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Bits & Pieces

De Leon v. Great American Assur. Co.

District Court of Appeal of Florida,

Third District.

Jose DE LEON, Appellant,

v.

GREAT AMERICAN ASSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee.

 

No. 3D09–646.

Oct. 12, 2011.

 

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami–Dade County, Jennifer D. Bailey, Judge.

Mark J. Feldman, for appellant.

 

Hinshaw & Culbertson, Maureen G. Pearcy and Luis A. Diz, for appellee.

 

Before SHEPHERD and SUAREZ, JJ., and SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.

 

SCHWARTZ, Senior Judge.

This is an appeal from an order denying attorney fees under section 627.428 Florida Statutes (2008), in an action for property loss benefits under an automobile insurance policy. The ruling, which was entered even though the insurer settled the case for the full amount claimed, was based on the notion that the action had been premature and unnecessary and was thus not effective in securing the favorable result. See JPG Enterprises, Inc. v. Viterito, 841 So.2d 528, 530 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (“A prevailing party is entitled to recover only fees which are ‘reasonably expended.’ Fla. Patient’s Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145, 1151 (Fla.1985).”); State Farm Florida Ins. Co. v. Lorenzo, 969 So.2d 393, 398 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (“Courts generally do not apply the confession-of-judgment doctrine, which supports awarding attorney fees under statute governing award of fees to insureds in insurance coverage actions, where the insureds were not forced to sue to receive benefits; applying the doctrine would encourage unnecessary litigation by rewarding a race to the courthouse for attorney fees even where the insurer was complying with its obligations under the policy.”); Garcia v. Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 246 So.2d 574, 574 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971) (“[I]nterest and attorneys’ fees will not be awarded where there is no necessity to institute suit to confirm or collect an arbitration award under an uninsured motorist provision in an automobile liability policy.”). This conclusion was in turn based on the finding that the insured had improperly refused to submit to and complete an appropriate and contractually required pre-suit examination under oath. See Lorenzo, 969 So.2d 393 (finding fees improper where insured sued without complying with policy conditions). We disagree with the result below and the premise upon which it was based and therefore reverse.

 

In happy contrast to such cases as Corey v. Corey, 29 So.3d 315, 321 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) and cases cited at n. 4 (Schwartz, J. dissenting), in which the tone of the author’s dissenting opinions were caused by their having been originally prepared for the court, this one was originally a dissent which, unusually enough, persuaded the previous majority.

 

The controversy began when someone stole a truck owned by De Leon and insured by Great American. When it was recovered, it had been damaged and, most significantly, was missing nine large, valuable tires. As shown by Great American’s payment of the entire claim, there was never a legitimate defense under the personal property section of his policy. Unfortunately, however, the carrier apparently decided to use the usual policy provision requiring a sworn statement as a license to make unwarranted and intrusive inquiries into the personal life of any insured who has the temerity to make a claim against it. At the statement, where De Leon appeared without counsel, Great American’s lawyer, Luis A. Diz, did not even get to the truck and the tires. Instead, he insisted on probing into the details of, among other things, a prior, totally unrelated criminal conviction, and the person with whom the claimant was then living.

 

The record shows that the following, which is quoted as a never-to-be-emulated model of its kind, occurred:

 

Q So from 1994 to 2003, you lived in Homestead?

 

A No. From 1994 to 2000—I don’t remember when I went to Kentucky and I was in Kentucky until 2003.

 

Q How long were you in Kentucky, more or less?

 

A From 1995 until 2003.

 

Q Okay. Maybe I’m a little confused. The way I understood your testimony was that you lived-you’ve lived at your current address for approximately three years, four years. You started living there in 2003; is that correct?

 

A From 2003 until now.

 

Q Prior to that you lived in Kentucky?

 

A I lived in Kentucky.

 

Q From 1995 to 2003 more or less?

 

A Correct.

 

Q And that’s—you were continually a resident of Kentucky during those eight years?

 

A Correct.

 

Q Do you remember the address in Kentucky you resided?

 

A I don’t remember the address.

 

Q Do you remember the city?

 

A I was in Lexington and Manchester.

 

Q Any other cities?

 

A No.

 

Q Who did you live with when you resided in Kentucky?

 

A With Barbara, the mother of my son.

 

Q Just you and Barbara?

 

A Yes.

 

Q You mentioned Homestead. Did you have a house in Homestead?

 

A Yes.

 

Q When was that?

 

A In 1994.

 

Q How long did you live at the house in Homestead?

 

A. One year

 

Q So you had it from 1994 to 1995 more or less?

 

A Correct.

 

Q Do you remember where you lived before that?

 

A In the southwest. In Shenandoah.

 

Q How long did you live in Shenandoah?

 

A In 1989 until 1994. ’94 that I bought in Homestead.

 

Q Okay. You mentioned Barbara and the fact that she resided with you in Kentucky. Did anybody else live with you while you were in Kentucky either in Manchester or Lexington?

 

A Yes. There were more than 2,000 people in the prison. I lived in a facility.

 

Q What’s the name of the facility?

 

A Federal Correction. Lexington Federal Correction or something like that.

 

Q You were serving time for a Federal offense?

 

A Correct.

 

Q Were you convicted of a crime?

 

A Correct.

 

Q What crime?

 

A Fraud. Cellular phone fraud. Conspiracy for a cellular phone thing, nothing to do, nothing that I did. You see what I’m telling you? What does that have to do with what has to be done. Absolutely nothing.

 

….

 

Q What was the facility called, the one that you were residing in in Kentucky?

 

A I don’t remember. I told you I don’t know. Lexington, Kentucky, Lexington Medical Center or something like that. Something like that.

 

Q When you were convicted of the cellular fraud, did you stand trial?

 

A Correct.

 

Q Where was the courthouse located, do you remember?

 

A Downtown.

 

Q Lexington?

 

A Miami.

 

Q You stood trial in Miami?

 

A Miami.

 

Q Did you have a lawyer?

 

A Correct.

 

Q What’s the lawyer’s name?

 

A Juan Gonzalez.

 

Q Do you know if Mr. Gonzalez is still practicing law in the State of Florida?

 

A I don’t know. I have no idea.

 

Q When was the last time you spoke to Mr. Gonzalez?

 

A ’94, ’95, something like that.

 

Q Do you remember the specific allegations that were made against you when you stood trial for cellular fraud?

 

A That was complicated. Because the police came into my house looking for drugs, you understand? And that is something I would not like to talk about it. They came into my house by mistake looking for drugs and when they knocked on the door they even cut my wife, Barbara’s, forehead and then they left and they didn’t get anything. And they saw that I have never—I don’t have anything to do—I’ve never had anything to do with drugs. I’ve not used drugs, I have not been a drug addict or anything.

 

So—but they had some recordings but they could prove there was a telephone and that was all. So they called the Secret Service and those are the ones that came. But look, we go back to the same. Look where we are and we have not talked anything about what I’m here for.

 

Q What department came to your home?

 

A The police.

 

Q Was it Miami–Dade?

 

A I don’t know. I didn’t ask them. They were tons of them. You know, if it’s a Federal case, you know, the Miami place is not Federal. It’s Secret Service, U.S. Customs, and then they called the Secret Service of the United States.

 

Q Sir, the reason I’m asking you these questions is in case I want to get the records regarding an arrest I need to know specifically where to go.

 

A The public records. You’re an attorney, you know where they are. I know where to go look for a book.

 

Q Do you have any copies of any documents?

 

A Yes. I have copy of everything but I cannot give you anything because I have them to defend myself because I was in jail for eight years. And that I’m making a claim and I won my case and I have everything. And I have everything, as you can see here, to defend me. But I can’t. What I wanted is finish this now. If you’re not going to do it, then okay. I’m going to look for an attorney to make a claim on this and I don’t have any problem.

 

Q What do you mean by you won the case?

 

A That I won the case.

 

Q What case?

 

A The case against the government when they took me into jail.

 

Q Did you file a civil suit against, the government?

 

A I’m trying to do a civil lawsuit. I reached the Supreme Court.

 

Q Have you engaged an attorney in that regard?

 

A No. I don’t have him yet.

 

Q Would you have any objection if, in the course of our investigation, we request that you sign an authorization directed to Attorney Gonzalez for all records regarding the fraud case, would you be inclined to sign that authorization?

 

A Not at all.

 

Q No objection?

 

A I don’t know where he is. I don’t know about him.

 

Q My question is not if you know where the attorney’s at. I can get that information.

 

A My answer is no.

 

Q You have no objection?

 

A No. My answer is no.

 

This passage was as follows:

 

Q Okay. Is Barbara your wife?

 

A I refuse to respond.

 

Q Does Barbara currently reside with you?

 

A No.

 

Q Do you have her current address?

 

A No.

 

Q Who do you live with at the current address?

 

A With my wife.

 

Q What’s your wife’s name?

 

A Barbara Castellan.

 

Q Is that the Barbara you’ve been referring to during this deposition?

 

A No.

 

Q What’s the other Barbara’s last name?

 

A Del Castillo.

 

Q Do you know if she is in Miami?

 

A No.

 

Q She’s not or you don’t know?

 

A She’s not in Miami.

 

Q Where is she?

 

A I don’t know. I don’t know.

 

Q How long have you been married to Barbara Castellan?

 

A I’m not married. We just live together.

 

Q How long have you been living together?

 

A Around 2003.

 

Q Does anybody live with you at that address other than Barbara Castellan?

 

A I’m not married. We just live together.

 

Q How long have you been living together?

 

A Around 2003.

 

Q Does anybody live with you at that address other than Barbara Castellan?

 

A Her two children.

 

Q What ‘are their names and ages, please?

 

A They have not authorized me to give them to you.

 

Q Are you denying answering that question?

 

A Correct.

 

Q Do you have any kids of your own?

 

A Yes.

 

Q What are their names and ages, please?

 

A Jose De Leon.

 

Q How old is Jose?

 

A Twelve years old.

 

Q Where does he live?

 

A With the mother.

 

Q And what’s the mother’s name?

 

A Barbara del Castillo.

 

Q Have you ever been married?

 

A Yes. Once.

 

Q With Barbara del Castillo?

 

A No.

 

Q Does Jose De Leon live in Miami?

 

A No.

 

Q Where does he live?

 

A I don’t know.

 

Q When was the last time you saw him?

 

A I don’t remember.

 

Q More than five years?

 

A I don’t remember. Three years, something. I don’t remember.

 

Q When you last saw him was it in Miami?

 

A Correct.

 

Q Where?

 

A I refuse to respond. That has nothing do with this. We go back to the same thing. And to me—forgive me for taking this attitude. But I’m tired of this. I’m tired of all these problems. It’s been too long and I’ve lost too much money with this problem. But I’m going to recuperate it for sure.

 

With complete justification, De Leon declined to answer most of these questions, even though Diz specifically warned him that he was jeopardizing his insurance coverage and invited him to withdraw his claim in lieu of responding.  In fact De Leon told Diz that if he continued on that track, he would leave, get an attorney, and see him in court. Diz did not desist. He persisted. True to his word, De Leon got a lawyer and filed suit.

 

The colloquy follows:

 

Q Were you convicted of a crime?

 

A Correct.

 

Q What crime?

 

A Fraud. Cellular phone fraud. Conspiracy for a cellular phone thing, nothing to do, nothing that I did. You see what I’m telling you? What does that have to do with what has to be done. Absolutely nothing.

 

Q Well, sir, its all relevant. Under Florida law, prior convictions are relevant. And that’s something that you have to disclose when you go through a deposition pursuant to Florida law.

 

A I don’t have to do anything. I know a lot about law. Unfortunately, I defended myself and I don’t have to answer anything. My record is public. You can get it. I’m not applying to work with the government. I’m not making an application for anything. I’m making a claim. When the insurance company insured my truck, they did not make any investigation, took my check, cashed it and used it however he wanted. Unfortunately, a fatality happened, they stole my truck, there’s a camera there. I already told the police to look for the camera and ask for the camera to see who stole the truck. I have nothing to do.

 

What do you want to do? You want to pay for my truck? Okay. If you don’t want to pay for my truck, at least, I’m not going to stay here.

 

Q We’ll get to the incident and your understanding of what happened. I’m just trying to get some background information now.

 

A But it has nothing do with for you to ask me that.

 

Q Unfortunately, however you want to look at it, basically it’s something that you’re duty bound, based on the terms and conditions of the policy issued by Great American—

 

A Obligated to? I’m not obligated. There’s other companies. At any time—at no time they told me I had an obligation to say anything. I simply went to get the insurance. I did not get insurance to rob you or to make a fraud or anything. The-my car is there. They broke into my car to steal from it. So what’s my need? What do I get out of this? I have my credit there. I have everything that I paid for my tires. Where are my tires?

 

Q Sir, I can’t speak to other insurance policies, what they read or what they require from an insured. I know what Great American requires.

 

A Correct. That’s correct. But when they insured me they didn’t say anything, they just took my money. I’ve always paid, I’ve never been late. I renewed the insurance and everything and I’ve never been late. I was very happy with them.

 

….

 

Q Would you have any objection if, in the course of our investigation, we request that you sign an authorization directed to Attorney Gonzalez for all records regarding the fraud case, would you be inclined to sign that authorization?

 

A Not at all.

 

Q No objection?

 

A I don’t know where he is. I don’t know about him.

 

Q My question is not if you know where the attorney’s at. I can get that information.

 

A My answer is no.

 

Q You have no objection?

 

A No. My answer is no.

 

Q That you have no objection. You would sign an authorization, in other words?

 

A No.

 

Q You would not sign an authorization?

 

A Not at all.

 

Q Why not?

 

A Because I don’t. I won’t. I want to concentrate—I go back. If not on this—if I get tic and leave, that’s it. I don’t want anymore questions. I’m requesting the insurance to return all of the money I’ve given them from the moment to the policy to give me my money back and I leave as easy as that.

 

Q Sir, I can’t tell you what to do or not do. I’m just here—it’s my job to ask you these questions.

 

A I know. I know. Correct. But concentrate on what it is, not on what is not. I have the right to keep quiet and not respond to anything. That’s what I have. I have the right. I want to concentrate on what you’re going to ask. If not, I have my papers here. You have a copy of my papers, all my receipts, the bills, everything. If you don’t want—if you’re not going to talk to me about-about what it is, see you next time.

 

Q Okay. Sir, I can’t tell you what to do but you’re more than free to withdraw your claim. In fact, it’s your choice.

 

A No, I’m not going to withdraw my claim, no. Please. I’m going to look for an attorney and I want to have the attorney talk to you.

 

MR. DIAZ [sic]: Off the record for a second..

 

(Discussion off the record.)

 

MR. DIAZ [sic]: We’re back on.

 

BY MR. DIAZ [sic]:

 

Q Mr. De Leon, I want to tell you this right now so it’s clear for everyone. There’s questions I’m going to ask and you may not think they’re relevant but they are to me. And I’m just doing my job. Okay? So, if you’re not inclined to answer any of my questions, I just want to let you know you may be jeopardizing coverage under the Great American Insurance policy that was issued.

 

Now that that’s on the table and it’s clear to everybody here, I’m going to keep on asking questions. If you don’t want to answer, I understand that’s your personal choice but the caveat is you may be jeopardizing coverage.

 

Going back to a question I asked previously that I don’t believe I got an answer to, can you tell me the specific allegations that were made by the U.S. Government in relation to the cellular fraud claim or cellular fraud charge that they made?

 

A Absolutely no. Next page.

 

Q Are you denying to answer the question; are you objecting to it; are you not going to answer it?

 

A Correct.

 

Q You said that Barbara was also with you when you were serving time in Kentucky; is that correct?

 

A I said I’m not going to answer. Next page.

 

Q Have you ever been convicted of any other crimes?

 

A I don’t know. I deny responding.

 

Q Are you saying you don’t remember or you’re making an objection—

 

A I deny—I’m not going to respond. I refuse to respond.

 

….

 

Q Okay. Have you retained a lawyer regarding the claim that you’ve made to Great American Insurance Company?

 

A I don’t have it yet but I’m going to have one. There’s money for those.

 

Q Has anyone other than you and Barbara resided at the address you gave us earlier, your current address?

 

A I don’t know. I have no idea.

 

Q During the time you lived there.

 

A Those are things that have nothing to do with—those are private things. Are we not in a free country? That has nothing to do anything with this. Please.

 

Q Are you denying answering the question?

 

A For sure.

 

Q Other than—strike that. You said you were married once; is that correct?

 

A. Look, excuse me. I’m sorry that you came from so far away. But we’re not going to get anywhere so I’m leaving and we’ll see you in court. And I’ll tell you who my attorney is going to be and then we’re going to talk. Because nothing is going to be resolved that way.

 

Excuse me. I know it’s your job. And I want to continue because I want to do it and I’m going to go to court because it’s my right and you have to pay.

 

One cannot help but sympathize with De Leon’s eloquent statement about the disconnect between the simple facts of his claim and the subject of the interrogation Great American insisted on putting him through:

 

I’m not making an application for anything. I’m making a claim. When the insurance company insured my truck, they did not make any investigation, took my check, cashed it and used it however he wanted. Unfortunately, a fatality happened, they stole my truck, there’s a camera there. I already told the police to look for the camera and ask for the camera to see who stole the truck. I have nothing to do.

 

What do you want to do? You want to pay for my truck? Okay. If you don’t want to pay for my truck, at least, I’m not going to stay here.

 

The appellee’s position is based on the argument that

 

De Leon’s refusal to complete the examination and provide the requested documents prevented Great American from exercising its contractual right to fully investigate his claim.

 

This is completely wrong; because De Leon “refused” to respond to wholly impertinent and improper questions which had nothing to do with the merits of the claim. And we think he was right to do so. To hold in these circumstances, as did the trial court, that it was not necessary to file the action and thus that section 627.428 is inapplicable, is to turn reality upon its head. What actually happened is that De Leon took Diz up on his challenge (and the propriety of his conduct of the sworn statement) and sued the company because, as was obvious, there was no other way to be paid. So far from being improperly employed, the statute was enacted for the very purpose presented by this case—to discourage the games insurance companies play. See Beverly v. State Farm Florida Ins. Co., 50 So.3d 628, 633 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (“[A]n insurer’s post-suit payment of additional policy proceeds entitles the insured to section 627.428 attorney’s fees where the insurer ‘wrongfully caus[ed] its insured to resort to litigation in order to resolve a conflict with its insurer when it was within the company’s power to resolve it.’ See Clifton [v. United Cas. Ins. Co. of Am., 31 So.3d 826, 829 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) ] (citing First Floridian Auto & Home Ins. Co. v. Myrick, 969 So.2d 1121, 1124 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)); see also Hill, [v. State Farm Florida Insurance Co., 35 So.3d 956, 960–61 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) ]; Goff, [v. State Farm Florida Insurance Co., 999 So.2d 684, 688 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) ].”); see also Pepper’s Steel & Alloys, Inc. v. U.S., 850 So.2d 462, 465 (Fla.2003) (“[t]he statute’s [section 627.428] purpose ‘is to discourage insurance companies from contesting valid claims, and to reimburse insureds for their attorney’s fees incurred when they must enforce in court their contract with the insurance company .’ Bell v. U.S.B. Acquisition Co., 734 So.2d 403, 411 n. 10 (Fla .1999).”); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Lecks, 165 So. 50, 54 (Fla.1935); Underwood Anderson & Associates, Inc. v. Lillo’s Italian Restaurant, Inc. 36 So.3d 885, 888 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (“[T]he courts have often stated to be the purpose of the attorney’s fee statute, which is to encourage insurance companies to pay when they are presented with valid claims and, failing that, to compensate insureds that are forced to litigate their contracts with improperly recalcitrant insurance companies.”).

 

We cannot permit Great American to escape the consequences of what it tried to get away with in this case. Because the rule that any success in an action on an insurance policy, let alone the full payment of the asserted claim, requires an award of fees, see Pineda v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 47 So.3d 890, 892 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (“An insured is entitled to attorney’s fees under 627.428, Florida Statutes, where it was reasonably necessary for the insured to litigate in court ….”), applies in spades in this case, the order under review is reversed and the cause is remanded with directions to make an appropriate award of attorney’s fees.

 

Reversed and remanded.

 

SHEPHERD, J., concurring.

This court recently admonished “all counsel” who practice in the courts of this state that “improper conduct” in the courtroom “will not be condoned by this court.” Chin v. Caiaffa, 42 So.3d 300, 311–12 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (emphasis added). This case involves conduct outside the courtroom, stemming from the theft of a 2000 Freightliner “eighteen wheeler” commercial truck from the premises of an interstate trucking company where it was parked. The police found the vehicle the next day. The insured’s principal claim is that the thieves took ten expensive tires from the truck and replaced them with then-inferior tires. After suit was filed, the trial court abated the action and ordered completion of the previously begun examination under oath (EUO). The same lawyer who conducted the first aborted EUO conducted the second. It lasted over seven hours. It strains credulity to assert—as the insurer does in this case—that a seven-hour sworn statement of a single individual is necessary to the investigation of an $8000 tire loss claim, whatever might be the insurer’s suspicions. “Over-lawyering” is a frequent affliction found in the legal profession. If there is any question concerning whether the insured’s instincts about the interrogator’s purpose was any different in the second EUO than in the first, the doubt can be dispelled easily by reviewing the transcript of the latter EUO.

 

An attorney is an officer of the court, and he plays his role badly, even outside the courtroom, if he trespasses against the obligations of his professional responsibilities. See Georgopoulos v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL–CIO, 942 F.Supp. 883, 905 (S.D.N.Y.1996). A careful review of the transcript of the second EUO reveals the role played by counsel during that EUO was performed just like the first—badly. As in the first EUO, counsel’s misunderstanding of the permissible range of inquiry in a sworn statement taken to verify a simple theft loss, whatever might have been the insurer’s suspicions, was palpable. Upon a review of the entire record, it now is undeniable, in my estimation, that—although it should have been—the insured’s claim in this case was not resolvable absent judicial intervention.

 

With these additional observations, I fully join in the well-reasoned opinion of the court.

Jackson v. Purdy Bros. Trucking Co., Inc.

Court of Appeals of Tennessee.

Leroy JACKSON, Jr.

v.

PURDY BROTHERS TRUCKING CO., INC., et al.

 

No. E2011–00119–COA–R3–CV.

Sept. 21, 2011 Session.

Oct. 12, 2011.

 

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Knox County, No. 2–72–09 Harold Wimberly, Jr., Judge.

Stanley F. LaDuke, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Leroy Jackson, Jr.

 

Dana C. Holloway, Tonya R. Willis, and Ryan C. Dreke, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Purdy Brothers Trucking Co., Inc., f/d/b/a Purdy Brothers Trucking, Loudon County Trucking f/d/b/a Purdy Brothers Trucking, and Blair B. Greene.

 

JOHN W. McCLARTY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., and D. MICHAEL SWINEY, JJ., joined.

 

OPINION

JOHN W. McCLARTY, J.

This appeal arises from a tractor-trailer (“truck”) collision involving two professional drivers, Leroy Jackson, Jr., who was driving as an owner operator for USA Trucking, and Blair B. Greene, who was employed by Purdy Brothers Trucking Company, Incorporated (“PBTCI”) and Loudon County Trucking (“LCT”), both formerly doing business as Purdy Brothers Trucking (“PBT”). Mr. Jackson’s truck was repossessed shortly after it was repaired, and he filed suit against Mr. Greene, PBTCI, and LCT (collectively “Trucking Company”) for property damage, loss of income, lost equity in his truck, incidental expenses, and punitive damages. Trucking Company filed a motion for partial summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion, in part, holding that Trucking Company was not liable for the lost equity in the truck but that the case could proceed on the remaining issues. Trucking Company made an offer of judgment, which was accepted by Mr. Jackson and set forth in the court’s final order. Mr. Jackson appeals, contending that the court erred in granting partial summary judgment. We dismiss the appeal because Mr. Jackson accepted the offer of judgment without reserving the right to appeal.

 

Trucking Company also asserted that Mr. Greene was employed by LCT, which was not formerly doing business as PBT and that Mr. Greene was operating a trailer owned by LCT and a tractor owned by PBTCI and leased to LCT. Other than acknowledging this distinction, we will not resolve this factual issue because it is not pertinent to this appeal.

 

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. Jackson resided in Minnesota but would frequently travel through Tennessee while driving for USA Trucking as an owner-operator. Thus, while USA Trucking paid for his license, registration, and permits, he owned his truck, which he was purchasing pursuant to an installment contract from Russ Darrow Leasing, Incorporated (“Russ Darrow”). On the day of the accident, he had picked up his truck in Memphis, Tennessee and was driving to New York when he stopped at a truck stop in Knoxville, Tennessee. As he was driving around the station, he encountered Mr. Greene, who was attempting to turn around. He stopped and allowed Mr. Greene to complete the turn. Mr. Greene subsequently crashed into the front area of Mr. Jackson’s truck, resulting in repairs in excess of $13,000. Mr. Jackson called the police, reported the incident, had his truck towed to a repair shop, and took a bus home to Minnesota. He was unable to work while his truck was being repaired. Approximately one month later, he returned to Tennessee and attempted to pick up his truck from the repair shop. When he arrived, he was told that he could not have his truck because Russ Darrow was going to repossess it. Approximately one week later, USA Trucking hired him as a company driver.

 

Mr. Jackson filed suit against Trucking Company, alleging that they were liable for his loss of income, the damage to his truck, the lost equity in his truck, and incidental expenses relating to the accident and repossession of the truck. He explained that as a result of the accident and his corresponding loss of income, his truck was repossessed because he was no longer able to submit his monthly payments. Trucking Company responded that Mr. Jackson’s failure to maintain his payments pursuant to his installment contract and the resulting repossession of the truck acted as an intervening and superseding cause, absolving them from liability for any loss relating to the repossession of the truck. Accordingly, Trucking Company filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to judgment as a matter of law regarding the following losses related to the repossession of the truck: the loss of income relating to the repossession, the lost equity in the truck itself, and the repossession costs. Trucking Company alleged that the repairs were completed in less than ten days and that Russ Darrow repossessed the truck because Mr. Jackson had defaulted on his payments prior to the accident. Mr. Jackson asserted that he was unable to retrieve his truck until after the insurance company had submitted the payment for the repairs, less the deductible. He said that he had an agreement with Russ Darrow regarding his payments, that he was compliant with that agreement, and that after the accident and his corresponding loss of income, he was unable to make the agreed payments. He argued that factual issues remained regarding Trucking Company’s liability and that those issues should be submitted for jury determination.

 

He also filed suit against Russ Darrow for conversion of personal property. This suit was settled. Additionally, Mr. Jackson eventually recovered the expenses relating to the repossession of his truck from Russ Darrow and no longer sought damages relating to those expenses from Trucking Company.

 

The trial court granted, in part, the motion for partial summary judgment, holding that “there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute as to whether [ Trucking Company] owed a legal duty to [Mr. Jackson] as a matter of law with regard[ ] to [Mr. Jackson’s] claim for lost equity value in [the] truck” but that “genuine issues of material fact [remained] on the issue of whether [ Trucking Company] owed a legal duty to [Mr. Jackson] with regard to [his] claim for loss of income.” Mr. Jackson sought permission from the trial court to appeal the grant of partial summary judgment. The trial court granted permission; however, this court denied permission. Trucking Company made an offer of judgment, allowing judgment in the amount of $5,500 to be rendered in Mr. Jackson’s favor. Mr. Jackson accepted the offer, and the offer was set forth in the trial court’s final order. Mr. Jackson filed a notice of appeal, and Trucking Company filed a motion to enforce the Rule 68 judgment. The trial court denied the motion, stating that the issue of whether Mr. Jackson’s acceptance of the offer barred his right to appeal was appropriate for appellate review. Trucking Company then filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, and this court denied the motion.

 

II. ISSUES

We consolidate and restate the issue raised by Mr. Jackson as follows:

 

A. Whether the trial court erred in granting partial summary judgment.

 

Trucking Company also raised issues for our consideration that we consolidate and restate as follows:

B. Whether Mr. Jackson waived his right to appeal because he accepted an offer of judgment without reserving the right to appeal.

 

C. Whether the trial court erred in denying summary judgment relating to Mr. Jackson’s claim for loss of income.

 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal, the factual findings of the trial court are accorded a presumption of correctness and will not be overturned unless the evidence preponderates against them. See Tenn. R.App. P. 13(d). The trial court’s conclusions of law are subject to a de novo review with no presumption of correctness.   Blackburn v. Blackburn, 270 S.W.3d 42, 47 (Tenn.2008); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn.1993). Mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness; however, appellate courts have “great latitude to determine whether findings as to mixed questions of fact and law made by the trial court are sustained by probative evidence on appeal.” Aaron v. Aaron, 909 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tenn.1995).

 

IV. DISCUSSION

As the threshold issue in this case, we must first determine whether Mr. Jackson waived his right to appeal by accepting the offer of judgment without reservation. Mr. Jackson asserts that the express terms of the offer did not reference a waiver of the right to appeal and that the language of the offer and corresponding judgment should be construed against the drafter. He claims that he never intended to waive his right to appeal the summary judgment issue and that such a waiver should not be presumed because recipients of an offer of judgment must either accept or reject the express terms of the offer. Trucking Company responds that by unequivocally accepting their offer of judgment, Mr. Jackson waived his right to appeal. Trucking Company asserts that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the appeal because the Rule 68 judgment was conclusive on all matters in the case, leaving no issues to appeal. Trucking Company acknowledges that an appeal may lie from a Rule 68 judgment but contends that the right to appeal from these types of judgments must be specifically reserved.

 

Rule 68 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure provides,

 

At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending against a claim may serve upon an adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against the defending party for the money or property, or to the effect specified in the offer, with costs then accrued. Likewise a party prosecuting a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against that adverse party for the money or property or to the effect specified in the offer with costs then accrued. If within 10 days after service of the offer the adverse party serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may file the offer and notice of acceptance, together with proof of service thereon, with the court and thereupon judgment shall be rendered accordingly. An offer not accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in the proceeding to determine costs. If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree shall pay all costs accruing after the making of the offer. The fact that an offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer.

 

(Emphasis added). The rule was adopted from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule’s intended purpose was to “promote settlements.”   Francois v. Willis, 205 S.W.3d 915, 917 (Tenn.Ct.App.2006).

 

Rule 68 judgments are akin to consent orders, which are “conclusive upon the consenting parties, and can neither be amended nor in any way varied without like consent; nor can it be reheard, appealed from or reviewed upon writ of error.” Nance v. Pankey, 880 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tenn.Ct.App.1993). However, a party may appeal from a consent order upon a claim of lack of actual consent, fraud in its procurement, mistake, or lack of the court’s jurisdiction to enter the judgment. Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 323–24, 48 S.Ct. 311, 72 L.Ed. 587 (1928). “A judgment by consent is in substance a contract of record made by the parties and approved by the court.” 49 C.J.S Judgments § 227. The cardinal rule of contract interpretation is that the court “must attempt to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties.” Christenberry v. Tipton, 160 S.W.3d 487, 494 (Tenn.2005). In attempting to ascertain the intent of the parties, the court must examine the language of the contract, giving each word its usual, natural, and ordinary meaning. See Wilson v. Moore, 929 S.W.2d 367, 373 (Tenn.Ct.App.1996). The “court’s initial task in construing a contract is to determine whether the language of the contract is ambiguous.” Planters Gin Co. v. Fed. Compress & Warehouse Co., 78 S.W.3d 885, 889–90 (Tenn.2002). Where the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, its literal meaning controls the outcome of the dispute. Id. at 890.

 

The Rule 68 offer of judgment in this case provided,

 

Come now [ Trucking Company], by and through their counsel of record, and offer to allow judgment to be taken against them in favor of [Mr. Jackson] in the amount of [$5,500], with regular court costs in this case only now accrued.

 

Pursuant to Rule 68 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, if this [o]ffer of [j]udgment is not accepted within ten (10) days, it shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof shall not be admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs. Notice is hereby given if the judgment finally obtained by [Mr. Jackson] is not more favorable than this offer, [ Trucking Company] will apply to the [c]ourt for an [o]rder requiring [Mr. Jackson] to pay all costs accrued in this litigation from the date of this offer, including discretionary costs in this lawsuit.

 

The original [o]ffer of [j]udgment has been mailed to counsel for [Mr. Jackson]. It has not been filed with the [c]ourt. The offer is made purely to avoid the time and expense of a trial and not as an admission of liability.

 

The subsequently entered Rule 68 judgment evidencing the agreement between the parties provides,

Come now the parties, by and through their attorneys, and announce to the [c]ourt that an [o]ffer of [j]udgment was made by [ Trucking Company] and accepted by [Mr. Jackson], both of which have been filed with the [c]ourt and that an [o]rder of [f]inal disposition and entry of the [j]udgment is necessary. Moreover, the parties announce that the [j]udgment rendered in favor of [Mr. Jackson] has been satisfied by [ Trucking Company]. It is accordingly;

 

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that

 

1. The [j]udgment offered by [ Trucking Company] and accepted by [Mr. Jackson] in this cause be entered and that [j]udgment has been satisfied.

 

2. The court costs of this cause are adjudged against [ Trucking Company] for which execution may issue if necessary.

 

3. Each party shall bear their own discretionary costs.

 

(Emphasis added).

 

The terms of the offer and corresponding final order provided a clear resolution of the entirety of the case. Neither the offer of judgment nor the judgment evidencing the acceptance of the offer mentioned the grant of partial summary judgment or contained a reservation of the right to appeal. It is important to note that before Mr. Jackson accepted Trucking Company’s offer of judgment, he had already attempted to appeal from the grant of partial summary judgment pursuant to Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Thus, except as provided in Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, Mr. Jackson could not appeal from the court’s grant of partial summary judgment until a final order, disposing of all of the claims for relief, had been entered. Indeed, an appeal as of right is not available from an order that adjudicates fewer than all of the claims for relief. Tenn. R.App. P. 3(a). Mr. Jackson asserts that as evidenced by his notice of appeal, he is appealing the original grant of partial summary judgment, not the issues disposed of in the Rule 68 judgment.

 

While this court has not encountered this precise factual scenario, similar claims have been discussed in cases decided by other courts. Decisions from those courts while persuasive, are not controlling on this court. One such court held that orders and rulings filed before a party’s acceptance of a Federal Rule 68 offer of judgment “were merged with or [were] an integral part of the consent judgments, such that they [were] subject to the general rule of non-appealability.” Mock v. T.G. & Y Stores Co., 971 F.2d 522, 527 (10th Cir.1992). In Mock, the court noted that the “consent judgments dismissed the entire case of each plaintiff with absolutely no indication that particular claims would be appealed.” Id. Another court held that parties who accept the substance of a consent order waive their right to appeal unless they specifically reserve the right to appeal. See Taylor Brands, LLC v. GB II Corp., 627 F.3d 874, 878 (Fed.Cir.2010) (clarifying that when a party consents to the substance of an order, as opposed to merely consenting to the form of an order, that party has presumptively “waived its right to appeal-absent an express reservation of that right on the record”). In Taylor Brands, the court stated that “voluntarily agreeing to an adverse substantive outcome is an indication that the party has abandoned its underlying claims or defenses.” Id. at 878. The court ultimately held that the plaintiff had merely consented to the form of the final order in order to facilitate appellate review of the grant of summary judgment that disposed of the majority of his claims. Id. at 878–79.

 

While the judgment in this case was not entirely adverse to Mr. Jackson, he agreed to forego a trial in exchange for a sum of money, thereby releasing his claim against Trucking Company. Indeed, Mr. Jackson accepted the offer of judgment and corresponding award of $5,500 before submitting his acceptance of the offer to the court for the issuance of a Rule 68 judgment. Prior to the court’s filing of the judgment, both parties announced that Trucking Company had satisfied the judgment. The judgment provided no indication that Mr. Jackson would be appealing any of his particular claims. Additionally, pursuant to Rule 68 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, Mr. Jackson could have reserved the right to appeal the summary judgment issue by rejecting the offer of judgment and submitting his own offer with a reservation of the right to appeal. The rule specifically provides that the denial of an offer does not preclude subsequent offers before trial and that the prosecuting party may serve an offer of judgment on the adverse party. Thus, we believe Mr. Jackson’s assertion that he was forced to accept or reject the terms of the offer in its entirety without any recourse or hope of reaching an agreement is unpersuasive. With these considerations in mind, we conclude that the prior orders merged with the final order evidencing the Rule 68 offer of judgment and that Mr. Jackson’s acceptance of that offer without reservation amounted to a waiver of the right to appeal the prior grant of partial summary judgment. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. Having dismissed the appeal, we will not address the remaining issues related to the appeal of the grant of partial summary judgment.

 

V. CONCLUSION

The appeal is dismissed, and the case is remanded for such further proceedings as may be necessary. Costs of the appeal are taxed to the appellant, Leroy Jackson, Jr.

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