TRISTATE ANTIQUES, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant.

 

CIVIL ACTION No. 17-1823

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

 

2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167523

 

 

October 11, 2017, Decided

October 11, 2017, Filed

 

 

COUNSEL:  [*1] For TRISTATE ANTIQUES, Plaintiff: JONATHAN WHEELER, LEAD ATTORNEY, LAW OFFICES OF JONATHAN WHEELER PC, PHILADELPHIA, PA.

 

For FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant: STEPHEN S. KEMPA, LEAD ATTORNEY, CHARLES J. JESUIT, JR., COZEN O’CONNOR, PHILADELPHIA, PA.

 

JUDGES: ROBERT F. KELLY, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

 

OPINION BY: ROBERT F. KELLY

 

OPINION

 

MEMORANDUM

ROBERT F. KELLY, Sr. J.

Plaintiff Tristate Antiques (“Tristate”) filed suit against Defendant Federal Insurance Company (“Federal”) in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, alleging that Federal breached its obligations under an Inland Marine Policy (the “Policy”). Federal removed the case to this Court on the basis of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1132.

Presently before the Court are Federal’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Tristate’s Response in Opposition/Cross-Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint. Federal has filed a Reply Brief, and Tristate has filed a Surreply. Federal has also filed a Motion to Extend Discovery in the event we deny its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. For the reasons noted below, Federal’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is granted, as is Tristate’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint. [*2]  Federal’s Motion to Extend Discovery is denied as moot.

 

1. BACKGROUND

Federal insured Tristate under Inland Marine Policy Number 0661-79-16 EUC, which had a Policy Period of December 8, 2010 to December 8, 2011. (Compl. ¶ 3 (citing Ex. A (“Policy Decl.”)).) Tristate alleged that on or about December 1, 2011, while the Policy was in effect, it suffered a loss “of fine arts and dealers stock and trade” in the amount of $140,000. (Id. ¶ 4.) Tristate claimed it promptly reported the claim to Federal, but Federal refused to pay as allegedly required under the Policy. (See id. ¶¶ 5, 6.)

Federal filed an Answer to the Complaint, averring that the Policy was cancelled effective July 15, 2011. (See Def.’s Answer ¶ 4.) The Policy contained a provision where “[t]he first Named Insured may cancel this policy or any of its individual coverages at any time by sending [Federal] a written request or by returning the policy and stating when thereafter cancellation is to take effect.” (Def.’s Mem. Support Mot. J. on Pleadings at 7 (citing Ex. 1 (“Policy”)).) Thus, Federal maintains that it owes no obligations under the Policy because it was cancelled prior to Tristate’s alleged December 1, 2011 loss. (See generally [*3]  id.)

Tristate filed suit against Federal in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, alleging a sole count of breach of contract. Federal subsequently removed the case to this Court on the basis of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction. On August 16, 2017, Federal filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. On August 17, 2017, Federal also filed a Motion to Extend Discovery in the event that we deny its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. On August 30, 2017, Tristate responded to Federal’s Motion and cross-moved for leave to file an amended complaint.

 

II.LEGAL STANDARD

 

1. Rule 12(c) Standard

A party may move for judgment on the pleadings “[a]fter the pleadings are closed – but early enough not to delay trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A court may grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings “if, on the basis of the pleadings, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” DiCarlo v. St. Mary Hosp., 530 F.3d 255, 262 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “We ‘view[] the facts alleged in the pleadings and the inferences to be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'” D.E. v. Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 271 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Mele v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 359 F.3d 251, 253 (3d Cir. 2004)). “A Rule 12(c) motion ‘should not be granted unless the moving party has established that there is no material issue of fact to resolve, and [the moving party] is entitled [*4]  to judgment as a matter of law.'” Id. (quoting Mele, 359 F.3d at 253). “Ordinarily, in deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court considers the pleadings and attached exhibits, undisputedly authentic documents attached to the motion for judgment on the pleadings if plaintiffs’ claims are based on the documents, and matters of public record.” Atiyeh v. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. of Hartford, 742 F. Supp. 2d 591, 595 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (footnotes omitted).

 

1. Rule 15(a) Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides that, when a party cannot amend its pleading as a matter of course, “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave,” and directs that courts “should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). “Leave to amend must generally be granted unless equitable considerations render it otherwise unjust.” Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 204 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S. Ct. 227, 9 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1962)). Factors that may justify the denial of leave to amend include undue delay, bad faith, and futility. See id. (citing Lorenz v. CSX Corp., 1 F.3d 1406, 1413 (3d Cir. 1993)). However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has “consistently recognized” that “prejudice to the non-moving party is the touchstone for the denial of an amendment.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Prejudice results when a party changes its “tactics or theories” that results in the non-moving party having “undue [*5]  difficulty in prosecuting [or defending] a law suit.” Heraeus Med. GmbH v. Esschem, Inc.,     F.R.D.    , No. 14-5169, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86365, 2017 WL 2439554, at *2 (E.D. Pa. June 6, 2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).

 

III.DISCUSSION

 

1. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

As a preliminary issue, we first decide what materials we will consider in addressing Federal’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. In its Complaint, Tristate attached the Declarations for the Policy, but did not attach the entire Policy itself. (See Compl.) Federal has attached the entire Policy in reliance on its Motion. (See generally Policy.) Further, Federal has also attached a “Cancellation Request/Policy Release” (“Cancellation Request”). (See Def.’s Mem. Support Mot. J. on Pleadings, Ex. 2.) Tristate does not dispute the authenticity of those documents, and its claims are without question based upon them. Accordingly, we will consider them for purposes of Federal’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.

The Policy issued to Tristate had a Policy Period of December 8, 2010 to December 8, 2011. (See Policy Decl.) Federal moves for judgment on the pleadings on the basis that no breach of contract can exist because the Policy was cancelled effective July 15, 2011, which was before Tristate’s December [*6]  1, 2011 loss. (See generally Def.’s Mem. Support Mot. J. on Pleadings.) To allege a breach of contract under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must show “(1) the existence of a contract, including its essential terms, (2) a breach of a duty imposed by the contract[,] and (3) resultant damages.” Kaymark v. Bank of Am., N.A., 783 F.3d 168, 182 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Omicron Sys., Inc. v. Weiner, 2004 PA Super 389, 860 A.2d 554, 564 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Under the terms of the Policy, Tristate had the right to cancel it “at any time by sending [Federal] a written request.” (See Policy.) The Cancellation Request unquestionably satisfies that provision. The Cancellation Request lists the “Named Insured” as “Tri-State Antiques”; the Policy Number is 0661-79-16 EUC; the cancellation date is July 15, 2011; the insurance company name is “Federal Insurance Company”; and it is signed and dated by Purnima Som, Tristate’s proprietor. (See Cancellation Request; see also Pl.’s Response Opp’n Def.’s Mot./Cross-Mot. Leave to File Amended Compl.1 at 6.) Tristate does not put forth any meritorious argument that the Policy was in effect at the time of the December 1, 2011 loss.2 Accordingly, there was no enforceable contract at the time of the December 1, 2011 loss, and Federal is entitled to judgment on the pleadings. [*7] 3

 

1   Tristate did not include page numbers in its Response in Opposition/Cross-Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint. Accordingly, we will use the ECF generated pagination when citing.

2   Tristate, without any citation or support, puts forth the strange argument that the cancellation was made by an “individual agent, Armanda [sic] Bassi,” and that the cancellation was made “unbeknownst” to Tristate. (See Pl.’s Response Opp’n Def.’s Mot./Cross-Mot. Leave to File Amended Compl. at 11.) Notwithstanding the fact that nowhere in the Complaint is that allegation made, but Tristate’s argument is clearly without merit because Purnima Som, the proprietor of Tristate, signed the Cancellation Request.

3   Given that Federal is entitled to judgment on the pleadings, we deny its Motion to Extend discovery as moot.

 

1. Tristate’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint

Clearly recognizing the weakness in its claim against Federal, Tristate alternatively moves for leave to file an amended complaint. Tristate has attached a “(Proposed) Amended Civil Action Complaint” as an exhibit to its Response in Opposition/Cross-Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint, where it names a different plaintiff, a different defendant, and alleges a breach of a different insurance policy. (See Pl.’s Response Opp’n Def.’s Mot./Cross-Mot. Leave to File Amended Compl., Ex. H (“Proposed Complaint”).) Specifically, the Proposed Complaint names “Purnima Som d/b/a Tristate Antiques” as the Plaintiff, “Great Northern Insurance Company” as the Defendant, and alleges a breach of contract under Policy Number 13250719-01. (See Proposed Compl.) Despite Federal not being named as a Defendant in the Proposed Complaint, it nevertheless argues that Tristate should not be permitted to amend its Complaint because it would be “inherently prejudicial” and would cause undue delay, given that Tristate has known about the claim against Great Northern Insurance Company for quite some time. (See Def.’s Reply at 7-8.)

We may dispose [*8]  of Federal’s arguments fairly quickly. First, Federal suffers absolutely no prejudice as a result of Tristate being given leave to amend, as it is not named as a Defendant in the Proposed Complaint. See Arthur, 434 F.3d at 204 (stating that prejudice is the “touchstone” for the denial of leave to amend). Further, Federal is entitled to judgment on the pleadings, resulting in it being dismissed from this action with prejudice. While there may be evidence in the record that Tristate knew about the claim against Great Northern Insurance Company even before this action was filed, we cannot say that such delay was “undue.” See id. at 204-05 (discussing that only one appellate court approved the denial of leave to amend based on a delay of less than one year). This case has only been litigated in this Court since April 2017. Given the liberal policy of allowing plaintiffs leave to amend, and Federal suffering no prejudice whatsoever in this instance, we grant Tristate’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint.

 

IV.CONCLUSION

The Policy issued to Tristate had a Policy Period of December 8, 2010 to December 8, 2011, but allowed Tristate to cancel it by sending written notice to Federal. There is no question that the Cancellation [*9]  Request evidences the cancellation of the Policy effective July 15, 2011, which was before Tristate’s December 1, 2011 loss. Accordingly, Tristate cannot maintain a breach of contract claim against Federal, and Federal is entitled to judgment on the pleadings.

However, we grant Tristate’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint because Federal suffers no prejudice as a result of Tristate filing an amended complaint. Further, even though there may have been some delay in seeking leave to amend, we cannot say that such delay was “undue.” Accordingly, Tristate is permitted to file an Amended Complaint.

An appropriate Order follows.

 

ORDER

AND NOW, this 11th day of October, 2017, upon consideration of Federal Insurance Company’s (“Federal”) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Plaintiff Tristate Antiques’ (“Tristate”) Response in Opposition/Cross-Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint, Federal’s Reply, and Tristate’s Surreply, it is hereby ORDERED that:

 

1. Federal’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. No. 13) isGRANTED. Federal is DISMISSED from this action with PREJUDICE;
2. Tristate’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 15) isGRANTED. Tristate shall [*10] file an Amended Complaint within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order; and
3. Federal’s Motion to Extend Discovery (Doc. No. 14) is DENIED as MOOT.

 

 

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Robert F. Kelly

ROBERT F. KELLY

SENIOR JUDGE

NATIONAL INDEPENDENT TRUCKERS INSURANCE COMPANY, RRG, Plaintiff, vs. WILNER MATHIEU d/b/a MATHIEU EXPRESS, et al., Defendants.

 

Case No. 8:16-cv-3081-T-27TGW

 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, TAMPA DIVISION

 

2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174238

 

 

October 19, 2017, Decided

October 20, 2017, Filed

 

 

COUNSEL:  [*1] For National Independent Truckers Insurance Company, RRG, Plaintiff: Larry I. Gramovot, LEAD ATTORNEY, Gramovot & Takacs, PL, Tallahassee, FL.

 

Wilner Mathieu, doing business as Mathieu Express, Defendant, Pro se, West Palm Beach, FL.

 

For Arisner Agenor, Defendant: Trakina L. Graham, LEAD ATTORNEY, Graham Law Group, LLC, Orlando, FL.

 

For Alene Desir, Defendant: Michael Anthony Mills, LEAD ATTORNEY, Law Offices of Michael A. Mills LLC, Orlando, FL.

 

JUDGES: JAMES D. WHITTEMORE, United States District Judge.

 

OPINION BY: JAMES D. WHITTEMORE

 

OPINION

 

ORDER

BEFORE THE COURT is National Independent Truckers Insurance Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 52), which Alene Desir and Wilner Mathieu d/b/a Mathieu Express oppose (Dkts. 54, 76).1 Upon consideration, the Motion is GRANTED.

 

1   Arisner Agenor did not respond. Wilbert Sanon was dismissed without prejudice. (Dkt. 36). Default final judgment was entered against Yvonie Agenor and Mathieu Express, LLC. (Dkts. 50, 64).

 

1. Undisputed Material Facts

The evidence in this declaratory judgment action is undisputed,2 Plaintiff issued a commercial motor vehicle insurance policy to Wilner Mathieu d/b/a. Mathieu Express (“Mathieu”) applicable for the period of November 18, 2013 to November 18, 2014. (Dkt. 66 at 5). Two drivers, Wilner Mathieu and Jean E. Moise, were reported drivers on the policy. (Dkt. 66 at 11).

 

2   Plaintiff Desir, and A. Agenor filed a Joint Stipulation to Certain Facts. (Dkt. 51).

On December 27, 2013, Wilbert Sanon, an unreported driver, [*2]  was driving a Mathieu owned tractor-trailer rig when he was involved in an automobile accident with a vehicle operated by Arisner Agenor in which Alene Desir was a passenger. (Dkt. 51 ¶ 1; Dkt. 66 at 11). At the time of the accident, Sanon was delivering a load from Kissimmee, Florida to Pompano Beach, Florida. (Dkt. 51 ¶ 2). This shipment of nonhazardous material was entirely within the State of Florida. (Dkt. 51 ¶ 2). And, on the date of the accident, Sanon did not drive a tractor-trailer assembly outside of the State of Florida. (Dkt. 51 ¶ 2). The weight of the tractor-trailer rig exceeded 10,000 pounds. (Dkt. 51 ¶ 3). And, the gross vehicle weight was 80,000 pounds. (Dkt. 66 at 9).

The policy’s Unreported Driver Coverage Endorsement provides:

 

The limit of insurance provided by this policy with respect to any accident involving an unreported driver to which this insurance applies, including any accident with an uninsured or underinsured vehicle, shall be the minimum liability insurance coverage required under the Motor Vehicle Compulsory or Financial Responsibility Laws of the State having jurisdiction with respect to the issuance of this policy or the State in which the accident [*3]  occurred if the law of that State requires that its motor vehicle Financial Responsibility Laws must be applied to the accident.

 

 

(Dkt. 68 at 3).3

 

3   The complete policy was filed in accordance with this Court’s Order. (Dkts. 63, 66-68).

 

1. Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A genuine factual dispute exists only if a reasonable fact-finder ‘could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the [non-movant] is entitled to a verdict.'” Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294, 1300 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)). A fact is material if it may affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997).

The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine disputes of material fact that should be decided at trial. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986)). If the moving party fails to demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute, the motion should be denied. Kernel Records, 694 F.3d at 1300 (citation omitted). On the other hand, “‘[i]f no reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and summary judgment will be granted.'” Lima v. Fla. Dep’t of Children & Families, 627 F. App’x 782, 785-86 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Beal v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 20 F.3d 454, 459 (11th Cir.1994)).

 

III. Discussion

Plaintiff contends that the undisputed evidence shows that Sanon was transporting nonhazardous materials [*4]  in intrastate commerce at the time of the accident. And pursuant to the Unreported Driver Coverage Endorsement, the minimum limits of insurance, $300,000, under Fla. Stat. § 627.7415 apply, rather than the minimum limits of insurance, $750,000, under 49 C.F.R. § 387.9. Rather than rebutting Plaintiff’s evidence, Desir speculates that the tractor-trailer “was engaged in foreign and interstate commerce” and therefore the minimum limits of $750,000 apply.4 Desir’s position is unsupported and does not create a genuine issue of material fact.

 

4   Mathieu adopts Des ir’s response. (Dkt. 76 at I). Additionally, Mathieu argues, without support, that Plaintiff is not authorized to do business in Florida and that the insurance policy and endorsements may not comply with Florida law. (Dkt. 68). Without more, Mathieu’s argument lacks merit.

The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 addresses financial responsibility for trucking accidents. 49 U.S.C. § 13906(a); see Nat’l Specialty Ins. Co. v. Martin-Vegue, 644 F. App’x 900, 906 (11th Cir. 2016). It applies, with exceptions, to “for-hire motor carriers operating motor vehicles transporting property in interstate or foreign commerce” and “to motor carriers operating motor vehicles transporting hazardous materials, hazardous substances, or hazardous wastes in interstate, foreign, or intrastate commerce.” 49 C.F.R. § 387.3. And, it requires motor carriers registered to engage in interstate commerce to carry a minimum amount of insurance.5 49 U.S.C. § 13906(a); Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Yeates, 584 F.3d 868, 873-74 (10th Cir. 2009); Martin-Vegue, 644 F. App’x at 906.

 

5   Compliance with the MCA minimum insurance requirements can be shown in one of three ways: (1) the MCS-90 endorsement, (2) a surety bond, or (3) self-insurance authorization from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Yeates, 584 F.3d 868, 873-74 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing 49 C.F.R. § 387.7(d)(1)-(3); see Canal Ins. Co. v. Distrib. Servs., Inc., 320 F.3d 488, 489 (4th Cir.2003)). The MCS-90 endorsement “creates a suretyship, which obligates an insurer to pay certain judgments against the insured arising from interstate commerce activities, even though the insurance contract would have otherwise excluded coverage.” Canal Ins. Co, v, Coleman, 625 F.3d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Minter v. Great Am. Ins. Co. of N, Y., 423 F.3d 460, 470 (5th Cir.2005)); see Martin-Vegue, 644 F. App’x at 907 (recognizing a majority of courts treat the MCS-90 endorsement as a suretyship). The complete policy filed by Plaintiff does not contain the MCS-90 endorsement. (Dkts. 66-68). Although Desir contends Mathieu possessed the MCS-90 endorsement (Dkt. 54 at 6), it is not part of the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Notwithstanding, the MCS-90 endorsement is immaterial.

The majority of courts considering whether the financial responsibility requirements of the MCA apply initially determine the nature of the transport “at the [*5]  time of the accident.” See Martin-Vegue, 644 F. App’x at 907 (“the relevant question is whether Freight was the for-hire motor carrier . . . at the time of the accident”); Herrod v. Wilshire Ins. Co., 499 F. App’x 753, 760 (10th Cir. 2012) (remanded to determine whether driver was acting as “for-hire” at the time of the accident); Canal Ins. Co. v. Coleman, 625 F.3d 244, 251 (5th Cir. 2010) (recognizing that the “at the time of the accident” analysis is the majority approach)6.

 

6   (citing see, e.g., Century Indem. Co. v. Carlson, 133 F.3d 591, 595 (8th Cir.1998) (agreeing with “the determination that the grain in question in this case at the time of the accident traveled in interstate commerce” (emphasis added)); Canal Ins. Co. v. J. Perchak Trucking, Inc., 3 :CV-07-2272, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28932, 2009 WL 959596, at *2 (M.D.Pa. Apr. 6, 2009) (denying summary judgment because “[c]onsideration of the important issues presented in this case should be made only in the context of a concrete determination as to whether the insured’s vehicle was involved in interstate or intrastate commerce at the time of the accident” (emphasis added)); Canal Ins. Co, v. Paul Cox Trucking, 1:05–CV-2194, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71307, 2006 WL 2828755, at *4 (M.D.Pa. Oct. 2, 2006) (holding that a federal court has jurisdiction over the question of whether truck was “engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the accident” (emphasis added)); Kolencik v. Progressive Preferred Ins. Co., 1:04–CV-3507, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24855, 2006 WL 738715, at *7 (N.D.Ga. Mar. 17, 2006) (“Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that endorsement MCS-90 plays no role in the instant accident because it involved only intrastate commerce from Cartersville, Georgia to Acworth, Georgia with no intention of the dirt ever going beyond Acworth.”); Branson v. MGA Ins. Co., 673 So.2d 89 (F1.Dist.Ct.App. I 996) (declining to apply the MCS-90 to purely intrastate transportation); Gen. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Barrentine, 829 So.2d 980, 984 (F1.Dist.Ct.App.2002) (“The issue is not whether a truck might be used for an interstate shipment in the future. That much could be said of nearly any tractor-trailer rig. Rather, the issue is whether the injury in question occurred while the truck was operating in interstate commerce.” (emphasis added)). But see, e.g., Royal Indem. Co, v. Jacobsen, 863 F.Supp. 1537, 1541 (D.Utah 1994) (“In the court’s view, Royal’s ‘trip specific’ reading of the Holdens’ ICC endorsement (or any ICC endorsement for that matter) is incorrect.”); Travelers Indent, Co. of IL v. W. Am. Specialized Transp. Servs., Inc., 235 F.Supp.2d 522, 529-30 (W.D.La.2002) (holding that the truck’s procurement or lease agreement, rather than the circumstances of the particular loss, determine the MCS-90’s application); Reliance Nat’l Ins. v. Royal Indem, Co., 99–Civ.-10920, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12901, 2001 WL 984737, at *4-7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2001) (same)).

Rather than disputing the nature of the transport at the time of the accident, Desir conclusively argues that the MCA applies because the “rig was intended to travel outside of Florida and possessed the necessary, federally mandated insurance minimums to conduct such interstate business.” (Dkt. 54 at 3). Desir fails to point to any evidence to support her position.7 It is undisputed that at the time of the accident, Sanon was transporting nonhazardous property in intrastate commerce. (Dkt. 51 at 3). Therefore, the financial responsibility requirements of the [*6]  MCA do not apply. See Martin-Vegue, 644 F. App’x at 907; Herrod, 499 F. App’x at 760; Canal, 625 F.3d at 249.

 

7   Indeed, Desir’s contention is the minority approach. See Coleman, 625 F.3d at 251.

The Unreported Driver Coverage Endorsement provides that the limit of insurance for accidents involving an unreported driver “shall be the minimum liability insurance coverage required under the Motor Vehicle Compulsory or Financial Responsibility Laws of the State having jurisdiction with respect to the issuance of this policy or the State in which the accident occurred if the law of that State requires that its motor vehicle Financial Responsibility Laws must be applied to the accident.”8 (Dkt. 68 at 3) (emphasis added). The plain, unambiguous meaning of the Unreported Driver Coverage Endorsement is that Florida’s financial responsibility laws applies. See Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 913 So. 2d 528, 532 (Fla. 2005) (unambiguous insurance contracts construed according to their plain meaning).

 

8   The parties’ dispute is limited to whether federal regulations or Florida law applies.

Under Fla. Stat. § 627.7415(3), the minimum level of combined bodily liability insurance and property damage liability insurance for a commercial vehicle with a gross vehicle weight of 44,000 pounds or more is $300,000. Therefore, because Sanon was an unreported driver on the policy and the Wilner owned tractor-trailer’s gross vehicle weight was 80,000 pounds, the minimum level of combined bodily liability insurance and property damage liability [*7]  insurance available under the policy for the accident on December 27, 2013 is $300,000. Fla. Stat. § 627.7415(3); Taurus Holdings, 913 So. 2d at 532.

Accordingly, National Independent Truckers Insurance Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to ENTER FINAL JUDGMENT in favor of Plaintiff and CLOSE the file.

DONE AND ORDERED this 19th day of October, 2017.

/s/ James D. Whittemore

JAMES D. WHITTEMORE

United States District Judge