STATE AUTO PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRUMIT SERVICES, INC., AN ILLINOIS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

Counsel: For STATE AUTO PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff – Appellant: Robert M. Chemers, Attorney, PRETZEL & STOUFFER, CHARTERED, Chicago, IL.

For BRUMIT SERVICES, INC., an Illinois corporation, CARL E. BRUMIT, JR., Defendants – Appellees: Stephen C. Buser, Attorney, LAW OFFICES OF STEPHEN C. BUSER, Columbia, IL.

For DELORES M. MENARD, ALLEN W. MENARD, Defendants – Appellees: Tom D. Adams, Attorney, ADAMS AND HUETSCH, Columbia, IL.

Judges: Before FLAUM, RIPPLE, and MANION, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by: MANION

Opinion

 

 

MANION, Circuit Judge. In this insurance dispute, insurer State Auto Property and Casualty Insurance Company seeks a declaratory judgment that it has no duty to defend insured Brumit Services, Inc., because the latter failed to provide prompt notice of an accident that eventually led to a lawsuit. The district court concluded that the insured’s 21-month delay in notifying the insurer was reasonable and awarded judgment to the insured. We disagree. Brumit’s failure to provide prompt notice of the accident was inexcusable under Illinois law. Therefore, we reverse [*2]  the judgment of the district court.

 

1. Background

Carl Brumit owns Brumit Services, Inc., a small business that performs residential concrete construction work. The company has two employees and operates out of Brumit’s home. On behalf of the company, Brumit purchased a Business Auto Liability insurance policy from State Auto to cover the truck he used for the business.1 Like most auto insurance policies, Brumit’s policy provided that State Auto would defend and indemnify Brumit in the event he was sued for an accident causing bodily injury or property damage. However, State Auto had “no duty to provide coverage” unless Brumit complied with his duties under the policy, one of which was that Brumit “must give [State Auto] prompt notice of the ‘accident’ or ‘loss.'”

On September 6, 2013, Brumit was in the parking lot of a Phillips 66 gas station in Columbia, Illinois, with the covered truck. When he backed out of his parking space, he unwittingly struck 68-year-old Delores Menard with the truck’s tailgate. Menard fell and suffered scrape wounds on her elbow and knee. She was treated by an EMT and declined a trip to the hospital, instead choosing to drive herself home. For his part, Brumit [*3]  was unaware that he had hit Menard until a bystander alerted him as he was driving away. He then came back to the scene, called for an ambulance, and provided the police officer at the scene with a statement. He observed that Menard was sitting down and “may have had a scratch on her knee.”

After everyone parted ways, Brumit thought the incident so minor that he was not required to report it to State Auto. But on June 22, 2015, he was served with a lawsuit in Illinois state court in connection with the accident. Menard alleged in the state court complaint that the accident caused her to “sustain severe, permanent and permanently disabling injury; including injuries to her back and spine and the soft tissue structures thereof.” She sought damages in excess of $50,000. Her husband also sued Brumit, alleging, among other things, loss of consortium.

The next day, Brumit notified State Auto that he had been sued. State Auto then sought a declaratory judgment in the district court that it had no duty to defend Brumit in the lawsuit because Brumit had breached the policy’s notice requirement. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment; the district court granted Brumit’s motion and [*4]  denied State Auto’s. State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brumit Servs., Inc., 245 F. Supp. 3d 1048 (S.D. Ill. 2017). The court concluded that Brumit’s 21-month delay in notifying State Auto about the accident was reasonable as a matter of law. This appeal followed.

 

1. Analysis

 

1. Standard of Review and Governing Law

HN1[] This case comes to us on cross-motions for summary judgment with no disputed facts, so we review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo. “Where facts are not disputed, if a district court grants one party-s motion for summary judgment and denies the other party-s cross-motion, this court can reverse and award summary judgment to the losing party below.” Glass v. Dachel, 2 F.3d 733, 739 (7th Cir. 1993). The parties agree that Illinois law applies. Our job is to apply Illinois law to the undisputed facts of this case.

 

1. Overview of Applicable Law

HN2[] “In construing an insurance policy, we must ascertain and give effect to the intentions of the parties, as expressed in the policy language.” West Am. Ins. Co. v. Yorkville Nat’l Bank, 238 Ill. 2d 177, 939 N.E.2d 288, 293, 345 Ill. Dec. 445 (Ill. 2010). “Unambiguous words in the policy are to be given their plain, ordinary, and popular meaning.” Id. By contrast, ambiguous terms should be construed liberally in favor of coverage. Id. In short, Illinois courts construe insurance policies just like other contracts; the rule suggesting that courts should construe ambiguous provisions [*5]  in favor of coverage is analogous to the general canon that a contract ought to be construed against the party that drafted it.

The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly held that notice provisions in insurance policies are reasonable. As the court explained in Barrington Consolidated High School v. American Insurance Co., 58 Ill. 2d 278, 319 N.E.2d 25, 27 (Ill. 1974), HN3[] “[a] provision in an insurance liability policy requiring an insured to give the insurer notice of an accident is a reasonable policy requirement, one which affords the insurer an opportunity to make a timely and thorough investigation and to gather and preserve possible evidence.” These “are not merely technical requirements but are conditions precedent to an insurer’s contractual duties.” Farmers Auto Ins. Ass’n v. Burton, 2012 IL App (4th) 110289, 967 N.E.2d 329, 333, 359 Ill. Dec. 599 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). Therefore, as the policy in this case provides, breach of a notice requirement absolves the insurance company of any obligation to defend or indemnify the insured. Id. at 334 (citing Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Livorsi Marine, Inc., 222 Ill. 2d 303, 856 N.E.2d 338, 343, 305 Ill. Dec. 533 (Ill. 2006)).

HN4[] When a notice provision becomes the subject of a dispute, Illinois courts have read such provisions as requirements that the insured provide notice within a reasonable time. See id. (citing Yorkville, 939 N.E.2d at 293-94). The Illinois Supreme Court considers five factors in assessing the reasonableness of a delay in giving notice: “(1) the specific language of the policy’s notice provision; (2) [*6]  the insured’s sophistication in commerce and insurance matters; (3) the insured’s awareness of an event that may trigger insurance coverage; (4) the insured’s diligence in ascertaining whether policy coverage is available; and (5) prejudice to the insurer.” Yorkville, 939 N.E.2d at 293-94. No one factor trumps the others in this totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. See Livorsi Marine, 856 N.E.2d at 346 (explaining that an insurer need not be prejudiced in order to insist on reasonable notice of an accident).

 

1. Application of the Yorkville Factors

The district court held that each Yorkville factor weighed in favor of Brumit’s position that his 21-month delay in notifying State Auto was reasonable. We disagree. Instead, we conclude that each factor tilts in favor of the unreasonableness of the delay. We discuss each factor in turn.

 

1. Policy Language

We begin with the language of the policy. Its terms are unmistakably clear: State Auto will have “no duty” to defend an insured unless the insured provided “prompt notice” of the accident at issue, and the insured “must” report any accident. The notice provision is “couched in mandatory terms.” Am. Standard Ins. Co. of Wis. v. Slifer, 395 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 919 N.E.2d 372, 377, 335 Ill. Dec. 653 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); see also Andrews v. Foxworthy, 71 Ill. 2d 13, 373 N.E.2d 1332, 1335, 15 Ill. Dec. 648 (Ill. 1978) (“The use of the words ‘shall’ or ‘must’ is generally regarded as mandatory.”). Because nobody [*7]  can dispute that an accident occurred when Brumit backed his truck into Menard, the mandatory language in the policy imposed “a contractual obligation to promptly report” the accident. Slifer, 919 N.E.2d at 377.

Despite the unambiguous language, the district court concluded that it wouldn’t make sense for State Auto to want to know about “each and every accident its insureds are involved in,” because its “phones would never stop ringing.” State Auto, 245 F. Supp. 3d at 1057. It cited the Illinois Supreme Court’s recognition that “[i]t cannot be plausibly said that by the notice provision the insurer intended that every occurrence or accident had to be reported to it.” Barrington Consol. High Sch., 319 N.E.2d at 28. However, the district court took that statement out of context; the Illinois Supreme Court was referring to the distinction between accidents covered by the policy and those not covered. See id. (the provision “obviously refers to an occurrence or accident covered by the policy”). Of course, the insurance company wouldn’t want to know about an accident if “there was no ground for … a reasonable person to believe that a claim under the policy would be made.” Id. But where such a ground does exist, the insured has a duty to report the accident. It is not our job to determine how [*8]  many phone calls an insurance company is equipped to receive.

Here, any reasonable driver would recognize that the accident might lead to a claim. Although everyone at the scene on the day of the accident apparently viewed it as minor, it is fairly common for individuals involved in automobile accidents to experience injuries that don’t manifest themselves until days, weeks, or even months after the accident. Brumit even testified that he was aware such latent injuries might arise, indicating that he knew Menard might later claim to be injured as a result of the accident. Even more directly, every reasonable driver should know that making contact with a person could plausibly lead to an insurance claim or a lawsuit, especially when the contact causes the person to fall down. Striking a person is much different from bumping into a curb, grocery cart, or door. State Auto, 245 F. Supp. 3d at 1057. Because a reasonable person would have known that a claim might be filed after the accident, Brumit cannot avoid the mandatory policy language. This factor weighs strongly in State Auto’s favor.

 

2. Brumit’s Sophistication

The second factor is Brumit’s sophistication in matters of commerce and insurance. The district court held that [*9]  Brumit “falls somewhere on the unsophisticated end of the spectrum.” Id. at 1059. Again, we disagree. Brumit is a high school graduate who has taken two years of college courses and had about eight years of experience working elsewhere when he started his own business. When the accident occurred, he had operated the business for four years and provided income for two employees. He had also purchased several insurance policies for himself, his home, and his business, and over several years surely had to renew those policies. His company also participates in workers’ compensation insurance. A person in his position should be expected to possess a better-than-average understanding of commerce and insurance. Surely it is safe to say that Brumit is probably more sophisticated than a majority of insured drivers on Illinois roads.

Moreover, for the purposes of sophistication, Illinois courts have distinguished automobile insurance policies from other types of insurance, such as homeowners’ insurance. In Farmers Auto Insurance Association v. Hamilton, 31 Ill. App. 3d 730, 335 N.E.2d 178, 181 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975), aff’d 64 Ill. 2d 138, 355 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1976), the appellate court explained that while a typical homeowner might not understand that he’s covered by a homeowners’ policy when he shoots someone on his property, that would not be the case [*10]  for “an automobile accident covered by a typical insurance policy.” Rather, “[t]he law is clear on the question of notice under the average automobile liability insurance.” Id. In short, it doesn’t take much expertise to interpret a basic automobile insurance policy, while a homeowners’ policy “requires some study as to its various provisions.” Id. Illinois law expects someone of Brumit’s intelligence and competence to understand his rights and obligations under a basic automobile insurance policy.

The cases cited in opposition are all distinguishable on the ground that they involved either insureds far less sophisticated than Brumit or policies more complex than an automobile insurance policy. For example, the insured in Grasso v. Mid-Century Insurance Co., 181 Ill. App. 3d 286, 536 N.E.2d 977, 980, 129 Ill. Dec. 927 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989), was a nineteen-year-old who had never purchased her own insurance policy, while the policy in Berglind v. Paintball Business Association, 402 Ill. App. 3d 76, 930 N.E.2d 1036, 1039, 1045, 341 Ill. Dec. 522 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010), was a commercial general liability policy, and the one in Long v. Great Central Insurance Co., 190 Ill. App. 3d 159, 546 N.E.2d 739, 741, 137 Ill. Dec. 794 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989), was a dram shop liability policy. No Illinois case has held that a person with Brumit’s background was too unsophisticated as a matter of law to understand a basic automobile insurance policy.

The approach taken by the district court and advocated in this court by Brumit and Menard would render most people in Illinois [*11]  unsophisticated as a matter of law. Only corporations, attorneys, and insurance agents would likely qualify as sophisticated insureds under this approach, leaving insurance companies to wonder whether the provisions of their policies will be enforced against the vast majority of Illinois residents. See State Auto, 245 F. Supp. 3d at 1058. This is not only untenable as a matter of law, but it is contrary to the Illinois Supreme Court’s repeated holdings that notice provisions in insurance policies are reasonable. We cannot endorse it. Therefore, we conclude that the second factor weighs in favor of State Auto.

 

3. Awareness of Possible Claim

The third factor we consider is Brumit’s awareness that a claim might be filed. Here, the district court reasoned that “the incident was trivial, resulted in no apparent harm, and furnished no reasonable ground for Brumit to believe that a claim might arise, particularly given his lack of sophistication in insurance matters.” State Auto, 245 F. Supp. 3d at 1060. However, we have already concluded that Brumit was sophisticated enough to understand that a claim might follow after he knocked a woman to the ground with his truck. No matter how minor the incident appeared to be at the time, a reasonable driver would understand [*12]  that a claim might be filed against him in such a situation. What is more, even though Brumit knew about latent injuries, he never tried to contact Menard for any assurances that she would not file a claim or lawsuit. Cf. Brotherhood Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roseth, 177 Ill. App. 3d 443, 532 N.E.2d 354, 358, 126 Ill. Dec. 669 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (late notice to insurer was excused in part because “the very nature of the relationship” between the insured and the accident victim “and their continued contact” meant that “there was no reason to put them on notice” of a possible claim). Simply put, there was no reason for Brumit to be so sure that no claim would be filed.

Cases such as Berglind and  National Bank of Bloomington v. Winstead Excavating of Bloomington, 94 Ill. App. 3d 839, 419 N.E.2d 522, 524, 50 Ill. Dec. 414 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981), do not require a different result. In Berglind, the appellate court held that the insured, a high school dropout who had taken over his girlfriend’s paintball business, had a reasonable belief that a claim would not be filed after a child was struck in the eye by a paintball. The court explained that “in [the insured’s] unsophisticated mind, he thought [the child] had no injury after his eye was washed out,” as he was “sitting calmly” and “everything looked great.” Berglind, 930 N.E.2d at 1045-46. But Brumit was far more sophisticated than the insured in Berglind,2 our case involves an easier-to-understand auto policy rather than a commercial general liability [*13]  policy, and, as we have emphasized, Brumit knew that latent injuries were a possibility. National Bank of Bloomington is even further afield, as in that case the insured was merely pulling onto a highway when a truck driving too fast behind him flipped over and landed in the median. Not having made any contact with the truck, or having any involvement in the accident at all, the insured had no reason to believe that a claim might be filed against him. Nat’l Bank of Bloomington, 419 N.E.2d at 524-25. Brumit of course knew that he was the cause of the minor injuries Menard sustained at the scene, so he had no excuse not to notify State Auto that a claim might be forthcoming.

The upshot is that “[a]n insured cannot simply roll the dice with the insurer’s funds, hiding behind the statistical probabilities it has assigned to the case outcome.” Kerr v. Ill. Cent. Ry. Co., 283 Ill. App. 3d 574, 670 N.E.2d 759, 768, 219 Ill. Dec. 81 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). “[T]he burden to an insured to give notice is slight, whereas the repercussions felt by an insurer due to late notice can be substantial.” Id. Brumit’s own calculations—that the accident was minor and Menard was okay—are not a sufficient excuse to leave his insurer in the dark about the accident. Had it received timely notice, State Auto would have been in a far better position than Brumit to [*14]  determine the possibility that a claim or suit would be filed. Therefore, we weigh this factor in favor of State Auto.

 

4. Brumit’s Diligence

The fourth Yorkville factor is Brumit’s diligence in ascertaining whether the accident would be covered. Here, we strongly disagree with the district court’s conclusion that “[t]here is very little [Brumit] could have done to be more diligent.” State Auto, 245 F. Supp. 3d at 1061. On the contrary, the undisputed facts reveal that Brumit did nothing other than glance at his policy during the 21 months after he hit Menard. He did not call anyone to try to determine whether a claim might be filed against him. Instead, he relied upon his own assumptions that Menard was not badly injured to determine that he wouldn’t have to notify State Auto. But of course, “an insured’s subjective beliefs must give way to an objective standard of reasonableness based on all the circumstances.” Kerr, 670 N.E.2d at 768. A reasonable driver would have at least called his insurance agent to determine whether the accident should have been reported. Because Brumit failed to do even that, we conclude he was not diligent and weigh this factor in favor of State Auto.

 

5. Prejudice to State Auto

The final factor we consider is to what extent [*15]  Brumit’s delay prejudiced State Auto.3 Brumit says early notification would have made no difference, because the evidence would not have been any different if he had called State Auto the day after the accident. But that is not necessarily true. As the Illinois Supreme Court explained, a notice provision “affords the insurer an opportunity to make a timely and thorough investigation and to gather and preserve possible evidence.” Barrington Consol. High Sch., 319 N.E.2d at 27. This case involves latent injury and the potential interaction between the accident and a pre-existing medical condition, so early notification would have given State Auto the opportunity to do its own investigation into Menard’s injuries. Perhaps State Auto could have gathered medical evidence that would help it defend against a claim that the accident caused the severe injuries alleged in the state court complaint. Because of Brumit’s failure to comply with the notice provision, we will never know. That is the problem.

Moreover, compliance with the notice provision would have allowed State Auto to contact Menard to determine her willingness to settle. While Menard claimed at her deposition that she would not have settled, that might not have been the case [*16]  had she been contacted by a State Auto representative in the weeks after the accident. As the Illinois appellate court put it, “[p]erhaps settlement would have been discouraged, and perhaps not. In our view, having the right to so act is part of the benefit of the prompt-notice provision.” Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Blackburn, 208 Ill. App. 3d 281, 566 N.E.2d 889, 896, 153 Ill. Dec. 39 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). Brumit’s breach exposed State Auto to significant uncertainty and deprived it of the benefit it expected to receive from the notice provision. Therefore, we hold that State Auto was prejudiced and weigh this factor in its favor.

 

6. Summation of the Yorkville Factors

We conclude that each of the factors for consideration under Illinois law weighs in favor of a finding that Brumit’s 21-month delay was unreasonable as a matter of law. Brumit breached a mandatory notice provision without a reasonable excuse. As a small-business owner with two years of college and multiple insurance policies, he was sophisticated enough to understand that striking a person with his truck might lead to an insurance claim or a lawsuit. But instead of notifying State Auto, he relied on his own assumptions that turned out to be wrong. In doing so, he deprived State Auto of the opportunity to do its own investigation into the accident [*17]  and the source of Menard’s injuries. That mistake means he cannot now rely on State Auto’s defense in Menard’s lawsuit.

 

III. Conclusion

Insurance policies are contracts like any other. The job of a court when presented with a contractual dispute is to determine the rights and responsibilities of the parties under the contract. In this case, it was Brumit’s responsibility to notify State Auto that he had been in an accident that might lead to a claim. He failed to do so, and his failure was inexcusable under Illinois law. Therefore, under the terms of the contract, State Auto has no duty to defend or indemnify Brumit in the personal injury suit arising out of the accident. State Auto is entitled to declaratory relief to that effect.

REVERSED

SHARPE et al. v. GREAT MIDWEST INSURANCE COMPANY et al.

Judges:  [*1] DILLARD, Chief Judge. Self, J., concurs and Ray, J., concurs in judgment only as to division 3 and otherwise fully.

Opinion by: DILLARD

Opinion

 

 

DILLARD, Chief Judge.

In this civil action, Harold and Judy Sharpe sued Phillip Gray, alleging that, while driving a vehicle owned by his employer, Harold suffered injuries when Gray’s vehicle collided with his vehicle. Later, the Sharpes sought uninsured motorist coverage and, thus, served their complaint on their own automobile insurance carrier, Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (“Georgia Farm Bureau”), as well as Harold’s employer’s carrier, Great Midwest Insurance Company (“GMIC”). Thereafter, GMIC filed a motion to dismiss, both insurers filed motions for summary judgment, and the trial court granted all three motions. On appeal, the Sharpes contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to both insurers on the ground that they failed to timely notify them of the accident and in granting GMIC’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the Sharpes failed to properly serve it with process. For the reasons set forth infra, we affirm.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Sharpes (i.e., the nonmoving parties),1 the record shows that in [*2]  the early evening of December 3, 2013, Harold—a superintendent with McLendon Enterprises—was traveling in his company-owned truck just outside of Statesboro. While stopped at an intersection waiting for the traffic signal to change, Harold peered into his rearview mirror, saw another vehicle approaching, and quickly realized that it was traveling too fast to stop before hitting him. Seconds later, the approaching vehicle, driven by Gray, collided into the rear of Harold’s truck, pushing the truck into the rear of another vehicle that was also idling at the intersection. As a result of the accident, Harold suffered an injury to his neck.

At the time of the accident, the Sharpes maintained two automobile insurance policies with Georgia Farm Bureau, both of which provided uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. Additionally, and also at the time of the accident, Harold’s employer maintained an insurance policy on Harold’s work truck with GMIC, which provided coverage for employees using the vehicle. This policy similarly provided uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage.

On March 9, 2015, the Sharpes filed suit against Gray, alleging that his negligence caused the automobile [*3]  collision that lead to Harold’s injuries. Shortly thereafter, based on their belief that Gray was either uninsured or underinsured, the Sharpes served Georgia Farm Bureau, as their alleged uninsured/underinsured motorist carrier, with a copy of the complaint and summons. On April 3, 2015, the Sharpes also served GMIC, as notice to McLendon’s uninsured/underinsured motorist carrier, with a copy of the complaint. Georgia Farm Bureau filed an answer, but GMIC initially did not. Following a brief discovery period, in which both of the Sharpes were deposed, Georgia Farm Bureau filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it had no duty to provide coverage because the Sharpes failed to comply with their policies’ requirement to provide notice of an accident within 90 days of its occurrence. The Sharpes filed a response, but on November 12, 2015, the trial court granted Georgia Farm Bureau’s motion.

The case proceeded, and on the day of the pretrial conference, March 8, 2016, GMIC filed an answer and a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Sharpes had failed to adequately serve GMIC with process. The Sharpes filed a response, arguing that GMIC had been properly served. Then, on May 17, [*4]  2016, while its motion to dismiss was still pending, GMIC filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing similarly to Georgia Farm Bureau that the Sharpes failed to provide timely notice of the accident as required by McLendon’s policy with GMIC. Less than one week later, the trial court granted GMIC’s motion to dismiss and thereby dismissed GMIC from the case without prejudice. A few days later, the Sharpes served GMIC with a summons, specifically naming the insurer, and thereafter, they filed a response to GMIC’s motion for summary judgment. But on October 14, 2016, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of GMIC. This appeal follows.

It is well established that HN1[] summary judgment is proper if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”2 If summary judgment is granted, it enjoys no presumption of correctness on appeal, and an appellate court must satisfy itself that the requirements of OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) have been satisfied.3 In conducting this de novo review, we are charged with “viewing the [*5]  evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.”4 Furthermore, HN2[] as for motions to dismiss for insufficient service, a trial court’s ruling will be upheld on appeal “absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.”5 Of course, when an appeal from the grant of a motion to dismiss presents a question of law, we review the trial court’s decision de novo.6 With these guiding principles in mind, we turn now to the Sharpes’ specific claims of error.

1. The Sharpes contend that the trial court erred in granting GMIC’s motion to dismiss on the ground that the Sharpes failed to properly serve it with process pursuant to OCGA § 33-7-11 (d). We disagree.

Tasked with interpreting statutory language, we necessarily begin our analysis with “familiar and binding canons of construction.”7 Indeed, HN3[] in considering the meaning of a statute, our charge as an appellate court is to “presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.”8 And toward that end, we must afford the statutory text its plain and ordinary meaning,9 consider the text contextually,10 read the text “in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary [*6]  speaker of the English language would,”11 and seek to “avoid a construction that makes some language mere surplusage.”12 In summary, when the language of a statute is “plain and susceptible of only one natural and reasonable construction, courts must construe the statute accordingly.”13

Turning to the statute at issue, OCGA § 33-7-11 (d), in part, provides:

In cases where the owner or operator of any vehicle causing injury or damages is known, and either or both are named as defendants in any action for such injury or damages, and a reasonable belief exists that the vehicle is an uninsured motor vehicle under subparagraph (b) (1) (D) of this Code section, a copy of the action and all pleadings thereto shall be served as prescribed by law upon the insurance company issuing the policy as though the insurance company were actually named as a party defendant. … In any case arising under this Code section where service upon an insurance company is prescribed, the clerk of the court in which the action is brought shall have such service accomplished by issuing a duplicate original copy for the sheriff or marshal to place his or her return [*7]  of service in the same form and manner as prescribed by law for a party defendant.14

The manner in which a party defendant is to be served is governed by OCGA § 9-11-4 of the Civil Practice Act. HN4[] Under OCGA § 9-11-4 (a), “[u]pon the filing of the complaint, the clerk shall forthwith issue a summons and deliver it for service,” and “[u]pon request of the plaintiff, separate or additional summons shall issue against any defendants.” In addition, under OCGA § 9-11-4 (b), “[t]he summons shall be signed by the clerk; contain the name of the court and county and the names of the parties; [and] be directed to the defendant. …”15 Furthermore, OCGA § 9-11-4 (e) (1) (A) provides:

Except for cases in which the defendant has waived service, the summons and complaint shall be served together. The plaintiff shall furnish the clerk of the court with such copies as are necessary. Service shall be made by delivering a copy of the summons attached to a copy of the complaint as follows … If the action is against a corporation incorporated or domesticated under the laws of this state or a foreign corporation authorized to transact business in this state, to the president or other officer of such corporation or foreign corporation, a managing agent thereof, or a registered agent thereof, provided that when [*8]  for any reason service cannot be had in such manner, the Secretary of State shall be an agent of such corporation or foreign corporation upon whom any process, notice, or demand may be served.16

In this matter, as previously noted, the Sharpes initially served GMIC with a copy of the complaint as notice to McLendon’s uninsured/underinsured motorist carrier on April 3, 2015. But at that time, their attempt to serve GMIC did not include a summons, much less a summons directed to GMIC. And HN5[] under OCGA § 9-11-4, “[p]roper service of summons is necessary for the court to obtain jurisdiction over a defendant.”17 Given these particular circumstances, GA(1)[] (1) the Sharpes failed to serve GMIC as though the insurance company were actually named as a party defendant as required by a plain reading of OCGA § 33-7-11 (d).18 Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting GMIC’s motion to dismiss.

2. The Sharpes contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Georgia Farm Bureau on the ground that the Sharpes failed to timely notify Georgia Farm Bureau of the accident as required by a provision in their policies. Again, we disagree.

It is well established HN6[] in Georgia that insurance contracts are “governed [*9]  by the rules of construction applicable to other contracts, and words in the policy must be given their usual and common signification and customary meaning.”19 It is similarly well established that the hallmark of contract construction is to “ascertain the intention of the parties, as set out in the language of the contract.”20 And when the language of an insurance policy defining the extent of an insurer’s liability is “unambiguous and capable of but one reasonable construction, the courts must expound the contract as made by the parties.”21 Importantly, the proper construction of a contract, and whether the contract is ambiguous, are “questions of law for the court to decide.”22

In this matter, both of the Sharpes’ personal automobile insurance policies with Georgia Farm Bureau included uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage. Additionally, both policies also included a section titled “PART F — DUTIES AFTER AN ACCIDENT OR LOSS,” which provided:

We have no duty to provide coverage under this policy unless there has been full compliance with the following duties:

1. We must be notified promptly when the insured becomes aware that a loss has occurred, but in no event later [*10]  than 90 days from the date the accident or loss becomes known by the insured, of how, when and where the accident or loss happened. Notice should also include the names and addresses of any injured persons and of any witnesses.

Here, the accident occurred on December 3, 2013, and Harold testified that his neck began hurting immediately after the collision. But as Harold also testified, the Sharpes did not notify Georgia Farm Bureau about the accident until approximately six months after it occurred, which was well beyond the policies’ requirement that notification be provided within 90 days. Thus, the Sharpes failed to comply with their policies’ clear condition precedent to coverage, and “[i]t is well established that a notice provision expressly made a condition precedent to coverage is valid and must be complied with, absent a showing of justification.”23

Nevertheless, the Sharpes argue that their delay in notifying Georgia Farm Bureau was, in fact, justified, claiming that because Harold was driving a truck owned by his employer at the time of the accident, they did not realize they needed to notify their own automobile insurance carrier. This excuse is a nonstarter. Although it is [*11]  correct that “questions of the sufficiency of the excuse offered, and the diligence in giving the notice are generally questions of fact, to be determined by the jury, according to the nature and circumstances of each individual case,”24 HN7[] an unexcused significant delay in notifying an insurer about an incident or lawsuit “may be unreasonable as a matter of law.”25 And in this case, any claim that the Sharpes were unaware that they might need to utilize their UM coverage “until some point after the accident occurred provides no excuse.”26 Indeed, the law requires “more than just ignorance, or even misplaced confidence, to avoid the terms of a valid contract.”27 Accordingly, GA(2)[] (2) the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Georgia Farm Bureau on the ground that the Sharpes failed to timely notify it of the accident as required by the policies.

3. Finally, the Sharpes similarly contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of GMIC on the ground that the Sharpes failed to timely notify it of the accident as required by its policy insuring Harold’s employer’s truck. Once again, we disagree.

The GMIC policy at issue included a section titled [*12]  “Duties In The Event Of Accident, Claim, Suit Or Loss.” That section in part provided:

We have no duty to provide coverage under this policy unless there has been full compliance with the following duties:

1. In the event of “accident”; claim, “suit” or “loss”, you must give us or our authorized representative prompt notice of the “accident” or “loss”. Include:

(1) How, when and where the “accident” or “loss” occurred;

(2) The “insured’s” name and address; and

(3) To the extent possible, the names and addresses of any injured persons and witnesses.

The language in this section was slightly modified by an Endorsement of Georgia Changes, which provided:

Paragraph 2.a. of Duties In the Event Of Accident, Claim, Suit or Loss is replaced by the following:

1. In the event of “accident”; claim, “suit” or “loss”, we or our representative must receive prompt notice of the “accident” or “loss”. Include:

(1) How, when and where the “accident” or “loss” occurred;

(2) The “insured’s” name and address; and

(3) To the extent possible, the names and addresses of any injured persons and witnesses.

The requirement for giving notice of a claim, if not satisfied by the “insured” within 30 days of the date of the [*13]  “accident”, may be satisfied by an injured third party who, as the result of such “accident”, has a claim against the “insured”. However, in this event, notice of a claim given by an injured third party must be mailed to us.

Here, the Sharpes provided notice to GMIC about the accident, at the earliest, in March, 2015—essentially at the same time they filed their lawsuit and approximately one year and three months after the accident occurred. But the GMIC policy required that notice of an accident be “prompt,” which means “[c]haracterized by readiness or quickness; done, performed, etc. at once, at the moment, or on the spot.”28 And in this matter, we conclude that the Sharpes’ 15-month delay in informing GMIC of the accident did not amount to “prompt” notice under the terms of the GMIC policy as a matter of law.29

Nevertheless, as they similarly argued with regard to Georgia Farm Bureau’s motion for summary judgment, the Sharpes maintain that their delay in notifying GMIC was justified because they were not the named insured on the policy for Harold’s employer’s truck and, thus, were not aware that such notice was required. Although it is true that Harold’s [*14]  employer was the named insured on the policy, the policy explicitly provided, in the section titled “Who Is An Insured,” that: “The following are ‘insureds’: … Anyone else while using with your permission a covered ‘auto’ you own, hire or borrow. …” And there is no evidence, indeed, not even an assertion, that the Sharpes’ “ignorance of the terms of the subject insurance policy was due to any fraud or overreaching on the part of [GMIC] or its agents.”30 Moreover, as previously explained, “[t]he law requires more than just ignorance, or even misplaced confidence, to avoid the terms of a valid contract.”31 Given these particular circumstances, the Sharpes’ delay in providing GMIC with notice of the accident is without excuse.32 Accordingly, GA(3)[] (3) the trial court did not err in granting GMIC’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that the Sharpes failed to timely notify it of the accident as required by the policy insuring Harold’s employer’s truck.

For all these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order granting GMIC’s motion to dismiss and its orders granting Georgia Farm Bureau and GMIC’s motions for summary judgment.

Judgment affirmed. Self, J., concurs and Ray, J., concurs [*15]  in judgment only as to division 3 and otherwise fully. DIVISION 3 OF THIS OPINION IS PHYSICAL PRECEDENT ONLY. COURT OF APPEALS RULE 33.2 (a).