2018 WL 6182693

United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia.
EDWARD EUGENE HARRIS, Plaintiff,
v.
THE KENAN ADVANTAGE GROUP, INC., et al., Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:18-cv-01264
|
Filed 11/27/2018

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
THOMAS E. JONHSTON, CHIEF JUDGE
*1 Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Allegations of Punitive Damages and Reckless Conduct Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 6.) For the reasons discussed herein, the Court DENIES the motion. (ECF No. 6.)

I. BACKGROUND
This case arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on November 4, 2015, in Parkersburg, West Virginia, between Plaintiff Edward Harris (“Harris”) and Defendant Charles Smith (“Smith”). (See ECF No. 1-1 at 3–4, ¶¶ 9–11.) Harris alleges that he was the front-seat passenger in a vehicle that was proceeding through the intersection of Pike Street and the Interstate 77 exit ramp when a tractor-trailer driven by Smith drove through a red light and struck the vehicle. (Id. at 4, ¶¶ 10–12.) Harris further alleges that Defendant Transport Service, LLC (“Transport”), Defendant The Kenan Advantage Group, Inc. (“KAG”), and/or Defendant Valden Transport, Inc. (“Valden”) were the authorized motor carriers for the load being hauled by Smith and that Smith was acting within the scope of his employment with the above Defendants at the time of the accident. (See id. ¶¶ 13–15.)

On July 2, 2018, Harris filed the present action in the Circuit Court of Wood County, West Virginia. (See id. at 1.) In his Complaint, Harris alleges Negligence/Recklessness/Vicarious Liability against KAG, Transport, and Valden (Count I) and Prima Facie Negligence against Smith (Count II). (See ECF No. 1-1 at 2–5.) Harris further requests punitive damages, “to the extent that the conduct of any or all of the Defendants warrant such damages.” (Id. at 6.)

Defendants subsequently removed the case to this Court on August 28, 2018, invoking the Court’s diversity jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1.) On August 29, 2018, Defendants filed the present motion to dismiss Harris’s allegations of punitive damages and reckless conduct. (ECF No. 6.) Harris timely responded to the motion, (ECF No. 8), and Defendants timely replied. (ECF No. 9.) As such, the motion is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.

II. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007). The rule requires the plaintiff to allege sufficient facts, which, if proven, would entitle him to relief under a cognizable legal claim. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554–55 (2007). “Consequently, this Court will only dismiss Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages if ‘it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [his] claim which would entitle [him] to relief.’ ” Graham v. A.T.S. Specialized, Inc., No. 5:06-cv-00243, 2007 WL 148999, at *1 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 17, 2007) (quoting Byrd v. Gate Petroleum Co., 845 F.2d 86, 87 (4th Cir. 1988)).

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint, and the factual allegations must be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Randall v. United States, 30 F.3d 518, 522 (4th Cir. 1994). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[,]” and if a plaintiff does not “nudge” his claim “across the line from conceivable to plausible[,]” then the complaint should be dismissed. Id. at 555, 570. “Conclusory allegations in a complaint, if they stand alone, are a danger sign that the plaintiff is engaged in a fishing expedition.” Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int’l Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 325 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing DM Research v. Coll. of Am. Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir. 1999)).

III. DISCUSSION
*2 In their motion to dismiss, Defendants argue that Harris has not stated a plausible claim for recklessness and, thus, Harris cannot state a plausible claim for punitive damages. (See ECF No. 7 at 4.) Specifically, Defendants assert that Harris’s allegation that Smith “recklessly drove his tractor-trailer through the red traffic control signal” is a legal conclusion that is not sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. (See id. at 5.) Harris, however, argues that he has alleged sufficient facts to state a plausible claim that Smith acted recklessly and, thus, he has stated a plausible claim for punitive damages. (See ECF No. 8 at 4–5.)

Under West Virginia law, punitive damages “may be awarded ‘in actions of tort, where gross fraud, malice, oppression, or wanton, willful, or reckless conduct or criminal indifference to civil obligations affecting the rights of others appear.’ ” Lawson Heirs Inc. v. Skyway Towers, LLC, No. 2:17-cv-2198, 2018 WL 3381411 (S.D. W. Va. July 11, 2018) (citing Syl. Pt. 4, Mayer v. Frobe, 22 S.E. 58 (W. Va. 1895)). Further, in defining willful, wanton, and reckless conduct, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has stated that such conduct occurs when “the actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a risk known to him or so obvious that he must be taken to be aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow.” Holsten v. Massey, 490 S.E.2d 864, 877 (W. Va.1997).

Here, Harris has demonstrated a sufficient factual basis for a claim for recklessness. In his Complaint, Harris alleges that Smith acted recklessly when Smith ran a red light while operating a tractor-trailer, which resulted in Smith striking the vehicle Harris was in. (See ECF No. 1-1 at 4, ¶¶ 10–12.) Were the Court to strike the word recklessly as a legal conclusion, the Court would still be left with the allegation that Smith drove through an intersection in a tractor-trailer in spite of a red traffic signal. Surely, this is an obvious risk with a high probability of causing harm. See Holsten, 490 S.E.2d at 877. Thus, contrary to Defendants’ assertions, Harris has done more than simply state a legal conclusion. Harris has provided sufficient facts to support a claim for recklessness and, thus, punitive damages. See Graham, 2007 WL 148999, at *2 (finding that, under West Virginia law, the plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently alleged punitive damages where the risk alleged was one that made it highly probable harm would occur).

Further, this District and its sister district have found a claim for recklessness, and thus punitive damages, was sufficiently pled where, similar to here, the plaintiff alleged facts that the defendant tractor-trailer driver acted in a way that violated traffic rules and subsequently caused an accident. See, e.g., Shulin v. Werner Enters., Inc., No. 1:15-cv-95, 2015 WL 4730064, at *4 (N.D. W. Va. Aug. 10, 2015) (finding that the plaintiff sufficiently stated a plausible claim for punitive damages where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant tractor-trailer driver, who was using a cellular device, saw a vehicle stopped on the shoulder of the interstate but, nonetheless, took his attention off the road and hit two people standing outside the parked car and then swerved into another lane); Hartung v. Yelverton, No. 2:13-cv-4178, 2013 WL 2484517, at *3 (S.D. W. Va. June 10, 2013) (finding that the plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant tractor-trailer driver drove on a major interstate with a load so heavy that it caused the speed of the vehicle to drop to approximately five percent of the minimum speed limit was sufficient to state a plausible claim for punitive damages and noting that the plaintiff explicitly alleged that this conduct was reckless).

*3 Defendants further argue that their behavior amounts to, at most, negligence. (See ECF No. 7 at 5–6.) In support of this argument, Defendants direct the Court to the fact that Harris pled negligence in the alternative to recklessness. (See id.) However, one of the most basic pleading tools available to a plaintiff is the ability to plead causes of actions in the alternative. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2)–(3). A plaintiff is “free to plead as many reasonable, alternative paths” to recovery as the plaintiff wishes. Patriot Coal Sales, LLC v. Bridgehouse Commodities, No. 2:12-cv-03653, 2013 WL 12284820, at *2 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 25, 2013) (“While the defendants can rest assured that the plaintiff will not recover twice for the same injury, the plaintiff is free to plead as many reasonable, alternate paths to that recovery as it wishes in the meantime.”) Alternative causes of action are evaluated independently for sufficiency. See, e.g., Tyson v. BB&T Corp., No. 3:16-cv-814, 2017 WL 708724, at *4 (E.D. Va. Feb. 22, 2017) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)) (“If Count III meets this requirement, it cannot be dismissed simply because it is brought in the alternative to other, factually inconsistent claims.”). Thus, Harris’s decision to also plead a claim for negligence does not alone weaken his claim for recklessness. Accordingly, construing the facts in a light most favorable to Harris, Harris has stated a plausible claim for punitive damages.

IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed more fully above, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Allegations of Punitive Damages and Reckless Conduct Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 6.)

IT IS SO ORDERED.

The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to counsel of record and any unrepresented party.

All Citations
Slip Copy, 2018 WL 6182693

2018 WL 6304205

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.
MICHAEL PETIT, KRISTINA PETIT, GAYLE MARIE PETIT, and EDWARD J. PETIT, Plaintiffs
v.
PENSKE TRUCK LEASING CORPORATION, et al., Defendants
CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:18-CV-187
|
12/03/2018

Christopher C. Conner, Chief Judge, United States District Court

MEMORANDUM
*1 Plaintiffs filed the instant action alleging that defendants’ negligence caused a series of multi-vehicle accidents that resulted in significant injuries. Defendant U.S. Xpress, Inc. (“U.S. Xpress”) and defendant Daimler Trust (“Daimler”) (collectively, the “moving defendants”) each move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We will grant the motions.

I. Factual Background & Procedural History
This action arises out of a series of multi-vehicle accidents that occurred on February 13, 2016, on the westbound lanes of Interstate 78 (“I-78”) in Lebanon County, Pennsylvania due to reduced visibility and adverse road conditions.1 (See Doc. 1 ¶¶ 71, 73, 76). Plaintiff Michael Petit (“Michael Petit”) was driving westbound on I-78 with plaintiff Gayle Marie Petit (“Gayle Petit”) and plaintiff Edward J. Petit (“Edward Petit”) as passengers. (Id. ¶ 71). Observing stopped traffic ahead, Michael Petit also stopped his vehicle. (Id. ¶ 73). Defendant Danny Fantom (“Fantom”) was also driving in the left westbound lane of I-78 in a tractor-trailer owned by Fantom’s employer, defendant Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 21, 74). As he attempted to slow down, Fantom allegedly lost control of his tractor-trailer, which then struck the Petits’ vehicle and multiple others. (Id. ¶ 75). Following this initial collision with Fantom’s tractor-trailer, several subsequent collisions occurred, causing additional harm to Michael, Gayle, and Edward Petit. (Id. ¶ 76). As a result of these collisions, Michael, Gayle, and Edward Petit each suffered significant physical injuries. (Id. ¶¶ 76, 80, 86, 91).

At all times relevant, defendant Clarence Herman (“Herman”) operated a tractor-trailer as an employee of defendant Total Transportation of Mississippi LLC (“Total Transportation”). (Id. ¶¶ 61-62; see also Doc. 95 ¶¶ 52, 61-62). Plaintiffs allege that each of three defendants—Total Transportation, U.S. Xpress, and Daimler—was “the titled owner, registered owner, lessee, and/or lessor” of the tractor-trailer driven by Herman. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 53, 56, 59). There are no specific allegations in the amended complaint regarding what role Herman’s tractor-trailer played in the chain-reaction accident on February 13, 2016. (See id. ¶¶ 71-78).

Plaintiffs commenced this action alleging claims of negligence and loss of consortium against 23 defendants under Pennsylvania law. Specifically, Michael, Gayle, and Edward Petit each assert a claim of negligence against all defendants. Plaintiff Kristina Petit (“Kristina Petit”), as Michael Petit’s wife, brings a claim for loss of consortium against all defendants. U.S. Xpress and Daimler each move to dismiss the negligence and loss of consortium claims concerning their alleged role in the multi-vehicle accident under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The motions are fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

II. Legal Standard
*2 Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings, Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)). In addition to reviewing the facts contained in the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents” attached to a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based upon these documents. Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).

Federal notice and pleading rules require the complaint to provide “the defendant fair notice of what the…claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (alteration in original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To test the sufficiency of the complaint, the court conducts a three-step inquiry. See Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2010). In the first step, “the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.’ ” Id. at 130 (alteration in original) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009)). Next, the factual and legal elements of a claim must be separated; well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, while mere legal conclusions may be disregarded. Id. at 131-32; see Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009). Once the court isolates the well-pleaded factual allegations, it must determine whether they are sufficient to show a “plausible claim for relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts “that allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

III. Discussion
To state a claim for negligence under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must plead: “(1) a duty of care; (2) [a] breach of the duty; (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting to the plaintiff.” Farabaugh v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 911 A.2d 1264, 1272-73 (Pa. 2006); see also Berrier v. Simplicity Mfg., Inc., 563 F.3d 38, 61 (3d Cir. 2009). Loss of consortium is an independent cause of action for “loss of services, society, and conjugal affection of one’s spouse.”Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, PLC, 885 F.3d 760, 777 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Darr Const. Co. v. W.C.A.B. (Walker), 715 A.2d 1075, 1080 (Pa. 1998)). It is derivative of the injured spouse’s tort claim. Id. The moving defendants contend that the complaint improperly names them as owners of the tractor-trailer driven by Herman. They also argue that no employment or agency relationship exists between Herman and either U.S. Xpress or Daimler.

Assuming arguendo that the moving defendants are owners, lessees, or lessors of the tractor-trailer driven by Herman, plaintiffs fail to state a plausible claim of negligence against them. The complaint is devoid of any factual allegations as to whether or the manner in which Herman’s tractor-trailer interacted with the Petits’ vehicle. Plaintiffs merely assert that, after Fantom’s tractor-trailer struck their vehicle, “multiple collisions occurred on or around the location of plaintiff[s’] vehicle” and that “all defendants named herein contributed to the happening of the accident by negligent and careless driving.” (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 76-77). Plaintiffs provide insufficient detail from which the court could plausibly infer that Herman’s conduct was a “substantial factor” in the causal chain resulting in their injuries, and that U.S. Xpress and Daimler are therefore directly or vicariously liable. Taken as true, Michael, Gayle, and Edward’s factual allegations fail to state a claim for negligence. Because the underlying tort claim against the moving defendants is deficient, Kristina Petit’s loss of consortium claim against the moving defendants must also be dismissed. See Shuker, 885 F.3d at 777.

*3 Courts should grant leave to amend before dismissing a curable pleading in civil rights actions. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007); Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Courts need not grant leave to amend sua sponte in dismissing non-civil rights claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fletcher-Harlee Corp., 482 F.3d at 252-53, but leave is broadly encouraged “when justice so requires,” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). Based on the court’s understanding of the nature and circumstances of the events of February 13, 2016, it is likely that plaintiffs possess and can present additional factual material with respect to their claims against the moving and other defendants. In the interest of justice, we will grant plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint.

IV. Conclusion
The court will grant the moving defendants’ motions (Docs. 104, 107) to dismiss. An appropriate order shall issue.

/S/ CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER

Christopher C. Conner, Chief Judge

United States District Court

Middle District of Pennsylvania

Dated: December 3, 2018
All Citations
Slip Copy, 2018 WL 6304205

Footnotes

1
In their complaint, plaintiffs do not explicitly describe the relevant weather conditions on February 13, 2016. (See Doc. 1). For helpful context, we note that a plaintiff in a related federal case before this court alleges the existence of “windy and snowy” conditions on the day of the accident. New Prime, Inc. v. Transervice Logistics, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-226, Doc. 8 ¶ 51 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 12, 2018).