CHRISTOPHER PRACHT, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Eric F. Lee, Plaintiff, and GREENWOOD MOTOR LINES, INC. d/b/a R+L CARRIERS and R&L TRANSFER, INC., Intervenor Plaintiff, v. SAGA FREIGHT LOGISTICS, LLC and TOMAS HERRERA, JR., Defendants.

 

3:13-cv-00529-RJC-DCK

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA, CHARLOTTE DIVISION

 

2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69158

 

 

May 20, 2016, Decided

May 26, 2016, Filed

 

 

SUBSEQUENT HISTORY:    As Corrected June 8, 2016.

 

PRIOR HISTORY: Pracht v. Saga Freight Logistics LLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40952 (W.D.N.C., Mar. 27, 2014)

 

COUNSEL:  [*1] For Christopher Pracht, Plaintiff: Dawn Tiffani Mistretta, LEAD ATTORNEY, Winston-Salem, NC; Jack M. Strauch, LEAD ATTORNEY, Strauch & Fitzgerald, P.C., Winston-Salem, NC; Richard Austin Oyler, LEAD ATTORNEY, Strauch Fitzgerald & Green, P.C., Winston-Salem, NC.

 

For Greenwood Motor Lines, Inc., R&L Transfer, Inc., Intervenor Plaintiffs: Richard Austin Oyler, LEAD ATTORNEY, Strauch Fitzgerald & Green, P.C., Winston-Salem, NC; David Baker Hall, PRO HAC VICE, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Birmingham, AL; Jeffrey W. Hastings, PRO HAC VICE, Baker, Donelson,Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, Houston, TX; Samuel Hawley Poole, Jr., Cranfill, Sumner & Hartzog, L.L.P., Charlotte, NC.

 

For Saga Freight Logistics, LLC, Defendant, Counter Claimant: Christopher M. Kelly, LEAD ATTORNEY, Gillian Shannon Crowl, Gallivan White & Boyd, P.A., Charlotte, NC.

 

For Tomas Herrera, Defendant: Gillian Shannon Crowl, LEAD ATTORNEY, Gallivan White & Boyd, P.A., Charlotte, NC; Gregory Charles York, LEAD ATTORNEY, York, Williams, Barringer, Lewis & Briggs, LLP, Charlotte, NC.

 

For Greenwood Motor Lines, Inc., R&L Transfer, Inc., Counter Defendants: David Baker Hall, LEAD ATTORNEY, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell [*2]  & Berkowitz, PC, Birmingham, AL; Richard Austin Oyler, LEAD ATTORNEY, Strauch Fitzgerald & Green, P.C., Winston-Salem, NC; Jeffrey W. Hastings, PRO HAC VICE, Baker, Donelson,Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, Houston, TX; Samuel Hawley Poole, Jr., Cranfill, Sumner & Hartzog, L.L.P., Charlotte, NC.

 

For R&L Transfer, Inc., Counter Defendant: David Baker Hall, PRO HAC VICE, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Birmingham, AL; Richard Austin Oyler, LEAD ATTORNEY, Strauch Fitzgerald & Green, P.C., Winston-Salem, NC; Jeffrey W. Hastings, PRO HAC VICE, Baker, Donelson,Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, Houston, TX; Samuel Hawley Poole, Jr., Cranfill, Sumner & Hartzog, L.L.P., Charlotte, NC.

 

For Greenwood Motor Lines, Inc., R&L Transfer, Inc., Counter Defendants: Richard Austin Oyler, LEAD ATTORNEY, Strauch Fitzgerald & Green, P.C., Winston-Salem, NC; David Baker Hall, Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Birmingham, AL; Jeffrey W. Hastings, Baker, Donelson,Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, Houston, TX; Samuel Hawley Poole, Jr., Cranfill, Sumner & Hartzog, L.L.P., Charlotte, NC.

 

JUDGES: Robert J. Conrad, Jr., United States District Judge.

 

OPINION BY: Robert J. Conrad, Jr.

 

OPINION

 

ORDER

THIS MATTER comes before [*3]  the Court on Intervenor Plaintiff Greenwood Motor Lines, Inc. d/b/a R+L Carriers and R&L Transfer, Inc.’s (“R&L”) Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment (“Rule 50(b) Motion”), (Doc. No. 163), and R&L’s Motion for Appeal of Clerk’s Denial of Bill of Costs, (Doc. No. 179).

 

1. BACKGROUND

Following the week-long trial of this matter, the parties are familiar with the background; therefore, the Court will not recapitulate it here. The Court only adds the following to clarify the proceedings during and since the November 2015 trial.

The trial of this matter was bifurcated into the liability phase followed by the damages phase. After the close of the liability phase, the jury determined that R&L’s damages were a result of gross negligence by Defendant Tomas Herrera, Jr. (“Herrera”). (Doc. No. 156 ¶ 3). As a result of that determination, Defendant Saga Freight Logistics, LLC (“Saga”) and Herrera (collectively, “Defendants”) were found to be liable for the damages sustained by R&L, and the trial proceeded to the damages phase. In the damages phase, R&L presented documentary evidence of the damages sustained from the loss of its tractor-trailer and cargo [*4]  along with towing and cleanup costs, which indicated that its total damages were $99,276.83.1 Defendants raised no objections to the admission of any of R&L’s damages evidence, and Defendants declined to test the evidence through cross-examination. Furthermore, Defendants did not controvert the evidence, offer any evidence of their own, or present any argument disputing R&L’s damages evidence.

 

1   Specifically, R&L’s damages evidence indicated the following losses: (1) $39,202.01 for loss of the freight; (2) $9,530.37 for cleanup costs; (3) $26,325.00 for towing costs; (4) $16,836.45 for loss of the tractor; and (5) $7,383.00 for loss of the trailer. (Doc. No. 164-2).

At the close of evidence, R&L made an oral motion for judgment as a matter of law as to the amount of damages, which was denied. (Doc. No. 175 at 4-5). On November 6, 2015, the jury returned its verdict awarding R&L nominal damages of one dollar for the loss of its tractor-trailer and cargo. (Doc. No. 157 ¶ 2). On November 24, 2015, R&L filed its Rule 50(b) Motion. (Doc. No. 163). In the Motion, R&L requests that the Court enter judgment as a matter of law in its favor in the amount of $99,276.83. Defendants filed their response in opposition [*5]  on December 9, 2015, (Doc. No. 167), and R&L replied on December 21, 2015, (Doc. No. 170).

In a separate but related matter, as the prevailing party at trial R&L filed its Bill of Costs on December 10, 2015, (Doc. No. 168), to which Defendants objected on December 15, 2015, (Doc. No. 169). The Clerk of Court denied R&L’s Bill of Costs on January 21, 2016, (Doc. No. 178), and R&L filed its Motion for Appeal of Clerk’s Denial of Bill of Costs on January 27, 2016, (Doc. No. 179). The motions have been fully briefed and the issues are ripe for adjudication.

 

1. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 50(b) allows an aggrieved party to file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. The rule provides that “the court may: (1) allow judgment on the verdict, if the jury returned a verdict; (2) order a new trial; or (3) direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). A jury verdict will withstand a Rule 50(b) motion unless the nonmovant presented no substantial evidence to support the jury verdict. Stamathis v. Flying J, Inc., 389 F.3d 429, 436 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 1991)). A mere scintilla of evidence supporting the verdict is insufficient. See In re Quinn, No. 92-2366, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 21527, 1993 WL 321583, at *6 (4th Cir. Aug. 23, 1993); Custer v. Hall No. 91-2673, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 21083, 1992 WL 214514, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 3, 1992) (both citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)). The amount of damages is left to the discretion of the jury. First Union Commercial Corp. v. GATX Capital Corp., 411 F.3d 551, 556 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Compton v. Wyle Labs., 674 F.2d 206, 209 (4th Cir. 1982)). “The court will uphold a damage award ‘unless no [*6]  substantial evidence is presented to support it, it is against the clear weight of the evidence, it is based upon evidence that is false, or it will result in a miscarriage of justice.'” Id (quoting Barber v. Whirlpool Corp., 34 F.3d 1268, 1279 (4th Cir. 1994)).

A Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law is subject to the same standard as a motion for summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250. In considering the motion, therefore, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir. 2002). Such a motion presents a question of law as to whether, when all the evidence is considered together with all reasonable inferences drawn in the nonmovant’s favor, there exists a failure or lack of evidence to support the verdict. Spell v. McDaniel, 604 F. Supp. 641, 646 (E.D.N.C. 1985). A court should grant a Rule 50(b) motion “only where the evidence points all one way and is susceptible of no reasonable inferences sustaining the position of the nonmoving party.” Singer Co. v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 579 F.2d 433, 441 (8th Cir. 1978) (internal quotations marks omitted).

 

III. DISCUSSION

 

1. R&L’s Rule 50(b) Motion

R&L contends that the verdict of one dollar is not based on the evidence. The Court agrees. R&L presented comprehensive evidence at trial objectively documenting the losses it sustained from the destruction of its tractor-trailer and cargo. That undisputed [*7]  evidence indicated that R&L’s total damages were $99,276.83. Defendants did not raise any objection to this evidence; test, attack, or controvert the evidence; or introduce any opposing evidence. In their closings, Defendants did not even mention R&L’s damages, much less make any argument disputing the evidence.

As Defendants point out, the jury was free to disbelieve the evidence presented by R&L, and as the trier of the facts, it is the jury’s duty to resolve any conflicts in the evidence. (Doc. No. 167 at 8 (citing Beaufort v. United States, No. 3:10-cv-425-FDW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20152, 2011 WL 815784, at *1 n.4 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 1, 2011)). However, there was no conflicting evidence related to R&L’s damages, and no reasonable person could determine that R&L suffered only one dollar in damages from the total destruction of its tractor-trailer loaded with cargo. This is not a case involving the abstract value of constitutional rights or one in which no objective evidence of damages was presented. Compare Spell 604 F. Supp. at 653-54 (ordering new trial on damages because undisputed objective evidence of the plaintiffs medical expenses clearly exceeded the jury’s $1,000 verdict), with Denny v. Hinton, 900 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1990) (affirming a nominal award of one dollar for injuries the plaintiff allegedly incurred during a “beating” by [*8]  corrections officers because the abstract value of constitutional rights is not compensable and the plaintiff presented no objective medical evidence of his injuries).

The evidence presented at trial clearly established that R&L suffered damages well in excess of one dollar. Having reviewed that evidence, the Court finds that R&L established by a preponderance of the evidence that it sustained damages in the amount of $99,276.83. Defendants presented no evidence, much less substantial evidence, to support a verdict of one dollar. In view of the undisputed evidence of R&L’s damages, which grossly exceeded the jury’s one dollar verdict, it is evident that the jury did not comply with the instructions of the Court in determining its damages award.2 Consequently, the jury verdict awarding one dollar in damages to R&L cannot stand. The jury verdict as to the amount of damages R&L is entitled to recover from Defendants, (Doc. No. 157 ¶ 2), is hereby set aside, and pursuant to the Court’s authority under Rule 50(b), the Court will enter a judgment as a matter of law in R&L’s favor in the amount of $99,276.83.

 

2   Regarding R&L’s damages, the jury was instructed as follows: “Finally, as to the [issue of R&L’s [*9]  damages] on which [R&L has] the burden of proof, if you find by a preponderance of the evidence the amount of actual property damages proximately caused by the negligence of the defendants, then it would be your duty to write that amount in the blank space provided.” (Doc. No. 170 at 4). As discussed, R&L proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it sustained damages well in excess of one dollar, and a finding otherwise disregards these instructions.

 

1. R&L’s Appeal of Denial of Bill of Costs

R&L is a prevailing party in this litigation. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and Local Civil Rule 54.1, therefore, it is entitled to recover its costs, and the Court will grant R&L’s Motion appealing the denial of its costs. However, Local Rule 54.1(F) and (G) permits the recovery of costs associated with obtaining a deposition and an original transcript of the deposition. Multiple copies of deposition transcripts are specifically excluded as costs that are normally taxable. LCvR 54.1(F). It appears that R&L’s Bill of Costs contains costs for multiple copies of depositions. Accordingly, while the Court finds that R&L shall recover its costs, such costs will not include amounts associated with obtaining multiple copies of deposition transcripts. R&L [*10]  shall submit a revised Bill of Costs excluding any such amounts, and the costs will be taxed accordingly.

 

1. CONCLUSION

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that:

 

1. R&L’s Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law and Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment, (Doc. No. 163), is GRANTED. Specifically, the jury verdict of one dollar, pertaining to the amount of damages R&L is entitled to recover from Defendants, (Doc. No. 157 ¶ 2), is SET ASIDE, and the Court enters judgment as a matter of law in R&L’s favor in the amount of $99,276.83.
2. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in accordance with this Order.
3. R&L’s Motion for Appeal of Clerk’s Denial of Bill of Costs, (Doc. No. 179), is GRANTED. R&L shall file a revised Bill of Costs excluding any amounts related to obtaining multiple copies of deposition transcripts.

 

 

Signed: May 20, 2016

/s/ Robert J. Conrad, Jr.

Robert J. Conrad, Jr.

United States District Judge

United States District Court,

D. Kansas.

JOHN BROWN and SANDRA BROWN, Plaintiffs,

v.

JAVIER CARMONA CEBALLOS; GM CARGO, INC.; and CASTLEPOINT FLORIDA INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants.

Case No. 6:15-cv-01330-JTM

|

05/26/2016

 

J. THOMAS MARTEN, JUDGE

 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

*1 This matter is before the court on defendant Castlepoint Florida Insurance Company’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. 34). The motion argues that the court lacks personal jurisdiction over Castlepoint. For the reasons set forth below, the court denies the motion.

 

 

I. Background.

Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that on December 4, 2013, defendant Javier Carmona Ceballos (“Carmona”) was driving a tractor-trailer rig on Interstate 70 in Kansas, when he negligently caused the truck to strike plaintiffs’ vehicle, thereby injuring the plaintiffs. It alleges that Carmona was an agent or employee of GM Cargo, Inc., and his acts were within the scope of his employment, making GM Cargo vicariously liable for his actions. It also alleges that GM Cargo’s negligence in hiring, retaining and training Carmona was a proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injuries. Finally, it alleges that Castlepoint Florida Insurance Company, a Florida corporation with its principal place of business in New York, was the insurer of GM Cargo and Carmona. The complaint alleges personal jurisdiction over Castlepoint “because it conducts substantial and continuous business” in Kansas. Dkt. 1, ¶¶ 7, 27. It further alleges that K.S.A. § 66-1,128 permits a direct cause of action against Castlepoint.

 

Castlepoint moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. It argues that it does not have sufficient minimum contacts with Kansas to satisfy due process. Castlepoint asserts that it has no office or agent in Kansas, does not transact any business in Kansas, has not caused any tortious injury in the state, and has no other ties to the state such as owning property, having a telephone listing, or having a bank account.

 

In response, plaintiffs argue that K.S.A. § 66-1,128 permits a direct action against an insurer arising out of a tort by an insured commercial trucker, and that such liability is sufficient for jurisdiction. Dkt. 37 at 1. Plaintiffs argue that “direct liability arising from the commission of ‘a tortious act in the state’ is sufficient to impose jurisdiction” under the Kansas long-arm statute, K.S.A. § 308(b)(1)(B).

 

 

II. Standards.

In determining whether a federal court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the court must determine: 1) whether the applicable statute potentially confers jurisdiction by authorizing service of process on the defendant; and 2) whether the exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process. Niemi v. Lasshofer, 770 F.3d 1331, 1348 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1217 (10th Cir. 2006)). Because Kansas’s long-arm statute confers jurisdiction to the extent of the Due Process Clause, see Merriman v. Crompton Corp., 282 Kan. 433, 459, 146 P.3d 162, 179 (2006), the court can proceed directly to the question of due process. Niemi, 770 F.3d at 1348.

 

An exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is consistent with due process if: 1) the defendant has minimum contacts with the state such that it should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there; and 2) such jurisdiction will not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Melea, Ltd. v. Jawer SA, 511 F.3d 1060, 1067 (10th Cir. 2007). The first step may be demonstrated by showing the existence of either general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction. Because plaintiffs do not claim that general jurisdiction exists here, see Dkt. 37 at 1, the court turns to specific jurisdiction.

 

*2 Under the specific jurisdiction requirement, a plaintiff must show that: 1) defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities or consummating a transaction in the forum state; and 2) the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities. Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Bartile Roofs, Inc., 618 F.3d 1153, 1160 (10th Cir. 2010). In tort, as opposed to contract cases, courts sometimes employ the “purposeful direction” test, under which plaintiff must show: 1) an intentional action 2) that was expressly aimed at the forum state, and 3) with knowledge that the brunt of the injury would be felt in the forum state. See Niemi, 770 F.3d at 1348. In either case, the “purposeful” requirement is designed to ensure that a nonresident defendant is not haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts. Id. See also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985).

 

The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over a defendant. When a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is ruled on without an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. The plaintiff may meet its burden by demonstrating, via affidavits or other written materials, facts that if true would support jurisdiction over the defendant. See OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086, 1091 (10th Cir. 1998).

 

 

III. Discussion.

Exercise of jurisdiction over Castlepoint in this case is supported by defendant’s minimum contacts with the state. While the record at this point does not include Castlepoint’s insurance contract with GM Cargo,1 plaintiffs’ allegations show that Castlepoint purposefully provided commercial liability insurance to GM Cargo, an over-the-road motor carrier company that operates on Kansas highways and elsewhere. By Kansas law, carriers who operate in this state are required to maintain a certain minimum level of liability insurance, and the Kansas Supreme Court has determined that a party injured by a motor carrier has a direct cause of action in tort against the insurer. Kirtland v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 220 Kan. 631, 556 P.2d 199 (1976). This is a procedural right, remedial in nature, that is designed to ensure adequate protection for members of the public from the negligent conduct of motor carriers on Kansas highways. Id. at 633-34.

 

Castlepoint’s activities in this sense are purposely directed at Kansas, as it collects premiums from GM Cargo and in exchange provides the required coverage for the carrier’s business operations in Kansas and elsewhere. Unlike some policies that exclude coverage in specified jurisdictions, Castlepoint does not deny that its policy provides coverage for its insured’s operations in Kansas. Because the laws of Kansas allow a party injured by the negligence of a motor carrier to bring a direct action against the carrier’s insurer, Castlepoint had fair warning that it could be subjected to suit in Kansas from the operations of its insured in this state. Moreover, jurisdiction here does not depend, as Castlepoint suggests, on the unilateral actions of its insured, because Castlepoint purposefully directed its commercial activities toward the area of its insured’s operations, including those in Kansas, and it did so knowing that any injuries from its insured’s negligence in Kansas would be felt in this state. The fact that Castlepoint made a choice to insure trucking operations in Kansas, when it was on notice that it would be subject to direct suit for negligent injuries caused by its insured, takes this case out of the “unilateral activity of another party” or the “random,” “fortuitous” or “attenuated” contacts that were insufficient to support jurisdiction in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) and World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). See TH Agriculture & Nutrition, LLC v. Ace European Group, Ltd., 488 F.3d 1282, 1290 (10th Cir. 2007) (“insurers quite clearly avail themselves of the privilege of conducting business in a forum state when that state is included in an insurance policy’s territory of coverage”). Cf. OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086, 1095 (10th Cir. 1998) (although disagreeing “to some extent” with cases that fail to examine defendant’s actions or that rely too much on foreseeability, “we do agree that by contracting to defend the insured in the forum state, the insurer creates some contact with the forum state.”). See also Pugh v. Okla. Farm Bur. Mut. Ins. Co., 159 F.Supp. 155, 158-59 (E.D. La. 1958) (“Since the accident within the state is sufficient contact to justify maintenance of the suit for damages against the nonresident motorist, it would seem that the same accident should justify maintenance of the suit against his nonresident liability insurer who, after all, is the real party in interest.”). In sum, plaintiffs’ allegations show that Castlepoint has sufficient minimum contacts with Kansas and that the action arises out of those contacts.

 

*3 The court further finds that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Castlepoint is consistent with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See TH Agriculture, 488 F.3d at 1292 (listing relevant factors). Among other things, the court notes that Castlepoint cites nothing concrete to suggest that defending the action in this forum would impose a significant burden on it; the State of Kansas has a significant interest in providing a forum in which persons injured on its highways can seek redress; the plaintiffs have elected the convenience of a Kansas forum; Kansas appears to be the most efficient place to litigate the dispute; and the exercise of jurisdiction by Kansas over this matter will not adversely affect the policies of foreign states. Cf. Pugh, 159 F.Supp. at 159 (“Having agreed to cover Louisiana risks, [the insurer] cannot deny Louisiana courts the right to determine its liability on claims arising from accidents occurring in this state.”).

 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED this 26th day of May, 2016, that defendant Castlepoint Florida Insurance Company’s Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 34) is DENIED.

___s/ J. Thomas Marten______

 

 

J. THOMAS MARTEN, JUDGE

All Citations

Slip Copy, 2016 WL 3015046

 

 

Footnotes

 

1

 

Plaintiffs represent that neither Castlepoint nor its insured has produced a copy of the relevant policy. Dkt. 37 at 5.