2018 WL 6011864

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.
MARSHALL JONES, Administrator of the Estate of Ashley Ferguson, MARSHALL JONES, AALIYAH JONES, PPA Marshall Jones, and MICHAEL JONES, PPA Marshall Jones, Plaintiffs,
v.
NICHOLAS MARCU, MGR FREIGHT SYSTEM, INC., PLAN BETA, LLC, and TOTAL QUALITY LOGISTICS, LLC, Defendants.
No. 3:18-cv-485 (VAB)
|
Filed 11/16/2018

RULING AND ORDER ON MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
Victor A. Bolden United States District Judge
*1 On November 13, 2018, Defendant MGR Freight System, Inc. (“MGR Freight”) moved for a protective order to prevent Marshall Jones, Administrator of the Estate of Ashley Ferguson, Marshall Jones, Aaliyah Jones, PPA Marshall Jones, and Michael Jones, PPA Michael Jones (collectively “Plaintiffs”) from conducting a deposition of MGR Freight’s Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”), Radomir Dobrosinovic. Motion for Protective Order, dated Nov. 13, 2018 (“Mot.”), ECF No. 50.

The deposition is currently scheduled to be held on November 19, 2018 at MGR Freight’s corporate headquarters in Countryside, Illinois. Memorandum of Law in Support of Mot., dated Nov. 13, 2018 (“MGR Mem.”), ECF No. 50-1, at 1, 3.

For the following reasons, MGR Freight’s motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Facts Relevant to this Dispute
This action seeks recovery of damages related to a motor vehicle accident on December 1, 2016 on I-95 in Old Lyme, Connecticut. A tractor trailer driven by another Defendant, Nicolae Marcu, allegedly struck and killed Ashley Ferguson Jones. Plaintiffs sued MGR Freight and the other named Defendants in this action for wrongful death, loss of consortium, and bystander emotional distress.

MGR Freight is alleged to have owned the tractor trailer. Documents produced during discovery, however, have raised questions about ownership of the tractor trailer at the time of the accident: whether MGR Freight, or some related entity controlled by MGR Freight’s CEO, Radomir Dobrosinovic, owns the tractor trailer. Similarly, documents produced have raised questions as to whether Mr. Marcu was—as he contends—an independent contractor or an employee.

On November 8, 2018, Plaintiffs noticed a deposition duces tecum of Mr. Dobrosinovic for November 19, 2018. See Re-Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum, annexed as Ex. A. to Mot., ECF No. 50-3. The deposition sought, inter alia, a “complete inventory of all assets” owned by MGR Freight and by fourteen other entities: MGR Express, Inc., MGR Freight, Inc., MGR Expedited, Inc., MGR Expedited1, LLC, MGR Freight, LLC, MGR Lease, LLC, MGR Auto Lease, LLC, MGR Truck Rental, LLC, MGR Truck Sale, Inc., MGR Logistics, Inc., MGR 016, LLC, MGR 017, LLC, MGR Truck Repair, Inc., and Plainfield 014, LLC. Id. ¶ 15.

B. Procedural History
On November 13, 2018, MGR Freight moved for a protective order to prevent the deposition of Mr. Dobrosinovic. Mot. The Court held a telephone conference on the motion on November 14, 2018, and set an expedited briefing schedule for Plaintiffs’ opposition. Minute Entry, dated Nov. 14, 2018, ECF No. 54; Notice, dated Nov. 14, 2018, ECF No. 53. Plaintiffs filed an opposition the following day. First Objection to Mot., dated Nov. 15, 2018 (“Pls.’ Opp.”), ECF No. 55.

On November 16, 2018, the Court held a hearing by telephone on the motion. Minute Entry, dated Nov. 16, 2018, ECF No. 57.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a party moves for a protective order related to discovery in a civil action, “[t]he court may, on good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense,” including “specifying terms, including time and place or the allocation of expenses, for the disclosure of discovery” and “designating the persons who may be present while the discovery is conducted.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1).

*2 The “proponent of a protective order bears the burden of demonstrating good cause for imposing limitations on discovery.” Haber v. ASN 50th Street, LLC, 272 F.R.D. 377, 383 (2011) (citing Penn Grp., LLC v. Slater, No. 07-cv-729 (MHD), 2007 WL 2020099, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. June 13, 2007)); see also Spreadmark, Inc. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 116, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“It is the party seeking such an order that bears the burden of proving that the proposed deponent has nothing to contribute.”) (citing Naftchi v. N.Y.U. Med. Ctr., 172 F.R.D. 130, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Initial Burden
Because the proponent of a protective order to prevent the deposition of a corporate executive bears the burden of showing good cause, they also bear the initial burden of demonstrating that the executive has no unique, relevant knowledge of facts giving rise to the allegations in the litigation. See, e.g., Haber, 272 F.R.D. at 383. Typically, that initial burden can be satisfied through the submission of an affidavit from the executive. See id. (“The submission of an affidavit by a high-level executive has been found to satisfy a moving party’s initial burden of demonstrating that the executive has no unique, relevant knowledge of facts giving rise to the allegations.”); Retail Brand Alliance, Inc. v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., No. 05 Civ. 1031 (RJH)(HBP), 2008 WL 622810, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2008) (“Mr. del Vecchio has submitted an affidavit in which he states that he has no unique personal knowledge of the claims raised in this matter and that any testimony he could give would be duplicative of the testimony already given by other employees of plaintiff …. This affidavit satisfies Mr. del Vecchio’s initial burden of demonstrating a lack of relevant knowledge.”); Bouchard v. New York Archdiocese, No. 04 Civ. 9978 (CSH)(HBP), 2007 WL 2728666, at *2–4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2007) (“Cardinal Egan’s affidavit satisfies his initial burden of demonstrating a lack of relevant knowledge.”); see also Thomas v. Int’l Bus. Machs., 48 F.3d 478, 483 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding district court’s protective order justified where IBM Board Chair submitted affidavit stating that he lacked personal knowledge of plaintiff and was unaware of her age, her performance ranking, any work evaluations that she might have received, or that she even worked for IBM).

Where no such affidavit has been submitted, however, courts may still find the initial burden satisfied if the face of the motion demonstrates that the deponent would lack relevant, discoverable information. See, e.g., Burns v. Bank of Am., No. 03 Civ. 1685 (RMB)(JCF), 2007 WL 1589437, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2007) (initial burden satisfied and protective order granted, despite lack of affidavit, where the executive did not work for the company when the disputed transactions at issue in the case occurred and therefore could not have direct knowledge of relevant facts).

Here, MGR Freight has not submitted an affidavit from Mr. Dobrosinovic. Nevertheless, because Plaintiffs seek discovery of information of corporate entities that are not parties in this litigation, and such information is not, on its face, relevant to this litigation, MGR Freight has met its initial burden.

B. The Need for Dobrosinovic Testimony
*3 MGR Freight argues that Mr. Dobrosinovic’s testimony is not necessary because two other corporate officials, Goca Tomovic and Maya Jesovic, are available to be deposed and have greater relevant firsthand knowledge “of all the facts and issues bearing on liability to MGR Freight System, Inc.” than Mr. Dobrosinovic. MGR Mem. at 3. Ms. Tomovic allegedly handles claim prevention and management for MGR Freight, while Ms. Jesovic is allegedly responsible for all safety issues. Id. MGR Freight therefore insists that “these depositions should be taken before any effort is made to go forward with a deposition of the CEO of the company.” Id.

Plaintiffs contend, however, that neither of these officials has the same level of knowledge regarding the issue of the ownership of the tractor trailer, or of Mr. Marcu’s employment status, as Mr. Dobrosinovic. In particular, Plaintiffs note that Mr. Dobrosinovic personally “signed the title to the Great Dane trailer that was involved in the collision under the corporate name MGR Lease LLC,” and also personally signed “a lease agreement between Mr. Marcu’s company, Plan Beta, LLC, a Defendant in this action, and MGR Freight System, Inc. for said trailer.” Pls.’ Opp. at 4. Plaintiffs have submitted these documents in support of their motion. See Certificate of Title, annexed as Ex. A to Pls.’ Opp.; Lease Agreement, annexed as Ex. B to Pls.’ Opp.

The Court agrees with Plaintiffs—to a point—and finds that MGR has not satisfied its ultimate burden of showing good cause to block Mr. Dobrosinovic’s deposition.

The Court agrees that this documentary evidence indicates Mr. Dobrosinovic may have relevant information, and that MGR has failed to put forward evidence that meets its burden in proving that he has no such relevant information. MGR’s motion for a protective order therefore is DENIED IN PART, insofar as it seeks to block the deposition of Mr. Dobrosinovic altogether.

However, an open-ended, searching inquiry into corporate entities not named in this litigation does not seem either warranted, appropriate, or proportional to the needs of this litigation. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action … the importance of discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”); Metcalf v. Yale Univ., No. 15-cv-1696 (VAB), 2017 WL 6614255, at *2 (D. Conn. Dec. 27, 2017) (“Under this standard, this Court must determine whether the discovery sought is proportional to the needs of the case.”).

This action involves a single motor vehicle accident. To permit discovery into every related corporate entity allegedly controlled by Mr. Dobrosinovic—who is himself not a party—would result in discovery neither relevant nor proportional to the needs of this case.

As a result, MGR Freight’s motion is GRANTED IN PART—to the extent that it seeks to limit discovery into entities that are not parties to this litigation—subject to the following conditions.

The Court finds that the deposition of Mr. Dobrosinovic may only address his role as MGR Freight CEO and any knowledge he may have regarding MGR Freight’s ownership of the relevant tractor trailer, the one involved in this accident. To the extent that documents produced in discovery identify corporate entities that are not parties to this case, Plaintiffs may question Mr. Dobrosinovic as CEO of MGR Freight about MGR Freight’s relationship with those entities and the extent to which that relationship affects the ownership of the relevant tractor trailer. Mr. Dobrosinovic also may be questioned about his knowledge of Mr. Marcu’s employment relationship with MGR Freight.

*4 At this time, without more, no further questioning of Mr. Dobrosinovic will be permitted.1 In the interest of efficiency, the Court also orders that the depositions of Ms. Tomovic and Ms. Jesovic proceed before Mr. Dobrosinovic’s deposition to avoid any redundancy. See Meisch v. Fifth Transoceanic Shipping Co., Ltd., No. 94 Civ 0683 (DAB), 1994 WL 582960, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 1994) (“While under the Federal Rules a discovery priority is not established based upon which party notices a deposition or serves interrogatories first, Rule 26(d) authorizes the court to order the sequence of discovery upon motion …. An order regarding the sequence of discovery is at the discretion of the trial judge.”) (citing Cruden v. Bank of N.Y., 957 F.2d 961, 972 (2d Cir. 1992) (“A trial court enjoys wide discretion in its handling of pre-trial discovery ….”); Gen. Houses v. Marloch Mfg. Corp., 239 F.2d 510, 514 (2d Cir. 1956) (“The order of examination is at the discretion of the trial judge ….”)).

IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, MGR Freight’s motion is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART, as detailed in the ruling set forth above.

SO ORDERED this 16th day of November, 2018 at Bridgeport, Connecticut.

All Citations
Slip Copy, 2018 WL 6011864

Footnotes

1
Indeed, while the Court need not address the issue at this time, to the extent Plaintiffs believe that additional testimony from Mr. Dobrosinovic may become relevant at some later time for some other reason, the Court is not inclined to permit a second deposition of Mr. Dobrosinovic. See Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885, 1889 (2016) (“[D]istrict courts have the inherent authority to manage their dockets and courtrooms with a view toward the efficient and expedient resolution of cases.”). Of course, if Plaintiffs decided to only take the depositions of the other two corporate witnesses from MGR Freight on Monday, November 16, 2018 and not Mr. Dobrosinovic, then a more complete record may allow for a more expansive deposition of him later, if it is warranted.

2018 WL 5920404

This case was not selected for publication in West’s Federal Reporter.
See Fed. Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 generally governing citation of judicial decisions issued on or after Jan. 1, 2007. See also U.S. Ct. of App. 11th Cir. Rule 36-2.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
EMMETT WILLIAMS, Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
BROOKS TRUCKING COMPANY, INC. OF MEMPHIS, CANAL INSURANCE COMPANY, RICHARD A. MARCHETTI, ESQ, Individually and as an Agent, Agency, and Employee of Brooks Trucking Company of Memphis and Canal Insurance Company, JUDGE WILLIAM C. RUMER, Muscogee County Georgia Superior Court Judge, Individually and as an Agent, Agency, and Employee of Muscogee County Georgia Superior Court, BROWN & ADAMS, LLC, et al., Defendants – Appellees.
No. 17-12630
|
(November 13, 2018)
D.C. Docket No. 4:17-cv-00058-CDL
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia
Before NEWSOM, FAY, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
Opinion

PER CURIAM:

*1 Plaintiff Emmett Williams, proceeding pro se, contends that each Defendant violated his constitutional rights, and his rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, during the litigation of his personal injury action against Defendant Brooks Trucking Company, Inc. The district court granted all of Defendants’s motions to dismiss. After careful review, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background
On September 14, 2006, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant Brooks Trucking in the Superior Court of Muscogee County, Georgia, seeking to recover for personal injuries allegedly sustained by him in an automobile accident occurring on September 17, 2004 (“Williams I”). On, February 3, 2011, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his personal injury action without prejudice.

On August 3, 2011, Plaintiff filed a renewal action against Brooks Trucking in the Superior Court of Muscogee County, Georgia (“Williams II”). Defendant Canal Insurance Company insured Brooks Trucking. Canal Insurance provided defense counsel Richard A. Marchetti of Brown & Adams, LLC, to represent Brooks Trucking in the matter. On October 13, 2012, following trial, the jury reached a verdict in favor of Brooks Trucking.

On November 9, 2012, Plaintiff, represented by counsel, filed a motion for a new trial, asserting that the verdict was contrary to law and against the weight of the evidence. On April 9, 2013, Plaintiff filed a pro se motion for an appeal in the renewed personal injury action, arguing that Brooks Trucking’s counsel, Marchetti, had improper contact with jurors during the deliberation process. Plaintiff asserted a violation of his “Constitutional Rights as to having a fair, just, equal and impartial trial.” Plaintiff’s counsel filed an amended motion for new trial contending that the alleged improper contact with jurors justified a new trial.

On September 18, 2013, Honorable William Rumer, Judge of the Superior Court of Muscogee County, denied Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. Plaintiff appealed to the Georgia Court of Appeals, but the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on October 30, 2014, because Plaintiff failed to pay filing fees.

On August 4, 2015, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed suit in the Superior Court of Muscogee County against Defendant Brooks Trucking and its prior counsel, Marchetti (“Williams III”). Plaintiff alleged that Marchetti and Brooks Trucking violated his constitutional rights to a “Fair, Equal, Just, and Impartial Trial on October 13, 2012” by Marchetti allegedly contaminating the jury which heard the Williams II case. Defendant Mark Lefkow of Nall & Miller, LLP, represented Marchetti in Williams III. Defendant Clayton M. Adams of Brown & Adams, LLC, represented Brooks Trucking in Williams III. Plaintiff did not name Canal Insurance as a defendant in Williams III but, without leave of the court, attempted to add it as a defendant. Canal Insurance retained John T. Sparks of Austin & Sparks, P.C., to represent it in Williams III.

On October 27, 2015, Judge Rumer dismissed Plaintiff’s claims in Williams III on multiple grounds, including: (1) that the two-year statute of limitations applicable to constitutional claims had expired; (2) that Marchetti was not properly characterized as a state actor for purposes of constitutional liability; and (3) that “[t]he undisputed evidence conclusively demonstrates that jury tampering did not occur.” On January 10, 2017, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed Judge Rumer’s dismissal order in Williams III. The Georgia Court of Appeals stated that Judge Rumer’s dismissal order was “correct for many reasons” but focused on Plaintiff’s failure to submit evidence that Marchetti improperly communicated with jurors during deliberations.

B. Procedural History
*2 Plaintiff filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia on March 10, 2017. The complaint asserts that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s constitutional due process and Thirteenth Amendment rights, obstructed justice, and violated his rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Plaintiff later claimed that Defendants also engaged in extortion, mail fraud, and racketeering. Plaintiff grounds all his claims on his assertion that Marchetti contaminated the jury in Williams II and that, consequently, he should have been granted another jury trial.

Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims. On June 5, 2017, the district court granted all of Defendants’s motions and entered judgment for Defendants. The district court noted:
It is unclear what conduct Williams believes violates Title VII’s prohibition of employment discrimination or the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition of slavery, and the Court finds both of these provisions inapplicable to the facts of this case. Williams’s claims of extortion and racketeering appear to be based on him paying a filing fee and other costs associated with the state court constitutional action [Williams III]. See Pl.’s Resp. 4, ECF No. 33. Williams’s claims for mail fraud appear to be based on Defendants serving Williams with documents throughout that litigation. See Pl.’s Suppl. Resp. Ex. F, Mail Fraud, ECF No. 44. None of this conduct violates the law. The Court finds that Williams’s claims are best characterized as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for violations of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The district court found that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded review of Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Rumer and that Judge Rumer would be entitled to judicial immunity even if the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply. With respect to the remaining Defendants, the district court found that Plaintiff’s claims are likely barred by res judicata since those claims were adjudicated in the Williams III state court action, but noted that Defendants did not raise that defense. The court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against the private Defendants because Plaintiff failed to allege any connection between them and the state and, thus, failed to allege that they acted under color of law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiff timely appealed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review
“Whether an official is entitled to absolute immunity is a question of law that we review de novo.” Stevens v. Osuna, 877 F.3d 1293, 1301 (11th Cir. 2017). We also review de novo dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1270 (11th Cir. 2009). Finally, “[w]e review de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 872 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). “We are not, however, required to accept the labels and legal conclusions in the complaint as true.” Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need only present sufficient facts, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Renfroe v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 822 F.3d 1241, 1243 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A complaint is plausible on its face when it contains sufficient facts to support a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678).

B. The District Court Properly Dismissed Plaintiff’s Claims
*3 We agree with the district court’s determination that Plaintiff failed to allege facts to support his Title VII claim. Title VII prohibits certain workplace discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 807 (11th Cir. 2010). At the very least, one must allege an employment relationship to properly plead a Title VII claim. Id.; see Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1024 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[A] Title VII plaintiff must demonstrate that an employer intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of a protected characteristic.”). Plaintiff did not allege that any Defendant employed him and his Title VII claim fails for at least that reason.

We also agree with the district court’s determination that Plaintiff failed to allege facts to support a Thirteenth Amendment claim. The Thirteenth Amendment provides that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for [a] crime … shall exist within the United States.” U.S. Const. amend XIII, § 1. Plaintiff did not allege any facts tending to establish that he was enslaved, subject to involuntary servitude, or otherwise subject to conduct that constitutes a “badge or incident of slavery.” See Terry Properties, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. (Ind.), 799 F.2d 1523, 1536 (11th Cir. 1986).

Moreover, Plaintiff does not have any valid constitutional claim against any of the Defendants. As the district court correctly concluded, absolute immunity protects Judge Rumer from liability for damages for acts committed within his judicial jurisdiction.1 Stevens, 877 F.3d at 1301, citing Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 199 (1985). “The immunity applies even when the judge’s conduct ‘was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority ….’ ” Id., quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978). Nor can Plaintiff’s constitutional claims be sustained against the remaining Defendants who are all private persons or entities. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837 (1982) (Fourteenth Amendment “applies to acts of the states, not to acts of private persons or entities.”).

Plaintiff also failed to allege facts sufficient to sustain claims of extortion, racketeering, and mail fraud he made during the course of litigation. We agree with the district court’s assessment that “Williams’s claims of extortion and racketeering appear to be based on him paying a filing fee and other costs associated with the state court constitutional action [Williams III],” and his claims for “mail fraud appear to be based on Defendants serving Williams with documents throughout the litigation.” None of those actions constitute unlawful conduct on the part of any Defendant, much less extortion, racketeering, or mail fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (defining extortion); 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (defining mail fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (defining racketeering activity).

*4 Moreover, we cannot sustain Plaintiff’s claims even if they are liberally construed as an alleged violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “A successful section 1983 action requires that the plaintiff show [he] was deprived of a federal right by a person acting under color of state law.” Stephens v. DeGiovanni, 852 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2017), quoting Almand v. DeKalb Cty., 103 F.3d 1510, 1513 (11th Cir. 1997). “A person acts under color of state law when he acts with authority possessed by virtue of his employment with the state.” Id., quoting Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2001). The private Defendants in this case were not acting under color of state law in defending against Plaintiff’s personal injury action.

Nor is there a basis to suggest that any private party conspired with a state actor to deny Plaintiff his rights. “[P]rivate defendants can be held liable in a § 1983 action if they act in concert with … state officials in depriving a plaintiff of constitutional rights.” Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 909 F.2d 463, 468 (11th Cir. 1990). “To prove a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 conspiracy, a plaintiff must show the parties reached an understanding to deny the plaintiff his or her rights and prove an actionable wrong to support the conspiracy.” Bailey v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 956 F.2d 1112, 1122 (11th Cir. 1992), quoting Bendiburg, 909 F.2d at 468. An “understanding” and “willful participation” between private and state defendants is necessary to show the kind of joint action that will subject private parties to § 1983 liability. Bendiburg, 909 F.2d at 469. Section 1985 similarly requires a conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of equal protection of the laws to establish a cause of action for obstruction of justice. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2), (3); Childree v. UAP/GA AG CHEM, Inc., 92 F.3d 1140, 1147 (11th Cir. 1996). The private Defendants’s defense of Plaintiff’s personal injury action before Judge Rumer represents neither reaching an understanding nor willful participation with Judge Rumer in a conspiracy to subvert Plaintiff’s rights.

Despite liberally construing Plaintiff’s pleadings and subsequent filings, we see no viable cause of action.2

III. CONCLUSION
*5 For the reasons explained above, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.3

All Citations
— Fed.Appx. —-, 2018 WL 5920404

Footnotes

1
We agree with the district court that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine also bars Plaintiff’s efforts to overturn Judge Rumer’s rulings. We apply Rooker-Feldman to bar “claims asserted by parties who have lost in state court and then ask the district court, ultimately, to review and reject a state court’s judgments.” Target Media Partners v. Specialty Mktg. Corp., 881 F.3d 1279, 1286 (11th Cir. 2018). “To determine which claims invite rejection of a state court decision, we … consider whether a claim was either (1) one actually adjudicated by a state court or (2) one ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state court judgment.” Id., quoting Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009). A claim is “inextricably intertwined” if it asks to “effectively nullify the state court judgment, or it succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiff’s complaint makes clear that he seeks an impermissible review and rejection of the state court judgment, specifically requesting “a WRIT that will Strike Down, Throw Out, and Remove Judge Rumer’s Unconstitutional and Discriminatory October 27, 2015, DISMISSAL and SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER …”

2
Plaintiff’s claim that “the District Court unconstitutionally Discriminated and Obstructed Justice against the Plaintiff Emmett L. Williams’ Constitutional Rights on June 5th, 2017 when he unconstitutionally DENIED and DEPRIVED the Plaintiff Emmett L. Williams of his Rights to Hire Professional Legal Counsel or Attorneys” to protect his rights is baseless. Plaintiff brought this action pro se on March 10, 2017. He represented in late April 2017 that he would “be hiring brand new attorneys during the month of May 2017” while demanding a $2.5 million dollar settlement. Plaintiff later represented that he “has already made arrangements as to Constitutionally Hiring Attorneys during the month of May 2017.” On May 1, 2017, Plaintiff reiterated that he would be hiring “Brand New Attorneys … in the month of May” and stated that Defendants faced a summer 2017 “trial seeking the Relief Amount of $180 million” if Defendants did not pay $2.5 Million by May 11, 2017. Despite his previous representations, on May 25, 2017, Plaintiff stated that he “has been working DILIGENTLY as to hiring NEW ATTORNEYS which will be DETERMINE [sic] in the month of June 2017.” Under the circumstances, the district court did not err in ruling on Defendants’ already briefed motions to dismiss before Plaintiff retained counsel. Pro se litigants are subject to the relevant law and rules of court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff did not move to stay the proceedings while he sought to retain counsel. To the contrary, he pushed for immediate settlement under threat of a quick trial. Even if we were to construe Plaintiff’s representations regarding hiring of counsel as a motion for a stay and a request for supplemental briefing, the district court acted within its discretion to rule on the pending motions to dismiss. See Arabian Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 939 F.2d 1472, 1479 (11th Cir. 1991) (district court did not abuse its discretion in denying continuance and proceeding with trial after permitting counsel to withdraw where party engaged in pattern of dilatory tactics).

3
In his reply brief, Plaintiff maintains that this Court’s August 8, 2017, decision denying his “Motions … for an En Banc Session and Panel for Appeal Case Number 17-12630-E and for Summary Judgment for a Total of Five (5) Percent (%) of the $180 Million Relief that was Requested or $9 Million to be Granted to the Plaintiff/Appellant Emmett L. Williams” deprived him of his constitutional rights. We see no error in that decision. Among other things, Plaintiff’s motion failed to comply with the requirements of a Petition for Hearing En Banc as specified in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35. An en banc hearing “is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered unless: (1) en banc consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions; or (2) the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.” Fed. R. App. P. 35(a). Neither circumstance exists here.