2021 WL 411146

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, San Antonio Division.
THERESA ACUNA, ASHLEY ACUNA, Plaintiffs,
v.
COVENANT TRANSPORT, INC., CTG LEASING COMPANY, CHARLES JAMES LEACH, Defendants.
SA-20-CV-01102-XR
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Filed 02/05/2021

ORDER
ELIZABETH S. (“BETSY”) CHESTNEY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
*1 Before the Court in the above-styled cause of action is Plaintiffs’ Motion for Protective Order and Motion to Quash Defendant’s Rule 45 Subpoena [#36], which was referred to the undersigned for disposition. The Court held a telephonic hearing on the motion on this day, at which Plaintiffs and Defendants appeared through counsel. At the close of the hearing, the Court issued certain oral rulings, which it now memorializes with this written Order.

This is a personal-injury action arising out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on January 22, 2019. Plaintiffs allege various theories of negligence against Defendant Charles James Leach, the driver of the tractor-trailer that allegedly struck Plaintiffs’ vehicle, and Defendants Covenant Transport, Inc. and CTG Leasing Company, Leach’s alleged employers. Defendants served Plaintiffs with Notices of Deposition by Written Questions on January 19, 2021, requesting employment records from several named previous employers of Plaintiffs. The subpoena requests records dating back to 1972 for Plaintiff Theresa Acuna and to 1990 for Plaintiff Ashley Acuna. These records are described as including, but not limited to, the following:
business records, time sheets, resumes, applications for employment, pre-employment screening/testing forms, questionnaires and results, physical examination reports, medical records, attendance records, evaluation reports, training manuals, reprimands, insurance records, benefits, worker’s compensation records, injury reports, correspondence to or from any other person/entity, or any other information, letters or other writings, instruments or documents of nay kind or character whatsoever in the possession, custody or control of the [employer], and every such record to which the witness may have access pertaining to each [Plaintiff].
(Notice [#36-1] at 3.) Plaintiffs object to the requested discovery on the basis that it is not relevant and proportional to the needs of this case, unduly burdensome, constitutes an invasion of privacy, and seeks information that is privileged. Plaintiffs ask the Court to issue a protective order and limit the scope of discovery at issue to wage and payroll documentation and the timeframe of one year prior to the date of the collision underlying this suit.

Prior to the scheduled hearing, the parties conferred in an attempt to resolve their dispute and were able to reach an agreement to limit the timeframe of the employment requests to three years prior to the date of the collision to the present. They were unable to reach an agreement as to the scope of the requested records.

Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally limits discovery to “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Rule 45 governs subpoenas and provides a mechanism for a party to seek the modification of a subpoena that subjects a person to an undue burden or requires disclosure of privileged or other protected information. Id. at 45(d)(3). In evaluating whether a subpoena imposes an undue burden, courts in the Fifth Circuit consider the following factors: (1) relevance of the information requested, (2) the need of the party for the documents, (3) the breadth of the document request, (4) the time period covered by the request, (5) the particularity with which the party describes the requested documents, and (6) the burden imposed. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 392 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2004). When the target of the subpoena is a non-party, as here, the court may also consider the expense and inconvenience caused by the subpoenas. Id. On a motion to quash, the moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. Id.

*2 Defendants seek the broad category of employment records from Plaintiffs in order to discover the general level of physical activity of Plaintiffs both before and after the accident, as well as the physical requirements of Plaintiffs’ employment. Defendants contend that this information is relevant to Plaintiffs’ claim for damages, which includes medical expenses associated with post-accident surgeries and a nominal amount for lost wages. Plaintiffs have established that allowing Defendants to access the entirety of their employment records is not proportional to the needs of this case, and Defendants were only able articulate the relevance of a subset of the requested documents. The Court will therefore grant Plaintiffs’ motion in part and limit the scope of the discovery to Plaintiffs’ timesheets, wage sheet documents, job applications, resumes, job description(s), performance evaluations, accommodation requests, and worker’s compensation applications (and associated documentation regarding injuries) from January 22, 2016 to the present. In doing so, the Court will also order the parties to confer on and jointly move for the entry of an agreed protective order that will enable them to designate all or some of the employment records to be designated as confidential or for attorney’s eyes to ensure that any private medical or other information remains confidential. The parties are advised that a form protective order is available on the Court’s website.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Protective Order and Motion to Quash Defendant’s Rule 45 Subpoena [#36] is GRANTED IN PART as set forth herein.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties confer and submit an agreed protective order for the Court’s entry on or before February 12, 2021.

SIGNED this 5th day of February, 2021.

All Citations
Slip Copy, 2021 WL 411146

2021 WL 627717

United States District Court, W.D. Louisiana,
Lake Charles Division.
ASHLEY MOREAUX
v.
CLEAR BLUE INSURANCE CO. ET AL.
CASE NO. 2:18-CV-01255
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Filed 02/17/2021

MEMORANDUM RULING
JAMES D. CAIN, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
*1 Before the court is a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [doc. 103] filed by defendant James River Insurance Company (“JRIC”). No opposition to the motion has been filed and the time for doing so has passed. Accordingly, the motion is regarded as unopposed.

I. BACKGROUND
This suit arises from a motor vehicle accident that occurred at about 4:05 am on March 1, 2018, on Interstate 10 in Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana. The accident involved a vehicle driven by plaintiff Ashley Moreaux and a tractor-trailer allegedly “owned, managed, possessed, operated and/or controlled” by defendants Tim Ables Trucking Company LLC (“Tim Ables Trucking”), Shannon Wayne Watson, and Kevin Posey.1 Doc. 16, ¶¶ 8–9.

Ms. Moreaux alleges that she was seriously injured when her vehicle was struck by the tractor-trailer driven by Mr. Watson, as he attempted to merge from the shoulder onto the interstate. Id. at ¶¶ 10–16. She further alleges that Mr. Watson only stopped for a brief time after the crash, then continued down the interstate for another forty miles before eventually reporting the accident. Id. at ¶¶ 17–25. Finally, she asserts that tractor-trailer had an inoperable turn signal and that a prescription bottle containing a Schedule V drug, Soma (carisoprodol), was found in the cab but that authorities were unable to test Watson for his level of impairment at the crash due to the delay caused when he fled the scene. Id. at ¶¶ 26–27.

Ms. Moreaux filed suit against the above-named defendants and their insurer, Clear Blue Insurance Company, in this court on September 24, 2018.2 Doc. 1. She seeks compensatory damages as well as punitive and exemplary damages under Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.4. Doc. 16. In the Second Amended and Restated Complaint she added excess insurers JRIC and Hallmark Insurance Company as defendants. Doc. 57. Since that time Ms. Moreaux has also executed a Gasquet settlement and dismissed her claims against any named defendant, except to the extent that insurance coverage is found applicable to the claims proven at trial. Docs. 88, 90.

JRIC admits that it issued an excess liability insurance policy to Tim Ables Trucking, and that the policy was in effect at the time of the accident. Doc. 74, ¶ 33; see doc. 103, att. 2. It maintains, however, that the policy’s express exclusion for punitive damages means that all claims for such damages against JRIC are barred as a matter of law. Accordingly, it seeks summary judgment on these claims. Doc. 103. No party has responded to the motion and their time for doing so has passed, meaning that the motion is regarded as unopposed.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Under Rule 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The moving party is initially responsible for identifying portions of pleadings and discovery that show the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995). He may meet his burden by pointing out “the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party’s case.” Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 404 (5th Cir. 2003). The non-moving party is then required to go beyond the pleadings and show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To this end he must submit “significant probative evidence” in support of his claim. State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1990). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (citations omitted).

*2 A court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). The court is also required to view all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Clift v. Clift, 210 F.3d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 2000). Under this standard, a genuine issue of material fact exists if a reasonable trier of fact could render a verdict for the nonmoving party. Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 2008).

III. LAW & APPLICATION
Under Louisiana law, an insurance policy is a contract and should be interpreted using the general rules set forth in the Louisiana Civil Code. Williams v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 2014 WL 2197067, at *2 (M.D. La. May 27, 2014). The court’s role, therefore, is to determine the parties’ common intent. In this determination words and phrases must be construed “using their plain, ordinary and generally prevailing meaning, unless the words have acquired a technical meaning.” Starr Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Banner Prop. Mgmt. Co., 2018 WL 6448840, at *5 (E.D. La. Dec. 10, 2018) (citing La. Civ. Code art. 2047). Where the terms of the policy are clear and do not lead to absurd consequences, no further interpretation is required. La. Civ. Code art. 2046. An ambiguous term, however, is generally construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage. Cadwallader v. Allstate Ins. Co., 848 So.2d 577, 580 (La. 2003).

Under the terms of JRIC’s policy, JRIC agrees to pay
those sums in excess of the scheduled “underlying insurance” that [Tim Ables Trucking becomes] legally obligated to pay as damages because of injury or property damage to which this insurance applies, provided that the damages would be covered by the scheduled “underlying insurance(s)” or would apply but for the exhaustion of the applicable Limits of Insurance.
Doc. 103, att. 2, p. 6. Under a section entitled “Exclusion – Punitive Damages,” however, the policy also excludes coverage for “[c]ivil or criminal fines, sanctions or penalties, whether imposed pursuant to statute or otherwise,” as well as “[p]unitive or exemplary damages and the multiplied portion of multiplied damages.” Id. at 22.

Here there is no ambiguity as to the exclusion and its impact on coverage. “Absent a conflict with statutory provisions or public policy, insurers … are entitled to limit their liability and to impose and to enforce reasonable conditions upon the policy obligations they contractually assume.” La. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Interstate Fire and Cas. Co., 630 So.2d 759, 763 (La. 1994). Louisiana courts have routinely upheld punitive damages exclusions as valid and enforceable. See, e.g., Pike v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 796 So.2d 696 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2001); McDaniel v. DeJean, 556 So.2d 1336 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1990); Yonter v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 802 So.3d 950 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2001). The court finds no basis to depart in this matter, and agrees that punitive damages are not recoverable under JRIC’s policy.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [doc. 103] will be GRANTED and all claims for exemplary and/or punitive damages brought against defendant James River Insurance Company will be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

*3 THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Chambers on this 17th day of February, 2021.

All Citations
Slip Copy, 2021 WL 627717

Footnotes

1
Mr. Posey is only specifically named under the negligent entrustment claim and appears to pay some sort of supervisory role at the company.

2
Plaintiff’s father, Chris Moreaux, originally joined the suit as a plaintiff based on his emotional distress at witnessing the crash scene. See docs. 1, 16. He later voluntarily dismissed these claims. Doc. 44.