which these defendants have appropriately responded to this order (or not).
Doc. 27.

Plaintiff filed a Motion for Contempt and Discovery Sanctions pursuant to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on August 5, 2020. Doc. 28. In this motion plaintiff maintains that defendants have taken no action to comply with the court’s July 6, 2020, order and have not produced “a single document or responded to one interrogatory.” Doc. 28, att. 2, p. 10. A Notice of Motion Setting was issued in reference to this motion giving defendants twenty-one days to file a response in opposition. Doc. 29. Defendants failed to file a timely response to the motion and, on September 22, 2020, the undersigned set the matter for a hearing in open court. Doc. 31. The matter was fixed for hearing on October 23, 2020. Id. Three days before the hearing, on October 20, 2020, defendants filed an opposition to the motion for contempt and sanctions. Doc. 32. In their opposition defendants submit that they have responded to plaintiff’s discovery without objection, have designated a corporate representative, and provided initial disclosures. Id., p. 1. Defendants represent that the delay in responding to discovery was not a “disregard for this court’s authority,” but rather defendant Empire’s “difficulty in gathering the requested information.” Id. pp. 1-2.

At the hearing held on Thursday, October 23, 2020, defense counsel stated that he had only received responses from his client the week before and answered the discovery over the weekend. He emailed these discovery responses to counsel for plaintiff on Monday, October 19, 2020 and had the documents and attachments sent by Federal Express on Tuesday, October 19, 2020.3 Counsel for plaintiff pointed out that he first received the disc with exhibits on the morning of the hearing.4 After hearing argument the undersigned emphasized the seriousness of the violation particularly considering the nature of the case and the fact that a year had passed without any discovery forthcoming. The court stated that sanctions would be imposed and attorney fees awarded. See doc. 33. This opinion addresses those issues.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Motion for Attorney Fees—Rule 37(a)
*3 Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney Fees is based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(A) which provides that, when a motion to compel discovery is granted, as in the case here, the court must require the party whose conduct necessitated the motion pay the movant’s expenses and fees. The court should not award expenses and fees if the nondisclosure was “substantially justified” or if “other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(ii)(iii). Plaintiff claims that, as a prevailing party on the motion to compel, she is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a). We agree. Defendants offered no opposition to the motion to compel and consequently we find no justifiable reason for nondisclosure and will grant expenses and attorney’s fees incurred in connection with the filing and prosecution of the motion to compel.

B. Motion for Contempt and Discovery Sanctions—Rule 37(b)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A) provides sanctions that the court may issue for failure to comply with a discovery order. It provides in part,
If a party or a party’s officer, director, or managing agent–or a witness designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a)(4)–fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, … the court where the action is pending may issue further just orders. They may include the following:
(i) directing that the matters embraced in the order or other designated facts be taken as established for purposes of the action, as the prevailing party claims;
(ii) prohibiting the disobedient party from supporting or opposing designated claims or defenses, or from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(iii) striking pleadings in whole or in part;
(iv) staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed;
(v) dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part;
(vi) rendering a default judgment against the disobedient party; or
(vii) treating as contempt of court the failure to obey any order except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A). In her motion plaintiff first asks the court to sanction the defendants by issuing a default judgment. Alternatively, she moves the court to deem certain facts admitted, strike defendants’ defenses, and/or find defendants in contempt of court.

Rule 37 (b)(2) allows the court to “impose ‘just’ sanctions on parties who disobey a discovery order.” F.D.I.C. v. Conner, 20 F.3d 1376, 1380 (5th Cir.1994). Rule 37 grants a court considerable, but not unlimited, discretion in fashioning appropriate penalties for those who disobey such an order. Chilcutt v. United States, 4 F.3d 1313, 1320 (5th Cir.1993). The law favors resolution of legal claims on the merits; and, because terminating the litigation is a severe sanction, the Fifth Circuit has characterized termination as “draconian” or a “remedy of last resort.” Batson v. Neal Spelce Associates, Inc., 765 F.2d 511, 515 (5th Cir.1985).

Initially and in preparation for hearing we were indeed considering a recommendation of the sanction of default considering defendants’ failure to: (1) provide initial disclosures as provided in Rule 26; (2) respond to interrogatories and request for production that were served with the original petition; (3) designate a corporate representative for a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition; (4) provide any opposition to the motion to compel; and (5) abide by this court’s order mandating that they respond to discovery by a certain deadline. It was not until three days before the hearing on the motion for contempt and sanctions that defendants filed an untimely opposition. Before that point it appeared to us as though defendants simply decided not to participate in this lawsuit.

Nevertheless, since discovery has been provided, we find that a lesser sanction is in order. But defendants are cautioned that any further actions that we perceive as an attempt to impede or hinder the discovery process and/or the expeditious movement of this case to trial will result in a more severe sanction.

*4 Section (b)(2)(C) of Rule 37 provides that in addition to or instead of the sanctions listed in section (b)(2)(A),
the court must order the disobedient party, the attorney advising that party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(C).

In Tollett v. City of Kemah, 285 F.3d 357 (5th Cir.2002), the Fifth Circuit differentiated between Rule 37(a) and Rule 37(b) and discussed the method by which courts must determine the reasonableness of attorney’s fees under either section.
Under Rule 37, if a motion to compel is granted, the district court shall … require the party … whose conduct necessitated the motion … to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney’s fees. Likewise, for failure to comply with a discovery order, the district court shall require the party failing to obey the order … to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure.
Id. at 367-69 (emphasis in original) (quotations and citation omitted). The court noted that the lodestar method is used to calculate attorney’s fees under either section of Rule 37. Id. at 367.

Finding that defendants gave no justifiable reason for their failure to abide by the court’s order issued on July 6, 2020, we will grant expenses and attorney fees incurred in filing the motion for contempt and discovery sanctions.

C. Calculating Attorney’s Fees
Determining the amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees is a two-step process. “Initially, the district court must determine the reasonable number of hours expended on the litigation and the reasonable hourly rate for the participating lawyers.” Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir.1995)(citing Hensley v. Eckerhart, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939 (1983)). “Then, the district court must multiply the reasonable hours by the reasonable hourly rates.” Id.(citing Blum v. Stenson, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1544 (1984). “The product of this multiplication is the lodestar, which the district court them either accepts or adjusts upward or downward, depending on the circumstances of the case.” Id.(citing Brantley v. Surles, 804 F.2d 321, 325 (5th Cir.1986).

In this case plaintiff seeks a total award of $13,685 which represents 39.10 hours of work performed by her attorney Jere Jay Bice in connection with both the motion to compel and the motion for contempt and discovery sanctions. See doc. 49, att. 1.

Defendants do not contest the hourly fee but contend that the amount of time expended is excessive and that certain time entries should be disregarded. See Doc. 52. A review of the affidavit submitted by counsel for plaintiff shows that he spent 6.3 hours researching the motion to compel, drafting the motion to compel, and reviewing court notices regarding the motion setting and deadlines. Doc. 41, att. 1, p. 2. As for the motion for contempt and discovery sanctions, counsel submits a total of 11 hours for researching, drafting, and revising the motion and memorandum. Id., pp. 2-3.

*5 A review of the record in this case reveals that counsel for plaintiff tried on several occasions, to no avail, to contact or work with counsel for defendant prior to filing the motion to compel. He filed a motion along with a memorandum brief and attachments totaling 70 pages. Doc. 25. After the court granted the motion and issued its order and defendants still failed to respond to plaintiff’s discovery, plaintiff filed a motion for contempt and discovery sanctions (26 pages) seeking, among other things, his attorney fees. Doc. 28. Based on the work performed in this case, the court finds that the number of hours expended preparing these two motions is reasonable.

Counsel for plaintiff requests and defendants do not dispute that he should be compensated for the time spent preparing for and travelling to the hearing on the motion for contempt and sanctions. Doc. 49, att. 1, p. 3. Thus, we find that the eight hours spent in this regard is reasonable and should be awarded.

At the hearing on the motion the court requested that counsel for plaintiff review the discovery information that defendants provided in response to discovery and submit to the court a summary of what has not yet to be produced. In connection with this filing counsel for plaintiff lists a total of 10 hours for reviewing and summarizing the information provided, reviewing minutes from the proceeding, phone conversation with opposing counsel, and preparing a memorandum in response to the court’s request. Doc. 49, att. 1, p. 3. Defendants oppose the time spent reviewing responses to discovery and contend that it was not expended in connection with the filing of the original motion. Doc. 52, p. 3. As noted above, the court instructed plaintiff to review the material provided and report back to the court. Contrary to defendants’ assertion we find that these hours are attributable to the motion to compel, are reasonable, and attorney fees should be awarded.

Plaintiff’s counsel itemizes 2.8 hours of time spent for reviewing defendants’ opposition to the motion for contempt and discovery sanctions and for preparing a reply memorandum. Doc. 49, att. 1, p. 3. Again, we find this to be reasonable and will award fees for this time.

There is one entry in the affidavit for which we will not award fees. Plaintiff’s counsel listed a conference with his client regarding the status of the case and motion to compel. Id. We do not find that the 1 hour entry is in any way related to the prosecution of the motion to compel and will deny attorney’s fees for this entry.

Turning to hourly rates, plaintiff’s attorney, who has practiced law in Lake Charles, Louisiana for over 30 years, seeks an award of $350 per hour. After reviewing recent decisions in this district and noting that the hourly fee is not challenged by defendants we find that the rate of $350 is reasonable and appropriate.5 For these reasons we find that an award of $13,335.00 (38.1 hours at $350/hour) should be awarded to as attorney fees.

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Motion for Attorney Fees [doc. 25] and the Motion for Contempt and Discovery Sanctions [doc. 28] are GRANTED. Defendants Empire National, Inc., and Progressive Southeastern Insurance Company are ordered to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of Thirteen Thousand Three Hundred Thirty-Five Dollars ($13,335.00) to plaintiff within ninety (90) days of the signing of this order.

*6 The effect of this order is suspended for a period of fourteen (14) days from the filing to allow the parties to appeal to the district court for review. Should either party seek review from the district court, then the effect of this order is suspended until final resolution by the district court.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers this 8th day of February, 2021.

All Citations
Slip Copy, 2021 WL 433976

Footnotes

1
The Motion for Attorney Fees [doc.25] was originally filed as a Motion to Compel and Motion for Attorney Fees. On July 6, 2020 the court granted the motion to compel and deferred ruling on an award of attorney fees pending defendants’ response to the order on the motion to compel. Doc. 27.

2
Plaintiff also named Riverside Transport, Inc. as a defendant in her petition but this defendant was voluntarily dismissed. Doc. 12. Defendant Justin Anthony Chong was also voluntarily dismissed from the lawsuit [doc. 15] but plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint added him again as a defendant. Doc. 44.

3
Lake Charles, Louisiana, experienced two hurricanes during this period of time — Hurricane Laura on August 27, 2020, and Hurricane Delta on October 9, 2020 – causing a great deal of property damage in the area and interruption of delivery services to the area.

4
Considering that plaintiff’s counsel had yet to review the answers and documents produced, the court ordered that he report back as to any deficiencies in the production. Plaintiff filed a response to the court’s order and, while she claims that there are deficiencies in the production, she noted that she would pursue the responsiveness through depositions and from other sources, reserving her right to re-urge her motion to compel should it become necessary. Doc. 39.

5
Decisions in this district have awarded $295/hour for a senior partner at a law firm with 27 years-experience (Ryan v. Calcasieu Parish Police Jury, et al, No. 18-cv-1496 (W.D. La. Dec. 16, 2019)), $265/hour for an attorney with 27 years-experience, (Trevillion v Union Pacific R.R., No. 18-cv-610 (W.D. La. Aug. 28, 2019)), and $275/hour for an attorney with 40 years-experience (Bushnell v. Natali, No. 17-01146, 2019 WL 3980698, at *2 (W.D. La. Aug. 21, 2019)).