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Volume 21 Cases (2018)

Mizell v. Professional Transportation Solutions

2018 WL 4961495

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.
DAVID MIZELL AND KYONG MIZELL, PlaintiffS,
v.
PROFESSIONAL TRANSPORTATION SOLUTIONS, LLC, Defendant.
Case No. 4:18CV1706 HEA
|
10/15/2018

HENRY EDWARD AUTREY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
*1 This matter is before the Court on the verified motion of Plaintiffs David Mizell (“David”) and Kyong Mizell (“Kyong”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) for a temporary restraining order (Doc. No. 3). A hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion was held on October 12, 2018, at which counsel for Plaintiffs appeared. Plaintiffs’ counsel averred that he made reasonable efforts to give Defendant notice of the motion for a temporary restraining order. For the following reasons, the motion will be granted.

BACKGROUND
The facts summarized herein are set forth in Plaintiffs’ Complaint (Doc. No.
1) and Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Memorandum in support of their motion for a TRO (Doc. No. 8). Plaintiffs are a married couple and citizens of the State of Florida. David has COPD and had double bypass heart surgery about three years ago. Defendant Professional Transportation Solutions, LLC (“Defendant”) is a Missouri limited liability company with its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. Defendant is a licensed federal motor carrier (US DOT 2950850).

In May 2018, Plaintiffs contacted Liberty Bell Moving Group, LLC, a transportation broker, to arrange for a licensed motor carrier to transport their household goods from their home in Chester, Virginia to their new home in Saint Augustine, Florida. Liberty Bell Moving Group then arranged for Defendant to pick up Plaintiff’s household furnishings in Virginia and to move them to Florida.

Defendant agreed to pick up Plaintiff’s household furnishings on May 29, 2018. Defendant actually arrived on May 30, 2018. That day, Kyong signed a Bill of Lading with Defendant for the shipment to Florida. Defendant loaded Plaintiffs’ furnishings and household goods on its truck. The goods loaded on the truck included Plaintiffs’ documents containing their social security numbers, a “lifetime” of personal family photographs, David’s military medals and uniform, as well as several of David’s health-related items, including his wheelchair, porta potty, and BiPap device, which assists his breathing.

The total estimated charges per the Bill of Lading were $8,383.07. Plaintiffs paid Defendant $1,479.89 for the booking deposit and $1,685.00 for the pickup charge. After deducting the two pre-shipment payments, the remaining total estimated charge was $5,218.18. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant orally informed them that the anticipated delivery date for the furnishings and household goods was no later than June 5, 2018.

Between June 5, 2018 and July 20, 2018, Plaintiffs, and Christein Stith, their daughter, on their behalf, had been telephoning Defendant and Liberty Bell Moving Group on a daily basis demanding delivery of the household goods and furnishings. Defendant claimed that the truck carrying Plaintiffs’ goods had crashed in South Carolina and that it would not deliver the goods until the crash had been investigated by Defendant’s insurance carriers.

Defendant delivered Plaintiffs’ household goods and furnishings to Plaintiffs’ home in Florida on July 20, 2018, and demanded immediate payment of $5,381.59 as a condition for delivery of the goods. July 20 is outside the “standard delivery window” provided in the bill of lading. Plaintiffs refused to pay $5,381.59 on July 20, 2018, contending that they were entitled to an offset because of late delivery, and that they were entitled to inspect the goods for damages before making any payment. Defendant would not allow Plaintiffs to inspect their property, and refused to unload the property until and unless Plaintiffs paid them $5,381.59.

*2 Defendants have not delivered Plaintiffs’ property. Plaintiffs claim that as a result of the late delivery, they have incurred expenses on a hotel and minimal furnishings for their home to permit habitation therein. David has not been able to acquire another BiPap device, which he claims is harming his health.

Between July 20, 2018 and October 1, 2018 Defendant demanded payment of $5,381.59, plus additional charges for warehouse handling, storage charges and redelivery charges. Defendant sent Plaintiffs a Notice of Default dated October 1, 2018, claiming an estimated balance due of $10,185.09. This sum includes a $175.00 discount for the initial late delivery. Defendant also states that it intends to sell Plaintiffs’ household goods and furnishings on October 18, 2018 if the $10,185.09 balance is not paid by October 18, 2018.

Plaintiffs’ Complaint contends that Defendant breached the Bill of Lading and violated the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 14706 by failing to deliver the shipped goods on or before June 5, 2018. In addition, Plaintiffs assert a cause of action for common law conversion and request injunctive relief.

In their motion for a TRO, Plainitffs ask the Court to temporarily enjoin Defendant from selling Plaintiffs’ household goods and furnishings.

DISCUSSION
In determining whether to issue a TRO, the Court must consider the following four factors: (1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movants; (2) the balance between this harm and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other parties litigant; (3) the probability that movants will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public interest. Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc); see also Home Instead, Inc. v. Florance, 721 F.3d 494, 497 (8th Cir. 2013). The party requesting injunctive relief bears the “complete burden” of proving that an injunction should be granted. Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 811 F.2d 414, 418 (8th Cir. 1987).

Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The Court is satisfied that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their Carmack Amendment claim.

“In adopting the Carmack Amendment, Congress intended to impose a single uniform federal rule upon the obligations of carriers operating in interstate commerce.” Rocky Ford Moving Vans, Inc. v. United States, 501 F.2d 1369, 1372 (8th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted). “The cases make it clear that when damages are sought against a common carrier for failure to properly perform, or for negligent performance of, an interstate contract of carriage, the Carmack Amendment governs.” Fulton v. Chicago, Rock Island & P. R. Co., 481 F.2d 326, 332 (8th Cir. 1973). Late delivery and refusal to deliver are such failures to perform, consequently the Carmack Amendment applies to Plaintiffs’ claim.

The bill of lading, as attached to Plaintiffs’ motion, provides for a delivery window of up to a maximum of 30 business weekdays from the first available date for delivery. The bill of lading indicates that “5-4-18” (May 4, 2018) is the first available date for delivery. (However, because the pick-up date was May 30, 2018, it appears that May 4, 2018 may have been typographical error, with the correct first available date for delivery being June 4, 2018.) Nevertheless, 30 business weekdays after the latter of the two possible dates is July 16, 2018, putting the actual delivery date of July 20, 2018 outside of the bill of lading’s delivery window, and indicating a breach of the bill of lading by Defendant. Plaintiff has pled money damages that resulted from Defendant’s late delivery and refusal to deliver. The Court therefore finds Plaintiffs’ Carmack Amendment claim likely to succeed on the merits.

Irreparable Harm to Plaintiffs Absent an Injunction
*3 “[T]o demonstrate irreparable harm, a party must show that the harm is certain and great and of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief.” Novus Franchising, Inc. v. Dawson, 725 F.3d 885, 895 (8th Cir. 2013). This Court finds Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable harm if Defendant sells their belongings.

Here, Plaintiffs aver that irreplaceable family items, like photographs, military medals and uniform, and personal paperwork containing sensitive information, are included in their property which is under Defendant’s control, and that Defendant intends to sell Plaintiffs’ property on October 18, 2018. If Defendant is allowed to sell Plaintiffs’ belongings on October 18, Plaintiffs will suffer the irreparable harm of losing irreplaceable family mementos. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs has demonstrated that, absent injunctive relief, they will suffer irreparable harm.

Balance of Harms
The Court finds that in contrast to the irreparable harm that Plaintiffs will suffer if injunctive relief is not granted, Defendant will suffer comparatively little harm. If injunctive relief is granted so as to maintain the status quo pending litigation, Defendant’s only harm will be maintaining storage for Plaintiffs’ property for that period. The potential harm to Defendant will be purely economic, and can be satisfied by the payment of any monies that may be spent on storage. Thus, the harm that Plaintiffs will suffer absent an injunction outweighs any harm that may befall Defendant if its actions are enjoined.

The Public Interest
Here, the balance of the equities also favors granting Plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief. Enjoining Defendant from selling Plaintiffs personal property will not harm the public. Defendant will be able to continue serving the public with its moving business, as usual. Conversely, denying injunctive relief will cause Plaintiffs irreparable harm and undermine the federal statute. Moreover, parties should be able to rely on each other to comply with their agreements and should be able to rely on the courts to enforce agreements when they are breached. The public interest thus weighs in favor of enjoining Defendant as requested by Plaintiffs.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing analysis, the Court concludes a temporary restraining order is appropriate.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order (Doc. No. 3) is GRANTED. The Court hereby orders as follows:
1. That Defendant Professional Transportation Solutions, LLC is hereby enjoined from selling or otherwise disposing of Plaintiffs David and Kyong Mizell’s household goods and furnishings;
2. That Plaintiffs shall enter bond in the amount of $500.00 before close of business on October 17, 2018;
3. That this Order shall remain in effect until October 29, 2018 at 4:30 p.m. Dated this 15th day of October, 2018.

HENRY EDWARD AUTREY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

8
All Citations
Slip Copy, 2018 WL 4961495

Miller and Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America, v. Lawson and Short Mountain Trucking

2018 WL 5023328

United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky.
DAVID K. MILLER and DEBBIE MILLER, Plaintiffs,
INDEMNITY INSURANCE CO. OF NORTH AMERICA, Intervenor Plaintiff,
v.
CRAIG LAWSON and SHORT MOUNTAIN TRUCKING I, Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:17-146-KKC
|
Filed: 10/16/2018

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
KAREN K. CALDWELL, CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
*1 This matter is before the Court on the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment. (DE 71). For the following reasons, the motion shall be GRANTED.

I. INTRODUCTION
This dispute arises out of a car accident between Plaintiff David Miller and Defendant Craig Lawson, both of whom were operating semi-tractor trailers on Man O War Boulevard in Lexington, Kentucky, on March 8, 2016. (DE 1-1 at 2). It is alleged that Lawson operated his semi-tractor trailer in a negligent or grossly negligent manner such that he collided with the semi-tractor trailer operated by Miller after running a red light. (DE 71-1 at 2; DE 72 at 4). The plaintiffs filed this action in Fayette County Circuit Court on March 1, 2017, seeking relief through negligence, loss of consortium, and punitive damage claims. (DE 1; DE 1-1). The matter was removed to this Court on March 24, 2017, and the parties commenced discovery. (DE 1; DE 5).

The defendants now move for partial summary judgment, seeking the Court to dismiss the plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim against both Lawson and his employer, Short Mountain Trucking I. The defendants argue that Lawson’s alleged running of a red light alone fails to entitle the plaintiffs to punitive damages from Lawson. (DE 71-1). The defendants further argue that because no action of Lawson was grossly negligent, any punitive damages claim based on respondeat superior against Short Mountain Trucking I must be dismissed as well. Id.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A moving party is entitled to summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In order to defeat a summary judgment motion, “[t]he nonmoving party must provide more than a scintilla of evidence,” or, in other words, “sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find in that party’s favor.” Van Gorder v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., Inc., 509 F.3d 265, 268 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). Summary judgment must be entered if, “after adequate opportunity for discovery,” a party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 940 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Defendant Lawson
Kentucky law permits the recovery of punitive damages for conduct that “exceed[s] ordinary negligence whether such conduct [is] expressed as gross negligence, recklessness, wantonness, or some other such term.” Williams v. Wilson, 972 S.W.2d 260, 263 (Ky. 1998). Actions constituting gross negligence need not be express: “it is possible that a certain course of conduct can be so outrageous that malice can be implied from the facts of the situation.” Kinny v. Butcher, 131 S.W.3d 357, 359 (Ky. 2004).1

*2 This Court has considered on multiple occasions whether the actions of semi-tractor trailer drivers constitute negligence or gross negligence. In Turner v. Werner Enter., Inc., 442 F. Supp. 2d 384 (E.D. Ky. 2006), this Court “found that the defendant, a tractor-trailer driver, was not grossly negligent when, despite being sleepy, he decided to try to drive to the next truck stop, fell asleep and struck a pickup truck.” Oaks v. Wiley Sanders Truck Lines, Inc., 2008 WL 2859021, at *3 (E.D. Ky. July 22, 2008). Likewise, in Estate of Embry v. Geo Transp. of Ind., 478 F. Supp. 2d 914 (E.D. Ky.2007), this Court found that a semi-tractor trailer driver committed no more than ordinary negligence when he fatally struck a car head-on after having a coughing fit and blacking out.

In contrast, Kentucky car accident cases where there is a finding of gross negligence typically involve some sort of extraordinary culpable conduct. For example, Shortridge v. Rice, 929 S.W.2d 194 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996), and Stewart v. Estate of Cooper, 102 S.W.3d 913 (Ky. 2003), both involved drunk driving accidents. Phelps v. Louisville Water Co., 103 S.W.3d 46, 53 (Ky. 2003), presented eighteen (18) instances where the Louisville Water Co. misrepresented the dangerous nature of a highway, violated its own safety policies, and disregarded industry guidelines, evidencing a “reckless disregard” for the safety of persons and resulting in the death of two individuals.

Here, the plaintiffs argue that the defendants are liable for punitive damages due to Lawson’s running his semi-tractor trailer through a red light. (DE 72 at 4). The mere running of a red light does not align with the sort of malignant behavior described in Kentucky cases where punitive damages were permitted. Turner v. Warner Enters., Inc., 442 F. Supp. 2d 384, 386 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (“Arlandson’s alleged misconduct in this action, driving while sleepy, but within the speed limit, apparently within the proper lane, and without any suggestion of intoxication, does not match … the level of culpability of the drunk drivers in Shortridge and Stewart.”). Further, this Court has already held that “to permit an award of punitive damages [ ] based on the mere negligent act of running a red light would render meaningless the distinction between ordinary and gross negligence and make almost any negligent act committed while driving a basis for the imposition of punitive damages.” Oaks v. Wiley Sanders Truck Lines, Inc., 2008 WL 2859021, at *3 (E.D. Ky. July 22, 2008). Thus, “as a matter of law,” Lawson’s alleged conduct does not rise to the level of gross negligence required for punitive damages, and the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment is granted as to Lawson. Id.

B. Defendant Short Mountain Trucking I
The plaintiffs’ punitive damage claim must also be dismissed as to Lawson’s employer, Short Mountain Trucking I. The plaintiffs’ claims against Short Mountain Trucking I are based on respondeat superior theory. (See DE 1-1). It is axiomatic in this case that because the Court dismisses the plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim against Lawson, the claim must also be dismissed against Short Mountain Trucking I. Turner, 442 F. Supp .2d at 387 (“The claims against Werner are based on a respondeat superior theory, and as the punitive damages claims against Arlandson are being dismissed, the punitive damages claims against Werner must be dismissed as well.”); see also Oaks, 2008 WL 2859021, at *4. As such, the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment is also granted as to Short Mountain Trucking I.

IV. CONCLUSION
*3 The Plaintiff asserts that the “test at this stage of the proceeding is merely whether the Plaintiffs can offer any evidence by which a jury may conclude that the conduct of the Defendants amounted to gross negligence.” (DE 72 at 8 (emphasis added)). This is incorrect. “[T]he existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s position will not be sufficient.” Sutherland v. Mich. Dept. of Treasury, 344 F.3d 603, 613 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986)). The nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

Here, the plaintiffs assert that Lawson’s running a red light is sufficient to establish gross negligence, opening the door to punitive damages. This too, however, is incorrect: running a red light is insufficient to establish gross negligence as a matter of law. Oaks v. Wiley Sanders Truck Lines, Inc., 2008 WL 2859021, at *3 (E.D. Ky. July 22, 2008). Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, (DE 71), is GRANTED, and the plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages against Defendants Lawson and Short Mountain Trucking I are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

All Citations
Slip Copy, 2018 WL 5023328

Footnotes

1
Kinney—which the plaintiffs cite as favoring a finding of gross negligence that would support a punitive damages claim—actually held that a driver’s “traveling at a possible speed of ten miles per hour in excess of the posted speed limit and failing to complete a pass before entering a no-passing zone constitute[s] nothing more than ordinary negligence.” Kinney v. Butcher, 131 S.W.3d 357, 359 (Ky. 2004).

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