Bits & Pieces

Pepper v. C.R. England

528 P.3d 587

Supreme Court of Nevada.

Chantel PEPPER, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Eric Pepper; and Travis Akkerman, Appellants,

C.R. ENGLAND, a Utah Corporation; and Tesfaye Alamin, Individually, a Resident of Clark County, Nevada, Respondents.

No. 84009

Filed May 4, 2023

Synopsis

Background: After motorist, a resident of Texas, sustained fatal injuries when his vehicle collided with semi-truck parked on highway, motorist’s widow, individually and as personal representative of motorist’s estate, and motorist’s son filed wrongful death lawsuit in Nevada district court against driver of truck and trucking company. The District Court, Clark County, Joanna Kishner, J., granted truck driver’s motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, in which company joined. Widow appealed.

Holdings: The Supreme Court, Herndon, J., held that:

^[1] dismissal of complaint for forum non conveniens was abuse of discretion when defendants omitted a supporting affidavit, and

^[2] as a matter of first impression, a sister-state-resident plaintiff should be treated as “foreign” for purposes of forum non conveniens analysis and thus be afforded less deference in her choice of forum unless she shows bona fide connections to Nevada.

Reversed and remanded.

[1] Courts Denial, dismissal, or transfer

A district court must weigh several factors in considering whether to dismiss for forum non conveniens: first, the court must determine the level of deference owed to the plaintiff’s forum choice, second, the court must determine whether an adequate alternative forum exists, and third, if an adequate alternative forum does exist, the court must then weigh public and private interest factors to determine whether dismissal is warranted. Nev. Rev. St. § 13.050(2)(c).

[2] Courts Alternate Forum

Dismissal for forum non conveniens is appropriate only in exceptional circumstances in which factors strongly weigh in favor of another forum. Nev. Rev. St. § 13.050(2)(c).

[3] Appeal and Error Forum non conveniens

The Supreme Court reviews a district court’s balancing of the forum non conveniens factors for an abuse of discretion. Nev. Rev. St. § 13.050.

[4]Appeal and Error Forum non conveniens

For appellate purposes, a district court abuses its discretion in its forum non conveniens analysis by relying on insufficient evidence, by relying on an erroneous view of the law, by relying on clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or by striking an unreasonable balance of relevant factors. Nev. Rev. St. § 13.050.

[5] Courts Parties’ choice of forum; forum-shopping

Applying the wrong level of deference to a plaintiff’s choice of forum is an abuse of discretion.

[6] Courts Denial, dismissal, or transfer

Dismissal of complaint for forum non conveniens was abuse of discretion, on defendants’ motion in motorist’s widow’s wrongful death suit against trucking company and driver of truck with which motorist’s vehicle collided, notwithstanding driver’s argument that another state, in which widow resided and motorist had resided, was the more appropriate forum, where driver and company failed to submit any affidavit in support of their motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens. Nev. Rev. St. § 13.050(2)(c).

[7] Courts Conditions precedent

An affidavit is required before a complaint is dismissed for forum non conveniens.

[8] Courts Parties’ choice of forum; forum-shopping

Generally, a plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to great deference, but a foreign plaintiff’s choice of a United States forum is entitled to less deference.

[9] Courts Parties’ choice of forum; forum-shopping

A foreign plaintiff’s choice of forum in the United States is entitled to substantial deference only when the case has bona fide connections to the chosen forum and convenience favors the chosen forum. Nev. Rev. St. § 13.050(2)(c).

[10] Courts Residency of parties; state of incorporation Courts Presumptions and burden of proof

For purposes of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a plaintiff’s residence is a proxy for convenience; if a plaintiff files suit where she resides, a court reasonably can conclude that forum is convenient. Nev. Rev. St. § 13.050(2)(c).

[11] Courts Presumptions and burden of proof

For purposes of a forum non conveniens analysis, when a foreign plaintiff sues in the United States, it is less reasonable to assume that the forum choice was made for convenience; the plaintiff may be forum shopping or selecting a forum for other strategic reasons, rather than selecting the most convenient forum. Nev. Rev. St. § 13.050(2)(c).

[12] Courts Presumptions and burden of proof

Even without allegations of forum shopping, a court has no reason to assume that a United States forum would be more convenient for a foreign plaintiff, absent other considerations. Nev. Rev. St. § 13.050(2)(c).

[13] Courts Parties’ choice of forum; forum-shopping

A sister-state-resident plaintiff should be treated as “foreign” for the purposes of a forum non conveniens analysis and thus be afforded less deference in her choice of forum, unless she proves that Nevada is a convenient forum by showing bona fide connections to Nevada. Nev. Rev. St. § 13.050(2)(c).

[14] Courts Parties’ choice of forum; forum-shopping

The justification for affording less deference to a foreign plaintiff’s choice of a Nevada forum holds true for a sister-state-resident plaintiff—there is no reason to presume that she chose Nevada as a forum for convenience, because she does not live in Nevada. Nev. Rev. St. § 13.050(2)(c).

*588 Appeal from a district court order dismissing a complaint for forum non conveniens. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Joanna Kishner, Judge.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Matthew L. Sharp, Ltd., and Matthew L. Sharp, Reno; The Cowden Law Firm, PLLC, and George Cowden, IV, Tyler, Texas, for Appellants.

Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, and Michael P. Lowry, Las Vegas, for Respondents.

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, HERNDON, LEE, and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, HERNDON, J.:

In this appeal, we consider whether a district court abused its discretion by dismissing a complaint for forum non conveniens. In dismissing the complaint, the district court granted a motion that did not include a supporting affidavit, and it treated a Texan plaintiff as a foreign plaintiff, thereby affording her choice of a Nevada forum less deference. *589 We hold the district court abused its discretion by granting the motion because the moving parties did not include a supporting affidavit and therefore failed to meet their evidentiary burden. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Although not affecting our disposition here, we take this opportunity to address a second issue because it presents an unresolved question in Nevada law and is likely to arise on remand—what level of deference is owed to a plaintiff who resides in a sister state and selects Nevada as a forum? Generally, a non-U.S.-resident (foreign) plaintiff’s choice of a Nevada forum is afforded less deference because a plaintiff’s residence is a proxy for convenience—a foreign plaintiff does not live in Nevada, so there generally is no reason to presume that her choice of a Nevada forum is convenient. We hold, as did the district court, that a sister-state-resident plaintiff is “foreign” for the purposes of forum non conveniens because this rationale applies to her.

BACKGROUND AND FACTS

Respondent C.R. England, Inc., is a trucking company incorporated and headquartered in Utah. C.R. England hired respondent Tesfaye Alamin, a Nevada resident, to drive its semitrucks. According to the complaint, Alamin was driving in Texas en route to Colorado when he parked his semitruck and trailer in the left lane of a snow-covered two-lane highway. Meanwhile, Eric Pepper, a Texas resident, and his passenger were driving on the same highway, miles behind Alamin’s semitruck. As Pepper approached the parked semitruck, a bend in the highway obstructed his view, and he collided with the semitruck. Pepper sustained a head injury and died a few days later.

Pepper’s widow, appellant Chantel Pepper, in her individual capacity and on behalf of Eric Pepper’s estate, and Eric’s son, appellant Travis Akkerman (collectively Pepper), filed a wrongful death lawsuit in Nevada district court against C.R. England and Alamin. Alamin moved to dismiss for forum non conveniens, arguing that Texas was the more appropriate forum. His motion, which C.R. England joined, did not include any supporting attachments or exhibits.

After a hearing on the motion to dismiss, the district court granted the motion. In its analysis, the district court treated Pepper as “foreign” and found that the case lacked a bona fide connection to Nevada. Accordingly, the district court afforded Pepper’s choice of a Nevada forum less deference. Pepper appealed.

DISCUSSION

Pepper makes three arguments. First, she argues the district court erred by dismissing for forum non conveniens because C.R. England and Alamin failed to attach a supporting affidavit and made only general allegations of inconvenience and thus did not meet their evidentiary burden. Second, she argues that she is not a “foreign” plaintiff, so her choice of a Nevada forum should not have received less deference on that basis. “Foreign,” in her view, refers only to non-U.S.-resident plaintiffs, not sister-state-resident plaintiffs. Third, even if she were considered foreign under a forum non conveniens analysis, Pepper argues, her choice of a Nevada forum should still receive great deference because her suit has bona fide connections to Nevada.

^[1] ^[2]NRS 13.050 codifies the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Mountain View Recreation, Inc. v. Imperial Commercial Cooking Equip. Co., 129 Nev. 413, 419, 305 P.3d 881, 884 (2013). It provides that a “court may, on motion or stipulation, change the place of the proceeding … [w]hen the convenience of the witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change.” NRS 13.050(2)(c). In Provincial Government of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., this court set forth several factors that a district court must weigh in considering whether to dismiss for forum non conveniens. 131 Nev. 296, 300-01, 350 P.3d 392, 396 (2015). First, the “court must … determine the level of deference owed to the plaintiff’s forum choice.” Id. at 300, 350 P.3d at 396. Second, the court “must determine whether an adequate alternative forum exists.” Id. at 301, 350 P.3d at 396 (internal quotation marks omitted). And third, “[i]f an adequate alternative *590 forum does exist, the court must then weigh public and private interest factors to determine whether dismissal is warranted.” Id. The court “should also consider whether failure to apply the doctrine would subject the defendant to harassment, oppression, vexatiousness or inconvenience.” Id. at 305, 350 P.3d at 398 (internal quotation marks omitted). Dismissal is appropriate only in “exceptional circumstances” where the factors strongly weigh in favor of another forum. Id. at 301, 350 P.3d at 396.

Standard of review

^[3] ^[4] ^[5]We review a district court’s balancing of the Placer Dome factors for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 300, 350 P.3d at 395-96. A district court abuses its discretion by relying on insufficient evidence, see Mountain View Recreation, 129 Nev. at 420, 305 P.3d at 885, “by relying on an erroneous view of the law, by relying on clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or by striking an unreasonable balance of relevant factors,” Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 643 F.3d 1216, 1224 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying the wrong level of deference to a plaintiff’s choice of forum is an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1229.

C.R. England and Alamin did not meet their evidentiary burden, as they failed to support their motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens with an affidavit

Pepper argues that Nevada law requires a moving party to submit affidavits in support of a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens.¹ C.R. England and Alamin counter that affidavits are sufficient but not necessary to support dismissal for forum non conveniens.

^[6] ^[7]In Mountain View Recreation v. Imperial Commercial Cooking Equipment Co., we held that a district court abused its discretion in dismissing for forum non conveniens where there was insufficient evidence in the record to support such a finding. 129 Nev. at 420, 305 P.3d at 885. In doing so, we held that “[a] motion for change of venue based on forum non conveniens must be supported by affidavits” to enable the district court to assess whether there are exceptional circumstances favoring dismissal. Id. at 419, 305 P.3d at 885 (emphasis added). Mountain View Recreation’s requirement is clear—an affidavit is required before a complaint is dismissed for forum non conveniens. Because C.R. England and Alamin omitted a supporting affidavit, the district court abused its discretion in dismissing Pepper’s complaint. Nonetheless, we consider whether the district court should categorize Pepper as a foreign plaintiff because it is an unresolved question of Nevada law likely to arise on remand.

Sister-state-resident plaintiffs are “foreign”

Pepper argues that she is not a “foreign” plaintiff, so her choice of a Nevada forum should not receive less deference on that basis. “Foreign,” in her view, refers only to non-U.S.-resident plaintiffs, not sister-state-resident plaintiffs.

^[8] ^[9]In applying the first Placer Dome factor, “[g]enerally, a plaintiff’s choice of forum is entitled to great deference, but a foreign plaintiff’s choice of a United States forum is entitled to less deference.” Placer Dome, 131 Nev. at 301, 350 P.3d at 396 (citing Pollux Holding Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 329 F.3d 64, 71 (2d Cir. 2003)). A foreign plaintiff’s choice of forum in the United States is “entitled to substantial deference only where the case has bona fide connections to and convenience favors the chosen forum.” Id.

In Placer Dome, a local government in the Philippines filed suit in Nevada district court against Placer Dome, Inc., a Canadian corporation, which owned subsidiaries operating in Nevada. Id. at 299-300, 350 P.3d at 395. We held that the district court properly determined that the Philippines government was “foreign” and entitled to less deference because its decision to sue in Nevada to obtain personal jurisdiction over Placer Dome was not a “bona fide” connection, given that *591 whether personal jurisdiction over Placer Dome existed in Nevada was unclear. See id. at 301-02, 350 P.3d at 395–96. Likewise, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals case we relied on, Pollux Holding Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, afforded foreign corporate plaintiffs’ (both plaintiff corporations were incorporated in Liberia with their principal place of business in Greece) choice of a United States forum less deference. 329 F.3d at 68, 74.

^[10] ^[11] ^[12]To determine whether a sister-state-resident plaintiff should be treated like a Nevada resident or like a foreign plaintiff for the purposes of forum non conveniens, we turn to the rationale behind this rule. As the Second Circuit explained in Pollux, a plaintiff’s residence is a proxy for convenience. Id. at 71, 73-74. If a plaintiff files suit where she resides, a court reasonably can conclude that forum is convenient. Id. at 71 (citing Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 519, 524, 67 S.Ct. 828, 91 L.Ed. 1067 (1947) (discussing plaintiff’s suit in his home district)). In contrast, when a foreign plaintiff sues in the United States, it is less reasonable to assume that choice was made for convenience. Id. In that case, the plaintiff may be forum shopping or selecting the forum for other strategic reasons, rather than selecting the most convenient forum. Id. Even without allegations of forum shopping, a court has no reason to assume a U.S. forum would be more convenient for a foreign plaintiff, absent other considerations. Id.

^[13] ^[14]We conclude that the rationale behind affording less deference to a foreign plaintiff’s choice of a Nevada forum applies with equal force to a sister-state-resident plaintiff. See Fennell v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 369 Ill.Dec. 728, 987 N.E.2d 355, 362 (Ill. 2012) (holding that because a plaintiff did not reside in Illinois and the cause of action did not arise in Illinois, the plaintiff’s choice of an Illinois forum was entitled to less deference “for this reason alone”). If a foreign plaintiff sues in Nevada, we do not presume that choice was made for convenience because the plaintiff does not live in Nevada. This justification holds true for a sister-state-resident plaintiff—there is no reason to presume that she chose Nevada as a forum for convenience because she does not live in Nevada. Accordingly, we hold that a sister-state-resident plaintiff should be treated as “foreign” for the purposes of a forum non conveniens analysis and thus be afforded less deference in her choice of forum, unless she proves that Nevada is a convenient forum by showing bona fide connections to Nevada. However, we do not resolve whether this case has bona fide connections to Nevada, given that we conclude C.R. England and Alamin did not meet their evidentiary burden.

CONCLUSION

In summary, a sister-state-resident plaintiff is “foreign” for the purposes of a forum non conveniens analysis. A foreign plaintiff’s, including a sister-state-resident plaintiff’s, choice of a Nevada forum is entitled to less deference unless she can show the case has bona fide connections to this state. Here, Pepper is a Texan, so her choice of a Nevada forum is entitled to less deference unless this case has a bona fide connection to this state. But we do not consider whether a bona fide connection exists in this case because the underlying motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens lacked a supporting affidavit. The district court therefore abused its discretion in granting the motion. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

We concur:

Lee, J.

Parraguirre, J.

All Citations

Footnotes

In light of our disposition, we do not address Pepper’s remaining argument that C.R. England and Alamin did not meet their evidentiary burden by making only general allegations of convenience.

End of Document

Martinez v. ITF LLC

2023 WL 3236030

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.

Alwin MARTINEZ, Plaintiff–Respondent,

ITF LLC, et al., Defendants,

Yesenia Camacho, Defendant–Respondent,

J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., Defendant–Appellant.

Yesenia Camacho, Plaintiff–Respondent,

ITF LLC, et al., Defendants,

J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., Defendant–Appellant,

Alwin Martinez, Defendant–Respondent.

185-, 186-, 187

Index Nos. 20977/18E, 25135/18E

Case Nos. 2022-01483, 2022-01494, 2022-05075

Entered May 4, 2023

Synopsis

Background: Driver of automobile, which became disabled on highway, and motorist, who drove to scene to help driver, brought personal-injury action against operator of tractor–trailer and lessee of trailer, alleging that operator’s negligence caused accident in which tractor–trailer crashed into back of motorist’s stopped automobile. The Supreme Court, Bronx County, Ben R. Barbato, J., entered order granting plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment on issue of liability and dismissing lessee’s affirmative defense of comparative negligence on part of driver and later entered order denying lessee’s motion to renew. Lessee appealed.

Holdings: The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that:

^[1] operator and lessee were liable for driver’s and motorist’s injuries;

^[2] emergency doctrine did not apply;

^[3] driver was not negligent;

^[4] call that driver made to motorist for assistance did not constitute intervening act that broke chain of causation; and

^[5] new evidence did not warrant allowing lessee to renew its opposition to motions for summary judgment.

Affirmed.

[1] Automobiles Care required of following vehicle

Operator of tractor–trailer and lessee of trailer were liable for personal injuries that driver of automobile, which became disabled on highway, and motorist, who drove to scene to help driver, sustained in accident in which tractor–trailer crashed into back of motorist’s automobile, since tractor–trailer rear-ended motorist’s stopped automobile.

[2] Automobiles Rear-end collision

Rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the driver of the rear vehicle.

[3] Automobiles Acts in emergencies

Emergency doctrine did not apply and thus did not preclude imposing liability on operator of tractor–trailer and lessee of trailer regarding collision in which tractor–trailer crashed into back of stopped automobile of motorist, who drove to scene to help driver of automobile that became disabled on highway, and allegedly caused injuries to motorist and driver; operator was driving over speed limit while talking on his cellphone just before collision, and operator had unobstructed view of highway with no other traffic in the area and saw motorist’s automobile for at least ten seconds before impact, yet he made no attempt to stop, move to the left, or blow his horn.

[4] Automobiles Vehicles stopped for repairs

Driver of automobile that became disabled on highway was not negligent, precluding affirmative defense of comparative negligence regarding driver’s personal-injury action that was brought against lessee of trailer and that arose from collision in which tractor–trailer crashed into back of stopped automobile of motorist, who drove to scene to help driver, where driver parked his disabled automobile completely on right shoulder of highway, outside flow of traffic.

[5] Automobiles Proximate cause of injury

Call that driver of automobile that became disabled on highway made to motorist for assistance did not constitute intervening act that broke chain of causation between negligence of operator of tractor–trailer in crashing into rear of motorist’s stopped automobile and injuries sustained by driver and motorist, and thus call did not preclude imposing liability on lessee of trailer, although motorist parked her automobile partially in rightmost lane of highway; fact that motorist could share some responsibility for injuries sustained by herself and driver did not absolve lessee from liability, as there could be more than one proximate cause of injuries.

[6] Summary Judgment Renewed or successive motions

New evidence offered by lessee of trailer did not warrant allowing lessee to renew its opposition to motions for summary judgment as to liability that driver of automobile, which became disabled on highway, and motorist, who drove to scene to help driver, filed in their personal-injury action arising from accident in which tractor–trailer crashed into back of motorist’s stopped automobile; new evidence would not have changed trial court’s determination even had it been offered on original motions, and at most, new evidence was relevant to credibility of expert for driver and motorist, which was collateral issue.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Coffey Modica O’Meara Capowski LLP, White Plains (John F. Watkins of counsel), for appellant.

Pollack, Pollack, Isaac & DeCicco, LLP, New York (Brian J. Isaac of counsel), for Alwin Martinez, respondent.

Avanzino & Moreno, P.C., Brooklyn (Stuart Long of counsel), for Yesenia Camacho, respondent.

Manzanet–Daniels, J.P., Singh, Moulton, Rodriguez, Pitt–Burke, JJ.

Opinion

*1 Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Ben R. Barbato, J.), entered on or about March 28, 2022, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment on liability and dismissed defendant J.B. Hunt Transport Inc.’s affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence by plaintiff Alwin Martinez, unanimously affirmed, without costs. Order, same court and Justice, entered on or about November 2, 2022, which denied J.B. Hunt’s motion to renew, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiffs were injured in an incident in which Martinez’s vehicle became disabled on the highway and plaintiff Yesenia Camacho drove to the scene to help him. Camacho testified that although she first parked behind Martinez on the shoulder, she eventually moved her vehicle so that it extended partially into the right-hand lane of the highway so that she could help jump start Martinez’s vehicle. While plaintiffs were waiting for Martinez’ vehicle to charge, a tractor–trailer driven by defendant Furdat Yuldashev crashed into the back of Camacho’s vehicle, injuring both plaintiffs. Defendant J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. was the lessee of the trailer.

^[1] ^[2]Plaintiffs established entitlement to summary judgment on liability, as a rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the driver of the rear vehicle (Reyes v. Gropper, 212 A.D.3d 565, 565, 183 N.Y.S.3d 369 [1st Dept. 2023]). In opposition, defendants failed to provide an adequate nonnegligent explanation for the accident, as no party disputes that Yuldashev’s tractor–trailer rear-ended Camacho’s stopped vehicle (see id.).

^[3]Furthermore, the emergency doctrine is inapplicable, since Yuldashev himself created the emergency (see Vanderhall v. MTA Bus Co., 160 A.D.3d 542, 542–543, 74 N.Y.S.3d 548 [1st Dept. 2018]; Johnson v. Phillips, 261 A.D.2d 269, 271, 690 N.Y.S.2d 545 [1st Dept. 1999]). As the evidence in the record makes clear, just before the collision, Yuldashev was driving over the speed limit while talking on his cellphone. In addition, the dash cam video showed he had an unobstructed view of the roadway with no other traffic in the area and saw Camacho’s vehicle for at least 10 seconds before the impact, yet he made no attempt to stop, move to the left, or blow his horn (see Fernandez v. Ortiz, 183 A.D.3d 443, 444, 121 N.Y.S.3d 867 [1st Dept. 2020]; Acevedo v. Akhtar, 204 A.D.3d 596, 597, 165 N.Y.S.3d 314 [1st Dept. 2002]).

^[4] ^[5]Supreme Court correctly dismissed J.B. Hunt’s affirmative defense with respect to Martinez’s comparative negligence, since the evidence shows that he parked his disabled vehicle completely on the right shoulder of the roadway, outside the flow of traffic. Furthermore, we reject J.B. Hunt’s argument that Martinez’s call to Camacho for assistance constituted an intervening act that broke the chain of causation. Although the record shows that Camacho parked her vehicle partially in the rightmost lane of the highway, that Camacho may share some responsibility for plaintiffs’ injuries does not absolve J.B. Hunt from liability, as there may be more than one proximate cause of an injury (see Hain v. Jamison, 28 N.Y.3d 524, 530, 46 N.Y.S.3d 502, 68 N.E.3d 1233 [2016]).

*2 ^[6]Finally, Supreme Court properly denied J.B. Hunt’s motion to renew. The new evidence offered on the motion would not have changed the court’s determination even had it been offered on the original motion. At most, the new evidence was relevant to the credibility of plaintiff’s expert, which is a collateral issue (see Crooms v. Sauer Bros. Inc., 48 A.D.3d 380, 381–382, 853 N.Y.S.2d 29 [1st Dept. 2008]).

We have considered J.B. Hunt’s remaining arguments and find them unavailing.

All Citations

— N.Y.S.3d —-, 2023 WL 3236030, 2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 02385

End of Document