User Name: Rocky Rogers
Date and Time: Saturday, June 25, 2022 2:01:00 PM EDT
Job Number: 173988661
Document (1)
1. Hamrick v. James, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99887
Client/Matter: 00010.00104
As of: June 25, 2022 6:01 PM Z
Hamrick v. James
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee
April 22, 2022, Filed
Case No. 3:20-cv-417
Reporter
2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 99887 *; 2022 WL 1788266
GRANT HAMRICK, Plaintiff, v. REGINALD JAMES, NANDLEEN LLC, UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, INC., SPLASH TRANSPORT, INC., and AHMED ELMEHALAWY, Defendants.
Prior History: Hamrick v. Splash Transp., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16881, 2022 WL 291894 (E.D. Tenn., Jan. 31, 2022)
Core Terms
rig, truck, summary judgment, tractor-trailer, shoulder, driving, parking, traffic, stationary, proximate, driver, proximate cause, emergency, nonmoving, trailer, hit, motor carrier, regulations, undisputed, started, travel, cases, hired, unfit
Counsel: [*1] For Nandleen LLC, doing business as, Reginald Devon James, Nandleen LLC, Nandleen Logistics, Cross Claimants: Kenneth W Ward, LEAD ATTORNEY, Trammell Adkins & Ward PC, Knoxville, TN.
For Ahmed Elmehalawy, Splash Transport Inc., Counter Defendants: Ethan Daniel Lavelle, LEAD ATTORNEY, Ambrose Wilson Grimm & Durand LLP, Knoxville, TN.
For Grant Hamrick, Plaintiff: Matthew E Wright, The Law Firm for Truck Safety LLC, Franklin, TN.
For Ahmed Elmehalawy, Splash Transport Inc., Counter Defendants: Brad A Fraser, LEAD ATTORNEY, Leitner Williams Dooley & Napolitan PLLC (Knoxville), Knoxville, TN.
For Ahmed Elmehalawy, Splash Transport Inc., Cross Defendants: Brad A Fraser, LEAD ATTORNEY, Leitner Williams Dooley & Napolitan PLLC (Knoxville), Knoxville, TN.
For Ahmed Elmehalawy, Splash Transport Inc., Cross Defendants: Ethan Daniel Lavelle, LEAD ATTORNEY, Ambrose Wilson Grimm & Durand LLP, Knoxville, TN.
For Reginald Devon James, Nandleen LLC, Nandleen Logistics, Nandleen LLC, doing business as, Defendants: Kenneth W Ward, LEAD ATTORNEY, Trammell Adkins & Ward PC, Knoxville, TN.
For Splash Transport Inc., Cross Claimant: Ethan Daniel Lavelle, LEAD ATTORNEY, Ambrose Wilson Grimm & Durand LLP, Knoxville, [*2] TN; Brad A Fraser, LEAD ATTORNEY, Leitner Williams Dooley & Napolitan PLLC (Knoxville), Knoxville, TN.
For Splash Transport Inc., Counter Claimant: Ethan Daniel Lavelle, LEAD ATTORNEY, Ambrose Wilson Grimm & Durand LLP, Knoxville, TN; Brad A Fraser, LEAD ATTORNEY, Leitner Williams Dooley & Napolitan PLLC (Knoxville), Knoxville, TN.
For Ahmed Elmehalawy, Splash Transport Inc., Defendants: Brad A Fraser, LEAD ATTORNEY, Leitner Williams Dooley & Napolitan PLLC (Knoxville), Knoxville, TN.
For Ahmed Elmehalawy, Splash Transport Inc., Defendants: Ethan Daniel Lavelle, LEAD ATTORNEY, Ambrose Wilson Grimm & Durand LLP, Knoxville, TN.
For United Parcel Service Inc., Defendant: David A. Chapman, LEAD ATTORNEY, Lewis Thomason King Krieg & Waldrop P.C. (Knox), Knoxville, TN.
Judges: TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE. Magistrate Judge Debra C. Poplin.
Opinion by: TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH
Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before the Court is Defendants Reginald James and Nandleen, LLC’s (“Nandleen”) motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. 116). For the reasons contained herein, the motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Reginald James
Reginald James is a truck driver who attended driving school in Georgia. (Doc. 116-1, at 5.) In driving [*3] school, James learned about the Federal Motor Carrier Regulations. (Id. at 5-6.) After graduating from Georgia Driving Academy, James’s employer tested him on the regulations and required that he drive with a trainer for 250 hours. (Id. at 6-8.) James drove for a company called Stevens Transport before he joined Nandleen. (Id. at 2-3.)
B. Nandleen
Nandleen is a registered motor carrier with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration and is run by Ailende Omozokpea. (Doc. 126-4, at 2.) To register with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, an agent of the company must certify that it “has in place a system and an individual responsible for ensuring the overall compliance with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety regulations.” (Id. at 6.) At Nandleen, Omozokpea attested to compliance with the above statement and was responsible for ensuring overall compliance with applicable regulations. (Id.)
Nandleen required its drivers to have at least two years’ driving experience and no atfault citations or accidents. (Doc. 116-1, at 9.) Nandleen’s insurance carrier ran a background check on James, which came back clean. (Doc. 126-4, at 10.) Omozokpea testified during his deposition that [*4] Nandleen has a safety and orientation program, as well as a program for overseeing driver-qualification requirements. (Id. at 8.) When Omozokpea first started Nandleen, he “didn’t know a lot,” so he never considered having a written policy regarding parking on the side of the road, and James testified that the company did not have a policy.1 (Id. at 9; Doc. 116-1, at 10.) However, when James started, Omozokpea told him that parking on the shoulder was only allowed in emergencies. (Doc. 131-1, at 3.)
C. The Accident
On July 27, 2020, James was hauling a load from Hayneedle, Ohio, to Miami, Florida, with a J.B. Hunt tractor-trailer. As he was driving through Knoxville, Tennessee, he began feeling sick—like he was “getting ready to vomit.” (Doc. 116-1, at 11; Doc. 125-1, at 2.) Because James believed vomiting in his truck to be more dangerous than pulling over onto the interstate shoulder, he decided to stop and park his vehicle. (Id. at 12.) He parked his truck entirely on the shoulder; no part of his vehicle was in the far-right lane where traffic was flowing. (Id. at 18; Doc. 116-3, at 4.) James testified that the first thing he did after pulling over was to turn his hazard lights on. [*5] 2 (Doc. 116-1, at 14.) It is undisputed that James did not exit his vehicle and put out safety triangles.3 After two or three minutes, James still believed he might vomit, so he called Omozokpea to see if he could go home to Greensboro, North Carolina, instead of proceeding to Miami. (Doc. 126-3, at 14-15.)
James, however, would not make it to Greensboro or Miami that night. Just after 9:00 p.m., Ahmed Elmehalawy—an employee of Splash Transport, Inc. (“Splash”)—was driving his tractor-trailer in the far-right lane on I-75 South and preparing to take the next exit. (Doc. 116-2, at 4.) Elmehalawy saw James’s rig up ahead to his right. (Doc. 125-1, at 14.) Instead of staying in his lane, though, Elmehalawy drifted into the emergency lane. (Doc. 116-2, at 4.) When asked why he drifted, Elmehalawy testified that he believed that James’s truck was still moving and that the shoulder was an active lane of traffic. (Id. at 4-5.) By the time that Elmehalawy realized that James’s rig was stationary, it was too late. (Id.) Elmehalawy was able to move his tractor cab back into the far-right lane, but his trailer hit James’s, causing substantial damage. (Id.)
The damage to James’s trailer turned out [*6] to be the least of Elmehalawy’s worries. Before the accident, Hamrick, who was driving a tractor-trailer for United Parcel Service, Inc. (“UPS”), noticed that James’s trailer was not moving and merged his truck into the middle lane of traffic to give James adequate space. (Doc. 116-3, at 2-3.) Hamrick, though, was struck by Elmehalawy as he tried to avoid the collision with James’s tractor-trailer, causing both Hamrick and Elmehalawy’s tractor-trailers to jackknife on I-75 South. (Doc. 116-2, at 15; Doc. 116-3, at 2-3, 7.) A few minutes after the accident, Elmehalawy texted the following to his supervisor:
Was traveling on I-75S Monday July 27th around 9pm was getting ready to get off exit (107) on this area the road is making curve to the right and there was truck setting [sic.] on the emergency lane (JB Hunt) I thought it was starting to move into traffic. Attempted to get over to the left lane to give him space started to look at my mirror there was corvette car next to me and ups truck is coming from the back while I was trying to leave my lane and because this part of the highway is curve my truck started to go towards this truck and as soon as I found out I make hard left to avoid [*7] hitting that truck but me doing that causes my trailer hitting the back of his trailer and my tractor hitting the ups truck. I feel JB Hunt was very close to side of traffic.
(Doc. 126-5, at 14-15).
D. The Present Suit
Hamrick instituted the present suit against Elmehalawy, Splash, UPS, Nandleen, and James in September 2020. (Doc. 1.) In December 2021, James and Nandleen filed the present motion for partial summary judgment on Hamrick’s claims against them. (Doc. 116.) The motion is now ready for the Court’s review.
II. STANDARD OF LAW
Summary judgment is proper when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and makes all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986); Nat’l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001).
The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 897 (6th Cir. 2003). The moving party may meet this burden either by affirmatively producing evidence establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact or by pointing out the absence of support in the record for the nonmoving party’s case. [*8] Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Once the movant has discharged this burden, the nonmoving party can no longer rest upon the allegations in the pleadings; rather, it must point to specific facts supported by evidence in the record demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial. Chao v. Hall Holding Co., Inc., 285 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir. 2002).
At summary judgment, the Court may not weigh the evidence; its role is limited to determining whether the record contains sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough; the Court must determine whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-movant based on the record. Id. at 251-52; Lansing Dairy, Inc. v. Espy, 39 F.3d 1339, 1347 (6th Cir. 1994). If not, the Court must grant summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Negligence Against James4
James contends that that he is entitled to summary judgment on Hamrick’s negligence claim because Hamrick cannot establish that James’s actions were the proximate cause of Hamrick’s injuries. (Doc. 117, at 6.) Hamrick argues that, because James’s conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about his injuries, summary judgment is inappropriate. (Doc. 126, at 14.)
In Tennessee, a plaintiff must establish five elements to succeed on a negligence claim: (1) “a duty [*9] of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff”; (2) “conduct falling below the applicable standard of care amounting to a breach of that duty”; (3) “an injury or loss”; (4) actual causation; and (5) “proximate, or legal, cause.” McClenahan v. Cooley, 806 S.W.2d 767, 774-75 (Tenn. 1991). The fifth factor, proximate causation, requires an additional three elements: (1) “the tortfeasor’s conduct must have been a “substantial factor” in bringing about the harm being complained of”; (2) “there is no rule or policy that should relieve the wrongdoer from liability because of the manner in which the negligence has resulted in the harm”; and (3) “the harm giving rise to the action could have reasonably been foreseen or anticipated by a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence.” Id. (citing Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738, 749-50 (Tenn. 1987)).
The Tennessee Supreme Court has adopted special rules of proximate causation in cases involving stationary vehicles. See, e.g., Carney v. Goodman, 38 Tenn. App. 55, 270 S.W.2d 572 (Tenn. 1954). In Carney, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted two lines of precedent dealing with standing vehicles. The first line of cases holds “that the negligence of one in obstructing the highway by standing vehicle [is] not superseded by the negligence of another in running into such vehicle.” Id. at 575. The second line of cases, however, holds that “the [*10] negligence of one in obstructing the highway by a standing vehicle [is] superseded by another’s negligence in running into such vehicle, and that the latter’s negligence [is] the proximate cause of the accident.” Id. at 576. In reconciling the two cases, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted:
The test of whether a case falls within one line or the other of these cases seems to be this: Did the driver running into the standing vehicle see it in time to enable him, by use of due care, to avoid the collision? If he did not, his negligence is merely a contributory cause; if he did, his negligence is the proximate case.
Id. The question in this case is whether James’s parking on the side of the road constitutes a proximate cause of Hamrick’s accident, or whether Elmehalawy’s actions were the sole legal cause of Hamrick’s injury.
The Sixth Circuit applied Carney in Kellner v. Budget Car and Truck Rental, Inc., 359 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2004), a case that bears substantial similarity to this one. In Kellner, the defendant’s tractor-trailer suffered a mechanical emergency, and, as a result, the defendant moved it to the interstate shoulder. Id. at 401. No part of his rig was in the lanes of travel, and his truck was clearly visible and accompanied by warning triangles as required by Tennessee law. Id. Nonetheless, [*11] a truck driven by plaintiffs left its lane of travel and struck defendant’s stationary tractor-trailer; two of the three passengers and the defendant were killed. Id. at 402.
The defendant’s estate moved for summary judgment, asserting that the tractor-trailer driver’s actions in moving his truck to the breakdown lane were not the proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ deaths. Id. The Sixth Circuit agreed with the defendant, rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that because the defendant “could foresee the possibility that a car would leave its lane and strike his rig, [] his actions were the proximate cause of the accident.” Id. at 406. In closing, the Sixth Circuit stated: “the district court correctly determined that it was not foreseeable, within the meaning of Tennessee law, that [the plaintiff], with an extended unobstructed view of [the defendant’s] tractor-trailer, would leave three travel lanes and strike the rig that was parked completely within the emergency breakdown lane.” Id. at 407.
In this case, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that James parked his rig entirely on the shoulder, and no part of his rig obstructed traffic. (Doc. 116-1, at 18.) Elmehalawy saw James’s rig from a distance. (Doc. 116-2, at [*12] 7-8, 18.) He hit James’s rig not due to poor visibility, but rather flawed asserted perception that James’s tractor-trailer was moving in a separate lane of traffic. (Id. at 8, 18, 21.) Elmehalawy, had he realized that James’s rig was stationary, would not have attempted to merge rightward and the accident would not have occurred. (Id. at 23.) Hamrick testified that it was readily apparent that James’s rig was stationary. (Doc. 116-3, at 7.)
Nonetheless, both Hamrick and Elmehalawy insist that this case is distinguishable from Kellner. First, Hamrick and Elmehalawy point out that the accident in Kellner occurred in broad daylight and that the defendant had placed warning triangles behind his rig. (Doc. 125, at 5; Doc. 126, at 17.) Second, Elmehalawy notes that, unlike the Kellner defendant, whose truck suffered a mechanical problem, James pulled over due to nausea, which Elmehalawy presumably maintains was an insufficient reason for parking on the shoulder. (Doc. 125, at 5.)
These attempts at distinguishing Kellner, though, are unpersuasive. In that case, the Sixth Circuit focused not on the use of warning signals or the time of day, but rather on the visibility of the stationary vehicle. See 359 F.3d at 399. It is undisputed [*13] that both Hamrick and Elmehalawy saw James’s rig. Elmehalawy simply made an error as to whether the tractor-trailer was moving. Nevertheless, he could have prevented the collision if he had correctly concluded that the vehicle was not moving. See Carney, 270 S.W.2d at 576. As a result, the Court concludes that Kellner controls. See also Humphrey v. Ybonta, No. 3:19-cv-00782, 2021 WL 780731, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 1, 2021) (“Like Kellner, Defendants have shown the Court undisputed facts that the deceased could plainly see the rig (i.e., the rig was plainly visible to a driver approaching the rig) before impact and the deceased crossed multiple lanes of traffic, a safety zone, and an entrance ramp lane before colliding with the trailer on the shoulder.”); see also Underwood v. Fitzgerald, No. 3:04-0680, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28294, 2005 WL 2837388, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 27, 2005) (citing Carney and Kellner in a fatal stationary vehicle accident case and finding that a decedent parking on shoulder was not the proximate cause of the wreck).
Accordingly, the Court finds that James could not reasonably foresee that a driver would exit the travel lanes, cross a solid white line, hit his rig, and subsequently cause injury to another tractor-trailer‘s driver due to his temporary parking on the shoulder. Therefore, James and Nandleen’s motion for summary judgment will be granted as to Hamrick’s negligence [*14] claim.
B. Negligence Per Se Against James5
James and Nandleen also seek summary judgment on Hamrick’s negligence-per-se claim. Hamrick and Elmehalawy contend that there is evidence that James did not comply with 49 C.F.R. § 392.22, governing emergency signaling for stopped commercial vehicles, Tennessee Code Annotated §§ 55-9-103, regarding disabled vehicles, and § 55-9-104, dealing with stopped vehicles.
“Liability under the negligence per se doctrine can arise when a party fails to perform a duty imposed by statute or ordinance.” Shaw v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 596 S.W.3d 726, 734 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019). The doctrine requires a plaintiff to establish two elements: (1) that the defendant violated a statute or ordinance that “imposes a duty or prohibition for the benefit of a person or the public” and (2) that “the injured party [is] within the class of persons intended to benefit from or be protected by the statute.” Id. at 734 (quoting Harden v. Danek Med., Inc., 985 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998)). Plaintiffs must still establish actual and proximate causation, as well as damages, to succeed on a negligence per se theory. Rains v. Bend of the River, 2003 Tenn. App. LEXIS 537, 124 S.W.3d 580, 590 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
Even assuming the statutes and regulations cited by Hamrick give rise to a negligence per se claim, Hamrick’s claim fails because James’s behavior was not the proximate cause of Hamrick’s injuries. See Section III.A. As a result, an essential element [*15] of negligence per se is missing, and the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of James and Nandleen on this claim.
C. Negligent Hiring Against Nandleen
Finally, Nandleen argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Hamrick’s negligent-hiring claim because no reasonable jury could find that James was unfit to drive a tractor-trailer. (Doc. 117, at 14-15.) Hamrick, on the other hand, contends that Nandleen did not have necessary policies in place to ensure that James was fit for the job. (Doc. 126, at 17-18.)
“Tennessee courts recognize the negligence of an employer in the selection and retention of employees and independent contractors.” Doe v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 306 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008). A plaintiff must demonstrate all the traditional elements of negligence, in addition to establishing that the employer had knowledge of the employee’s unfitness for the job. Gunter v. Estate of Armstrong, 600 S.W.3d 916, 928 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019). To prove a negligent-hiring claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) knowledge of unfitness for the particular job, (2) evidence that the applicant for employment, if hired, would pose an unreasonable risk to others, [and] (3) evidence that the prospective [employer] knew or should have known that the historical criminality of the applicant would likely be repetitive.” [*16] Phipps v. Walker, No. 03A01-9508-00294, 1996 WL 155258, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 1996) (alterations in original).
In this case, no reasonable jury could find that James was unfit to drive a commercial vehicle. James graduated from trucking school, drove for more than 250 hours with an instructor, and had no previous citations or accidents. Elmehalawy and Hamrick point to no evidence in the record indicating that James was unfit for the job or that Nandleen had any reason to believe that he would pose an unreasonable risk to others. (Doc. 125, at 9.)
Hamrick attempts to argue that his claim should survive because Nandleen “did little or nothing to investigate the safety and fitness” of James (Doc. 126, at 19), but this does not change the Court’s analysis. Based on the undisputed evidence, no reasonable jury could find that James was unsuitable for the position for which he was hired, even if Nandleen’s screening protocols were insufficient. On the contrary, James had sufficient experience and a clean driving record—two prerequisites for his hiring at Nandleen.
Furthermore, the Court has already found that James’s actions in parking on the shoulder were not the proximate cause of Hamrick’s injuries. See Section III.A. As a result, the requirements for negligent hiring and [*17] supervision are not met, and summary judgment is appropriate in favor of Nandleen.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Nandleen and James’s motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. 116) is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Travis R. McDonough
TRAVIS R. MCDONOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
End of Document
1 Omozokpea stated that “the policy at the time was for Nandleen to instruct its drivers that parking on the shoulder of highways and roads in tractor-trailers was not allowed unless it was an emergency.” (Doc. 131-1, at 4.)
2 Elmehalawy and Hamrick testified that they did not see James’s hazard lights. (Doc. 116-3, at 6; Doc. 125-1, at 11-12.)
3 During his deposition, James testified that he understood the regulations to require “us[ing] your hazards,” and, furthermore, “if you’re going to be parked for more than 10 minutes, you have to pull out your triangles.” (Doc. 116-1, at 10.) He admitted that there was no reason he could not have put the triangles out. (Doc. 125-1, at 7.)
4 Hamrick asserts that Nandleen is liable for James’s negligence under a theory of respondeat superior. (Doc. 83, at 10.)
5 Again, Hamrick asserts that Nandleen is liable for James’s negligence under a theory of respondeat superior. (Doc. 83, at 10.)
