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CASES (2022)

Resser v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc.

United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

April 27, 2022, Decided; April 27, 2022, Filed

No. 1:21-cv-01041

Reporter

2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76884 *; 2022 WL 1240859

DEBORAH RESSER, Plaintiff, v. J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT, Inc. and STANFORD RICKETTS, Defendants.

Core Terms

discovery, documents, driver, Supplemental, records, admissible evidence, carrier

Counsel:  [*1] For Deborah Resser, Plaintiff: Sean E. Summers, LEAD ATTORNEY, Summers Nagy Law Offices, York, PA.

For J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., Stanford Ricketts, Defendants: Diane B. Carvell, Rawle & Henderson, LLP, Harrisburg, PA; Gary N. Stewart, Patrick F. Coleman, Stephen G. Held, Rawle & Henderson LLP, Harrisburg, PA.

Judges: JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR., United States Magistrate Judge. CONNER, Judge.

Opinion by: JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.

Opinion


MEMORANDUM

This diversity case arises out of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on May 5, 2019. The action was commenced in the Court of Common Pleas of York County, Pennsylvania, on April 14, 2021. The defendants removed the case to this court on June 14, 2021. The matter is before us on the plaintiff’s motion to compel defendants’ discovery responses. (Doc. 26). For the reasons discussed below, we will grant the motion in part and deny it in part.


I. Statement of Facts

This accident occurred on May 5, 2019, on Susquehanna Trail, southbound, at the intersection of I-83 northbound, in Conewago Township, York County, Pennsylvania. The defendant, Stanford Ricketts, was the operator of the tractor trailer owned by defendant, J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., his employer. The plaintiff has alleged [*2]  that Ricketts failed to yield for southbound traffic on Susquehanna Trail, including the plaintiff’s vehicle, which caused the collision and resultant injuries to the plaintiff. The defendants contend that Ricketts made a left turn from the northbound Susquehanna Trail across the southbound lanes of Susquehanna Trail on a green turn light. They further contend that the accident was caused by the plaintiff by entering the southbound lanes of travel failing to take any avoidance maneuvers and braking.

The plaintiff served a request for production of documents upon the defendants which resulted in a discovery dispute. The matter was referred to the undersigned United States magistrate judge. We conducted a telephone conference with counsel following which we directed counsel for plaintiff to provide a more specific request regarding the production of Ricketts’s entire personnel and training file. (Doc. 18.) On February 2, 2022, the plaintiff served a more specific request upon defendants’ counsel identified as Supplemental Request for Production of Documents No. 19. In its response on March 4, 2022, J.B. Hunt asserted several objections to the revised request resulting in another request [*3]  for a conference with the court which occurred on April 4, 2022. (Doc. 18; Doc. 25.) As the matter was unable to be resolved by agreement, we permitted the plaintiff to file the subject motion to compel. The parties have briefed the motion and it is now ripe for disposition. (Doc. 28; Doc. 29-1; Doc. 30.)


II. Legal Standards

The federal courts have broad discretion to manage discovery, Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 734 (3d Cir. 1995), and the federal rules have long permitted broad and liberal discovery. Pacitti v. Macy’s, 193 F.3d 766, 777 (3d Cir. 1999). Pursuant to Rule 26(b)(1), parties may obtain discovery regarding “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case. . . . Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Further, the federal rules’ relevancy requirement is to be construed broadly, and material is relevant if it bears on, or reasonably could bear on, an issue that is or may be involved in the litigation. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 350, 98 S. Ct. 2380, 57 L. Ed. 2d 253 (1978).

Rule 26 establishes a liberal discovery policy. Discovery is generally permitted of any items that are relevant or may lead to the discovery of relevant information. Moreover, discovery need not be confined to items of admissible evidence but may encompass that which [*4]  appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Clemens v. N.Y. Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 300 F.R.D. 225, 226 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (citations omitted). When the Court is presented with a motion to compel discovery,

[t]he burden is on the objecting party to demonstrate in specific terms why a discovery request is improper. The party objecting to discovery must show that the requested materials do not fall within the broad scope of relevance or else are of such marginal relevance that the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary presumption in favor of broad disclosure.

Id. at 227 (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted).


III. Discussion

In her complaint, the plaintiff alleges a negligence claim against both defendants. (Doc. 1-2.) In Count I, the plaintiff alleges that J.B. Hunt, as Ricketts’s employer, is vicariously liable for the acts of its employee. In Count II, the plaintiff alleges that Ricketts was negligent by failing to recognize traffic patterns; failing to yield to oncoming traffic while making a left turn; operating the vehicle carelessly; and failing to operate the vehicle at a safe distance from the plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶25-29.) The defendants have denied liability. (Doc. 5.) However, the [*5]  defendants admit that defendant Ricketts was operating the J.B. Hunt tractor trailer within the course and scope of his employment with his employer, J.B. Hunt. (Doc. 5 ¶8.)

Under the Erie doctrine, in cases heard on diversity jurisdiction, a federal court must apply state substantive law and federal procedural law. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465, 85 S. Ct. 1136, 14 L. Ed. 2d 8 (1965). Thus, the elements of negligence under Pennsylvania law are: “a duty to conform to a certain standard for the protection of others against unreasonable risks; the defendant’s failure to conform to that standard; a causal connection between the conduct and the resultant injury; and actual loss or damage to the plaintiff.” Brewington ex rel. Brewington v. City of Philadelphia, 650 Pa. 139, 199 A.3d 348, 355 (Pa. 2018).

The plaintiff’s Supplemental Request for Production of Documents No. 19 and J.B. Hunt’s response thereto are set out as follows:

19. Provide the entirety of what is commonly referred to as a personnel file and/or training file for Defendant Ricketts, including but not limited to:

a. the driver qualification file mandated by 49 C.F.R. § 391.51;

b. the driver investigation history file mandated by 49 C.F. R. § 391.53;

c. all documents pertaining to the annual inquiry and review of Defendant Ricketts'[s] driving record performed by J.B. Hunt, as such is mandated by 49 C.F.R. § 391.25;

d. all documents related to any [*6]  audits of Defendant Ricketts'[s] driver qualification file performed by the Department of Transportation;

e. all documents required to be maintained related to Defendant Ricketts in the event of an audit by the Department of Transportation;

f. all documents concerning or related to Defendant Ricketts'[s] job performance (good or bad); and

g. all documents pertaining [to] Defendant Ricketts'[s] commencement and/or termination—voluntary or involuntary—of employment with J.B. Hunt.

RESPONSE: Objection. Answering defendant objects to this Request as overly broad, vague, not proportional to the needs of the needs of this case, unrelated to the claims asserted in the Complaint, beyond the scope of Rule 26(b)(1) which limits “discovery to any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense,” seeks documents pertaining to subsequent remedial measures, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. By way of further response, and without waiving the foregoing objection, see driver’s license, Medical Examiner’s Certificate, and termination document attached hereto.

(Doc. 26, at 12-13.) Thereafter, J.B. Hunt served upon plaintiff’s counsel a verified supplemental [*7]  response to plaintiff’s supplemental request for production of documents No. 19 on March 14, 2022. (Id. at 22-26.) This supplemental response contained all the same objections it previously raised, except an objection that the request is vague (excluding subparagraph (f)), but it set out its objections separately as to each subparagraph.1 (Id.)

J.B. Hunt contends that the information sought by the Supplemental Request No. 19 is overly broad, not proportional to the needs of the case as it is unrelated to the claims asserted in the complaint, beyond the scope of Rule 26(b)(1), seeks documents pertaining to subsequent remedial measures, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. It points out that the requested documents are irrelevant as the plaintiff has not alleged claims for negligent hiring, training, supervision, retention, and/or entrustment against J.B. Hunt. Further, J.B. Hunt argues that the proper focus in this case is what happened at the time of the accident.

While we agree with J.B. Hunt that the proper focus is what happened at the time of the accident, nonetheless motor vehicle carriers, such as J.B. Hunt, are required to maintain the requested [*8]  documents by federal regulations. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 391.25, 391.51, and 391.53. For example, § 391.25 requires each motor carrier to make an inquiry to the appropriate agency of every state in which the driver held a commercial motor vehicle operator’s license at least once every 12 months to obtain the motor vehicle record of every driver it employs, covering at least the preceding twelve months. One of the purposes of this requirement is for the motor carrier to determine if the driver exhibited a disregard for the safety of the public. § 391.51 requires the motor carrier to maintain a driver qualification file for each driver it employs. The qualification file for each driver must include, inter alia, the motor vehicle record received from each state driver licensing agency to the annual driver record inquiry required by § 391.25. These records are sought in Supplemental Request No. 19(a) and (c). Finally, § 391.53 requires each motor carrier to maintain investigation records relating to the safety performance history of a new or prospective driver and any data must only be used for the hiring decision. These records are sought in Supplemental Request No. 19(b). Thus, the records under §§ 391.25 (No. 19(c)) and 391.51 (No. 19(a)) are relevant for discovery [*9]  purposes as they relate to the safety record of the driver. However, the records requested under § 391.53 are not relevant as they relate only to the hiring decision. The plaintiff has not made a claim against J.B. Hunt for negligent hiring.

Regarding the records requested which may be subject to any audits by the appropriate department of transportation (No. 19(d) and (e)), the plaintiff has not articulated any reasons to support her position that those documents are relevant to the claims or defenses in this case. Likewise, the plaintiff’s request for records relating to Ricketts’s job performance (good or bad) fails for the same reason. We find that J.B. Hunt has complied with the request made in No. 19(g) in that it has provided the record of Ricketts’s termination.

Whether the requested records sought by No. 19(a) and (c) are eventually admissible at trial is not before us, and as the parties are presently engaged in discovery, the disclosure of those documents may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. We see no reason to deprive the plaintiff of this potential; as J.B. Hunt is not prejudiced because it can make appropriate motions in limine to preclude the admissibility of any [*10]  of the documents prior to trial. In addition, we point out that plaintiff’s counsel is not precluded from asking Ricketts the same questions which are the subject of Supplemental Request No. 19 at any future deposition. Our ruling here is only what may or may not be discoverable from J.B. Hunt’s perspective.

J.B. Hunt also objected that the requested discovery is disproportional to the needs of the case. It did not address its proportionality objection in its brief in opposition. (Doc. 29-1.) Nonetheless, proportionality determinations are to be made on a case-by-case basis using the factors set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) as follows: “The amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.” Id. “[N]o single factor is designed to outweigh the other factors in determining whether the discovery sought is proportional.” Bell v. Reading Hosp., Civ. No. 13-5927, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4643, 2016 WL 162991, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2016).

As J.B. Hunt did not address this portion of its objection to the requested discovery, we can only conclude that it has abandoned this part of its objection. Regardless, J.B. Hunt’s disproportionality [*11]  objection lacks merit in that: the amount in controversy is sufficient to meet federal court’s jurisdictional threshold of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs; J.B. Hunt, as the keeper of the records, has ready access to all relevant information, especially regarding Ricketts, its former employee; the importance of the discovery may be determinative of the issue whether the plaintiff can prove liability and that she was free from comparative fault; and the burden of producing the documents already in J.B. Hunt’s possession is outweighed by the benefit in providing the requested records which may lead to the admissibility of relevant evidence. Thus, we are not persuaded by J.B. Hunt’s disproportionality objection.

An appropriate order follows.

/s/ Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.

U.S. Magistrate Judge

Dated: April 27, 2022


ORDER

ORDER AND NOW, this 27th day of April, 2022, in accordance with the accompanying Memorandum, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The motion to compel defendants’ discovery responses filed by the plaintiff (Doc. 26) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

2. The motion is GRANTED, and J.B. Hunt shall provide the documents requested in supplemental request [*12]  No. 19(a) and (c) to plaintiff’s counsel within fourteen (14) days after the date of this Order.

3. In all other respects, the motion is DENIED.

Dated: April 27, 2022

/s/ Joseph F. Saporito, Jr.

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR.

U.S. Magistrate Judge


End of Document


As the parties are in possession of J.B. Hunt’s supplemental response, the court does not deem it necessary to set it out separately.

Sanchez v. S&H Transp., Inc.

United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma

April 25, 2022, Decided; April 25, 2022, Filed

Case No. 20-CV-0374-CVE-SH

Reporter

2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74480 *; 2022 WL 1213127

MAURICIO SANCHEZ, Plaintiff, v. S&H TRANSPORTATION, INC., DENNIS D. WOOD, JOHN DOE, a business entity, JANE DOE, an individual, Defendants.

Core Terms

negligent entrustment, driving, collision, training, chattel, driver, partial summary judgment, supervision, negligent hiring, retention, time of a collision

Counsel:  [*1] For Mauricio Sanchez, Plaintiff: John Paul Truskett, LEAD ATTORNEY, Truskett Law Firm PLLC, Tulsa, OK.

For S&H Transportation, Inc., a/k/a and/or d/b/a S&H Transportation a/k/a and/or d/b/a S&H a/k/a and/or d/b/a S&H Transport a/k/a and/or d/b/a S and H Transportation Inc. – a for profit business entity, S&H Transportation, S&H, S&H Transport, S and H Transportation Inc., Dennis D Wood, also known as, Dennis Wood, Defendants: Dan Steven Folluo, Rebecca Lynn Newman, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Rhodes Hieronymus Jones Tucker & Gable PLLC, TULSA, OK.

Judges: CLAIRE V. EAGAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Opinion by: CLAIRE V. EAGAN

Opinion


OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are defendant S&H Transportation, Inc.’s (S&H) motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. # 42), plaintiff Mauricio Sanchez’s response (Dkt. # 48), plaintiff’s supplement to his response (Dkt. # 52), and S&H’s reply (Dkt. # 57). This case arises from a collision between plaintiff’s car and defendant Dennis D. Wood’s 2000 Kenworth semi-truck pulling a trailer for defendant S&H. On July 6, 2020, plaintiff filed a petition in the District Court of Tulsa County, Oklahoma alleging numerous claims for relief against defendants S&H, Wood, John Doe, and Jane Doe, including [*2]  negligence, negligent entrustment, and negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention. Dkt. # 2-1. On July 30, 2020, defendants S&H and Wood removed the case to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441. On December 27, 2021, defendant S&H moved for partial summary judgment on the issues of negligent entrustment and negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention. Dkt. # 42, at 1.


I.

The following facts are not in dispute: on January 6, 2019, while “driving within the course and scope of his employment with S&H[,]” defendant Wood “rear-ended [p]laintiff’s vehicle” on U.S. Highway 169. Dkt. # 42, at 1-2; Dkt. # 48, at 8, 11. Wood was the owner/operator of the 2000 Kenworth semi-truck (Dkt. # 42, at 2; Dkt. # 48, at 8), which was pulling a trailer for S&H, and driving under S&H’s U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) authority. Dkt. # 48, 11; Dkt. # 57, at 2. On that day, plaintiff and Wood were both traveling southbound in the right lane on U.S. Highway 169, when Wood “drove his semi-tractor-trailer into the rear of [plaintiff’s] vehicle” traveling at “approximately 69 miles per hour.” Dkt. # 48, at 12; Dkt. # 57, at 2. “The impact caused [p]laintiff’s vehicle to spin around several [*3]  times, leave the roadway and [plaintiff’s vehicle] caught fire and burned.” Dkt. # 48, at 13; Dkt. # 57, at 2. Wood “agrees that [p]laintiff had the right-of-way at the time of the collision.” Dkt. # 48, at 14; Dkt. # 57, at 4.

Wood “claims he was looking straight down the road[,]” his “vision was not obscured[,]” the road was “level, straight and dry[,]” and traffic was “pretty light[.]” Dkt. # 48, at 11; Dkt. # 57, at 2. Moreover, Wood “denies he was having any difficulties with his vision; denies using his phone at the time of the collision; and denies he was asleep at the time of the collision.” Dkt. # 48, at 12; Dkt. # 57, at 2. In his deposition, Wood confirmed that “he did not see [plaintiff’s] vehicle until he hit it . . . [and he] does not know why he didn’t see [the] vehicle until immediately prior to the crash.” Dkt. # 48, at 12; Dkt. # 57, at 2.

Although defendants have not produced any relevant driver’s logs, Wood testified under oath that he was driving for two to three hours before the collision, and that he had slept six to eight hours before starting the drive. Dkt. # 48-1, at 16, 95. S&H submitted Wood’s drug testing results, performed less than 24 hours after the accident, [*4] 1 which confirm that Wood was negative for amphetamines, cocaine, opioids, phencyclidine, and marijuana. Dkt. # 57-2, at 1. Additionally, Wood testified that he had not had any alcohol within 48 hours of the collision. Dkt. #48-1, at 102-03.

At the time of the collision, Wood had a valid commercial driving license (CDL) and was “medically approved for professional driving.” Dkt. # 42, at 2; Dkt. # 42-6, at 5-8 (DOT medical examiner’s report); Dkt. # 48, at 10-11. One month prior to the collision, on December 4, 2018, Wood underwent a DOT medical evaluation for CDL certification. Dkt. # 42-6, at 5-8. The medical examiner noted that Wood had ear or hearing problems, high blood pressure, diabetes, a sleep disorder, and a body mass index (BMI) of 48.4.2 Id. at 6-7. Notwithstanding, the examiner concluded that Wood’s health conditions are well-controlled with medication, hearing aids, and a CPAP machine; Wood “[m]eets standards, but periodic monitoring required”; and the examiner medically certified Wood for one year for purposes of his CDL. Id. at 6, 8.

Prior to the collision, Wood had worked for S&H for nearly 30 years, except for a several month hiatus in 2015.3 Dkt. # 57-1, at 17; Dkt. # [*5]  48, at 11. Moreover, Wood testified that he had been a truck driver for 40 years. Dkt. # 48-1, at 97. Documents submitted by S&H show that at the time that it re-hired Wood in 2015, S&H performed a criminal background check and social security number verification; verified the number of Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) reportable crashes (which was zero); verified Wood’s employment history with his most recent previous employer, Frontier Leasing, Inc.; performed a drug test; performed a motor vehicle record (MVR) search; administered a road test (which Wood passed); confirmed that Wood received S&H’s driver’s manual; provided Wood with various policies, including log accuracy, prohibiting mobile phone use, and certain emergency procedures. Dkt. # 57-1, at 1-30. Moreover, S&H administered a written test regarding various policies and safety procedures, and submitted Wood’s certificate of training, which included “[g]eneral safe operating procedures.” Id. at 34-36. Finally, S&H submitted Wood’s post-collision MVR, which indicates that prior to the January 6, 2019 incident, Wood had one moving violation (not in his professional capacity), and one traffic accident in [*6]  his commercial vehicle, but no fault is indicated and it resulted in property damage only. Dkt. # 42-6, at 3.


II.

Summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 is appropriate where there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); Kendall v. Watkins, 998 F.2d 848, 850 (10th Cir. 1993). “[A] party may file a motion for summary judgment at any time until 30 days after the close of all discovery[,]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b), including before any discovery has been conducted. “Movants for summary judgment bear the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.” Silverstein v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 559 F. App’x. 739, 752 (10th Cir. 2014); see also Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670-71 (10th Cir. 1998). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.'” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986) (citations omitted). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. In essence, the inquiry for the Court is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a [*7]  matter of law.” Id. at 250. In its review, the Court construes the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Garratt v. Walker, 164 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir. 1998).


III.

Defendant S&H moves for partial summary judgment on the following claims:


a. Negligent Entrustment

In his petition, plaintiff alleged that the “truck [d]efendant Wood was driving at the time of the collision was owned . . . and/or controlled by [d]efendant S&H[.]” Dkt. # 2-1, at 2. In his response to S&H’s motion for partial summary judgment, plaintiff concedes that Wood is the owner/operator of the semi-truck that rear-ended plaintiff’s vehicle. Dkt. # 48, at 8. Plaintiff–precluded from arguing that S&H entrusted the semi-truck to Wood–pivots his theory of liability and argues that S&H is liable for “entrusting an incompetent or unfit driver with the power to drive under [d]efendant S&H’s [DOT] authority, where that driver causes injuries to another while operating under that authority.” Id. at 9.

According to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, unlike vicarious liability under a respondeat superior cause of action, negligent entrustment “is based on direct liability[.]” Fox v. Mize, 2018 OK 75, 428 P.3d 314, 320 (Okla. 2018). “Negligent Entrustment requires proof that an individual supplies a chattel for [*8]  the use of another whom the supplier knows or should know is likely to use the chattel in a way dangerous and likely to cause harm to others.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). “Liability for negligent entrustment arises from the act of entrustment, not the relationship of the parties.” Id. (quoting Sheffer v. Carolina Forge Co., L.L.C., 2013 OK 48, 306 P.3d 544, 550 (Okla. 2013)) (emphasis in original).

Here, plaintiff must demonstrate that 1) S&H supplied a chattel to Wood, and 2) S&H knew or should have known that Wood was likely to use the chattel in a dangerous way likely to cause harm to others. The Court is highly skeptical that DOT authority is chattel within the meaning of a negligent entrustment claim.4 Even if, assuming arguendo, that DOT authority is chattel, plaintiff’s claim still fails, because he is unable to sufficiently show that S&H knew or should have known that entrusting its DOT authority to Wood was dangerous and likely to cause harm to others. Specifically, prior to the January 6, 2019 collision, Wood was medically cleared to drive pursuant to DOT standards, had a valid CDL, and his MVR shows an unremarkable traffic history–one traffic collision since 2015 in which he was not assigned fault. Moreover, there is no evidence to show that Wood [*9]  was sleep deprived or exceeded his legal hours of service. Cf. Byrd v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., No. 17-CV-0111-CVE-JFJ, 2018 WL 1569499, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 30, 2018) (noting that a finding of negligent entrustment could be supported where plaintiff came forward with evidence that a truck driver suffered from sleep apnea, notified his employer of his sleep apnea, and exceeded his legal hours of service). The Court finds that plaintiff has not submitted sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that S&H is liable for negligent entrustment. In other words, plaintiff has failed to produce evidence that shows S&H supplied chattel to Wood when it knew or should have known that Wood would use any such chattel in a dangerous way likely to cause harm to others. Therefore, the Court finds that defendant S&H’s motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. # 42) should be granted as to the negligent entrustment claim against it.


b. Negligent Hiring, Training, Supervision, and Retention

According to Supreme Court of Oklahoma precedent, “[e]mployers may be held liable for negligence in hiring, supervising, or retaining an employee.” Le v. Total Quality Logistics, LLC, 431 P.3d 366, 375 (Okla. Civ. App. 2018) (citing N.H. v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 1999 OK 88, 998 P.2d 592, 600 (Okla. 1999)). Namely, “[a]n employer is found liable if the employer had reason to believe that the person [*10]  would create an undue risk of harm to others. Employers are held liable for their prior knowledge of the servant’s propensity to commit the very harm for which damages are sought.” Id. “The critical element for recovery is the employer’s prior knowledge of the servant’s propensities to create the specific danger resulting in damage.” Presbyterian Church, 998 P.2d at 600.

Here, the undisputed facts establish that Wood was a seasoned driver with over 30 years of experience; was certified by a DOT medical examiner; had a valid CDL; passed a drug screen before S&H re-hired him; had zero FMCSA-reportable crashes at the time of his 2015 hiring; received S&H’s driver’s manual; obtained S&H training certifications; and passed S&H’s written quiz and road test. Moreover, since S&H re-hired him in 2015, Wood had one accident while driving his commercial vehicle (prior to the January 6, 2019 collision), and Wood’s MVR indicates that he was not at fault, which Wood corroborates in his sworn testimony, Dkt. # 48-1, at 107. In sum, plaintiff failed to present evidence that S&H had prior knowledge or a reason to believe that Wood would create an undue risk of harm to others. Thus, plaintiff is unable to make a sufficient showing from [*11]  which a reasonable jury could find that S&H is liable for negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention. Therefore, the Court finds that defendant S&H’s motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. # 42) should be granted as to plaintiff’s negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention claim against S&H.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant S&H Transportation, Inc.’s (S&H) motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. # 42) is granted as to plaintiff’s negligent entrustment and negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention claims against defendant S&H.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff is directed to show cause, within 14 days, as to why defendants John Doe and Jane Doe have not been served, and to show good cause as to why the Court should not dismiss this case as to those defendants.

DATED this 25th day of April, 2022.

/s/ Claire V. Eagan

CLAIRE V. EAGAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE


End of Document


The traffic collision report shows that the incident occurred at 4:30 a.m. on January 6, 2019, Dkt. # 42-1, at 2, and the drug testing results show that a urine sample was collected at 12 a.m. on January 7, 2019, Dkt. # 57-2, at 1.

2A BMI of 30.0 and above is considered obese. https://www.cdc.gov/healthyweight/assessing/bmi/adult_bmi/index.html.

The Court notes that S&H denies that Wood worked for S&H for 30 years, Dkt. # 57, at 2; however, S&H’s submitted evidence indicates that Wood worked at S&H from August 1991 until December 2015, and then from May 2015 on, including at the time of the collision. Dkt. # 57-1, at 16-17. S&H claims that it has been in business since 1994, not 1991, Dkt. # 57, at 2; even so, the record evidence shows that Wood worked for S&H for approximately 25-28 years.

The Court notes that plaintiff presents no evidence or argument that the trailer, which Wood’s semi-truck was pulling for S&H, was the chattel that S&H negligently entrusted to Wood. In his response to S&H’s motion for partial summary judgment, plaintiff argues that the chattel that S&H negligently entrusted to Wood was its DOT authority only. See Dkt. # 48, at 9, 23. Accordingly, the Court will analyze plaintiff’s negligent entrustment claim as to S&H’s DOT authority only.

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