United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
December 31, 2021, Decided; December 31, 2021, Filed
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:21-CV-01044

Reporter
2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 248454 *
SEAN WILLIAMS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CW TRANSPORT, LLC, et al., Defendants.
Core Terms

allegations, motion to dismiss, definite statement, recklessness, reckless conduct, Defendants’, tractor-trailer, lawsuit, vague, failure to state a claim, district court, discovery, pleadings, notice
Counsel: [*1] For Sean Williams, Plaintiff: Daniel E. Kleiner, Lawrence G. Metzger, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Metzger & Kleiner, Philadelphia, PA.
For Jean Marie Dunn, Plaintiff: George G. Oschal, III, James John Albert, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Cefalo Law, LLC, West Pittston, PA; Karl J. Kwak, LEAD ATTORNEY, Cefalo Law, LLC, W. Pittston, PA; Andrew Keith Shumlas, Cefalo Law, West Pittston, PA.
For Corey Medley, Plaintiff: Marc F. Greenfield, LEAD ATTORNEY, Spear, Greenfield, Richman, Weitz & Taggart PC, Philadelphia, PA.
For CW TRANSPORT, LLC, SAED A. ABDULLE, Defendants: Megan C Zei, LEAD ATTORNEY, Pion Nerone Girman Winslow & Smith, P.C., Harrisburg, PA; Stephen E. Geduldig, LEAD ATTORNEY, Pion Nerone Girman Winslow & Smith PC, Harrisburg, PA.
Judges: KAROLINE MEHALCHICK, Chief United States Magistrate Judge.
Opinion by: KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
Opinion

MEMORANDUM
Presently before the Court are two motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and a motion for a more definite statement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e) brought by Defendants Saed A. Abdulle (“Abdulle”) and CW Transport, LLC (“CW Transport”) (collectively, the “Defendants”). (Doc. 24; Doc. 26). On September 22, 2021, the Court granted the unopposed motion to consolidate three cases individually brought by [*2] Plaintiffs Sean Williams (“Williams”), Jean Marie Dunn (“Dunn”), and Corey Medley (“Medley”) (collectively, the “Plaintiffs”). (Doc. 21; Doc. 22). For the following reasons, the motion brought on June 30, 2021, shall be GRANTED and the motion brought on August 6, 2021, shall be DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. (Doc. 24; Doc. 26).

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The above-captioned consolidated case arose out of a November 6, 2019, motor vehicle accident that occurred on Route 901 near Valley Road in Foster Township, Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 21-4, at 4, 16, 30). On that date, Abdulle was operating a tractor-trailer on Route 901 when it was involved in a motor vehicle accident with another tractor-trailer operated by Medley, in which Williams was a passenger, and another vehicle operated by Dunn. (Doc. 21-4, at 4, 16, 30). On or about May 20, 2021, Williams initiated an action by filing a complaint in the Pennsylvania County of Common Pleas. (Doc. 21-4, at 3). Defendants timely removed William’s lawsuit to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and based on the agreement of counsel, transferred the lawsuit to the United States District [3] Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, where the accident occurred. (Doc. 21, at 2). On June 1, 2021, Dunn initiated an action by filing a complaint in the Schuylkill County of Common Pleas. (Doc. 21-4, at 14). On or about June 24, 2021, Medley initiated an action by filing a complaint in the Schuylkill County of Common Pleas.1 (Doc. 21-4, at 29). Defendants timely removed both Dunn’s and Medley’s lawsuits to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. (Doc. 21, at 3). On June 30, 2021, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim (“June Motion”).2 (Doc. 24, at 1). On August 6, 2021, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and a motion for a more definite statement (“August Motion”). (Doc. 26, at 1). In the August Motion, Defendants first seek to dismiss Medley’s claims of recklessness/reckless conduct against Defendants on the basis that Medley does not allege sufficient facts to support the claim. (Doc. 26, at 203). Secondly, Defendants move for a more definite statement as to specific paragraphs in Medley’s complaint, or, alternatively, move to strike those paragraphs [4] if Medley does not provide the requisite specificity. (Doc. 26, at 3).
On September 20, 2021, Defendants filed an unopposed motion to consolidate cases, asserting that the three lawsuits involve common questions of law and fact, as they all arise out of the same motor vehicle accident, and involve claims of negligence against Defendants. (Doc. 21, at 3-4). After Plaintiffs’ counsels certified a concurrence to the motion to consolidate, the Court granted the motion on September 22, 2021. (Doc. 21-2, at 1; Doc. 22). In a telephonic status conference on September 28, 2021, the parties agreed that the aforementioned August Motion is still pending. (Doc. 31, at 1-2). The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition. (Doc. 26; Doc. 27; Doc. 28; Doc. 29; Doc. 32).
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Rule 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint are true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court finds the plaintiff’s claims lack facial plausibility.” Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). Although [5] a court must accept the factual allegations in a complaint as true, it is not compelled to accept “unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)). Additionally, a court need not assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526, 103 S. Ct. 897, 74 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1983). In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the United States Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S. Ct. 2499, 168 L. Ed. 2d 179 (2007). B. RULE 12(E) MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move “for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or [6] ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). “The motion must … point out the defects complained of and the details desired.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Rule 10(a) requires, among other things, that “[t]he title of the complaint must name all the parties.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). A motion for a more definite statement is one tool by which a defendant may seek to remedy alleged deficiencies under Rule 10. See, e.g., Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trustees of Cent. Fla. Cty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 367 (11th Cir. 1996).
However, “[a] motion for a more definite statement is not a substitute for the discovery process[,]” and that such motions are not favored. Wheeler v. United States Postal Service, 120 F.R.D. 487, 488 (M.D. Pa. 1987). Such motions are typically only granted where pleadings are “unintelligible or if it is virtually impossible for the opposing party to craft a responsive pleading.” Maya v. Chertok, et al., No. 1:15-CV-00484, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119815, 2015 WL 5254377, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2015) (quoting Morris v. Kesserling, et al., No. 1:9-CV-1739, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114292, 2010 WL 4362630, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2010) (quotations omitted)); see Schaedler v. Reading Eagle Publ’n, 370 F.2d 795, 798 (3d Cir. 1966) (such motions are “directed to the rare case where because of the vagueness or ambiguity of the pleading the answering party will not be able to frame a responsive pleading”). The opposing party must be unable to respond, “even with a simple denial[ ] in good faith or without prejudice to himself.” Brueggman v. Fayette Cty, et al., No. 95-CV-446, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15718, 1995 WL 606796, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 1995); see Kimberton Healthcare Consulting, Inc. v. Primary PhysicianCare, Inc., No. 11-CV-4568, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139980, 2011 WL 6046923, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2011) (“a motion for a more definitive statement is generally … used to provide a [*7] remedy for an unintelligible pleading rather than as a correction for a lack of detail”).

III. DISCUSSION
This action arises out of a November 6, 2019, motor vehicle accident that occurred on Route 901 near Valley Road in Foster Township, Schuylkill County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 214, at 30). In the August Motion, Defendants move for dismissal of Medley’s claims of recklessness/reckless conduct against Defendants on the basis that Medley’s complaint does not assert a facially plausible claim for recklessness/reckless conduct. (Doc. 26, at 2-3). Additionally, Defendants move for a more definite statement as to several paragraphs of Medley’s complaint, or, alternatively, move to strike those paragraphs if Medley does not provide the requisite specificity. (Doc. 26, at 3). In response, Medley contends that the complaint asserts sufficient facts to support a claim of recklessness/reckless conduct and that Defendants possess information regarding the motor vehicle collision that will further support his claims once discovery is complete. (Doc. 29, at 6).
A. Rule 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim of recklessness/reckless conduct contained in Paragraphs 8, 11, 11(s), 12, [8] 14, 34, 34(s), 35, 36, and 38. (Doc. 27, at 4).3 Defendants argue that the complaint fails to allege facts arising to the level of recklessness/reckless conduct by Defendants. (Doc. 27, at 8). Specifically, Defendants assert that Medley does not allege facts that warrant an inference that Defendants knew or should have known that their actions would cause injuries to others, or facts that show Defendants deliberately proceeded to take actions or omissions in conscious disregard of a known risk to Medley. (Doc. 27, at 9). In response, Medley argues that Pennsylvania law allows a plaintiff to generally aver reckless conduct and does not require a plaintiff to specifically plead facts to support a claim of recklessness. (Doc. 29, at 4). Further, Medley argues that the allegation of recklessness is relevant to the lawsuit and could affect the result of the case once discovery is complete. (Doc. 29, at 5). To determine whether Medley met his burden in this case, the Court reviews appliable Pennsylvania law. See Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938). A defendant acts recklessly when “his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another [and] such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary [9] to make his conduct negligent.” Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 584 Pa. 179, 883 A.2d 439, 445 (Pa. 2005).
An actor’s conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of others if “he does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.”
White v. Trybala, No. 3:19-CV-14, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81750, 2019 WL 2119982, at 3 (M.D. Pa. May 15, 2019) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500). Here, Medley alleges that Abdulle was operating a tractor-trailer, owned by CW Transport, at an unsafe speed when the tractor-trailer tipped over, landing directly onto the cab of a tractor-trailer occupied by Medley. (Doc. 21-4, at 30; Doc. 29, at 2). According to Medley, Abdulle was driving the tractor-trailer in a negligent, careless, and/or reckless manner as to cause the motor vehicle collision. (Doc. 21-4, at 30). At this stage, viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the Court finds that Medley has alleged “enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of” recklessness/reckless conduct in their assertion that Abdulle was operating [10] the tractor-trailer at an unsafe speed when it tipped over. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556; see White v. Trybala, et al., No. 3:19-CV-14, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81750, 2019 WL 2119982, at 3 (M.D. Pa. May 15, 2019) (denying defendants’ motion to dismiss because plaintiff pled enough facts to reveal evidence of reckless conduct where plaintiffs alleged the defendant was driving a tractor-trailer in an endangering fashion when he hit plaintiff’s vehicle). As such, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss Medley’s claims of recklessness/reckless conduct. (Doc. 26). B. Rule 12(e) MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT Secondly, Defendants move for a more definite statement as to Paragraphs 26(q), 26(r), 34(q), and 34(r) of Medley’s complaint, or, alternatively, to strike those paragraphs if Medley cannot provide the requisite specificity. (Doc. 26, at 3). In addition to the aforementioned paragraphs, Defendants take umbrage with Paragraphs 18(q) and 18(r).4 (Doc. 26, 3 n.2). Defendants argue that these “vague, open-ended catchall allegations of negligence” do not meet the specificity requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. (Doc. 27, at 5). Further, Defendants assert that Medley’s claims “leave Defendants to guess as to which statutes and ordinances that Plaintiff believes that Defendant violated” and provide him “with [11] free, unchecked license to amend or change his theories of liability during the pendency of this lawsuit.” (Doc. 27, at 12). In response, Medley states that “Defendants are put on notice to prepare an adequate response or defense to the statements alleged” and argues that he is not required to plead more than the material facts necessary to sustain a recovery. (Doc. 29, at 6). Medley does not refer to the contents of the disputed paragraphs or provide additional support for his allegations. (Doc. 28, at 2; Doc. 29, at 5-6).
In applying the standard for a Rule 12(e) Motion, the Court grants Defendants’ motion with respect to the following paragraphs:
¶ 18(q), 26(q), 34(q): Failing to operate a motor vehicle in compliance with the applicable laws and ordinances of the Township of Foster and Schuylkill County and the Statutes of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania pertaining to the operation and control of motor vehicles;
¶ 18(r), 26(r), 34(r): Operating a motor vehicle and other devices at the same time and in total disregard for the safety of the plaintiff and others in direct violation of the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
(Doc. 21-4, at 34-35, 39, 43).
Recognizing that federal pleading requirements [*12] set a plausibility standard for civil complaints, the Court acknowledges that “[a] complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings ‘allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 566 U.S. 921, 132 S. Ct. 1861, 182 L. Ed. 2d 644 (2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e), a defendant may move “for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 provides that a complaint must give the defendant fair notice of the claims and the grounds on which it rests. Pozarlik v. Camelback Associates, Inc., No. 3:11-CV-1349, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137310, 2011 WL 6003841, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2011).
In Harvell v. Brumberger, the Court adopted a report and recommendation in an automobile accident suit, granting in part and denying in part the defendants’ motion for a more definite statement. No. 3:19-CV-2124, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221668, 2020 WL 6946575, at 11 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2020). The Court applied the Rule 12(e) standard to disputed allegations in paragraphs and subparagraphs of the plaintiff’s complaint, including: “Failure to obey the rules of the road, the statutes of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; and the ordinances of New Milford Township, Pennsylvania while operating his vehicle on the highways and roadways of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.” [13] Harvell, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206828, 2020 WL 6947693, at *11. Adopting the findings of Carson v. Tucker, No. 5:20-CV-00399, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71553, 2020 WL 1953655 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2020), the Court found that these allegations are “impermissibly vague” and that “the manner in which these allegations are pled ‘do[es] not allow for Defendants to answer or amount a defense.'” Harvell, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206828, 2020 WL 6947693, at *11 (quoting Carson, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71553, 2020 WL 1953655, at *6). Analyzing similar language to the allegations within Medley’s complaint, the Court concluded that the allegations, as currently pleaded, did not sufficiently put the defendants on notice of the exact federal, state, or local statutes or regulations it would be required to defend against. Harvell, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206828, 2020 WL 6947693, at *11. Thus, the Court ordered the plaintiffs to replead the disputed allegations and set forth the specific statutes or regulations that they alleged the defendants had violated. Harvell, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206828, 2020 WL 6947693, at *11.
Here, the allegations enumerated in Paragraphs 18(q), 18(r), 26(q), 26(r), 34(q), and 34(r) are nearly identical to the allegations the Harvell court held to be, “as currently pleaded, [insufficient to] put the defendants on notice of the statutes and/or rules it will be required to defend against.” 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206828, 2020 WL 6947693, at *11; (Doc. 21-4, at 34-35, 39, 43). Such vague reference to “applicable laws and ordinances of the Township of Foster and Schuylkill County and the Statutes of the Commonwealth [*14] of Pennsylvania pertaining to the operation and control of motor vehicles” and “laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania” do not allow for Defendants to answer or mount a defense. (Doc. 21-4, at 34-35, 39, 43); see Harvell, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206828, 2020 WL 6947693, at *11. Therefore, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement. (Doc. 26).
C. LEAVE TO AMEND
The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., et al., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Further, “[a] district court has ‘substantial leeway in deciding whether to grant leave to amend.'” In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 564 F. App’x 672, 673 (3d Cir. 2014) (not precedential) (quoting Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000)). In this case, the Court will grant Grajales-El leave to file a second amended complaint in an attempt to cure the deficiencies outlined herein. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976); Grayson, 293 F.3d at 108.
Medley may be able to cure the defects identified in the complaint with a more detailed pleading. Accordingly, the Court will grant Medley leave to re-plead the allegations in Paragraphs 18(q), 18(r), 26(q), 26(r), 34(q), and 34(r) of the complaint in accordance with this Memorandum. (Doc. 21-4, at 34-35, 39, 43). Specifically, Medley shall have the opportunity to set forth the [*15] specific statutes or regulations he alleges Defendants violated. (Doc. 21-4, at 34-35, 39, 43); see Harvell, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206828, 2020 WL 6947693, at *11. Should Medley choose to re-plead, he shall have thirty (30) days from the date of this Memorandum to file an amended complaint setting forth allegations in support of this civil action against Defendants.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ June Motion is GRANTED. (Doc. 24). In addition, Defendants’ August Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. (Doc. 26).5
An appropriate Order follows.
Dated: December 31, 2021
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karoline Mehalchick
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
Chief United States Magistrate Judge

ORDER
AND NOW, this 31st day of December, 2021, for the reasons contained in the Memorandum docketed concurrently with this Order, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 24) the Dunn’s language: “includes, but is not necessarily limited to the following as discovery may show…” from her complaint is GRANTED;
2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 26) Medley’s allegations of recklessness/reckless conduct in Paragraphs 8, 11, 11(s), 12, 14, 34, 34(s), 35, 36, and 38 of the complaint is DENIED;
3. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 26, at [*16] 3 n.1) Medley’s allegations in Paragraphs 18, 18(s), 19, 20, 22, 26, 26(s), 27, 28, and 30 of his complaint is GRANTED. Medley’s allegations in these paragraphs and subparagraphs are DISMISSED without prejudice;
4. Defendants’ motion for a more definite statement (Doc. 24) is GRANTED; and
5. The Court GRANTS Medley leave to replead the allegations in Paragraphs 18(q), 18(r), 26(q), 26(r), 34(q), and 34(r) of his complaint. Medley has thirty (30) days from the entry of this order, on or before Monday, January 31, 2022, to file an amended complaint.
   /s/ Karofine Mehafchick
   KAROLINE MEHALCHICK
   Chief United States Magistrate Judge

Court of Appeals of Arkansas, Division One
January 12, 2022, Opinion Delivered
No. CV-21-244

Reporter
2022 Ark. App. 12 *; 2022 Ark. App. LEXIS 5 **
WAL-MART ASSOCIATES, INC., APPELLANT v. WILLIE ANDERSON AND DEATH & PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY TRUST FUND, APPELLEES
Notice: THE PAGINATION OF THIS DOCUMENT IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE PENDING RELEASE OF THE FINAL PUBLISHED VERSION.
Prior History: [**1] APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION. NO. G901750.
Disposition: AFFIRMED.
Core Terms

truck, clean, employment service, personal items, drivers, performing, sanitize, clocked, injuries, removing, night, substantial evidence, off duty, drive
Case Summary

Overview
HOLDINGS: [1]-The evidence supported the Workers’ Compensation Commission’s conclusion that the employee was performing employment services under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102 because at the time of their injuries, both a fellow employee and plaintiff were indirectly advancing the benefit of their employers and were doing something inherently necessary for the performance of their primary job: the fellow employee was headed to an area where he was required to monitor the dryers, and plaintiff was removing his personal items from the truck so he could clean and sanitize it; those activities were required by the employer.
Outcome
The judgment was affirmed.
LexisNexis® Headnotes

Evidence > Inferences & Presumptions > Inferences
Workers’ Compensation & SSDI > … > Judicial Review > Standards of Review > Substantial Evidence
HN1[ ] Inferences & Presumptions, Inferences
When reviewing a decision of the Workers’ Compensation Commission, an appellate court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission. The appellate court must affirm the decision of the Commission if it is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion of the Commission. The issue on appeal is not whether the appellate court might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding; if reasonable minds could reach the Commission’s conclusion, the appellate court must affirm its decision.

Workers’ Compensation & SSDI > Benefit Determinations > Medical Benefits
HN2[ ] Benefit Determinations, Medical Benefits
A compensable injury includes an accidental injury causing internal or external physical harm to the body arising out of and in the course of employment and which requires medical services or results in disability or death. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) (Repl. 2012). A compensable injury does not include an injury which was inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed. § 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii). The supreme court has interpreted the term employment services as performance of something that is generally required by an employer. Courts use the same test to determine whether an employee was performing employment services as they do when determining whether an employee was acting within the course of employment. The test is whether the injury occurred within the time and space boundaries of the employment when the employee was carrying out the employer’s purpose or advancing the employer’s interest directly or indirectly.
Counsel: Bassett Law Firm LLP, by: Curtis L. Nebben, for appellant.
Laura Beth York, for appellee Willie Anderson.
Judges: LARRY D. VAUGHT, Judge. HARRISON, C.J., and BROWN, J., agree.
Opinion by: LARRY D. VAUGHT
Opinion

[1] LARRY D. VAUGHT, Judge Wal-Mart Associates, Inc. (Wal-Mart), appeals the opinion of the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission (Commission) finding that Willie Anderson proved that he sustained compensable injuries to his pelvis, left leg, and left hip while performing employment services. Wal-Mart argues on appeal that the Commission’s opinion is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm. At the hearing before the administrative law judge (ALJ), Anderson testified that he had been a truck driver for Wal-Mart since 1992. He stated that in March 2019, he was living in Arkadelphia, but his employment was based in Searcy. He described his typical weekly work schedule: On Monday night, he would drive his personal vehicle from his home in Arkadelphia to Searcy, and he would spend the night in a Wal-Mart truck. On Tuesday morning, he would take care of his paperwork and load his personal items for the week (clothes, food, water, [2] an ice chest, a small refrigerator, and bedding) into the truck. He stated that Wal-Mart allows its [2] drivers to load their personal items in Wal-Mart trucks so the drivers do not have to stop on the road and purchase food or drinks. He stated that he would leave Searcy for the week around 8:00 a.m. and that he would return to Searcy on Saturday night. He testified that upon his return, he was required to drop off the trailer; refuel and wash the outside of the truck; turn in his paperwork; remove his personal items from the truck; clean the inside of the truck, which included sweeping and sanitizing the floors and sanitizing the bedding; and clock out. He said that Wal-Mart wanted the inside of the trucks cleaned with chemicals and the bedding sprayed because there had been a “rash of bedbugs at one time, and so they want the drivers to use Lysol on their truck, and on the floors and everything.” Anderson added that he and other drivers are given a credit card by Wal-Mart for necessary purchases related to the truck, which he said includes the purchase of Lysol. Anderson explained that if the interior of the truck is not cleaned, he could be punished or even terminated. Anderson also [3] mentioned that the truck he drove all week was not solely used by him; occasionally, other drivers would drive the truck when Anderson was off duty. After these activities were completed on Saturday evening, Anderson would drive his personal vehicle home to Arkadelphia.
Anderson also testified that he is not required by Wal-Mart to drive to Searcy on Mondays and spend the night in the truck. He said that he could have driven from Arkadelphia to Searcy early on Tuesday mornings to start the work week. However, he explained that Wal-Mart provides a courtesy to its drivers by allowing them to spend the night in a Wal-Mart truck the night before they are scheduled to start the work week. He added that he only gets paid by Wal-Mart for his time Tuesday to Saturday.
[3] On Saturday, March 9, Anderson returned to Searcy after being on the road all week. He stated that he removed the trailer from the truck, refueled and washed the exterior of the truck, and dropped off his paperwork. He said that he also washed and vacuumed his personal vehicle. He then began removing his personal items from the truck. He said that an alarm went off in the truck, warning him that he had about five minutes before [4] his Arkansas Department of Transportation (DOT) fourteen-hour time limit expired.1 He stated that he knew he would not be able finish removing his personal items and cleaning the interior of the truck in time, so he clocked out. He continued to remove his personal supplies from the truck. As he was climbing out of the truck, he missed a step and fell about five feet to the ground onto his hip. At the doctor’s office, he learned that his left femur was dislocated from his hip and that he had fractured his left pelvis. He had a total left hip replacement in December 2019. When he claimed that he was entitled to workers’-compensation benefits for his injuries, Wal-Mart denied the claim, contending that Anderson was not performing employment services at the time of his accident. The ALJ found that Anderson had failed to meet his burden of proving that he was performing a specific job function at the time of his injuries. The ALJ acknowledged that Anderson was responsible for cleaning the interior of the truck but found that he had already clocked out for the day and had spent time taking care of personal matters related to his own vehicle before he clocked out. The ALJ also found that Wal-Mart [5] allowed its drivers to sleep and store personal items in its trucks as a courtesy. [4] Anderson appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Commission, which reversed the ALJ and found that Anderson was performing employment services at the time of his accident. Specifically, the Commission found that Anderson testified that he was required to clean the truck at the end of his work week, he was removing his personal items from the truck so he could clean the truck, and he was subject to discipline if he failed to clean the truck. The Commission also found that Anderson is entitled to reasonable and necessary medical treatment and temporary total-disability benefits from March 9, 2019, to a date yet to be determined. Wal-Mart appealed the Commission’s opinion.
HN1[ ] When reviewing a decision of the Commission, this court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission. Trezza v. USA Truck Inc., 2014 Ark. App. 555, at 3, 445 S.W.3d 521, 523. This court must affirm the decision of the Commission if it is supported by substantial evidence. Id., 445 S.W.3d at 523. Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion of the Commission. Id., 445 S.W.3d at 523. The issue on appeal is not whether [6] the appellate court might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding; if reasonable minds could reach the Commission’s conclusion, the appellate court must affirm its decision. Id., 445 S.W.3d at 523. HN2[ ] A compensable injury includes an accidental injury causing internal or external physical harm to the body arising out of and in the course of employment and which requires medical services or results in disability or death. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) (Repl. 2012). A compensable injury does not include an injury which was inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(B)(iii). [5] The supreme court has interpreted the term “employment services” as performance of something that is generally required by an employer. Id., 445 S.W.3d at 523. We use the same test to determine whether an employee was performing “employment services” as we do when determining whether an employee was acting within “the course of employment.” Id., 445 S.W.3d at 523. The test is whether the injury occurred within the time and space boundaries of the employment when the employee was carrying out the employer’s purpose or advancing the employer’s interest directly or indirectly. Id. at 3-4, 445 S.W.3d at 523. Wal-Mart argues that the Commission’s opinion [7] is not supported by substantial evidence because at the time of Anderson’s injury, he was not performing employment services, i.e., he was not doing something that was generally required by his employer. For instance, he was not cleaning or sanitizing or sweeping the truck when his accident occurred. Rather, Wal-Mart claims that when Anderson was injured, he was engaged in a purely personal activity—removing his belongings from Wal-Mart’s truck. Wal-Mart points out that it did not require Anderson to carry food, drinks, and other personal items in the truck. Rather, it allowed Anderson to load his personal items in its truck as a courtesy. Wal-Mart also asserts that Anderson’s removal of his personal supplies from the truck is not necessary for his job of driving the truck.
In White v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 339 Ark. 474, 6 S.W.3d 98 (1999), White was on his way to a smoke break when he attempted to step off his forklift through a door located in front of one of the veneer dryers and fell approximately two to three feet injuring his ankle. The [6] Commission denied White’s claim, concluding that he failed to prove that he was performing employment services at the time of his accident. White, 339 Ark. at 477, 6 S.W.3d at 100.
The supreme court reversed, holding that substantial evidence failed [8] to support the Commission’s decision because White’s unrebutted testimony was that while he was entitled to breaks, oftentimes his employer failed to provide him with a relief worker, so he was told to take his break—not in the designated break area, but in an area where he could monitor the dryers, which is where White was headed when he fell. White also testified that he was told by his supervisor to take a break whenever he got the chance and that if he was needed while on break, White would have been forced to return to his forklift immediately. Id. at 478-79, 6 S.W.3d at 100. Finally, the supreme court noted that while White was not loading the dryers at the time of his fall, he was, in fact, monitoring them, which was a required part of his job duties. Id. at 481, 6 S.W.3d at 101. The facts in White are similar to those in the instant case in that at the time of their injuries, White and Anderson were clocked out and tending to personal matters that were not directly advancing the interests of their employers: White was headed for a smoke break, and Anderson was removing his personal supplies from the truck. Neither activity was required by the employees’ respective employers. However, at the time of their injuries, both White and Anderson [9] were indirectly advancing the benefit of their employers and were doing something inherently necessary for the performance of their primary job: White was headed to an area where he was required to monitor the dryers, and Anderson was removing his personal items from the truck so he could clean and sanitize it. Furthermore, these activities were required [7] by White’s and Anderson’s employers. As such, we hold that White is sound authority for affirming the Commission’s decision in Anderson’s case. The two cases Wal-Mart cites for support are distinguishable. In Trezza, this court affirmed the Commission’s finding that Trezza, a truck driver, was not performing employment services when he “got out” to go to the bathroom and stumbled or stepped incorrectly, which caused him to fall. Trezza, 2014 Ark. App. 555, at 1, 445 S.W.3d at 522. This court held that substantial evidence supported the Commission’s finding because at the time of his accident, Trezza had finished working for the day; he had parked his truck at the terminal; he had clocked out; and he was on a “thirty-four-hour restart,” which meant he was not going to perform any job functions for at least thirty-four hours after going off duty. Id. at 4-5, 445 S.W.3d at 524. This court also noted that Trezza was not taking [10] a bathroom break so that he could return to his work duties; instead, he was off work and not required to do anything. Id. at 5, 445 S.W.3d at 524. While Trezza testified that he was responsible for keeping his truck secure, he was not required to sit with or sleep in his truck. Id., 445 S.W.3d at 524. The second case cited by Wal-Mart is Kinnebrew v. Little John’s Truck, Inc., 66 Ark. App. 90, 989 S.W.2d 541 (1999). In Kinnebrew, this court affirmed the Commission’s finding that Kinnebrew, a truck driver, was not performing employment services when he was off duty and slipped and fell while taking a shower at a truck stop. This court held, “Showering is not inherently necessary for the performance of the job [Kinnebrew] was hired to do.” Id. at 92, 989 S.W.2d at 543. Trezza and Kinnebrew have a few facts in common with the facts in the case at bar: each employee was a truck driver, each had clocked out for the day when their injuries occurred, [8] and each were tending to personal needs at the time of their accidents. But the critical distinction is that when Trezza and Kinnebrew fell, they were not under any job requirements at the time. Trezza was off duty for a thirty-four-hour period, and Kinnebrew had been off duty for seven hours. In contrast, when Anderson fell, he still had job duties to tend to: he was required to clean and sanitize the truck. He testified [11] that he was required to do this, and if he did not, he was subject to discipline. He said that he was given a company credit card to purchase Lysol to clean and sanitize the interior of the truck. The only way Anderson could clean and sanitize the truck was to take his personal items out of it, which indirectly advanced Wal-Mart’s interest and was inherently necessary for the performance of Anderson’s primary job.
In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission, we hold that substantial evidence supports the Commission’s conclusion that Anderson was performing employment services when he fell from his truck.2 Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.
HARRISON, C.J., and BROWN, J., agree.