United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Northern Division

November 8, 2023, Decided; November 8, 2023, Filed

CASE NO. 3:22-CV-00143-BSM

Reporter

2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200667 *; 2023 WL 7386673

DANIEL YOUNGER, PLAINTIFF v. J&CT, LLC and GERALD CAMPBELL, DEFENDANTS

Counsel:  [*1] For Daniel T Younger, Plaintiff: Benjamin Renfro Criswell, John Holleman, Timothy A. Steadman, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Holleman & Associates, P.A., Little Rock, AR.

For J&CT LLC, Gerald Campbell, Defendants: Deborah S. Denton, LEAD ATTORNEY, Anderson, Murphy & Hopkins, LLP, Little Rock, AR.

Judges: Brian S. Miller, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Opinion by: Brian S. Miller

Opinion

ORDER

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [Doc. No. 19] is granted on Daniel Younger’s request for punitive damages and on all direct negligence claims against J&CT except the claim that it failed to adopt the policies or procedures necessary to assure that its vehicles and equipment were properly inspected, maintained, and operated.

I. BACKGROUND

Younger was working on a bridge in a highway construction area when Campbell, who was operating a tractor-trailer under J&CT’s motor carrier authority, drove through the construction area. Campbell failed to slow down for traffic and was unable to stop because his brakes were defective. Defs.’ Statement of Facts ¶¶ 1-2, 5-7 Doc. No. 20. To avoid being struck, Younger jumped over the bridge’s guardrail and fell to the ground. Id. ¶ 7. The Arkansas Highway Police inspected Campbell’s tractor-trailer shortly [*2]  after the accident and cited him for reckless driving with physical injury-first offense and unsafe vehicle/defective equipment. Id. ¶ 9.

In the two months preceding the accident, the tractor-trailer was given two Level II driver and vehicle inspections which resulted in multiple citations. Id. ¶¶ 11-12. After one inspection, the tractor-trailer was cited for violating 49 C.F.R. § 393.45(d) because it had leaks in the brake connections. Defs.’ Mot. Part. Summ. J. Ex. 1 at 3, Doc. No. 19-1. Neither of these inspections resulted in a citation for an out-of-service violation, id. at 3, 6, which is an infringement of a traffic safety statute or regulation that “substantially increases the likelihood of serious injury or death if not discontinued immediately.” 49 U.S.C. § 521(b)(5)(A), (B). The post-accident inspection, however, did result in an out-of-service violation for defective brakes. Defs.’ Mot. Part. Summ. J. Ex. 1 at 1.

J&CT admits that it is vicariously liable for Campbell’s negligence. It, however, is moving for summary judgment on Younger’s punitive damages and direct negligence claims. Defs.’ Statement of Facts ¶ 8; J&CT’s Stipulation, Doc. No. 18.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine [*3]  dispute as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). Once the moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute of material fact, the non-moving party must produce admissible evidence demonstrating a genuine factual dispute requiring a trial. Holden v. Hirner, 663 F.3d 336, 340 (8th Cir. 2011). All facts are viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Holland v. Sam’s Club, 487 F.3d 641, 643 (8th Cir. 2007). The evidence is not weighed, and no credibility determinations are made. Jenkins v. Winter, 540 F.3d 742, 750 (8th Cir. 2008).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Punitive Damages

Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the question of punitive damages because Younger cannot show by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to punitive damages. Punitive damages are a question for the jury when there is evidence that “[t]he defendant knew or ought to have known, in light of the surrounding circumstances, that his or her conduct would naturally and probably result in injury or damage and that he or she continued the conduct with malice or in reckless disregard of the consequences . . . .” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-55-206(1). Punitive damages may be awarded only when the evidence is “clear and convincing.” Ark. Code Ann. § 16-55-207.

Before 2003, the Arkansas Supreme Court allowed punitive damages in automobile accident cases only when [*4]  they involved driving under the influence and racing. See Nat’l Bank of Com. v. McNeill Trucking Co., 309 Ark. 80, 828 S.W.2d 584, 588 (Ark. 1992) (Dudley, J., concurring). In D’Arbonne Construction Co. v. Foster, 354 Ark. 304, 123 S.W.3d 894 (Ark. 2003), however, it affirmed punitive damages in an accident case involving a truck driver who was speeding with brakes that were in serious disrepair but had been effectively disabled so that the truck could continue to operate without them being repaired. Id. at 898-900. The Court held that “[w]hether a vehicle is being operated in such a manner as to amount to wanton or willful conduct in disregard of the rights of others must be determined by the facts and circumstances in each individual case.” Id. at 898. Subsequent rulings in vehicle accident cases, however, have continued to limit the availability of punitive damages. See Brumley v. Keech, 2012 Ark. 263, at 5 (Ark. 2012) (violation of controlled-substance testing regulation); Bizzell v. Transp. Corp. of Am., Inc., No. 4:16-CV-00376-JLH, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123147, 2017 WL 3381358, at *4 (E.D. Ark. Aug. 4, 2017) (driver had various citations and accidents); Riffey v. CRST Expedited, Inc., No. 3:12-CV-00294-BRW, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179594, 2013 WL 6836665, at *2-3 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 20, 2013) (tractor-trailer driven on icy, slick road); Perry v. Stevens Transp., Inc., No. 3:11-CV-00048-JLH, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94942, 2012 WL 2805026, at *5 (E.D. Ark. July 9, 2012) (driver had six prior non-injury scrape-and-bump collisions); Wheeler v. Carlton, No. 3:06-CV-00068-GTE, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 371, 2007 WL 30261, at *9-11 (E.D. Ark. Jan. 4, 2007) (driver had twelve prior driving citations and three accidents).

Younger contends that punitive damages are appropriate because Campbell drove his tractor-trailer through the construction site too fast although defendants knew its brakes were defective. Pl.’s Resp. Mot. Part. Summ. J. 5, Doc. [*5]  No. 23. In support of this position, Younger argues that defendants failed to repair the brakes although the brakes were cited on May 7 for having a leak in their air system. Id. The post-accident examination identified multiple brake system violations that were cumulatively serious enough to put the tractor-trailer out of service. Defs.’ Mot. Part. Summ. J. Ex. 1 at 1. The problem with Younger’s argument is that the brake violations cited in the post-accident examination were not the same as the brake connection air leak that was cited on May 7. Id. at 1, 3. Moreover, the air leak citation was not an out-of-service violation, which means that it was determined not to “substantially increase[] the likelihood of serious injury or death if not discontinued immediately.” 49 U.S.C. § 521(b)(5)(B). Finally, nothing in the record shows that the brake connection air leak caused, or even contributed to, the accident. See Brumley, 2012 Ark. 263, at *5. Younger has therefore failed to show that defendants acted with the “wanton or willful conduct” necessary to warrant punitive damages.

B. Direct Negligence Claim against J&CT

Summary judgment is granted on all of Younger’s direct liability claims against J&CT except his claim that J&CT failed to [*6]  adopt the policies and procedures necessary to assure that its vehicles and equipment were properly inspected, maintained and operated.

J&CT is moving for summary judgment on Younger’s direct liability claims against it because it has stipulated that it is vicariously liable for Campbell’s actions. Typically, when a defendant admits vicarious liability for the actions of its agent, a plaintiff alleging vicarious liability and direct liability is limited to proceeding on its vicarious liability claim. Elrod v. G&R Constr. Co., 275 Ark. 151, 628 S.W.2d 17, 18-19 (Ark. 1982). The two exceptions to this are: (1) when there is a valid punitive damages claim against the defendant and (2) when a plaintiff alleges liability based on the defendant’s policies and procedures. McCaslin v. French Trucking, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-000049-JLH, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155030, 2017 WL 4228204, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 22, 2017). Summary judgment has been granted on Younger’s punitive damages claim, so he does not meet the first exception.

There is, however, a genuine factual dispute regarding whether Younger meets the policies and procedures exception. See Am. Compl. ¶ 29 (alleging that J&CT had inadequate policies and procedures for inspecting, maintaining, and safely operating its vehicles and equipment). In support of this argument, Younger points out that, during the year of the accident, the tractor-trailer was [*7]  cited for numerous violations on three separate occasions. Defs.’ Mot. Part. Summ. J. Ex. 1 at 1, 3, 6. These citations reflect multiple expired or missing permits, registrations, and insurance and defective components of the vehicle, including a defect serious enough to render the vehicle an imminent hazard. Id.; 49 U.S.C. § 521(b)(5). When viewed in the light most favorable to Younger, the non-moving party, there is a genuine factual dispute on this issue.

Finally, although defendants argue that Younger has failed to present evidence that J&CT’s deficient policies and procedures were the proximate cause of the accident, Defs.’ Reply 5-6, Doc. No. 25, this argument will not be considered because it was raised for the first time in defendants’ reply brief. Anderson v. Rugged Races LLC, 496 F. Supp. 3d 1270, 1285 (D. Minn. 2020), aff’d, 42 F.4th 955 (8th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, summary judgment is granted on Younger’s punitive damages claim and on all direct negligence claims against J&CT except the claim that it failed to adopt the policies or procedures necessary to assure that its vehicles and equipment were properly inspected, maintained, and operated.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 8th day of November, 2023.

/s/ Brian S. Miller

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

End of Document

United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania

November 6, 2023, Decided; November 6, 2023, Filed

2:23-CV-01461-MJH

Reporter

2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 198505 *; 2023 WL 7301076

ROY JONES, Plaintiff, vs. SILVER CREEK TRANSPORT, LLC, AARON BAXTER, Defendants,

Counsel:  [*1] For ROY JONES, Plaintiff: Alexander C Hyder, LEAD ATTORNEY, Morgan & Morgan, Philadelphia, PA.

For SILVER CREEK TRANSPORT, LLC, AARON BAXTER, Defendants: John T. Pion, LEAD ATTORNEY, Pion, Nerone, Girman, Winslow & Smith, Pittsburgh, PA; Brian L. Shepard, Pittsburgh, PA.

Judges: MARILYN J. HORAN, United States District Judge.

Opinion by: MARILYN J. HORAN

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Roy Jones, brings the within action against Defendants, Silver Creek Transport, LLC and Aaron Baxter, for negligence arising from a motor vehicle accident. (ECF No. 1). Mr. Jones’s Complaint includes allegations of “recklessness,” “outrageous conduct,” and “gross negligence.” Id. at ¶¶ 21, 22, 34, 36, 38, 39, 48, 53, and 55-88. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Defendants move to dismiss said allegations and any claim for punitive damages.¹ The matter is now ripe for consideration.

Following consideration of Mr. Jones’s Complaint (ECF No. 1), Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11), the respective briefs (ECF Nos. 12 and 14), and for the following reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be granted. Mr. Jones’s allegations of “recklessness,” “outrageous conduct,” and “gross negligence” and any claim for punitive damages will be dismissed. [*2]  Mr. Jones’s will be granted leave to amend.

I. Background

Mr. Jones alleges that, while operating a motorhome, he began to slow for stopped traffic ahead. (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 16). At this time, Mr. Jones avers that Defendant, Aaron Baxter, while operating a tractor-trailer in the course and scope of his employment for Defendant, Silver Creek, failed to appreciate the slowing traffic, and impacted the rear of Mr. Jones’s vehicle. Id. at ¶¶ 17-19.

Mr. Jones alleges that the accident occurred because Mr. Baxter was negligent in:

a. failing to maintain proper and adequate control of the subject tractor-trailer so as to avoid crashing into the Plaintiff;

b. failing to notice a slowing vehicle in the roadway;

c. failing to pay proper attention while operating the subject tractor-trailer;

d. operating the subject tractor-trailer in a negligent, careless, and reckless manner without due regard for the rights and safety of the Plaintiff;

e. failing to have the subject tractor-trailer under such control that it could be readily stopped, turned aside or the speed thereof slackened upon the appearance of danger;

f. failing to remain alert;

g. failing to operate the subject tractor-trailer in accordance with [*3]  the FMCSR [Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations] in the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania;

h. failing to make necessary and reasonable observations while operating the subject tractor-trailer;

i. failing to take evasive action and/or failing to take appropriate and timely evasive action in order to avoid striking Plaintiff;

j. failing to timely and properly applied his brakes;

k. violating both the written and unwritten policies, rules, guidelines, and regulations of Silver Creek, LLC and/or the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania;

l. failing to maintain an assured clear distance;

m. failing to apprise himself of and/or abide by the FMCSR;

n. failing to apprise himself of a and/or abide by the regulations and laws pertaining to the operation of commercial vehicles;

o. failing to properly inspect his truck in violation of the FMCSR;

p. consciously choosing to drive the subject tractor-trailer at a high rate of speed for the location and circumstances; and

q. acting with a conscious disregard for the rights and safety of the Plaintiff.

Id. at ¶ 54. Based upon the alleged negligent conduct, Mr. Jones avers that 1) “Defendant Baxter’s operations of the subject tractor-trailer represented a foreseeable [*4]  and unreasonable risk of danger to other vehicles…”, 2) Mr. Jones was injured as the result of the “negligence, carelessness and recklessness” of Mr. Baxter, 3) that “the conduct of Defendant Baxter rises to the level of outrageous conduct in that it willfully ignored the known safety hazards which causes Plaintiff’s harm and damages…”, and 4) that Mr. Baxter “…acted with a willful, wanton, and reckless disregard for the safety of other vehicles…” Id. at ¶¶ 54, 56-58.

As against Silver Creek, Mr. Jones alleges that that the accident was caused by the “…negligence, carelessness, recklessness, and gross negligence” of Silver Creek in:

a. failing to properly train their employees;

b. failing to properly maintain their trucks, including the subject tractor-trailer;

c. failing to properly service their trucks, including the subject tractor-trailer;

d. failing to inspect their trucks, including the subject tractor-trailer;

e. failing to properly maintain, service and/or inspect the brakes and brake systems of their trucks, including the subject tractor-trailer;

f. failing to ensure the subject tractor-trailer was operated by a properly trained and licensed driver;

g. failing to properly [*5]  monitor driver performance;

h. promoting and encouraging drivers to rush at the expense of safety;

i. violating commercial motor vehicle regulations; and

j. failing to use due care under the circumstances.

Id. at ¶ 34. Based upon Silver Creek’s alleged conduct, Mr. Jones alleges that; 1) He was injured “[a]s a direct and proximate result of the negligence, carelessness, reckless[ness], and/or other liability-producing conduct of Defendant Silver Creek…”; 2) that “defendant Silver Creek knew or should have known that failing to have appropriate safety policies regarding the use, operation, and/or maintenance of their tractor-trailers…posed a very high risk of serious bodily injury and/or death to those other vehicles, including Plaintiff”; 3) that the “… conduct of defendant Silver Creek rises to the level of outrageous conduct by willfully and recklessly ignoring the known safety hazards which caused the severe and permanent personal injuries of Plaintiff…”; and that 4) Silver Creek acted with “a willful, wanton, and reckless disregard for the safety of other vehicles and pedestrians, including Plaintiff.” Id. at ¶¶ 36-39.

In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue that Mr. Jones’s [*6]  Complaint fails to adequately plead facts supporting punitive damages and that the same should be dismissed.

II. Relevant Standard

When reviewing a motion to dismiss, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Eid v. Thompson, 740 F.3d 118, 122 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir.2008)). “To survive a motion to dismiss a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); see also Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Factual allegations of a complaint must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A pleading party need not establish the elements of a prima facie case at this stage; the party must only “put forth allegations that ‘raise a reasonable expectation [*7]  that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element[s].'” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir.2009) (quoting Graff v. Subbiah Cardiology Associates, Ltd., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44192, 2008 WL 2312671 (W.D. Pa. June 4, 2008)); see also Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 790 (3d Cir.2016) (“Although a reviewing court now affirmatively disregards a pleading’s legal conclusions, it must still . . . assume all remaining factual allegations to be true, construe those truths in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and then draw all reasonable inferences from them.”) (citing Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 154 n. 1 (3d Cir.2014)).

Nonetheless, a court need not credit bald assertions, unwarranted inferences, or legal conclusions cast in the form of factual averments. Morse v. Lower Merion School District, 132 F.3d 902, 906, n. 8 (3d Cir.1997). The primary question in deciding a motion to dismiss is not whether the Plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but rather whether he or she is entitled to offer evidence to establish the facts alleged in the complaint. Maio v. Aetna, 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir.2000). The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to “streamline [ ] litigation by dispensing with needless discovery and factfinding.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326-327, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1989).

Finally, if the court decides to grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court must next decide whether leave to amend the complaint must be granted. The Court of Appeals has “instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative [*8]  amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 236 (citing Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir.2002)).

III. Discussion

Defendants argue that Mr. Jones’s punitive damages claim should be dismissed because the Complaint fails to establish the “something more” component beyond the ordinary negligence averments required for punitive damages. Specifically, Defendants maintain the Complaint alleges no conduct that elevates Mr. Baxter’s actions to outrageous or egregious actions. Finally, Defendants contend that, as regard allegations against Silver Creek, the Complaint alleges boilerplate, conclusory allegations regarding whether it trained Mr. Baxter inadequately, failed to monitor or supervise him adequately, failed maintain its vehicles adequately, or otherwise failed to properly comply with certain, undefined statutes or regulations.

Mr. Jones argues his Complaint contains a sufficient factual basis to put Defendants on notice of the claims for punitive damages. Mr. Jones also contends that dismissal of these claims is premature until discovery into the policies, procedures, training, safety/crash history, etc. of Defendants and into the conduct of Mr.Baxter, including any violations of the FMCSRs.

In Pennsylvania, [*9]  the assessment of punitive damages is proper “when a person’s actions are of such an outrageous nature as to demonstrate intentional, willful, wanton or reckless conduct.” SHV Coal, Inc. v. Cont’l Grain Co., 526 Pa. 489, 587 A.2d 702, 704 (Pa. 1991). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also adopted Section 908(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states as follows:

Punitive damages may be awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of others. In assessing punitive damages, the trier of fact can properly consider the character of the defendant’s act, the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff that the defendant caused or intended to cause[,] and the wealth of the defendant.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908(2); see Feld v. Merriam, 506 Pa. 383, 485 A.2d 742, 747-48 (1984); see also SHV Coal, Inc., 587 A.2d at 704. In the motor vehicle context, “simple allegations limited only to a defendant failing to comply with traffic laws are not sufficient for punitive damages.” Carson v. Tucker, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125243, 2020 WL 4015244 at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 16, 2020); see Babenko v. Dillon, No. 5:19-cv-00199, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130015, 2019 WL 3548833 at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 2019) (holding that defendant’s negligent speeding, failure to properly signal, and failure to properly observe roadways did not warrant punitive damages).

Here, Defendants’ arguments are well taken. Mr. Jones’s Complaint contains conclusory allegations that label Defendants’ conduct as reckless, wanton, or outrageous. Moreover, said allegations are devoid of facts that would [*10]  support any specified conduct or violations of specific regulations or statutes. As observed by another member of this Court, “[t]he inclusion of simple allegations that a truck driver did not comply with the law or violated regulations does not, by itself, satisfy the requirements of Pennsylvania law for awarding punitive damages.” Elmi v. Kornilenko, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33950, 2018 WL 1157996, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2018). Mr. Jones would have this Court adopt a per se rule where almost any liable driver, who almost invariably violate some traffic law or regulation, be forced to defend a claim for punitive claims without a “something more” averment beyond ordinary negligence. Id. Likewise, Mr. Jones’s Complaint against Silver Creek avers no specifics regarding its alleged acts or failure to act that shift its role from ordinary negligence to “something more.” Instead, the Complaint contains a litany of allegations against Defendants that are unsupported by the requisite specificity to reach a plausible conclusion regarding Defendants’ conduct which would buttress a punitive damage claim. Therefore, Mr. Jones’s claim against Defendants for punitive damages and the averments purporting to support the same will be dismissed.

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be [*11]  Granted. The Court enters the following order:

ORDER

Based upon the foregoing, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is Granted. To the extent that Mr. Jones’s Complaint seeks punitive damages against Defendants, the same are dismissed. Additionally, all allegations, that Defendants’ conduct constitutes “recklessness”, “outrageous conduct” and “gross negligence”, as contained in Complaint Paragraphs 21, 22, 34, 36, 38, 39, 48, 53, and 55-88, are hereby stricken therefrom as immaterial. In light of the Court’s Opinion, it will permit Mr. Jones to amend his Complaint. Any amendment should be filed on or before November 20, 2023. Defendants shall answer or otherwise respond to either Plaintiff’s Complaint or an Amended Complaint on or before December 4, 2023.

DATED this 6th day of November, 2023.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Marilyn J. Horan

MARILYN J. HORAN

United States District Judge

End of Document

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¹ The word “punitive” appears nowhere in Mr. Jones’s Complaint. However, a plaintiff may pursue a claim for punitive damages even where an explicit demand for such relief is not made in the complaint. Kozlowski v. JFBB Ski Areas, Inc., No. 18-353, 2020 WL 2468408, at *4, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84337, at *8-18 (M.D. Pa. May 13, 2020) (citing Newell v. State of Wis. Teamsters Joint Council No. 39, No. 05-552, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72917 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 28, 2007) (“[A]bsent an explicit demand, the complaint must contain sufficient allegations to inform the defendant that punitive damages are on the table….”)). “In Pennsylvania, punitive damages are available as a remedy for negligence actions.” Goodfellow v. Camp Netimus, Inc., No. CV 3:16-1521, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68140, 2017 WL 1738398, at *9 (M.D. Pa. May 4, 2017) (internal quotation omitted; citing inter alia Hutchison ex rel. Hutchison v. Luddy, 582 Pa. 114, 870 A.2d 766, 772-73 (Pa.

2005)). “This remedy is only available in cases where the defendant’s actions are so outrageous as to demonstrate willful, wanton or reckless conduct.” Id. Here, Mr. Jones has alleged “outrageous” and “reckless” conduct, and Defendants’ Motion appears to infer that Mr. Jones has demanded punitive damages.