2021 WL 2460612

United States District Court, W.D. Kentucky.
JESSE MURRAH PLAINTIFF
v.
TDY INDUSTRIES, LLC DEFENDANT
NO. 3:18-CV-217-CRS
|
Filed 06/16/2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Charles R. Simpson III, Senior Judge United States District Court
*1 This matter is before the Court on Defendant TDY Industries, LLC’s (“TDY’s”) motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. DN 73. Plaintiff Jesse Murrah (“Murrah”) filed a response, DN 74, and Defendant replied. DN 76. This matter is now ripe for adjudication. For the following reasons, Defendant’s motion will be granted by separate order.

I. BACKGROUND
This case arises from a single-vehicle accident in which a tractor trailer driven by Plaintiff overturned while rounding a curved interstate ramp in Louisville, Kentucky on February 23, 2017. DN 74 at 1; DN 73-1 at 1. Plaintiff was hauling eleven metal containers of steel wingnuts, which were manufactured and packaged by Defendant, weighing a total of 32,758 pounds and each container measuring about three feet by four feet at the base and standing approximately three feet tall. DN 74 at 1; DN 73-7 at 3. Murrah had picked up the cargo at Defendant’s facility in Lebanon, Kentucky and was in the process of transporting it to Pontiac, Michigan at the time of the accident. DN 73-1 at 1. In accordance with Defendant’s loading procedures, the materials were loaded onto Murrah’s trailer by an employee of TDY without any assistance from Plaintiff. DN 76-2 at 3; DN 73-3 at 4. Plaintiff states that he “observed the the [sic] materials were placed from front to back, but were centered in the middle of the tractor trailer, instead of being distributed from left to right.” DN 76-2 at 3. The containers were not secured in any way by Defendant. DN 73-5 at 3. Murrah’s inspection of the load occurred “from the ground, looking into the bed of the trailer.” DN 74. In the complaint and in discovery responses, Plaintiff attests that he was concerned about how the materials were loaded. DN 1-2 ¶ 9; 76-2 at 3. However, in his response, Plaintiff states that “there was nothing particularly unusual about the load.” DN 74 at 7–8. Plaintiff did not discuss any concerns about the load to TDY’s employees or request any load adjustments. DN 73-1 at 6.

At the time in question, Plaintiff was an independent contractor driving commercial tractor trailers for the carrier C.W. Express, LLC. DN 73-1 at 1. A brokerage agreement that both parties agree applies to the events in this case states that “[u]nless access is prohibited, Carrier assumes all responsibility for the placement, securement and transportation of commodities being shipped and for training its drivers to insure that the placement, securement and transportation of commodities is performed in compliance with all federal, state and local laws and regulations.” DN 73-4 at 3. In addition, it states that “Shipper agrees that Carrier has the right to request any load adjustments.” Id.

Murrah brought this action in Kentucky state court on December 1, 2017, alleging that TDY was negligent in loading the materials onto Plaintiff’s trailer. DN 1-2. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s negligent loading caused the materials to shift while rounding the interstate ramp, which caused the trailer and, consequently, the truck to which it was attached to overturn. Id. at ¶ 12. The complaint seeks compensatory as well as punitive damages. Defendant removed the case to federal court on April 9, 2018 on grounds of diversity jurisdiction. DN 1-1. After completion of discovery, Defendant filed the present motion for summary judgment. DN 73.

II. LEGAL STANDARD
*2 A party moving for summary judgment must show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Such an absence may be shown “by demonstrating that the nonmoving party lacks evidence to support an essential element of its case.” Ford v. GMC, 305 F.3d 545, 551 (6th Cir. 2002). “In response, the nonmoving party must present ‘significant probative evidence’ to show that ‘there is [more than] some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.’ ” Id. (quoting Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., 8 F.3d 335, 339–40 (6th Cir. 1993) (alteration in the original)). A genuine issue for trial exists when “there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Additionally, the Court must draw all factual inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

III. ANALYSIS
For a negligence claim to succeed under Kentucky law, a plaintiff must prove “(1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, (2) the defendant breached the standard by which his or her duty is measured, and (3) consequent injury.” Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons, 113 S.W.3d 85, 88 (Ky. 2003). Defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because it owed no duty of care to Plaintiff to ensure the safety of the load. DN 73-1 at 7. Whether a duty exists is a question of law to be determined by the court. Pathways, Inc., 412 S.W.2d. at 89. Defendant claims that federal regulations and case law “expressly place the responsibility squarely upon Plaintiff, as the driver for the Carrier, to ensure proper placement and securement of the load prior to transport.” DN 73-1 at 7–8. Therefore, Defendant argues, “[p]laintiff’s duties supersede any allegations of negligence on the part of TDY.” Id. at 8.

Defendant points to certain regulations promulgated under the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Act (“FMCSA”). These regulations apply to carriers and not shippers. 49 C.F.R. § 390.3(a) (applying to “all employers, employees and commercial vehicles, which transport property or passengers in interstate commerce”). They provide that “[a] driver may not operate a commercial motor vehicle … unless … [t]he commercial motor vehicle’s cargo is properly distributed and adequately secured” in accordance with the technical specifications of the chapter. 49 C.F.R. § 392.9(a). Specifically, “[c]argo must be contained, immobilized or secured … to prevent shifting upon or within the vehicle to such an extent that the vehicle’s stability or maneuverability is adversely affected.” 49 C.F.R. § 393.100(c). Defendant argues that these regulations alone establish that it owed no duty to Plaintiff to properly load or secure the materials. DN 73-1 at 8–9. The Sixth Circuit has noted that the FMCSA regulations, in general, are “indicative of the proper allocation of duty as between a common carrier and a shipper for the proper loading of goods.” Rector v. Gen. Motors Corp., 963 F.2d 144, 147 (6th Cir. 1992). However, although the FMCSA regulations do place a nondelegable legal duty on drivers to ensure proper load placement and securement, it does not follow that shippers are absolved of all duty to the driver when the shipper assumes the responsibility of loading the cargo, as is the case here. See Pierce v. Cub Cadet Corp., 875 F.2d 866, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 14626, *9 (6th Cir.1989) (“Only if and when a shipper assumes the responsibility for loading its property on a motor vehicle, does it have the duty to exercise reasonable care to see that the load is properly secured.”).

*3 When the shipper assumes the responsibility of loading the cargo, “the general rule is that he becomes liable for the defects which are latent and concealed and cannot be discerned by ordinary observation by the agents of the carrier; but if the improper loading is apparent, the carrier will be liable notwithstanding the negligence of the shipper.” United States v. Savage Truck Line, Inc., 209 F.2d 442, 445 (4th Cir. 1953). The so-called “Savage rule” has been accepted by most federal and state courts. Decker v. New England Pub. Warehouse, Inc., 749 A.2d 762, 767 (Me. 2000) (“Most courts now accept the rationale of Savage and require carriers to take responsibility for the loads they carry even if those loads have been improperly loaded by others.”); Kucharski v. Orbis Corp., No. 14-cv-05574, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68611, at *28 n.2 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2017) (collecting cases that “have either explicitly applied the Savage rule or utilized rationale embodied in the Savage rule”). The Sixth Circuit has stated in an unpublished opinion that the rule “comports with Kentucky’s jurisprudence on negligence and contributory negligence.” Pierce, 875 F.2d 866, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 14626, *9. Likewise, it has also been applied by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in an unpublished opinion. Musial v. PTC All. Corp., Nos. 2011-CA-001365-MR, 2011-CA-001481-MR, 2012 Ky. App. Unpub. LEXIS 639, at *19 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2012). Therefore, since Kentucky’s highest court has not spoken directly on the issue of what duty a shipper owes to a carrier when it assumes the responsibility of loading cargo, the Court will apply the Savage rule in this case. See Rutherford v. Columbia Gas, 575 F.3d 616, 619 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Where no controlling state decision exists, the federal court must attempt to predict what the state’s highest court would do.” (quoting Wankier v. Crown Equip. Corp., 353 F.3d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 2003)).

Because it is undisputed that TDY loaded the cargo into Plaintiff’s trailer on the day at issue, Defendant can only be liable for latent defects in the loading that would not have been apparent to Murrah upon ordinary observation. Savage Truck Line, Inc., 209 F.2d at 445. Thus, to survive summary judgment, Plaintiff must present evidence that a triable issue of fact exists as to whether a latent defect in TDY’s loading of the materials caused his injuries. As discussed below, plaintiff has not met this burden.

Courts applying the Savage rule have looked at two factors in deciding whether a latent defect exists: the driver’s level of experience and whether any assurances were given to the driver by the shipper regarding the safety of the load. See, e.g., Aragon v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 735 F.3d 807, 810 (8th Cir. 2013); Vargo-Schaper v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 619 F.3d 845, 849 (8th Cir. 2010). These factors go toward assessing the risk that should have been apparent to the driver upon inspecting the load. See Aragon, 735 F.3d at 810. “It stands to reason drivers with more experience are more capable of detecting loading defects than those without experience.” Vargo-Schaper, 619 F.3d at 849. In addition, reasonable reliance on assurances from the shipper, who is familiar with the materials themselves and with loading them, may conceal what would otherwise be an obvious defect. Spence v. ESAB Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 212, 221–222 (3d Cir. 2010).

For instance, in Franklin Stainless Corp. v. Marlo Transport Corp., the Fourth Circuit noted that although the loading of metal coils down the center of the trailer by the shipper without any type of securement was, of course, apparent to the driver upon visual inspection, “[i]t does not follow, however, that the defect in this manner of loading was open and obvious.” 748 F.2d 865, 868 (4th Cir. 1984). The court arrived at this conclusion because the driver had told the shipper that he had never hauled steel coils before, to which the shipper replied with assurances that the loading method was safe. Id. at 866, 869. See also Syngenta Crop Prod. v. Doyle Brant, Inc., No. 3:06-CV-84-S, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3492, at *11–12 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 15, 2008) (finding an issue of fact to exist regarding whether defect in loading was latent because the driver testified he had never hauled the type of container at issue and the shipper gave assurances that the load would not shift).

*4 However, in Decker v. New England Public Warehouse, Inc., the court held that an unsafe loading configuration was not latent. 749 A.2d at 768. The court explained that in addition to the plaintiff being “an experienced driver for an established carrier,” he only inspected the cargo from ground level and assumed the load configuration to be safe. Id. at 767–68. The driver’s inspection should have revealed an unsafe configuration, the court reasoned, adding that “[a]n inadequate inspection does not force liability onto the shippers.” Id. at 768. Likewise, in Vargo-Schaper v. Weyerhaeuser Co., the court held that there was no latent defect in the loading of bundles of cardboard boxes because any “crowning” effect, which would have resulted in instability of the load, “would have been visible upon inspection.” 619 F.3d at 850. The court found that the two factors discussed above did not apply because the driver had “years of experience” driving tractor trailers, including handling loads for the shipper whose cargo was involved in the accident at issue in the case, and there was no evidence of any assurances given by the shipper regarding the safety of the load. Id.

In this case, Plaintiff has failed to show any evidence that his alleged damages were the result of a latent defect in Defendant’s loading of cargo onto his trailer. To begin, the Court notes that it is unclear from his response what Plaintiff believes the alleged defect was that caused his accident. The complaint alleges that Defendant “placed large metal material for shipment along the middle of the tractor, doing nothing to ensure that the material could not shift while in transit.” DN 1-1 ¶ 8. Then, Plaintiff mentions in his response, but does not cite to or attach as an exhibit, a statement from Plaintiff’s expert report that the loading of the containers single file down the middle of the trailer was improper because “the load was not centered between the fifth wheel of the truck and the rear axel tires,” creating an “unbalanced load.” DN 74 at 2; DN 50-1 at 23. The report stops short of stating that the load being unbalanced in this way is what caused the load to shift and thereby cause the rollover. See id. at 23–24. Instead, the report continues, stating that “there was no reason for the containers to shift to the left unless they were loaded incorrectly, to the left of the centerline of the trailer, front to back.”1 Id. at 24. These two statements appear to conflict as to the alleged incorrect loading method. However, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, the Court will assume that not centering the load between the fifth wheel of the truck and the rear axel tires and the containers being loaded to the left of the centerline of the trailer are both potential theories of the alleged defect that caused the rollover. In addition to the load configuration, Plaintiff also suggests that the lack of securement, such as strapping, was a defect that caused the rollover. DN 74 at 2. In his response, Plaintiff cites to the deposition of one of TDY’s employees who responded in the affirmative when asked if driving with the containers unsecured by straps was a dangerous thing to do and whether it could cause a truck to overturn. Id.; DN 74-2 at 2–3.

No matter which theory Plaintiff relies on, he has put forward no evidence that any of these potential defects were latent. Although he had never previously transported cargo for Defendant, Plaintiff describes himself as an experienced driver who knew his responsibilities. DN 76-1 at 2– 3, 6. He also states in his deposition that he began learning about proper loading techniques while working for a furniture company in the 90s, the time at which he also began training for his CDL license. Id. 2–3. In addition, Plaintiff offers no evidence that Defendant gave any assurances regarding the safety of the load. The complaint alleges that “Plaintiff remarked at the placement of the material, but Defendant’s employees remarked that this was normal.” DN 1-2 ¶ 9. However, Plaintiff has not proven this assertion through the discovery process. Since neither of the above factors weigh in favor of the Plaintiff, there is no way for Plaintiff to prove that the load placement or lack of strapping were latent defects that were undiscoverable upon ordinary observation. To the contrary, both the placement of the cargo and the lack of securement were open and obvious. Plaintiff “had the opportunity to inspect the cargo and assure himself that it was properly distributed and adequately secured, as he was required to do under the [FMCSA] Safety Regulations.” Aragon, 735 F.3d at 812. Plaintiff’s failure to appreciate the risks of transporting the cargo, when the load placement and lack of securement were open and obvious to him, does not transfer responsibility onto Defendant.

*5 Yet, Plaintiff insists that “there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defect in Defendant’s loading was apparent.” DN 74 at 6. He states in his response that “there was nothing particularly unusual about the load” and that he “relied on the knowledge of the shipper.” Id. at 8. Plaintiff claims this was reasonable to do, citing Defendant’s expert as stating that “the friction of the metal tub and the wood floor could be sufficient,” and that additional securement may be unnecessary in some circumstances. Id. at 8. However, the Savage rule does not consider the reasonableness of the driver’s belief regarding the safety of the load when that belief is not based on assurances from the shipper. See Franklin Stainless Corp., 748 F.2d at 869. The driver has the primary obligation to know how to properly distribute and secure the load he is transporting and to ensure that both are accomplished. Savage Truck Line, Inc., 209 F.2d at 445 (“The primary duty as to the safe loading of property is therefore upon the carrier.”); 49 C.F.R. §§ 392.9(a), 393.100(c); DN 73-4 at 3. This remains the case even if the driver mistakenly assesses the safety of the load. See Decker, 749 A.2d at 768. Plaintiff saw how the cargo was loaded and had a right, as well as a duty under FMCSA regulations, to request an adjustment. DN 73-4 at 3 (“Shipper agrees that Carrier has the right to request any load adjustments.”); 49 C.F.R. §§ 392.9(a), 393.100(c). The fact that Plaintiff “lacked the requisite knowledge to request a load adjustment,” as he claims, was not the fault of Defendant, as any potential defect in Defendant’s loading was open and obvious to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant had knowledge that the load was unsafe and would shift, pointing to a statement of one of Defendant’s employees that he remembered one rollover incident that happened previously involving the transportation of Defendant’s cargo. DN 74 at 7–8. Plaintiff suggests that this statement makes the alleged defect latent because “[o]nly the shippers have the knowledge that … [the load] would [shift], and in fact had shifted [previously].” Id. at 8. However, this statement of TDY’s employee is irrelevant. In addition to the fact that Plaintiff has not proven that such an incident did in fact occur, the employee did not state that the alleged accident was due to a shifting load or that Defendant was in any way responsible. See DN 73-5 at 6. Therefore, Plaintiff’s arguments fail to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether there was a latent defect in how Defendant loaded Murrah’s trailer.

Lastly, Plaintiff points to certain language in the brokerage agreement that he claims places responsibility of Defendant. First, he claims that it limits Plaintiff’s ability “to participate in the loading of the trailer” because the agreement states that “drivers are not to remain in the cab of their trucks, nor are they permitted to be on the fiat bed of the trailer during loading or unloading,” and that “[d]rivers should be a safe distance from any loading or unloading of material.” DN 74 at 8; DN 73-4 at 3. However, this language in no way affected Plaintiff’s ability to make an inspection after the loading took place and then to request an adjustment if necessary. The agreement also states that the carrier is responsible for the placement of the load “unless access is prohibited.” DN 73-4 at 3. Plaintiff claims that his access was prohibited. DN 74 at 9. However, nothing in the record indicates that Plaintiff was not allowed access to his loaded trailer once loading was complete. The loading protocols outlined in the agreement are for the driver’s safety and do not amount to a prohibition on access as Plaintiff suggests.

Finally, Plaintiff highlights other language in the agreement as supporting his position. The agreement states that “Carrier will not be responsible to the extent that employees of the Shipper may assist Carrier’s driver with preparing, loading, or securing the commodities to be shipped and are negligent in doing so.” DN 73-4 at 3. In addition, the agreement provides that the carrier shall be required to indemnify the shipper, “except to the extent of Shipper’s negligence.” Id. Plaintiff argues that these provisions “support[ ] actionability on the part of the Plaintiff against the Defendant shipper here.” DN 74 at 9. This is incorrect. These provisions only state that the carrier will not be liable to the shipper in certain circumstances. They do not, however, state that the shipper will be liable to the carrier in those circumstances. In other words, the language does not overcome the allocation of duties as described in the case law regarding when a shipper is liable to a carrier for its negligent loading. Therefore, nothing in the agreement alters the above Savage rule analysis discussed by the Court. Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence that his damages were the result of a latent defect in Defendant’s loading as he is required to do to survive summary judgment. As a result, no reasonable jury could return a verdict for Plaintiff.

IV. CONCLUSION
*6 For the reasons discussed herein, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, DN 73, will be granted by separate order.

June 15, 2021

All Citations
Slip Copy, 2021 WL 2460612

Footnotes

1
The report states:
The evidence indicates that there was no reason for the containers to shift to the left unless they were loaded incorrectly, to the left of the centerline of the trailer, front to back…. This rollover was caused by the loaded [sic] moving to the left side of the trailer and causing the right-side trailer tires to lose contact with the ground.
DN 50-1 at 24.

2021 IL 126249
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
Thomas ROBERTS et al.
v.
ALEXANDRIA TRANSPORTATION, INC., et al., Appellants
(Safety International, LLC, Appellee).
Docket No. 126249
|
Opinion filed June 17, 2021.

OPINION
JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
*1 ¶ 1 Section 3 of the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act (Contribution Act) (740 ILCS 100/3 (West 2018)) provides that “[t]he pro rata share[1] of each tortfeasor shall be determined in accordance with his relative culpability” and that “no person shall be required to contribute to one seeking contribution an amount greater than his pro rata share.” However, section 3 contains an exception where “the obligation of one or more of the joint tortfeasors is uncollectable. In that event, the remaining tortfeasors shall share the unpaid portions of the uncollectable obligation in accordance with their pro rata liability.” Id.

¶ 2 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit certified a question of law to this court (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 20 (eff. Aug. 1, 1992)). Roberts v. Alexandria Transportation, Inc., 968 F.3d 794, 801 (7th Cir. 2020). The court of appeals asks “whether the obligation of a settling party is uncollectable pursuant to the Illinois Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act, 740 ILCS 100/3 [(West 2018)].” We answer the certified question in the negative, holding that the obligation of a tortfeasor who settles is not “uncollectable” within the meaning of section 3 of the Contribution Act.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 In September 2013, Thomas Roberts was driving a truck westbound through a construction zone on Interstate 70 in Madison County, Illinois, when he saw a flagger holding a sign that said “SLOW.” Roberts slowed down. The flagger suddenly turned the traffic sign from “SLOW” to “STOP.” Roberts abruptly slammed on his brakes.

¶ 5 Alexandre Solomakha had been driving a tractor-trailer behind Roberts for about two miles before the stop. The distance between the two vehicles was about 1½ tractor-trailers. When Solomakha saw Roberts slow down, Solomakha slowed down too. But when Roberts slammed on his brakes, Solomakha was not able to stop his tractor-trailer in time. Solomakha’s tractor-trailer rear-ended Roberts’s truck. Roberts’s injuries resulted in medical bills totaling more than $500,000.

¶ 6 In October 2014, plaintiffs, Thomas and his wife, Diane Roberts, filed a complaint for negligence under Illinois law in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, which sat in diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiffs named as defendants Solomakha, Alexandria Transportation, Inc., and Alex Express, LLC (hereinafter Alex Parties).

¶ 7 In October 2015, the Alex Parties filed a third-party complaint for contribution against several third-party defendants for their role in failing to maintain the safety of the construction site. The Alex Parties filed their contribution claim against Edwards-Kamalduski, LLC (E-K), the general contractor for the road construction project, and Safety International, LLC (Safety), the subcontractor E-K retained through an oral contract to manage (some disputed aspect of) the construction site’s worker safety program. The Alex Parties alleged that, if they are liable to plaintiffs in negligence for the crash, then the third-party defendants are also liable as joint tortfeasors because they failed in their duty to keep the construction site safe for travel by the general public.

*2 ¶ 8 In February 2017, plaintiffs settled with E-K for $50,000. Plaintiffs and E-K filed a joint motion for a finding of good faith pursuant to the Contribution Act. See 740 ILCS 100/2(c), (d) (West 2016). The Alex Parties objected, arguing that E-K’s settlement did not reflect its relative fault. The Alex Parties pointed out that plaintiffs claimed damages including approximately $500,000 in medical bills, $500,000 in future medical treatment, and lifetime lost wages, the total of which exceeded $1 million, without including past pain and suffering. The Alex Parties observed that plaintiffs’ last demand was $2 million and that the E-K settlement amount of $50,000 constituted less than 3% of plaintiffs’ demand. In May 2017, the district court granted the joint motion of plaintiffs and E-K for a finding of good faith and dismissed E-K from the Alex Parties’ third-party contribution action with prejudice.

¶ 9 In late 2017, the Alex Parties settled with plaintiffs for $1.85 million. That settlement released claims against Safety, as well. By its settlement, the Alex Parties paid to plaintiffs the collective tort liability of themselves and of Safety. Therefore, the only remaining claim in the district’s court’s litigation was the Alex Parties’ third-party contribution claim against Safety.

¶ 10 Prior to a jury trial on the Alex Parties’ contribution claim, Safety asked the district court to put all of the settling parties, including plaintiffs, on the verdict form. In May 2018, the district court, as a matter of Illinois law, denied Safety’s request as to plaintiffs. However, the district court determined that the Alex Parties, Safety, and E-K must appear on the verdict form so that the jury could adequately apportion fault among every tortfeasor, even though the court had dismissed E-K from the contribution action.

¶ 11 Giving rise to the certified question before us, in January 2019, the district court determined, based on its interpretation of the Contribution Act, that any share of liability that the jury would assign to E-K should not be reallocated between the Alex Parties and Safety on a pro rata basis. Therefore, the district court ordered that Safety would pay to the Alex Parties only what the jury determined was Safety’s portion of fault and that the Alex Parties would remain liable for E-K’s entire share along with its own.

¶ 12 In March 2019, after the conclusion of the trial, the jury determined the respective percentage of fault for each tortfeasor as follows:
15% Alex Parties
10% Safety
75% E-K.
Consequently, Safety was obligated to contribute 10% of the accident liability, leaving the Alex Parties liable for their share of liability for the accident plus E-K’s, which totaled 90% of the accident liability.

¶ 13 In terms of dollars, the $50,000 settlement payment by E-K and the $1.85 million settlement payment by the Alex Parties established the total common liability of $1.9 million owed to plaintiffs. See Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 161 Ill. 2d 267, 286-87, 204 Ill.Dec. 178, 641 N.E.2d 402 (1994) (explaining that common liability means the good-faith amount stated in the settlement agreement). Judgment was entered in favor of the Alex Parties and against Safety for $190,000, which represented Safety’s 10% pro rata share of the common liability.

¶ 14 The district court denied the Alex Parties’ posttrial motion to alter or amend the judgment, which asked the court to revisit its determination of the reallocation issue. The Alex Parties appealed, contesting the district court’s resolution of the reallocation issue. Roberts, 968 F.3d 794.2

*3 ¶ 15 The court of appeals began its analysis by citing section 2(b) of the Contribution Act, which provides that “[n]o tortfeasor is liable to make contribution beyond his own pro rata share of the common liability” (740 ILCS 100/2(b) (West 2018)). Roberts, 968 F.3d at 800. The court then observed that section 3 of the Contribution Act provides that “[t]he pro rata share of each tortfeasor shall be determined in accordance with his relative culpability” (740 ILCS 100/3 (West 2018)). Roberts, 968 F.3d at 800. The court then cited section 3’s exception where “the obligation of one or more of the joint tortfeasors is uncollectable. In that event, the remaining tortfeasors shall share the unpaid portions of the uncollectable obligation in accordance with their pro rata liability” (740 ILCS 100/3 (West 2018)). Roberts, 968 F.3d at 800.

¶ 16 In this case, the district court ruled that E-K’s obligation was not “uncollectable” and, therefore, did not reallocate E-K’s share of liability between the Alex Parties and Safety. Thus, the court of appeals viewed the meaning of an “uncollectable” obligation as the “key question” from the Alex Parties’ appeal. Id.

¶ 17 The Alex Parties argued that section 2(d) of the Contribution Act, which provides that a tortfeasor who settles with a plaintiff in good faith “is discharged from all liability for any contribution to any other tortfeasor” (740 ILCS 100/2(d) (West 2018)), renders a settling defendant’s obligation, such as E-K’s, “uncollectable” in any future contribution action. The court of appeals could not accept this argument, reasoning as follows: “ ‘Discharged,’ however, does not necessarily mean ‘uncollectable.’ We are unable to find, at least, any instance where an Illinois court has said it does.” Roberts, 968 F.3d at 800.

¶ 18 The court of appeals concluded as follows:
“In this case, the question of whether the obligation of a settling party is uncollectable will determine whether the Alex Parties may recover more than Safety’s pro rata share to account for E-K’s liability, and thus will control the outcome of this appeal. We can find no Illinois cases resolving this issue. We therefore respectfully ask the Illinois Supreme Court to answer the question of whether the obligation of a settling party is uncollectable pursuant to the Illinois Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act, 740 ILCS 100/3 [(West 2018)].” Id. at 801.

¶ 19 The court of appeals certified this question of law pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 20 (eff. Aug. 1, 1992). We agreed to answer the certified question.

¶ 20 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 21 A. Narrow Issue Presented
¶ 22 The narrow scope of the certified question is demonstrated by what it does not address. First, the original plaintiffs have no interest in this claim. Their rights and interests were extinguished by the terms of their agreement with the Alex Parties. See BHI Corp. v. Litgen Concrete Cutting & Coring Co., 346 Ill. App. 3d 300, 305, 281 Ill.Dec. 742, 804 N.E.2d 707 (2004). Rather, this is a third-party contribution claim brought by the Alex Parties against Safety and E-K. The Contribution Act “serves to sort out the relative rights of multiple defendants after the plaintiff has collected from among those defendants who are each fully responsible for all of the damages.” Id. at 306, 281 Ill.Dec. 742, 804 N.E.2d 707.

¶ 23 Second, there is no contention that E-K’s settlement with plaintiffs was not in good faith. Third, neither Safety nor the Alex Parties dispute that, although E-K settled, E-K was properly on the verdict sheet for accurate apportionment of total fault among all tortfeasors. See Barnai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2017 IL App (1st) 171940, ¶ 17, 419 Ill.Dec. 415, 93 N.E.3d 534 (citing Truszewski v. Outboard Motor Marine Corp., 292 Ill. App. 3d 558, 565, 226 Ill.Dec. 537, 685 N.E.2d 992 (1997)).

¶ 24 However, before this court, the Alex Parties and Safety maintain their disagreement on the correct allocation of their respective pro rata shares of the common liability. The Alex Parties contend that a tortfeasor who settles with a plaintiff in good faith “is discharged from all liability for any contribution to any other tortfeasor.” 740 ILCS 100/2(d) (West 2018). The Alex Parties reason that this language makes the obligation of a settling tortfeasor, such as E-K, “uncollectable” in any future contribution action. Therefore, according to the Alex Parties, section 3 of the Contribution Act requires that the 75% share of liability that the jury assigned to E-K be reallocated between the Alex Parties and Safety on a pro rata basis.

*4 ¶ 25 In opposition, Safety contends that a good-faith settlement with a plaintiff does not render the settling party’s obligation “uncollectable” within the meaning of section 3. Therefore, the Contribution Act protects Safety from contributing more than its pro rata share of the common liability, and E-K’s 75% share must not be reallocated between the Alex Parties and Safety.

¶ 26 Thus, the “key question” presented to the court of appeals (Roberts, 968 F.3d at 800), which that court certified to us, is whether the obligation of a settling party is “uncollectable” pursuant to section 3 of the Contribution Act (id. at 801).

¶ 27 B. Principles of Statutory Construction
¶ 28 The certified question requires us to construe several interrelated sections of the Contribution Act. Statutory construction presents a pure question of law that we review de novo. United States v. Glispie, 2020 IL 125483, ¶ 9, ––– Ill.Dec. ––––, ––– N.E.3d ––––; Carver v. Sheriff of La Salle County, 203 Ill. 2d 497, 506-07, 272 Ill.Dec. 312, 787 N.E.2d 127 (2003). We conduct this inquiry within a familiar analytical framework.

¶ 29 The primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. Glispie, 2020 IL 125483, ¶ 9, ––– Ill.Dec. ––––, ––– N.E.3d ––––. All other rules of statutory construction are subordinate to this cardinal principle. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 2012 IL 112566, ¶ 15, 357 Ill.Dec. 520, 963 N.E.2d 918; Carver, 203 Ill. 2d at 507, 272 Ill.Dec. 312, 787 N.E.2d 127. The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Glispie, 2020 IL 125483, ¶ 9, ––– Ill.Dec. ––––, ––– N.E.3d ––––. A statute is viewed as a whole. Id. ¶ 10. Therefore, words and phrases are construed in light of other relevant statutory provisions and not in isolation. Chicago Teachers Union, 2012 IL 112566, ¶ 15, 357 Ill.Dec. 520, 963 N.E.2d 918; Carver, 203 Ill. 2d at 507-08, 272 Ill.Dec. 312, 787 N.E.2d 127. Each word, clause, and sentence of a statute must be given a reasonable meaning, if possible, and should not be rendered superfluous. Chicago Teachers Union, 2012 IL 112566, ¶ 15, 357 Ill.Dec. 520, 963 N.E.2d 918. A court may also consider the reason for the law, the problems sought to be remedied, the purposes to be achieved, and the consequences of construing the statute one way or another. Glispie, 2020 IL 125483, ¶ 10, ––– Ill.Dec. ––––, ––– N.E.3d ––––; Chicago Teachers Union, 2012 IL 112566, ¶ 15, 357 Ill.Dec. 520, 963 N.E.2d 918. The court presumes that the General Assembly, in enacting legislation, did not intend absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice. Carver, 203 Ill. 2d at 508, 272 Ill.Dec. 312, 787 N.E.2d 127.

¶ 30 C. Statutory Overview
¶ 31 We begin by considering the nature and purpose of the Contribution Act as a guide to the intent of the legislature in adopting particular language or provisions. See Lakewood Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC v. Department of Public Health, 2019 IL 124019, ¶ 19, 441 Ill.Dec. 824, 158 N.E.3d 229.

¶ 32 Illinois adheres to the rule of joint and several liability. In general, the common-law doctrine of joint and several liability provides that when two or more individuals tortiously contribute to the same indivisible injury, each individual may be held jointly and severally liable for the entire injury. Woods v. Cole, 181 Ill. 2d 512, 518, 230 Ill.Dec. 204, 693 N.E.2d 333 (1998). Although the legislature has elsewhere placed limitations on the common-law rule (see, e.g., 735 ILCS 5/2-1117 (West 2018) (modifying joint and several liability)), section 4 of the Contribution Act expressly provides: “Rights of Plaintiff Unaffected. *** [A] plaintiff’s right to recover the full amount of his judgment from any one or more defendants subject to liability in tort for the same injury to person or property, or for wrongful death, is not affected by the provisions of this Act.” 740 ILCS 100/4 (West 2018).

*5 ¶ 33 Further, prior to 1977, Illinois courts followed the common-law rule prohibiting contribution among joint tortfeasors. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 8-10, 15 Ill.Dec. 829, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977) (collecting cases). The doctrine of joint and several liability allows a plaintiff to join all tortfeasors in a single action and execute the full amount of judgment against any one or more of the joint tortfeasors. The tortfeasor against whom a judgment was executed had no legal right to seek contribution from other joint tortfeasors. This common-law rule was predicated on the presumption that a wrongdoer had no right to seek judicial relief from his own wrongdoing. Id. The “no-contribution” rule resulted in harsh consequences to defendants. Because the doctrine of joint and several liability allowed the plaintiff to recover fully against any responsible party, the no-contribution rule permitted the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants were equally responsible, to be shouldered by one defendant alone while the other goes completely free. In re Guardianship of Babb, 162 Ill. 2d 153, 167-68, 205 Ill.Dec. 78, 642 N.E.2d 1195 (1994).

¶ 34 In our 1977 decision in Skinner, this court abolished the common-law rule prohibiting contribution among joint tortfeasors. The Skinner court created a contribution action in which liability for the plaintiff’s injuries was to be apportioned among joint tortfeasors based on their relative percentages of fault. Skinner, 70 Ill. 2d at 13-16, 15 Ill.Dec. 829, 374 N.E.2d 437.

¶ 35 In 1979, the legislature enacted the Contribution Act as a codification of this court’s decision in Skinner. BHI Corp. v. Litgen Concrete Cutting & Coring Co., 214 Ill. 2d 356, 363, 292 Ill.Dec. 906, 827 N.E.2d 435 (2005); Johnson v. United Airlines, 203 Ill. 2d 121, 128, 271 Ill.Dec. 258, 784 N.E.2d 812 (2003).

¶ 36 D. Plain Statutory Language: Settling Party’s Obligation Not “Uncollectable”
¶ 37 The Alex Parties argue that the plain meaning of the statutory term “uncollectable” includes the liability of settling tortfeasors. The Alex Parties note that the word “uncollectible” is defined simply as “not capable of being collected.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2485 (1993). The Alex Parties reason that, since a settling party is “discharged from all liability for any contribution to any other tortfeasor” (740 ILCS 100/2(d) (West 2018)), the settling party’s contribution obligation is legally uncollectable.

¶ 38 Section 2 of the Contribution Act provides in relevant part as follows:
“Right of Contribution. (a) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, where 2 or more persons are subject to liability in tort arising out of the same injury to person or property, or the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them, even though judgment has not been entered against any or all of them.
(b) The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability, and his total recovery is limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata share. No tortfeasor is liable to make contribution beyond his own pro rata share of the common liability.
(c) When a release or covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith to one or more persons liable in tort arising out of the same injury or the same wrongful death, it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide but it reduces the recovery on any claim against the others to the extent of any amount stated in the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration actually paid for it, whichever is greater.
(d) The tortfeasor who settles with a claimant pursuant to paragraph (c) is discharged from all liability for any contribution to any other tortfeasor.
(e) A tortfeasor who settles with a claimant pursuant to paragraph (c) is not entitled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability is not extinguished by the settlement.” Id. § 2(a)-(e).
Section 3 provides in relevant part as follows:
*6 “Amount of Contribution. The pro rata share of each tortfeasor shall be determined in accordance with his relative culpability. However, no person shall be required to contribute to one seeking contribution an amount greater than his pro rata share unless the obligation of one or more of the joint tortfeasors is uncollectable. In that event, the remaining tortfeasors shall share the unpaid portions of the uncollectable obligation in accordance with their pro rata liability.” (Emphasis added.) Id. § 3.

¶ 39 We reject the Alex Parties’ argument that section 2(d), which provides that a settling tortfeasor “is discharged from all liability for any contribution to any other tortfeasor” (id. § 2(d)), renders the obligation of that settling party “uncollectable.” To provide that a settling tortfeasor is “discharged” means “to free from an obligation that burdens” or “to get rid of (as a debt or duty) by paying or performing.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 644 (1993). Section 2(d) plainly refers to the effect of settlement on the settling tortfeasor and the other joint tortfeasors. In contrast, section 3’s exception plainly addresses the separate topic of the nature of a joint tortfeasor’s obligation, that is, its collectability. As the court of appeals succinctly observed: “ ‘Discharged,’ however, does not necessarily mean ‘uncollectable.’ ” Roberts, 968 F.3d at 800.

¶ 40 The plain language of section 3 provides that, where “the obligation of one or more of the joint tortfeasors is uncollectable,” “the remaining tortfeasors shall share the unpaid portions of the uncollectable obligation in accordance with their pro rata liability.” (Emphasis added.). 740 ILCS 100/3 (West 2018). The legislature could not have intended to include a settlement as an “uncollectable” obligation because there is no “unpaid portion” of a settlement. Section 2(c) provides that, where a joint tortfeasor settles with a plaintiff, it reduces the recovery on any claim against the other joint tortfeasors to the extent of the amount stated in the settlement agreement or in the amount of the consideration actually paid for the settlement, whichever is greater. Id. § 2(c). In this case, for example, E-K’s settlement payment of $50,000 contributed to the total common liability owed to plaintiffs. Safety accurately argues that E-K’s obligation “was not uncollectable—it was collected.”

¶ 41 Further, our construction of the Contribution Act accords with the general view that “the obligation of a settling tortfeasor is not uncollectible.” See Gregor v. Clark, 560 N.W.2d 744, 745 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). For example, in Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Machine Corp., 345 Ill. App. 3d 645, 647, 280 Ill.Dec. 707, 802 N.E.2d 1228 (2003), Illinois Tool Works settled with the underlying plaintiffs and then filed a contribution claim against Independent Machine, the remaining nonsettling defendant-tortfeasor. The court in Illinois Tool Works recognized the Gregor court’s statement of the general rule that the obligation of a settling tortfeasor was not uncollectable. Id. at 656, 280 Ill.Dec. 707, 802 N.E.2d 1228. However, Independent Machine asserted that any liability owed in contribution was statutorily capped at the amount of its workers’ compensation liability. The appellate court distinguished Gregor on the basis that the statutory cap, rather than a party’s settlement, rendered Independent Machine’s obligation uncollectable. Id.

*7 ¶ 42 In this case, the plain language of section 3 of the Contribution Act, read in light of the plain language of section 2 and of the entire Act, makes it clear that an “uncollectable” obligation, which requires reallocation of proportionate shares of liability among joint tortfeasors, does not include the obligation of a settling joint tortfeasor. 740 ILCS 100/2, 3 (West 2018).

¶ 43 E. Legislative History: Settling Party’s Obligation Not Uncollectable
¶ 44 However, the Alex Parties argue that the legislative history of the Contribution Act confirms its reading of section 3. We disagree. Unless the language of a statute is ambiguous, a court should not resort to further aids of construction and must apply the statute as written. LaSalle Bank National Ass’n v. Cypress Creek 1, LP, 242 Ill. 2d 231, 237, 351 Ill.Dec. 281, 950 N.E.2d 1109 (2011); Burrell v. Southern Truss, 176 Ill. 2d 171, 174, 223 Ill.Dec. 457, 679 N.E.2d 1230 (1997). Although the plain language of section 3 makes discussion of its legislative history unnecessary, the legislative history does not conflict with our construction.

¶ 45 Senate Bill 308, which eventually would be enacted as the Contribution Act, was introduced in March 1979. 81st Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Bill 308, 1979 Sess. Section 3 of the proposed legislation originally provided as follows:
“ ‘[N]o person shall be required to contribute to one seeking contribution an amount greater than his pro rata share unless one or more of the joint tortfeasors is or becomes insolvent in which event the remaining tortfeasors shall share the unpaid portions of the insolvent’s pro rata share in accordance with their pro rata liability.” (Emphases added). I Final Legislative Synopsis and Digest of the 81st Ill. Gen. Assem. (No. 23), at 236.
Senate Bill 308 was amended in committee to replace the references to insolvency with the references to collectability now found in section 3. Id.

¶ 46 The Alex Parties argue that the legislature, in amending section 3 from “insolvent” to “uncollectable,” intended that the reallocation be applied more broadly than to situations where a joint tortfeasor is unable to pay. The Alex Parties reason that, since they cannot collect against E-K, then E-K’s obligation is uncollectable.

¶ 47 We disagree. This court has consistently viewed the statutory references to collectability as referring to insolvency or immunity. See, e.g., Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp., 203 Ill. 2d 64, 80, 270 Ill.Dec. 724, 783 N.E.2d 1024 (2002). (“Section 3 explains how the amount of contribution is determined and what happens when one or more of the tortfeasors is insolvent” (emphasis added)); Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc., 97 Ill. 2d 104, 123, 73 Ill.Dec. 337, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1983) (stating “under the Act, it is the defendant or defendants who must bear the burden of the insolvent or immune defendant” (emphases added) (citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 70, ¶ 303)).

¶ 48 Legislative history, when considered, “is meant to clean up ambiguity, not create it.” Milner v. Department of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 574, 131 S.Ct. 1259, 179 L.Ed.2d 268 (2011). Thus, the legislative history of section 3 of the Contribution Act does not support a broader interpretation of the statute to include the obligation of a settling tortfeasor.

¶ 49 F. Consideration of Joint and Several Liability
¶ 50 We also note the Alex Parties’ invitation to consider our statute providing for modified joint and several liability (735 ILCS 5/2-1117 (West 2018)). Section 2-1117 of the Code of Civil Procedure replaces joint and several liability with several liability with respect to nonmedical damages for those found less than 25% responsible for a plaintiff’s injuries. Id. However, the statute preserves the common-law rule of joint and several liability for medical damages and for all other damages for those found to be 25% or more at fault for a plaintiff’s injuries. Unzicker, 203 Ill. 2d at 84-85, 270 Ill.Dec. 724, 783 N.E.2d 1024 (explaining 735 ILCS 5/2-1117 (West 1994)). The Alex Parties characterize this provision as similar and related, though not strictly in pari materia, to assist us in construing the ambiguity in section 3 of the Contribution Act.

*8 ¶ 51 We decline this invitation. We have concluded that section 3 is unambiguous. In the absence of a clear ambiguity, there is no reason to consider the wording of related statutory provisions in construing the statute before us. Kozak v. Retirement Board of the Firemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 95 Ill. 2d 211, 220, 69 Ill.Dec. 177, 447 N.E.2d 394 (1983).

¶ 52 G. Public Policy: Equitable Apportionment of Damages
¶ 53 In addition, our holding is consistent with a fundamental policy of the Contribution Act. See, e.g., Guerino v. Depot Place Partnership, 191 Ill. 2d 314, 322, 246 Ill.Dec. 629, 730 N.E.2d 1094 (2000) (describing its holding as consistent with underlying policy of Contribution Act).

¶ 54 This court has consistently recognized that the Contribution Act furthers two important public policies: (1) the encouragement of settlements and (2) the equitable apportionment of damages among tortfeasors. BHI Corp., 214 Ill. 2d at 365, 292 Ill.Dec. 906, 827 N.E.2d 435; Johnson, 203 Ill. 2d at 133, 271 Ill.Dec. 258, 784 N.E.2d 812. The Act promotes the equitable apportionment of damages mainly by creating the right of contribution among joint tortfeasors when one tortfeasor pays more than his pro rata share of the common liability. 740 ILCS 100/2(b) (West 2018); see BHI Corp., 214 Ill. 2d at 365, 292 Ill.Dec. 906, 827 N.E.2d 435; In re Guardianship of Babb, 162 Ill. 2d at 171, 205 Ill.Dec. 78, 642 N.E.2d 1195. The Act promotes settlement by providing that a tortfeasor who enters into a good-faith settlement with the plaintiff is discharged from any contribution liability to a nonsettling tortfeasor. 740 ILCS 100/2(c), (d) (West 2018).

¶ 55 In this case, when the Alex Parties established the total common liability to plaintiffs, they knew in advance what percentage of this contribution E-K had already paid and knew that this was all E-K would ever pay toward the common liability. The Alex Parties also knew that they would be able to recover from Safety only Safety’s pro rata share of fault and no more. The Alex Parties knew that Safety might be adjudged a small share of the total liability. The Alex Parties’ award of $190,000 in damages from Safety vindicates the Contribution Act’s public policy of equitably apportioning damages among tortfeasors.

¶ 56 We note that the Alex Parties voluntarily chose to settle with plaintiffs for $1.85 million and that Safety had absolutely no input in the settlement amount, which constituted the bulk of the common liability. Pursuant to the Contribution Act, it would be inequitable to require Safety to pay more than its pro rata share under these circumstances.

¶ 57 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 58 For the foregoing reasons, we answer the certified question in the negative, holding that the obligation of a tortfeasor who settles is not “uncollectable” within the meaning of section 3 of the Contribution Act.

¶ 59 Certified question answered.

Chief Justice Anne M. Burke and Justices Garman, Theis, and Overstreet concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Carter dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice Michael J. Burke.

¶ 60 JUSTICE CARTER, dissenting:

¶ 61 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit certified a question of law to this court (Ill. S. Ct. R. 20 (eff Aug. 1, 1992))—“Whether the obligation of a settling party is uncollectable pursuant to the Illinois Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act, 740 ILCS 100/3.” The majority answers the certified question in the negative, “holding that the obligation of a tortfeasor who settles is not ‘uncollectable’ within the meaning of section 3 of the Contribution Act.” Supra ¶ 58. Stated differently, the majority appears to hold that the obligation of a settling tortfeasor is collectable in a contribution action.

*9 ¶ 62 With respect, I believe the majority has misinterpreted section 3 of the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act (Contribution Act) (740 ILCS 100/3 (West 2018)). The majority’s holding that a settling tortfeasor’s obligation is “not uncollectable” cannot be reconciled with the legislature’s decision to provide a settling tortfeasor with absolute legal immunity from contribution claims. Under section 2(d) of the Contribution Act, a settling tortfeasor “is discharged from all liability for any contribution to any other tortfeasor.” Id. § 2(d). In addition to contradicting section 2(d), the majority’s decision has the potential to undermine an important legislative goal of the Contribution Act—the encouragement of settlements. See BHI Corp. v. Litgen Concrete Cutting & Coring Co., 214 Ill. 2d 356, 365, 292 Ill.Dec. 906, 827 N.E.2d 435 (2005) (recognizing the encouragement of settlements as an important public policy of the Contribution Act); Johnson v. United Airlines, 203 Ill. 2d 121, 133, 271 Ill.Dec. 258, 784 N.E.2d 812 (2003) (same). Because I disagree with the majority’s answer to the certified question and its construction of the Contribution Act, I respectfully dissent.

¶ 63 The construction of a statute presents a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Whitaker v. Wedbush Securities, Inc., 2020 IL 124792, ¶ 16, 443 Ill.Dec. 635, 162 N.E.3d 269. Our primary objective when construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent, best indicated by the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language. Id. The reviewing court should consider the statute in its entirety, mindful of its subject and the apparent legislative intent of its enactment. Rushton v. Department of Corrections, 2019 IL 124552, ¶ 14, 442 Ill.Dec. 749, 160 N.E.3d 929. The statutory language must also be considered in light of other relevant provisions and without construing any words or phrases in isolation. Id. No part of a statute should be rendered meaningless or superfluous. Van Dyke v. White, 2019 IL 121452, ¶ 46, 433 Ill.Dec. 153, 131 N.E.3d 511.

¶ 64 In relevant part, the certified question in this appeal centers on section 3, which provides:
“Amount of contribution. The pro rata share of each tortfeasor shall be determined in accordance with his relative culpability. However, no person shall be required to contribute to one seeking contribution an amount greater than his pro rata share unless the obligation of one or more of the joint tortfeasors is uncollectable. In that event, the remaining tortfeasors shall share the unpaid portions of the uncollectable obligation in accordance with their pro rata liability.” (Emphasis added.) 740 ILCS 100/3 (West 2018).
Effectively, the emphasized statutory language operates as a narrow exception to the general rule that no tortfeasor is required to pay more than its pro rata share of relative culpability. The exception applies only when the obligation of another joint tortfeasor is “uncollectable.”

¶ 65 Accordingly, the certified question and the parties’ dispute in this case focuses on whether the obligation of a settling tortfeasor—here, E-K—is “uncollectable,” thereby triggering the exception in section 3. To answer the question, it is necessary to consider that term in the context of the Contribution Act as a whole. See, e.g., Rushton, 2019 IL 124552, ¶ 14, 442 Ill.Dec. 749, 160 N.E.3d 929 (statutory language must be viewed in light of other relevant provisions and without construing any words or phrases in isolation).

¶ 66 When an obligation is “uncollectable,” it is considered “not capable of or suitable for being collected.” Merriam-Webster’s Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/uncollectible (last visited June 1, 2021) [https://perma.cc/R3W7-KG37]. Notably, the Contribution Act addresses the collectability of a settling tortfeasor’s obligation for contribution to a joint tortfeasor in very plain terms—section 2(d) provides that a settling tortfeasor “is discharged from all liability for any contribution to any other tortfeasor.” 740 ILCS 100/2(d) (West 2018).

¶ 67 The legislative intent of section 2(d) is crystal clear—a settling tortfeasor is immune from any contribution to any other joint tortfeasor with no exceptions. Put simply, section 2(d) provides a settling tortfeasor with absolute immunity from contribution claims. When viewed in context, the legislature’s decision comports perfectly with an important legislative goal of the Contribution Act—the encouragement of settlements. BHI Corp., 214 Ill. 2d at 365, 292 Ill.Dec. 906, 827 N.E.2d 435; Johnson, 203 Ill. 2d at 133, 271 Ill.Dec. 258, 784 N.E.2d 812. The absolute immunity from contribution claims granted to a settling tortfeasor by section 2(d) is no doubt a powerful incentive to settle in cases, such as here, that involve several tortfeasors with varying degrees of culpability.

*10 ¶ 68 Unlike the majority, I would adhere to this clear legislative intent. If a settling tortfeasor is never liable for a joint tortfeasor’s contribution claim under section 2(d), it necessarily follows that a settling tortfeasor’s obligation for contribution to a joint tortfeasor is “uncollectable” for purposes of section 3. As the Alex Parties argue, a settling tortfeasor’s liability for a contribution claim is statutorily discharged under section 2(d).

¶ 69 To reiterate—section 2(d)’s immunity from contribution liability for settling tortfeasors is absolute, and section 3 contains no language modifying or eliminating the immunity. As this court has explained, “[n]o rule of construction authorizes us to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute imports, nor may we rewrite a statute to add provisions or limitations the legislature did not include.” Zahn v. North American Power & Gas, LLC, 2016 IL 120526, ¶ 15, 410 Ill.Dec. 947, 72 N.E.3d 333.

¶ 70 The majority, however, essentially ignores section 2(d) by claiming that collectability under section 3 is a “separate topic” from the immunity provided under section 2(d). Supra ¶ 39. The majority reasons that “the legislature could not have intended [section 3] to include a settlement as an ‘uncollectable’ obligation because there is no ‘unpaid portion’ of a settlement.” Supra ¶ 40. More to the point, the majority agrees with Safety’s argument that E-K’s settlement payment of $50,000 contributed to the total common liability owed to plaintiffs and, therefore, E-K’s obligation “ ‘was not uncollectable—it was collected.’ ” Supra ¶ 40. Quoting Gregor v. Clark, 560 N.W.2d 744, 745 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), the majority states that its construction of section 3 accords with the general view that “ ‘the obligation of a settling tortfeasor is not uncollectable.’ ” Supra ¶ 41. Respectfully, I believe that the majority is mistaken for several reasons.

¶ 71 First, it is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that this court must construe a statute in its entirety and consider the language in light of other relevant provisions. Rushton, 2019 IL 124552, ¶ 14, 442 Ill.Dec. 749, 160 N.E.3d 929. We are not free to view related provisions in isolation, as the majority does here. The most reasonable construction of the plain statutory language is that a settling tortfeasor’s obligation or liability to other joint tortfeasors is “uncollectable” for purposes of section 3 because the legislature plainly stated that a settling tortfeasor “is discharged from all liability for any contribution to any other tortfeasor” in section 2(d). The majority’s decision to view section 2(d) and section 3 in isolation is not proper statutory construction.

¶ 72 Second, the majority’s reliance on a general statement about settling tortfeasors from the Minnesota appellate court’s decision in Gregor is misplaced. Gregor analyzed a Minnesota statute and did not reference Illinois’s Contribution Act, let alone construe the term “uncollectable” for purposes of section 3 and section 2(d) of the Contribution Act. Gregor is simply not instructive on the Illinois-specific statutory issue presented in the certified question.

¶ 73 Third, the majority implies that the term “uncollectable” in section 3 applies only to insolvent tortfeasors. Supra ¶ 47. This, too, is untenable. As the Alex Parties observe, the legislature amended section 3 to replace the term “insolvent” with “uncollectable.” It would be quite a feat for a reviewing court to construe a statute to mean only a word or term that the legislature deliberately removed, but that is precisely what the majority does here. Unlike the majority, I would not limit section 3 to insolvent tortfeasors when the legislature chose to remove any reference to insolvent tortfeasors in the provision. This court is not permitted to rewrite a statute or ignore its plain language. Zahn, 2016 IL 120526, ¶ 15, 410 Ill.Dec. 947, 72 N.E.3d 333.

*11 ¶ 74 Fourth, the majority expresses concern that enforcing the Contribution Act as written would be unfair. Specifically, the majority concludes that requiring Safety to contribute more than its pro rata share of fault to the Alex Parties’ $1.85 million settlement with the plaintiffs would be “inequitable” because “the Alex Parties voluntarily chose to settle with plaintiffs for $1.85 million and *** Safety had absolutely no input in the settlement amount, which constituted the bulk of the common liability.” Supra ¶ 56.

¶ 75 I note, however, that evaluating fairness on contribution liability is an inherently subjective endeavor in a complicated case involving several tortfeasors. I also observe that the legislature provided Safety with a way to shield itself from contribution liability to another joint tortfeasor under section 2(d)—settle with the plaintiffs. Safety apparently chose not to settle with plaintiffs, thus assuming the risk that it may be liable for a joint tortfeasor’s contribution claim under the Contribution Act.

¶ 76 Even if the scenario described by the majority is arguably unfair, it is also arguably unfair to deny, or diminish, the Alex Parties’ contribution claim against a nonsettling joint tortfeasor such as Safety. In fact, one could reasonably argue that Safety, a party who chose not to settle with plaintiffs, unfairly benefits from the Alex Parties’ settlement with plaintiffs because that settlement released claims against Safety and the Alex Parties paid plaintiffs the collective tort liability of themselves and Safety. Supra ¶ 9.

¶ 77 Nonetheless, I do not believe that this court is the appropriate venue for deciding what is the most equitable or fair outcome for each joint tortfeasor on the admittedly complicated facts of this case. Instead, I would defer to the legislature’s decision to provide absolute immunity to settling tortfeasors for contribution claims, thereby furthering the Contribution Act’s goal of encouraging settlements. BHI Corp., 214 Ill. 2d at 365, 292 Ill.Dec. 906, 827 N.E.2d 435; Johnson, 203 Ill. 2d at 133, 271 Ill.Dec. 258, 784 N.E.2d 812. I suspect that the majority’s conclusion here, reaching the opposite conclusion, will likely require the General Assembly to revisit the Contribution Act.

¶ 78 In summary, I would answer the certified question in the affirmative and hold that, under section 3, the obligation of a settling tortfeasor is “uncollectable” in a contribution claim because the legislature chose to immunize a settling tortfeasor “from all liability for any contribution to any other tortfeasor” in section 2(d). The related statutory provisions must be viewed together and applied as written. Policemen’s Benevolent Labor Committee v. City of Sparta, 2020 IL 125508, ¶¶ 14-15, ––– Ill.Dec. ––––, ––– N.E.3d ––––. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

¶ 79 JUSTICE MICHAEL J. BURKE joins in this dissent.
All Citations
— N.E.3d —-, 2021 IL 126249, 2021 WL 2460253

Footnotes

1
Although the term “pro rata share” can refer to equal shares, many contribution statutes, including the Contribution Act, provide for relative-fault shares and retain the term “pro rata shares” to describe the apportionment. See 3 Fowler V. Harper et al., The Law of Torts § 10.2, at 51 n.31, 52 n.32 (2d ed. 1986).

2
Also, Safety cross-appealed, arguing that the district court erred in determining it owed a duty to plaintiffs. The court of appeals held that the Alex Parties presented sufficient evidence at trial to show that the oral contract between Safety and E-K created a duty that Safety owed to plaintiffs to ensure the safety of the construction site. Roberts, 968 F.3d at 798-800. This part of the court of appeals decision is not pertinent to the certified question.